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ARTICLE VII.

UNITY AMID DIVERSITIES OF BELIEF, EVEN ON IMPUTED
AND INVOLUNTARY SIN;WITH COMMENTS ON A SECOND ARTICLE IN THE PRINCETON REVIEW
RELATING TO A CONVENTION SERMON.

By Edwards A. Park, Abbot Professor in Andover Theol. Seminary.

It is a grateful anticipation of all believers, that the leopard will one day lie down with the kid. It is also a consoling idea, that even now many wranglers in the church are disputing less on theology than on lexicography. The inward union of good men will soon be, and indeed already is more extensive than we imagine. In our bellicose propensities, we magnify the rumors of war. "Among those who admit the atoning death of Christ as the organic principle of their faith, there are differences, some of them more important, but many far less important, than they seem to be."¹ There are differences. It were idle to attempt an entire fusion of our evangelical creeds into one. These differences are important. All truth is important. The more exact our ideas of the Gospel, so much the more worthy will be our imaginative illustrations of it. Just in proportion as the theology of the head is the more complete, may the theology of the heart be the more copious and impressive, and the whole religious life may be the more in unison with heaven. Every new truth may call out some new grace, and if we have no idea of law, we can have no motive of obedience.² But let us not plunge into extremes. Let us not infer that pious men, believing "the doctrines which concentrate in and around a vicarious atonement,"³ must either become latitudinarian and care nothing for their differences, or else denounce each other as Pelagian, and magnify their minor disagree-

¹ Convention Sermon, Bib. Sac. Vol. VII. p. 559.

² See Convention Sermon, pp. 542—546. Notwithstanding all that is here said on the necessity of religious knowledge for the culture of religious feeling, our critic devotes several pages of his last Review (*Biblical Repository and Princeton Review*, Vol. XXIII. pp. 333—345) to prove, that this sermon is founded on a theory which rests on the principle that religion is a "blind feeling"! Is not the Reviewer in haste? He contradicts himself by elsewhere condemning the sermon for its theory that all moral character consists in a choice to obey or disobey a known law!

³ Convention Sermon, p. 544.

ments. At the present day, when Christians long for a more obvious unity in the faith, it is cheering to reflect on the particulars and on the methods in which they do harmonize, notwithstanding their frequent discords.

And, first, it is a delightful idea that the great majority of good Christians have received their faith immediately from the Bible, and have therefore agreed in adopting its essential truths. The men who trouble Israel are not the fair-minded theologians, but the polemic divines. It is these who go around beating the drum, brandishing the sword, crying "To arms," and already have their quarrels filled the world with spiritual orphans; but the women and children who pray in the vales and in the mountain fastnesses, have not understood the meaning of the war-cry; they have been called Lutherans, or Calvinists, or Zuinglians, or Baptists, or Methodists, or Presbyterians, and have scarcely known wherefore, but one thing they have known, and this has been their chief joy — that "Blessed is the Lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world." "The great mass of believers have never embraced the metaphysical refinements of creeds, useful as these refinements are; but have singled out and fastened upon and held firm those cardinal truths which the Bible has lifted up and turned over in so many different lights as to make them the more conspicuous by their very alternations of figure and hue."¹ We insist on the usefulness of these metaphysical refinements, and being so understood we shall not be accused of undervaluing any truth when we say with our worthy Reviewer, that "the mass of true Christians, in all denominations, get their religion directly from the Bible, and are but little affected by the peculiarities of their creeds."²

As yet, then, being in some measure harmonious with our critic, let us proceed to a second remark: pious men often adopt systems which agree with each other in their essential principles, but are irreconcilable in subordinate particulars. Augustinism is essentially right, notwithstanding its theory of baptismal regeneration; and Pelagianism is essentially wrong, notwithstanding its acknowledgment of Christ's divinity. The doctrinal system of Pictet, is different from that of Bellamy, but the difference is superficial, not fundamental. The great truths involved in the atonement of our blessed Lord, overpower various errors in philosophy, which may be fabricated around it; and every system which includes and is formed mainly

¹ Convention Sermon, p. 560.

² Bib. Repertory, Vol. XVII. p. 85. This article is generally imputed to our Reviewer.

upon those truths, has the right substance, even although it may have some unsightly protuberances. Those doctrines are the requisites for a faith which saves. They are welcomed by various sects. In a late Convention sermon, it was therefore said, that there is an "identity in the essence of many truths which are run in scientific or aesthetic moulds, unlike each other."¹ This *ought* not to have been understood as meaning, that the moulds, i. e. *the scientific theories*, are the same, but that the substance of the *religious truth* cast into them, is the same. The truth that Christ was a vicarious sacrifice in suffering the most expressive pain for sinners, is not *philosophically* identical with the notion that he suffered the exact punishment of sinners; yet, the general system of Dr. Edwards, which includes the vicarious sacrifice in one of its philosophical forms, is *essentially* like the general system of Abraham Booth, which includes the same doctrine in another of its philosophical forms. It was not said in the above named sermon, that *all* systems were alike, but that *many* are. Our earnest Reviewer perseveres in confounding "many" with "all." He says of the author: "When he stood up—to foretell the blending of *all* creeds into one colorless ray;" but the author said for himself: "*Many* various forms of faith will yet be blended into a consistent knowledge, like the colors in a single ray."²

Thirdly, we are also pleased to observe, that good men often contend about modes of presenting truth, when they agree in the truth presented. The same doctrines presented in certain forms constitute the theology of the intellect, and presented in other forms constitute the theology of the heart.³ This latter theology often "indulges in

¹ Convention Sermon, p. 559.

² Compare Bib. Rep., XXIII. p. 341, with Bib. Sac. VII. p. 561.

³ A form of a truth involves *that* truth in *that* form. Modes of theological exhibition are theological doctrines exhibited in certain modes. A style of theology is theology in a particular style. It is immaterial whether we say that the theology of the intellect is a kind of theological representation, or that it is theology represented in a certain method. "The theology of the intellect and feelings" is one system of truths exhibited in two modes. This is the single theory of the sermon under review. The attempt of the Reviewer, in Bib. Repert. Vol. XXIII. pp. 333—339, to prove that there is another and a "German" theory, can serve no other purpose than to link the sermon with the (to many persons) "*hard name*" of Schleiermacher. It is an unworthy attempt. Had he given a fair exhibition of either the German theory or the sermon, he could not have failed to show their antagonism. He pretends that the sermon grows out of the indirect idea that "right moral feeling may express itself in *wrong intellectual forms*," by which he means, *false statements literally understood*. No such thing: The contrary is asserted throughout the discourse. If the Reviewer will take the trouble

a style of remark which for sober prose would be unbecoming, or even when associated in certain ways, irreverent;” “in language which we fear to repeat.”¹ The Princeton Reviewer, for example, makes the following remark: “Paul says that Christ, though he knew no sin, was made sin; i. e. a sinner.”² If Paul *had* said that Christ was made a sinner, we would reverently repeat the words, even as we say with awe, “Then the Lord awaked as out of sleep, and like a mighty man that shouteth by reason of wine.”³ But inspired men never venture upon the declaration that our blessed Lord was made a sinner; and if uninspired authors wish to invent such phrases, they should do it with caution, and should step on this perilous ground with their shoes from off their feet. We hope, indeed, that our Reviewer means to express a *truth* by such a bold declaration, and that he here deviates from New England theology in respect of taste rather than doctrine. We believe also that other divines have, in certain states of mind, a right idea concealed under their dangerous, intense phraseology, when they say, as does the excellent Dr. Crisp, “Christ himself becomes the transgressor in the room and stead of the person that had transgressed; so that in respect of the reality of being a transgressor, Christ is as really the transgressor as the man that did commit it was, before he took it upon him.”⁴ Interpreted as bold metaphors, such expressions may sometimes, but always with extreme peril, be borne for a moment in the theology of excited feeling; but when literally interpreted, they belong neither to the theology of a sound head nor to that of a good heart, but are the occasions of infidelity and sin.

Fourthly, it is also a pleasant reflection, that good men often believe in a false doctrine as logically deduced from certain premises, and reject it in their pious meditations. They disagree as logicians with the advocate of truth, but as devotional Christians, they agree

to examine the discourse, he will see that the word “intellectual” is one of his own interpolations, and is an unwarrantable *gloss*.

¹ Conv. Sermon, Bib. Sac. VII. p. 538.

² Bib. Rep. VII. p. 426.

³ Psalm 78: 65.

⁴ See Crisp's Sermons, edited by Dr. Gill, Vol. I. pp. 429, 431, 437, 440, 261—264, 301, etc. We must believe that this good man does, in certain moods of feeling, use these terms in a figurative sense, although he denies that he so uses them here. “To affirm,” he says, p. 438, “that the Lord laid upon Christ the *guilt* of sin and not the *sin* itself, is directly contrary to Scripture; for you have many testimonies affirming that the Lord lays *sin* upon him; what presumption then is it for a man to say, he lays on Christ the *guilt*, and not the *sin* itself?” “See how careful the Spirit of God is to take away all suspicion of a figure in the text,” (he bare the *sins* of many). p. 430.

with him. "Dogmas of the most revolting shape, have no sooner been cast into the alembic of a regenerated heart, than their more jagged angles have been melted away."¹ Lest our Reviewer suspect this remark of Germanism, let him have the goodness to reperuse his own saying: "this is a doctrine which can only be held as a *theory*. It is in conflict with the most intimate moral convictions of men;" and further, "it is a product of the *mere* understanding, and does violence to the instinctive moral judgment of men;"² and further still: "even among those who make theology a study there is often one form of doctrine for speculation, and another simpler and truer for the closet. [1] Metaphysical distinctions are forgotten in prayer, or under the pressure of real conviction of sin, and need of pardon, and of divine assistance. Hence it is that the devotional writings of Christians agree far more than their creeds."³ Our critic here agrees very happily with the *Schleiermachersian* sermon, which declares that "in unnumbered cases, the real faith of Christians has been purer than their written statements of it."⁴

Sometimes, however, the erroneous formulas of the metaphysician are not "*forgotten*" in his prayers, but are merged into a merely intense expression of practical truth. In his study he regards them as literal statements; in his closet he uses the same words as bold metaphors. While his heart is cold, he adopts them as a theology of the intellect; but when his heart is warm, he changes them into *the* theology of feeling.⁵ The ice mountain in which he is frozen up as a scholar, melts into pure and refreshing water around him when he is in the glow of devotion. Imagine, if you can, that an exemplary divine should exclaim in his address to God: "I have 'done as well as I could do;' 'I have had no more power to change my disposition than to annihilate myself;' therefore 'I have lived up to the very extent of my ability,' but 'my debt has been fully paid,' and now 'it

¹ Conv. Sermon, p. 560.

² Bib. Rep. XVII pp. 91, 87. Here, and throughout this Article, the *italics* are made by the author of the Article.

³ Bib. Rep. Vol. XVII. p. 85.

⁴ Conv. Sermon, p. 560.

⁵ Our earnest Reviewer not only confounds "*many*" with "*all*," but also "*a*" with "*the*." *The* theology of the intellect is not, as he seems to think, Pelagianism, but it is the theology of a *sound* mind, i. e. it is the truth. *The* theology of feeling is not a class of doctrines adapted to a *wrong* heart, but to a *right* one; i. e. it is the truth, the same in substance but not in form with the preceding. On the other hand, a theology of intellect may be any form of religious error, and a theology of feeling may be any kind of injurious theological statement. See Conv. Sermon, Note B. Not all the expressions of our Reviewer belong to *the* theology of feeling.

would be unjust to punish me; 'I claim heaven as my right'—could there be any doubt that he used this language in a metaphorical sense, and that he meant something entirely different from the proper import of his words? Will a broken-hearted sinner use such phrases at the throne of grace, otherwise than as eloquent exhibitions of a truth which they do not *literally* express? Will not the false theories with which these phrases are allied, vanish into poetical illustrations of sacred doctrine, when the man, as *right-hearted*, becomes stronger than the man, as *wrong-headed*?

Fifthly, it is also cheering to know that when divines act as *men*, instead of theorists, they often relinquish their erroneous notions, and agree with the advocates of right doctrine. Not only as good Christians, but also as unsophisticated human beings, they accept the truth. Thus there is an habitual unity while there is a scholastic difference among many theologians. Human nature is too strong for bad logic. As children gaze at the sun until their eyes are darkened, so metaphysicians often reflect on a theme until their minds are *bewildered*. They see it in a blur. They have disordered, by straining, their vision. They are confident, pugnacious, but in their practical moods they think like other folks; Berkeley and Hume made but little use of their scepticism when out of doors. The absurdities of divines often fall off from them around the domestic hearth or in the circle of social prayer. So far as the theology of New England is a distinctive system, differing from that which has been so nobly opposed by Edwards and Dwight of Connecticut, it is the theology of the Bible explained by common sense. It is theology conformed to the fundamental laws of human belief. It is the theology which all good men adopt when they act in the capacity of men, in distinction from mere scholars or polemics. This is its glory. The church has ever been for it in its substance, even when against it in its forms. It is in fact nothing new, save in the precision and consistency of its statements. It is "the great granitic formation," if we may venture to use the strong words of our Reviewer, on which the fathers before and after Augustine, and even that imperial divine himself loved to build their practical religion. It has been, we are glad that it has been, grown over with rich meadows, and beautiful wild flowers, and fragrant briars and medicinal herbs. But we are sorry that distant observers fasten their gaze upon the surface, and mistake the beautiful drapery for the very rock itself, and think to build their triangular turrets upon the flowers, which were never meant to be crushed and bruised under the artificial masonry.

Let us give one illustration of the fact that men *must* often, whether they will or not, obey those principles of common sense by which He who inspired the Bible meant that we should explain it, and by which the New England divinity has been shaped into its distinctive form. Andrew Fuller says: "I have proved that *natural strength* is the *measure* of men's *obligation* to love God," and he often repeats, "we are only *required* to love God with all our strength."¹ But our worthy Reviewer regards this as one radical principle of Pelagianism, and remarks: "If there is anything of which the sinner has an intimate conviction, it is that the heart, the affections, his inherent moral dispositions are beyond his reach; that he can no more change his nature than he can annihilate it."² Does this gentleman, then, who will, we trust, admit the sinner's obligation to be holy, agree with the advocates of "ability commensurate with obligation?" No, not always, not in some of his theorizings, not at the moment of his controverting that truth. But what will he say as a *man*? Can a child be under obligation to lift up a mountain with his unaided hand, or to see through the globe with his unaided eye, or to hear the conversation of the antipodes with his unaided ear? 'By no means,' our critic will respond, 'for the maxim that ability is commensurate with obligation *does* apply to external acts.'³ Very well. The first step is gained. Can a child be under obligation, then, to learn all the languages of the world in one day, or to understand all the sciences in one hour? 'By no means,' our Reviewer will answer, 'that old maxim *does* apply to intellectual operations.' Very well. Then a second step is gained. Now for the third. You say that "the maxim has no more to do with the obligations of moral agents in reference to moral acts than the axioms of geometry have;"⁴ nothing at all, then, to do with moral acts! This is sweeping enough. But let us see. Can a man be under moral obligation to love God this moment with a love *infinitely* more ardent than that of the highest angel? Can he be under moral obligation to love the universe with a benevolence equal to that of God himself? Can the infant of a day be under moral obligation to exercise as much of holy feeling as is exercised by Him who is omnipotent? Are not these *moral* acts? You have wisely conceded that a creature cannot "be required to create a world; nor an idiot to reason correctly."⁵ Why not? Because *in these things* power must be equal to duty. But can a creature be under obligation to *annihilate* the world, or to *annihilate* his own nature?

¹ Fuller's Works, Vol. II. pp. 538, 656, and frequently elsewhere.

² Bib. Rep. XVII. pp. 329, 330.

³ Ib. p. 329.

⁴ Ib.

⁵ Ib.

Is he able to annihilate himself? No. And yet he is equally unable to make himself a new heart! Is he then required to perform this impossibility? And if not required to repent, does he disobey any requisition in not repenting? Does he sin? Now we *know* that we shall get the right answer at last. We know that there is in every man a *vis medicatrix*, curing the soul as well as the body of its disorders, and working itself through all sorts of metaphysics, and now it forces from the Biblical Repertory the following words, which "end the strife:" "*Man cannot be under obligation to do what requires powers which do not belong to his nature and constitution.*"¹ Still again it affirms, in language more unguarded than we have ever employed: "The unfortunate and *improper* use of the word 'necessity' by Edwards and his followers, has done more to prejudice the minds of *sensible* men against his system than all other causes. According to the *proper* usage of language, liberty and necessity are diametrically opposite; and to say a thing is necessary and at the same time free, is a *contradiction in terms*. Certainty and necessity are not the same; for although everything necessary is certain, everything certain is not necessary. Volitions, in certain given circumstances, may be as certain as any physical effects, but volitions are free in their very nature. A *necessary* volition is an absurdity, a thing *inconceivable*. To call this certainty a 'moral necessity,' a 'philosophical necessity,' will forever mislead, and produce confusion of ideas in the most *exact* thinkers."² These words are indeed rather extravagant, but their main import is satisfactory, and they show that divines writing as *men* and not as partizans, are *compelled* to admit the whole theory of natural power which our Reviewer has condemned as Pelagian, when found in a "practical" sermon. And yet will he abide by these principles? Will he not sometimes violate the fundamental laws of human belief? On pp. 329, 330, of his Reply to our Remarks, he asserts the doctrine of necessity with as much force as it was ever asserted by Hobbes or Belsham. And does he mean what the Repertory elsewhere affirms, that this necessity is a certainty *rather* than necessity?³ If so, why does he condemn a New England sermon for uttering the same truth? That sermon represents a sinner to be as unable to repent as he is to annihilate both himself and the universe—in the figurative sense which Jonathan Edwards and Andrew Fuller attach to the word *unable*. But the fact is, our Reviewer is misled by his strong language. Instead of using

¹ Bib. Rep. VII. p. 372.

² Ib. XVII. p. 638.

³ Ib. XV. pp. 46, 47, and in many other passages.

it, he allows himself to be used by it, and in criticising a New England sermon he does really think that a just God requires men under penalty of eternal death, to accomplish literal impossibilities! But his mind is too elastic to be always overpowered by this metaphysics; and just so truly as he is a man, not merely a good or great man, but a *man*, he does and must often pay allegiance to the fundamental law of human belief, that a being will never feel remorse or suffer a moral punishment for doing what he was literally and invincibly necessitated to do, or for not doing what was as strictly impossible as to annihilate himself.

Sixthly, not merely in their pious meditations, nor in their capacity as men in distinction from theorists, do certain advocates of error come over upon the side of truth; they do so in some of their speculative moods. In the devious paths of false doctrine, they must now and then double their track. For the sake of maintaining one theory, they will gainsay what they had advanced in maintaining another. Our critic has given several interesting examples of an occasional harmony even in speculation with the men whom he opposes.

It is often said by Dr. Crisp, that it would not be just, or even "honest," for the Deity to exact of us a payment of the debt which Christ has already paid for us; "that the Lord hath no more to lay to the charge of an elect person, yet in the height of iniquity, and in the excess of riot, and committing all the abominations that can be committed; I say, even then, when an elect person runs such a course, the Lord hath no more to lay to his charge, than he hath to lay to the charge of a believer; nay, he hath no more to lay to the charge of such a person, than he hath to lay to the charge of a saint triumphant in glory."¹ In an attempt to explain such statements, it was said in a late Convention Sermon, that the intellect, *left to its own guidance*, "would never suggest the *unqualified* remark, that Christ has fully paid the debt of sinners, for it declares that this debt may justly be claimed from them; nor that he has suffered the whole punishment which they deserve — for it teaches that this punishment may still be righteously inflicted on themselves."² But our Reviewer answers, that each of the above named "unqualified" remarks is true, and here he was outright in collision with the sermon.³ We

¹ Crisp's Sermons, edited by Dr. Gill, Vol. I., p. 570. See the same idea advanced in equally or more perilous language, on pp. 261, 263, 264, 463, 487, 557, 573, etc.

² Bib. Sac., Vol. VII., p. 535.

³ Bib. Rep., Vol. XXII., pp. 648, 649.

then commented on his answer;¹ and in his Reply, he has taken pains to qualify the original statements, and he now says: "Christ has paid the debt of sinners *in such a sense* that it would be unjust to exact its payment from those who believe;" "Christ has suffered the punishment of sin, *in such a sense* that it would be unjust to exact that punishment of those who accept his righteousness."² He thus gives up the word *sinner*, and substitutes *believer*! This is one interesting qualification. How, then, does the matter stand? Justice and merit are correlative terms. Where one is, the other must be; where one is not, the other cannot be. If it be unjust to punish a man, that man deserves no punishment. If he deserve no punishment, he is not sinful. But every man has been sinful and ill-deserving. What has become of his sin and demerit? Are they annihilated? If they do not belong to him, they must belong to another. Hence, we have been told, they are "transferred," "communicated," "imputed" to Christ. Therefore, the adorable Saviour is a sinner. This has been said a thousand times. But is he *morally* a sinner? No! our critic will answer. Is he, then, *morally* undeserving? No. Are our sins *severally* imputed to him? No, "not morally but juridically." Then, do they not morally belong to us? Yes. Then, are we not morally undeserving? Yes. Then, would it not be morally just to punish us? Yes. And to exact our debt of us? Yes. Then that "unqualified" phrase is qualified the second time, and it now stands: The punishment of sinners cannot be justly inflicted on them, provided that the sinners are believers, and the justice spoken of, is not a *moral* justice, but external and legal. In his Reply, our critic expresses his second qualification thus: "In *themselves*, they [believers] are hell-deserving; to *them*, their acceptance is a matter of grace, because it is not their own righteousness, but the righteousness of another, that is the ground of their justification."³ We are happy to see, then, that he agrees with us in acknowledging, not only in his confessions at the throne of grace, but also in some of his speculations, that eternal punishment is justly due to us, and may be justly inflicted upon us, so far forth as we are considered to be or to have been sinful; but that so far forth as we are considered to be believers, this punishment cannot be inflicted upon us in consistency with what

¹ Bib. Sac., Vol. VIII, pp. 161 — 163.

² Bib. Rep., Vol. XXIII. p. 331. The Reviewer is speaking of retributive justice, as he regards it a serious heresy to resolve (with Pres. Edwards, Dr. Dwight, and others) real justice into benevolence.

³ Bib. Rep., XXIII. p. 332.

is due to our Redeemer.¹ We certainly sympathize with the learned critic, when after twice qualifying an "unqualified" phrase, he comes over to the true faith; and even while he adheres to a false speculation, we cordially repeat the words with which himself is familiar, and which, considering their source, he will be slow to suspect of Schleiermacherism: "There is a region a little lower than the head, a little deeper than the reach of speculation, in which those who think they differ, or differ in *thinking*, may yet rejoice in Christian fellowship!"²

We now make a seventh and a general remark, that for various reasons, obvious and occult, theologians are often inconsistent with themselves; and while they would never come together if each were to follow out a few of his "radical principles," yet they are not always consecutive, and they often coincide by virtue of their inconsequent reasonings. Thus our Reviewer takes three "radical principles," viz. that "moral character is confined to acts, that liberty supposes power to the contrary [by which he means a natural, not a moral power, to choose right when one does choose wrong], and that ability limits responsibility,"³ and from these principles he constructs, by a species of "comparative anatomy," a theological system, to which, as *he* says, the sermon under review belongs. In that system he declares that "the sovereignty of God in the salvation of men must of necessity be given up," and he contrasts with it his own system which "has for its object the vindication of the divine supremacy and sovereignty in the salvation of men."⁴ But lo! a few minutes afterward he affirms, that in the system to which the sermon belongs, "the acceptance of the sinner is the act of a Sovereign, dispensing with the demands of the law!"⁵ and herein it is said to be in *contrast* with his own system, which on a preceding page was said to exalt the divine sovereignty while the other excluded it! And this contrast he makes yet more pointed on p. 330, where he affirms that "according to the one system [his own, making *much* of sovereignty] the deliverance of a believer from condemnation is the act of a *judge*; according to the other [our own as *he* says, and one which makes *nothing* of sovereignty] it is the act of a Sovereign!" What will this gentleman say next? Those

¹ "The atonement has such a relation to the whole moral government of God, as to make it consistent with the honor of his legislative and retributive justice, to save all men, and to make it *essential* to the highest honor of his benevolence or general justice, to renew and save some." Convention Sermon, p. 562.

² Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, Vol. XX. p. 140.

³ Bib. Rep. Vol. XXIII. p. 323.

⁴ *Ib.* pp. 308, 311.

⁵ *Ib.* p. 312.

three "radical principles," that liberty supposes a natural not a moral power of choosing right when one does choose wrong, and that this natural power limits responsibility, and that moral character is confined to acts, are the principles of our old *Hopkinsian* divines; and did those sturdy men overlook the sovereignty of God? The stale objection to them was, that they thought and talked and preached of nothing else! And the historical fact is, that this precious doctrine was never insisted on with so much force and frequency and safety, as in the pulpits where it has been combined with those three "radical principles." It never was and never can be preached as it ought to be, where the New England doctrine of "natural ability" is not also preached. Ministers and people "shrink from" it, without its complement of human freedom. We thank our Reviewer for so frankly letting out the truth that the system which is not his own *does* exalt the divine sovereignty in the salvation of men; and if his own system does the same, then so far forth both systems agree; and when he denies that the system which is not his own exalts the divine sovereignty, then he contradicts himself, and of course in one of his statements he must agree with us.¹

Again, the conductors of the *Princeton Review*, "or which is the same thing, our historian,"² assert: "Now we confess ourselves to

¹ The Reviewer represents the doctrines logically growing out of the three above-named "radical principles" as *Pelagianism*, and he repeatedly declares that the sermon under review advocates those Pelagian doctrines as literally correct and as essentially the same with the Augustinian! See *Bib. Rep.* XXIII pp. 319, 320, 322, 326, 328, etc. Now the truth is, that a disbelief in those three "radical principles" as they are stated in the sermon, is far more logically connected with *Baptismal Regeneration*, *Transubstantiation* and other Romish absurdities, than a belief in them is with *Pelagianism*. We might far more honorably attempt to associate the Reviewer with Romanists, with infidel and Mohammedan fatalists, than he has attempted to associate us with Pelagians. It has long been an artifice of polemic divines to tie up the system of their adversaries with some unpopular scheme, as *Mezentius* bound his enemies face to face with the bodies of the dead. But it is too late. This whole style of disputing, or rather *nicknaming*, is what we may call, "for want of a better name," *Moral Pelagianism*. We make allowances, however, for our critic, as he evidently writes in a "language of feeling;" see, for example, his assertion on p. 326, that if the author of the *Convention Sermon* has not represented the Augustinian and Pelagian systems as both true and reconcilable, "he must be set down as either the most unfortunate or the most unintelligible writer of modern times." Hegel is one writer of modern times, and he said in his last days, that only one man in Europe understood him, and that one misunderstood him. To be more unintelligible than Hegel is "unfortunate."

² See *Bib. Rep.* Vol. VI p. 431, and 92, 93.

be of the number of those who believe, whatever reproach it may bring upon us from a certain quarter, that if the doctrine of imputation be given up, the whole doctrine of original sin must be abandoned; and if this doctrine be relinquished, then the whole doctrine of Redemption must fall, and what may then be left of Christianity, they may contend for that will; but for ourselves we shall be of opinion that what remains will not be worth a serious struggle." On p. 455 of the same volume it is said of President Edwards: "As he had rejected all of imputation but the name, it is no matter of surprise that his followers soon discarded the term itself." And the same Review declares that Hopkins, as well as Dwight, "rejects the doctrine." And yet our Reviewer, doubtless considers that President Edwards, (who has been termed "the prince of American divines,") even at the time of abandoning this fundamental theory, was "in the main" correct, and preserved his essential orthodoxy by his logical inconsistency! And his followers, too, the Smalleys and the Robert Halls, did they make an utter shipwreck of the faith? Or if some of them did, can there be no hope that "the rest, some on boards and some on broken pieces of the ship escaped all safe to land?" Really, our critic must either save himself from pronouncing an absurd censure on those good men by a plea that he has exaggerated the importance of their deviations from his faith, or else he must allow that these mighty logicians were enabled to save their own orthodoxy by their logical blunders. To whichever horn of this dilemma our Reviewer may betake himself, he proves what we assert, that men may be so inconsistent with themselves as to agree on the substance of a creed, while they differ on important articles of it, and may preserve either their essential Calvinism, or their Christian charity by a self-contradiction.

Once more, our Reviewer says that in his own system, (irreconcilable with the sermon which he condemns,) Christ is not regarded "as simply rendering it consistent in God to bestow blessings upon sinners, so that we can come to the Father, of ourselves, with a mere obeisance to the Lord Jesus for having opened the door."! We read in Andrew Fuller's Gospel its own Witness, p. 194, Ed. 1801: "If we say, a way was opened by the death of Christ for the free and consistent exercise of mercy in all the methods which Sovereign wisdom saw fit to adopt, perhaps we shall include every material idea which the Scriptures give us of that important event." And did this meek divine, when he was received home to his Father's house, merely make his obeisance to his once suffering Friend "for having opened the door?" Has this been the superficial, not to say profane piety of

the beloved missionaries of the cross who have received the teachings of Andrew Fuller? We see here this great man's view of the Atonement. We have already seen his view of our natural ability. He asserts again and again that we are never personally blamable without "the concurrence of our wills." Our critic confesses that Fuller was a disciple of Edwards, and that the disciples of Edwards renounced the *fundamental* doctrine of imputation. But has it come to this, that Andrew Fuller will be accused of "philosophizing away" the Gospel (if we may be indulged in one of our critic's chosen words)? "Although we judge him in the main to be truly orthodox," says the Princeton Review, Vol. XVIII. pp. 553, 554, "yet there are minor points on which we should take the liberty of differing from him." "We have made up our minds never to contend with any man for agreeing in doctrinal points with Andrew Fuller." The mind of that Review, then, is *made up*. So much is *fixed*. It will never contend with any man merely for his advocating the — "*radical principles of Pelagianism.*"! There is a certain "practical" sermon which has uttered a few words in favor of natural ability, and against an inevitable sin, but — "Nolo contendere, for Andrew Fuller said the same, and said it fifty times where the sermon has said it once." — Not sleep itself gives more occasional rest to a polemic divine, than do his own inconsistencies. "Blessed be the man that first invented sleep," and — contradictions.

Having now shown the particulars and the methods in which *some* men who dispute for opposing systems, may *sometimes* be more harmonious than their creeds, and some creeds may harmonize not in all respects but in "substance of doctrine," let us apply these familiar, not "German," principles, to the doctrines of imputed and of involuntary sin. These doctrines are singled out for various reasons. First, they have been imagined to be *the* fundamental doctrines of the Bible: see p. 606 above. Secondly, it is more difficult to reconcile the New England with the old Calvinism on these subjects than on any other. If we can succeed here, we can succeed everywhere; and above all, on the doctrines of imputed righteousness, atonement, inability. Thirdly, the style of the old Calvinistic writers is here eminently instructive, and the manner in which they often explained it may illustrate the meaning of the phrase "theology of feeling."

On the subject of Imputed Sin let us consider, first, what is the true doctrine in regard to the influence of Adam upon his descendants: Our benevolent Creator formed a constitution, according to which Adam was to be the head of our race, and the state of his

posterity was so far suspended upon the conduct of their representative, that they were to be born like him in nature and condition. Because he sinned, they are subjected to manifold pains in this life, and are so constituted and circumstanced that, left to themselves, they will sin and only sin in all their moral acts. Even if they should not do wrong, they would suffer evil in consequence of his transgression; but as they do wrong uniformly, they not only endure pains in this world, but will, unless forgiven, be punished forever in the world to come. As they are condemned to eternal death, in consequence of their own sin, and as they are certain to sin in consequence of their corrupt nature, and as they receive this evil nature in consequence of Adam's disobedience, it may be said by an ellipsis only that they are condemned to eternal punishment as an ultimate result of the first disobedience. The Deity had benevolent reasons for making our character and condition thus dependent on him who was on probation for the race. We know not fully what these reasons are. We presume that they affect kindly the whole intelligent universe. We bow down before the Sovereign Author of this arrangement and say, "Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight." Here is one theory, and that critic must be in a peculiar state, who sees no essential difference between it and the Pelagian error that Adam's sin did not injure his descendants at all, or at most that it only presented an evil example for their imitation.

But in the second place, let us inquire what is the old theory, antagonistic to the preceding, in regard to Adam's influence upon his descendants. Its first and fundamental principle is, that God is influenced by retributive justice toward men in causing them to be born with an evil and suffering nature. The calamities which attend men at their very first formation are punishments, inflicted by God, acting not as a Sovereign but as a Judge; exercising justice not toward Adam alone, but toward the infants who have not yet seen the light. "For ourselves," says the Princeton Reviewer¹ (in language which when dying he will wish to blot), "we are free to confess that we instinctively shrink from the idea, that God in mere sovereignty inflicts the most tremendous evils upon his creatures, while we bow submissively at the thought of their being penal inflictions for a sin committed by our natural head and representative, and in violation of a covenant in which by a benevolent appointment of God we were included." In the immediate context he censures those New England divines who represent "that as a matter of sovereignty which we

¹ Bib. Rep. Vol. VI. p. 465.

regard as a matter of justice." And elsewhere he repeatedly condemns the theory which refers the calamities of our race to the "arbitrary appointment of God," by which phrase he means the sovereign appointment of Him who afflicts but does not punish us directly for Adam's sin.¹ Rivetus in his learned Treatise on the Protestant doctrine of Imputation, a Treatise which has been highly applauded by the most eminent theologians of modern times, by the Leyden Professors, by the great Turretin himself (Theol. Pars I. 691), has cited many authorities which ascribe the suffering of unborn infants to the exercise of retributive justice upon them.² On pp. 800, 807, 808, 809 of Riv. Opp., Tom. III. will be found the following and similar authorities:

Videlius affirms, that "the reason why God imputes the fall of Adam to his posterity, is the justice of God, but not his mere will, as the Arminians teach." Gomar says, that the fall of Adam "is ours by a just imputation." The synopsis of the four Leyden Professors, teaches, that Adam's "disobedience and fault with its consequent guilt, are justly imputed to all his descendants by God the Judge." "The proximate cause of original sin," says Wollsius, "is the guilt of Adam's first sin, in respect of which the punishment of God is most just." "The Catholic Church," says Vossius, "has always decided that the first offence [of our original ancestors] is imputed to all; that is, by the just judgment of God, it is transmitted to all the children of Adam, as to all its effects." Is this figurative justice, or literal and moral? What does the argument, as well as the phraseology, require?

This first and ground-principle being admitted, that Jehovah is influenced by punitive justice toward men, when he afflicts them before and independently of their own individual sin, it follows that they, without having ever acted in their own proper persons, deserve to be thus punished. God afflicts them justly; of course according to their proper merits. In Riv. Opp. III. pp. 802, 811, 812, 814, 817, will be found, unless otherwise specified, the following and other like authorities.

Aurolius teaches, that Adam's "first sin makes us guilty before God; then

¹ See, for one instance, Dr. Hodge's Commentary on Rom. 5: 12—21. How does the learned commentator justify himself in describing the divine sovereignty as arbitrary and in shrinking from it, when he avows that the distinctive aim of his theology is to exalt this doctrine, as we saw on p. 604 above?

² We prefer the citations from Rivetus to an equal number of British and American authorities, because the Princeton Review has often appealed to these citations as decisive. They are so. They are the true and the best representatives of the old theory of Imputation. The authors mentioned, were all eminently learned and useful men. The Treatise of Rivetus is entitled: *Decretum Synodi Nationalis Ecclesiarum Reformaturum Gallias initio 1645 de imputatione primi peccati omnibus Adamæ Posteris, cum Ecclesiarum et doctorum protestantium consensu, ex scriptis eorum, ab Andraea Riveto, collecto.*

it transfuses into us the corruption which has followed guilt in Adam; from which corruption now really inhering in us, we are again guilty by ourselves, and as infected with our own vitiosity, vile, spotted, and hateful to God, not only in Adam, or as we are regarded in him as the fountain and root of the human race, but as we are considered by ourselves and of ourselves, now so corrupted."—"The guilt and punishment of Adam's sin have passed over to all the posterity of Adam and Eve, Christ excepted." "For the opinion is false of those who teach that only the punishment of Adam's sin flowed into us, and not also the guilt and fault of that sin. For then we should be punished as undeserving. But the fault first, and then the punishment, passes over into us, and is cast upon us." Says Altingius, the sin of Adam "is imputed most deservedly, [*meritissime*, to his descendants] because all sinned in him as their stock and root." Crocius teaches, "that the disobedience of Adam is the meritorious cause of our condemnation; it is imputed to us, and on account of him, we are constituted sinners." Adam is called "the meritorious cause" of our ruin, by Fewbornius also. Speaking of the evils which we receive on account of our progenitor, Martin Bucer says, that these "evils are sent upon no man undeservedly." And even Calvin affirms that, "in his [Adam's] corruption, the entire human race was deservedly (*merito*) vitiated."¹ Was this *ill-desert*, which is the correlate of the Divine justice, a figurative *ill-desert*, or literal and moral? Reëxamine the phraseology, but mind well the demands of the argument.

This second principle being allowed, that men deserved to be formed with an evil and suffering nature, it follows that some moral offence must have been justly imputed to them before their own personal existence. They merited the evils which enter into their very *make*; of course they cannot *deserve* such an afflicted nature, unless they be justly chargeable with a sin antecedent to their personal formation. A just God imputes the sin, and therefore he imputes justly. He commits no mistake; (see Haldane on Rom. 5: 12, 29.)

Calvin says often, that "there could have been no condemnation without guilt," and "it is contrary to the equity of the divine government to punish an innocent man for the fault of another;" and that "by Adam's sin we are not condemned by imputation *alone*, as if the punishment of another's fault were exacted of us, but we bear his punishment for this reason, that we are also guilty of fault; for as our nature is vitiated in him, it is with God bound by the guilt of iniquity." Inst. Lib. II. Cap. VIII. § 19, Cap. I. § 8, and Com. on Rom. 5: 17, 18, 19. On the remark that "the imputation of Christ's righteousness is of grace, but the imputation of sin is of justice," Turretin says, "Grace can, but justice cannot ascribe to another that which does not belong to him; because grace bestows favor upon the undeserving, justice does not inflict punishment except on the deserving. For in the imputation of Adam's sin, the justice of God does not inflict punishment on the undeserving but on the deserving, if not on account of the proper and personal, yet on account of the participated and common desert, which is founded on the natural and federal union existing between us and Adam." Turretin Theol. Elenct. Pars I. p. 587. Zanchius writes: "We therefore affirm that [Adam's] disobedience, although it could not pass over to us [as persons] in act [i. e. personal act], yet did pass over in fault and guilt by imputation, since

¹ Cal. Inst., Lib. II. cap. I. 36.

God (imputes) that sin of Adam as the head, to us as the members, and he imputes it most justly." Lubbertus teaches that "when Adam in a total apostasy revolted from God, he became guilty of death, and all his posterity are implicated in the *same* guilt, *no otherwise* than if they had all perpetrated the crime of treason against their Creator." Meiserus says that "guilt could not be propagated to us [from Adam] unless the *imputation* of (his sinful) act had preceded, seeing that this imputation is the *ground* of that guilt. Wherefore St. Bernard writes that 'Adam's disobedience belonged to another, because we all sinned in *him*; but it also belonged to us, because *we* sinned although in another, and the disobedience was imputed to us by the just although hidden judgment of God.'" N. Hunnius, denying the *bare* imputation of Adam's sin to his descendants, affirms that "at the same time the fault *and* the guilt, together with the *resulting* punishment, are transfused (transfundi) into (his) posterity; nor by any means is the guilt separated from the punishment; therefore we judge it heterodox to believe that one can be a partaker of the punishment who was not also a partaker of the sin." Steegmannus writes that "no one can be exposed to a punishment unless he be guilty of a fault; and it is contrary to the justice of God that he should punish one for sins which another committed; wherefore the Scripture expressly asserts that punishment passed over from the first pair [to us, our ante-natal] guilt intervening." See Riveti Opp. Tom. III. pp. 809, 810, 816, 817, 818, for most of the preceding quotations.

Futile is the attempt to evade the preceding argument by the plea, that the word guilt, *reatus*, denotes a mere liableness or exposure to punishment. It has this meaning sometimes, but not in the statement of the Calvinistic theory. For, first, we are said to be guilty (*rei*) of Adam's crime *and also* exposed to his punishment; guilty of his fault *and likewise* of his death; exposed *and* obligated (*obnoxii et obligati*) to suffer his penalty. In the second place, the ambiguous word *reatus* is not the only word used in the argument. Turretin repeatedly affirms that the guilt of Adam's sin "passes over to all" his descendants, and "makes them *deserving* of his punishment" (*dignos poena ea*). Inst. Theol. Pars I. pp. 678, 690. Lubbertus and others write, "The same guilt [reatum with Adam's] or *which is the same thing*, the same crime [delictum] by which guilt is incurred, is imputed to all his posterity;" Riv. Opp. III. 809. Thirdly, the argument requires that the word guilt, as used in this theory, have its appropriate meaning of moral ill-desert. Substitute the phrase "exposure to punishment" for the word "guilt" in the preceding quotations, and they become mock-logic. "You cannot but perceive," says Augustine to Julian, "how *unjust* it would be to inflict punishment where there is no — [exposure to punishment? That will never do, but] *guilt*," i. e. ill-desert. Does the Westminster Confession speak of the exposure to punishment *whereby* we are exposed to punishment, when it speaks of the guilt *whereby* we are bound over to the wrath of God? If the word *guilt* be thus emptied of its moral import, the reasoning of the Calvinistic divines on this theme must go for little or nothing.

This third principle being admitted, that a moral offence has been justly imputed to men before their own personal existence, it follows that they must have sinned before they began to exist personally. If it be punitive justice which sends upon us our first calamities, then we deserve those calamities, and if we deserve them, then we deserve to have a moral offence imputed to us, and if we merit this imputation, then we must have committed that offence. This is the logical sequence, whether it have or have not been adopted by those who admit the premise. Now has it been adopted? It was an old Jewish notion that all his descendants existed in the body of Adam. Tertullian, who believed in the propagation of the soul, asserted that all human beings formed a part of the first man, and sinned in him. Ambrose and some other fathers asserted the same; but Augustine, influenced in part by a Realistic philosophy, in part by the Rabbinical fancies, in part also by the Vulgate's mistranslation of Rom. 5: 12, "*in whom all have sinned*," reduced the theory of our oneness with Adam to a more definite form, and made it a standard doctrine of the church. He repeats in a hundred different ways, that Adam was all men, and all men were Adam; they and he forming one person, he being the entire human race, his act being theirs, and they sinning in him. Wiggers, in his Historical Presentation of Augustinism and Pelagianism, has clearly exhibited this predominating theory. In accordance with it, as it has been more or less modified, we find among the divines of and after the Reformation, unnumbered testimonies to the doctrine that, in the language of the learned Thomas Boston, "Adam's sin is imputed to us *because* it is ours; for God doth not reckon a thing ours which is not so."¹ Our sin precedes the imputation, and the imputation does not precede the sin. If we were regarded as guilty before we had sinned, we should be so regarded by a mistake, but Omniscience cannot err.

Chamierus teaches, that "all men are not only made sinners by Adam, but also are said to have sinned in him, *which is a very different thing*." "It is certain both that all men are constituted *really* unrighteous by Adam, and all the faithful are constituted *really* righteous by Christ." Bishop Davenant says, that "the sin of Adam is imputed to us for our condemnation, *no less* than if it were something formally inhering in us." But, on what principle can Adam's sin be rightly ascribed to us, just as if (*soque, pariter*) we had actually committed it, unless we did really sin in him? In explaining Rom. 5: 12, W. Musculus says: "Some interpret the words, '*all have sinned*,' to mean, '*all have been ruined, or virtually made sinners, on account of [Adam's] offence*.' This is indeed true. But still nothing forbids our understanding by the words, the fact that all men existing in Adam's loins, did sin in his actual sin." Hundreds of times it is said by the standard Calvinistic writ-

¹ Boston's Body of Divinity, Vol. I. pp. 302, 303, 322, etc.

ers, "We were in Adam's loins when he sinned," "we sinned while we were in his loins," "we sinned with him and in him," "the whole race were deposited in him," "God placed us all in his body as a mass," "all his posterity sinned when he sinned, with him and by him, for all were comprehended in him." The following expression of John Junius has been generally credited, and is but one specimen of a large class: "In the sum of the matter, all the Reformed Churches agree, and teach with unanimous consent, agreeably to the sacred Scriptures and the general opinion of antiquity, that the sin of Adam was not a personal one, but was the sin of the whole human race, since this race was included in his loins, and it sinned in him the first parent of all, and the root of the entire human family." A volume might be filled with the repetitions of the following argument of Occitanus: "As the Levites who were to descend from Abraham, paid tithes in the person of their father, (as the Apostle teaches in Heb. 7: 9,) although they ought to receive tithes afterwards from their brethren; so likewise men who ought by natural generation to descend from Adam, were made guilty in the loins of their father, and were condemned to suffer the punishment of his disobedience; for his fall was the general fall of men who in the loss sustained by their ancestor, lost all the riches with which they ought (debuissent) to have been endowed." Meisnerus teaches, that "the sin of Adam was not personal, but universal, and was the act of the entire race, which existed in him as in a common stock, and therefore sinned at the same time with him, and died" (or was condemned). Martin Bucer teaches that infants are rightly represented as having sinned, and "since on account of that fault of disobedience which they all committed in Adam, they are born with such profound ignorance that they cannot understand the precepts of God their Maker, and with such rebellion of nature that they all resist these precepts; by the same law of obedience proposed not so much to Adam the father of the human race as to the whole race itself, they are justly condemned." Nothing can be plainer than the words of Turretin, (Inst. Theol. Pars I. p. 680), speaking of the common punishments which flow to us as well as to Adam from the first sin, — They "cannot justly be inflicted, unless there be supposed a common law and a common guilt; for if the punishment of the broken covenant be extended to all, the covenant also and the law ought to extend to all." The remark of Zanchius is often repeated, that "the command, together with its penalty, was not addressed to the person of Adam alone, but to the whole human family." "As God," says Francis Junius, "in the order of his creation placed the whole human race in Adam by nature, so in the order of his justice, he said to the whole human race in Adam, (in whom we sinned,) In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." And not only did all men transgress the law enforced upon them in our first parent, but also all men transgressed it voluntarily in him." This peculiar metaphysics was pushed along in a straight line; and it is often said that "all men lost their freedom by sinning, *of their own accord*, in Adam. (See the fifth subdivision of the following, the second head.) Some excellent divines have gone so far as to teach not only that we willed to eat the forbidden fruit, but even had natural power to avoid willing it! Our ante-natal sin is described in numerous other forms. It is affirmed in scores of instances, that all men must have participated in the first offence, because "a just participation in the punishment of that sin, presupposes a participation in the sin itself." Thus, the proof of the doctrine accompanies the statement of it. "Original sin, as well in Adam as in his posterity," we are told by Silesius, "includes these three deadly evils, the actual fault, legal guilt, or penalty of death, and the depravation or deformity of nature. For these meet together around the first sin in the parent and in his posterity; with this difference only, that

Adam sinning, was the *principal* agent committing the fault, deserving the penalty, casting off the image of God, and corrupting himself, [while] all these belong to his posterity, by *participation*,¹ *imputation*, and generation from a corrupted parent." "In the mass, they (his posterity) committed the same sin, and *therefore* it is imputed to all." For, says Fewbornius, "it is repugnant to the Divine justice, that any one should be a partaker in another's punishment, without a participation (*accessorie*) in that other's fault," and then he proceeds to show, that if Adam's posterity did not partake of his sin, they would not be ill-deserving, and if not ill-deserving, they could not be equitably punished. "By what right," says Scultetus, "are the descendants punished for the sin of their ancestors? Paul answers, 'Because all sinned in the first parents.'" (See Riveti Opp., Tom. III. pp. 799, 800, 804-8, 816-12, 814-17.) In like manner, the great Quenstedt (Theol. Didac., Pars II. p. 58) declares that "not only the first parents were the subjects of the first sin, but also all of their descendants," and he also says, that "not by a bare imputation, nor at all events by imitation, are we constituted sinners by Adam's crime, but also by the imputation of real guilt, and by propagation of natural depravity, and by participation in actual fault. And therefore the proximate cause why, the first man sinning, all his posterity have sinned, is the existence of the whole human species in the person of the first man." This is the reason why "God imputes the sin of Adam to them, most justly, for their condemnation." Our own President Edwards (Works II. p. 544, 546, 558, etc.) affirms, that Adam and all his posterity constituted "as it were, one complex person, or one moral whole." "And therefore the sin of the apostasy is not theirs, merely because God imputes it to them, but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that ground God imputes it to them." He appeals to Stapfer, who teaches that "the sin of the posterity, on account of their consent, and the moral view in which they are to be taken, is the same with the sin of Adam, not only in kind, but in number; therefore, the sin of Adam is rightly imputed to his posterity." Stapfer also affirms that the "chief divines" are of the same mind with him.

Let not the reader feel *bewildered* by this recital, for the theory which he is considering is often called "the *simplicity* of the faith," and all doubts concerning it are stigmatized as the results of "philosophizing," and as signs of a propensity "*obliquè pelagianizere*." Suffer then a word or two of further explanation.

We shall always misinterpret the old authors, unless we be mindful of the distinction between the personal existence of men as individuals, and their common existence in their progenitor. Thus many authors who contend for our real ill-desert on account of Adam's sin, do yet insist that we are thus ill-deserving not "personally," but only in our "common" union with him, not "*individually*" but "*originally*," not "*formally*" but by a "real imputation," not "*separately*" but "*virtually*," "*potentially*," "*radically*," "*seminally*," "*hereditarily*," etc. It is as *real* an ill-desert as if it were a separate one. In one respect the first sin is properly our own (*cujusque est proprium*); in a dif-

¹ The partaker, the accomplice, the accessory, is thought to be as really culpable as the primary offender.

ferent respect it is properly the sin of another person. In one view it is a foreign sin; in a different view it is ours. In one aspect it belongs to Adam alone; in another aspect it belongs to us as really as to him. It is not common to others in such a sense that it is not our own, nor is it our own in such a sense that it is not common to others. Therefore, says Lansbergius, "we are not guilty on account of a sin in which we have no participation (*alienum*), but on account of a sin which is our own (*proprium*) committed while we were in Adam's loins," etc. When some of the old Calvinists assert, therefore, that we could not have actually sinned thousands of years before our birth, they mean that we could not then have sinned in our distinct personality; but they do not mean that we were then free from fault; and the demerit which existed in us as parts of Adam, is now "communicated," "propagated," "transferred" to us as separate individuals. See Riveti, *Opp. Tom. III. pp. 807, 808, 809, 815, etc.* And Turretin says, in repeated instances, that the covenant in which we were involved with Adam, was a "moral" covenant, that Adam's sin was "morally" communicated to us, that his sinful choice although not ours personally, was ours "morally."¹ The whole dispensation with regard to the fall is a moral one. The judgment of God is a moral judgment. We need not suppose, then, that Turretin contradicts himself when he affirms, that our sin in Adam was not a moral one, i. e. in the sense of its being blameworthy in our own persons, just as it was not voluntary in the sense of its being our own individual, separate volition.²

Here, now, is the old theory of imputation; and in the third place let us inquire how it can be reconciled with the doctrine which we have previously (see pp. 607, 608, above) described as the true one. If we regard the old theory as expressed in literal terms, it cannot be harmonized with the truth. No one ever pretended that it could be. It is false, belonging neither to the theology of a sound intellect, nor to that of a right heart. But still, many who contend for this theoretic error have *substantially*, at least in their practical meditations, the same general faith with those who receive the pure truth, just as two men may have substantially the same nature, although one has, and the other has not, a horn growing out of his head.

But, this is not all; for, in the first place, the ground-principle which sustains this theory of our literal ill-desert for Adam's sin, is at times abandoned by the advocates of it, and the ground-principle

¹ Theol. Inst. Pars I. pp. 678, 679, 686, 689, 690.

² *Ib.* p. 716.

of the opposite doctrine is at times sanctioned by them. Their self-contradiction weakens the influence of their theory. In fact, their theory, *so far forth as it is contradicted*, is the same with its opposite. Its spirit is at last exchanged for that of its antagonist. Thus, when the question is put, how does God exercise retributive justice rather than sovereignty toward us, in causing us to suffer for a crime, long since consummated in Eden, we are often told that God imputed this crime to us *partly* because we are and were "of one blood" with Adam, i. e. we have and have had a "natural union" with him, but *principally* because God "willed" to form a covenant with Adam, according to which, the first man was to act for all his descendants, and his sin was to become theirs.¹ In part, and in *chief* part, then, his sin is imputed to us, because we were comprehended in the covenant which God made with Adam before the fall. Some divines go further still, and suppose this covenant to be the *whole* ground of the imputation. Adam represented us, and so we sinned in him, not naturally, but "representatively." Did we at that time deserve to be thus exposed to ruin? Did we really merit our subjection to the peril (how great, the Deity well knew) of that fall? Had we sinned in Adam *before* his sin? Surely this covenant was made not by retributive justice toward us, but by sovereign benevolence toward the universe. It constituted (according to the theory as now modified) a main reason for the justice of ascribing to us that ancient crime, and making us ill-deserving on account of it. Now, of course, the reason or ground for this justice, precedes and is distinct from the justice itself. It is a reason of sovereignty preparing the way for a strict retribution. That Turretin here supposed it to be a sovereign arrangement, is obvious from his pleading the authority of Calvin, who says, as often elsewhere: "Whence is it that the fall of Adam involves without remedy so many nations with their infant children in eternal death, unless because it so seemed good to Jehovah? *Decretum quidem horribile fateor.*"² This general ruin occurred, says Calvin on Job xiv, "because we were all included in his [Adam's] person by the *will* of God." Even the same gentleman who 'shrinks from the idea that God in mere sovereignty inflicts the most tremendous evils upon us,' does yet in the same breath confess that God inflicts these evils by virtue of a "covenant in which by a benevolent appointment of God we were included."³ This benevolent appointment is a sovereign appointment; for all our Father's sovereignty is

¹ Turretini Inst. Theol., Pars I. pp. 678, 679.

² Cal. Inst., Lib. II. Cap. XXIII. § 7.

³ Bib. Repertory, Vol. VI. p. 465.

benevolence, and all his specific benevolence is sovereignty. And so the Reviewer comes at the end of a sentence, to the same principle from which he recoiled at the beginning. Our calamities hang suspended on the sovereign purpose of Heaven, we say, directly; he says, indirectly; we say, without any intervening links; he says, with the intermediate links of imputation, guilt, etc. We say that infants are exposed to their first calamities, by the sovereign constitution of their Maker. The Reviewer says, that this would be unjust, but infants must first be charged with a sin which they never personally committed! They cannot be treated justly unless accused of a crime which was perpetrated in a place which they never saw, and at a time which preceded the birth of their first-born ancestor! We then ask, why are they so accused? Because they were comprehended in the covenant with Adam, says the Reviewer. But we press the question, why were they thus comprehended? Because they deserved to be? Here the Reviewer is compelled to admit the distinctive principle of the New England theology, and to abandon the distinctive principle of his own; and the only dispute is, whether we shall come a few minutes sooner or a few minutes later to the same thing, i. e. to the Divine Sovereignty. So far forth, then, he has united the two schemes, by dismissing the genetic principle of his favorite one. Now, we might ask, what kind of ill-desert is that which is occasioned within us by a sovereign arrangement, irrespectively of our personal fault? We can understand how a wise parent may afflict us, without our antecedent misdemeanor; but to suppose that he subjects us to a demerit which precedes all personal disobedience, is one of the many contradictions involved in this theory, which, however, is saved by its contradictions.¹

Nor is this all; for in the second place, the doctrine that we are literally and morally responsible for Adam's sin is sometimes altogether explained away by men who contend for it at other times. Not only practical Christians, but even polemic divines, who insist upon the justice of imputing to us the sin of Paradise, are often found to have forgotten their artificial theory, and to interpret its phrases as the mere language of emotion. It is natural for us, creatures of feeling, to use such language on so great a theme. Intent upon the

¹ It is an interesting fact that some European divines, staggering under their favorite doctrine of a literal imputation, have pronounced it utterly impossible to conjecture how or why the Deity has made such an imputation, and have *concededly* resolved the whole into the mystery of a mere sovereign act, without any allusion to our sinning in Adam — naturally or representatively.

thought of our intimate connection with Adam, we are unsatisfied with calm words, and we exclaim "his blood flows in our veins and so our blood once formed a part of his body; his nature has been drawn forth into ours and so our nature was once involved in his; we were actually in his loins of old; what he did we did; we sinned in him, and fell with him in his first transgression." And what do we mean by these intense utterances? Nothing more than that Adam's offence was the reason why our Sovereign so made us and so placed us, as to cause the certainty of our suffering evil, and of our uniform sinful preferences. In order to express with emphasis the truth that we not only imitate our first progenitor in disobeying God, but likewise that on account of his apostasy, we are fashioned so that we sin and are circumstanced so that we suffer, we are sometimes incited to say, careless of the peril attending such words, "God imputes to us the transgression of Adam; his anger continues to burn against us for it." Feeling the dreadfulness of the woes to which it has exposed us, we confess that "we are guilty of the original crime." Sensitive to the fitness of the arrangement by which we are doomed to these evils as the insignia of the hatefulness of that crime, some men may venture in certain peculiar moods, upon the strong expressions, "We were ill-deserving in that first sin; we are justly afflicted for it." These afflictions illustrate so vividly the regard of Jehovah for his law that we call them by the forcible word, *punishment*. And thus we go on from strength to strength, until some scholastic philosopher becomes "*bewildered*," and mistakes these vehement expressions of feeling for the accurate statements of science. Metamorphosing these poetical and eloquent utterances into the literal language of the schools, he constructs his severe system: "We are justly punished for Adam's sin; therefore we were ill-deserving in it; therefore we committed it."

Now we maintain that while it is natural for a good man to use these bold metaphors sometimes in the *enforcement* of truth, he is unable to persevere in uniformly employing them as literal phrases. A theorist may urge himself onward to such a use, while fabricating or defending an artificial creed; but tired nature will give out, and in his unguarded moments he will drop his forced logic. His conscience may be overborne by the theory during his hours of system-making, but it will right itself in his hours of leisure and will reassert the truth. While, then, we concede that many theologians have believed that our moral guilt for the Paradisiacal crime is a legitimate inference from our suffering on account of it, we still maintain that

these theologians have often abandoned this belief in their hours of clearer vision, and of religious as distinct from controversial interest. Not seldom have they lost their hold of it in their controversies even. As a theory, it is too absurd to be retained in the mind without an unnatural effort, and such an effort must be intermittent. Accordingly, in all their theological treatises, we detect the frequent signs of a "falling away." Expelled nature forces herself back. While they framed a logical theory on the strict import of justice, ill-desert and punishment, they often exchanged this import during their practical reflections, for a looser meaning; justice being a sense of *fitness*, guilt and ill-desert being a *fit* exposure to evil;¹ and punishment being the fit evil, and thus they often rested in that wise and deep scheme of truth which, since thier time, has been defended by the ablest of our New England divines.

And now, in defiance of *Blair's Rhetoric*, or, as the Reviewer says (in the language of feeling), "the Scotch Principal's dull lectures," we forewarn our readers that we are going to be interesting. Our critic says that the author whom he condemns, "has undertaken a great work" in attempting to reconcile opposing sects and creeds, and he adds: "when we reflect on what is necessarily even though unconsciously [?] assumed in this attempt, when we raise our eyes to the height to which it is necessary the author should ascend before all these things could appear alike to him, we are bewildered."² But so far as this "fundamental" doctrine of imputation is concerned we see no valid reason why our critic should be thus *bewildered*. For he himself goes further than we go in "*explaining away*" the ancient creeds. While we affirm that *often* the standard Calvinistic divines disown the doctrine of our proper ill-desert for the first sin, he affirms that they never believed the doctrine; that in their writings the sin of Adam "is never said to be in us (truly sin) *verè peccatum*;" the guilt of it is not said to arise "out of the moral character" of men; it is not *moral* guilt; it is not even so much as a *fit* exposure to punishment, but a mere exposure to it; the phrases, "we sinned in Adam," "were sinners in him," were "ill-deserving," have "demerit,"³ etc., do not imply our "moral pollution," express nothing with regard to

¹ Often, at least, the word *guilt* meant not a mere exposure to evil, but a *fit* exposure.

² *Bib. Repertory*, Vol. XXIII. p. 536.

³ One of these phrases is "*ought*," "*ought not*," as we have seen above. Of course, if the Reviewer explains all these words as figurative, he will give the same explanations of imputed righteousness, etc.

our "moral turpitude." Notwithstanding all that we have heard about the sin of Adam being "transfused," "transferred," "passing over," being "communicated to us," he denies that Calvinists, as a class, have ever believed in "a transfer of moral character." And as to our oneness with Adam, which formerly was so "mystical" and "mysterious," the Reviewer sweeps away all the mystery of it, and says that it is and was all a figure of speech. "We were in Adam," he remarks, "as Levi was in Abraham. Was this literally?"—"We were in him as branches in a root,' 'as the members are in the head.' Well, what does this mean? Literal oneness? Surely not. Does every writer who speaks of a father as the root of his family, hold to the idea of a 'literal oneness' between them? You may make as little or as much as you please out of such figurative expressions taken by themselves."¹ Now Turretin, who according to our Reviewer, "is universally regarded as having adhered strictly to the common Calvinistic system," denies that the words in Heb. 7: 9 "intimate a tropical and figurative thing, as if Levi were said to have been tithed only in a figure and not properly in Abraham."² Here then is a figurative ill-desert³ and a figurative sin, which is in plain truth (*verè*) no sin at all, the punishment for it therefore cannot be a moral, but must be a figurative punishment; and the justice which inflicts it cannot be a moral, but must be a figurative justice; and that moral attribute of God which is justice only by a metaphor, must be his sovereign benevolence. So far as the "substance of doctrine" is concerned, the Reviewer admits all that we can ask of him. He denies all that we deny. He avows every article of the Pelagianism which he has discovered in the Convention sermon in regard to imputed guilt. If that sermon "eviscerates" the ancient standards, its Reviewer does so yet more fatally. Very true; he insists that Adam's sin is ours, but still not "personally or properly;" that it is imputed to us, but not so as to be a "ground of remorse."⁴ In what way then is the first sin imputed to us? Only in this way; "we are regarded and treated as sinners" on account of it, while it never affects our "moral character."⁵ But how are we, while not sinners, regarded as sinners by him who regards all men precisely as they

¹ Bib. Repertory, VII. p. 436. For the preceding references, see pages 413, 414, 415, 422, 424, 426, 434, 436—438, etc., and Dr. Hodge on Rom. 5: 12, sq.

² Turret. Theol. Pars I. p. 687.

³ We are not responsible for the word *figurative*, in this connection. The Reviewer has forced it upon us. See Convention Sermon, pp. 8, 41, 2d Pamph. Ed.

⁴ Dr. Hodge's Com. on Rom. p. 221, 1st Ed.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 225.

are? The Reviewer modifies again, and says that "*nothing more* is meant by the imputation of sin than to cause one man to bear the iniquity [i. e. the punishment] of another.¹ But how are we punished for that primal transgression? In any way which implies that we are blamed for it by the Deity? No. Or condemned by our own conscience? No. Are we punished in the "most rigid and proper meaning" of the term? No. In what sense then? We are made to suffer evil "by a Judge, in execution of a sentence, and with a view to support the authority of the law."² But *was* He literally the moral judge of us, while we were only figuratively in existence? Was it literally a moral sentence, addressed to us centuries before we had any moral desert? Was it a moral law literally applied to us as moral beings, while we were moral beings only by a bold figure of speech? If the Reviewer regards all this as literal, he contradicts himself. Besides, *when* was this punishment inflicted upon us, irrespectively of our own sin? At a period preceding our personal life; for, says Dr. Hodge, "eternal misery is [not] inflicted on any man for the sin of Adam, irrespective of inherent depravity or actual transgression." That first "sin was the ground of the loss of the divine favor, the withholding of divine influence, and the *consequent* corruption of our nature."³ And when does he suppose that this corruption of our nature begins? With the very beginning of that nature itself. The punishment therefore must be logically, if not chronologically, antecedent to this beginning, for our corruption is *consequent* to the punishment. But how can one be punished in the order of nature before one's existence? And what kind of a *sin* is

¹ Bib. Repertory, Vol. VI. pp. 459, 462, 472. Hodge's Com. on Rom., First Ed. p. 226, etc.

² Bib. Repertory, VII. p. 442. The dispute turns chiefly on this word, punishment, and is *merely* verbal. We suppose the punishment which God inflicts to be moral, and to imply the ill-desert of the person punished. The old writers often used the word loosely to denote any evil inflicted by God for the purpose of improving the character of his subjects, or of sustaining the honor of his law. Thus Calvin says that "creation bears part of the punishment deserved by man," Inst. Lib. II. Cap. I. § 5. And again, Com. on Rom. 8: 21, "All created things in themselves blameless, both on earth and in the visible heaven, undergo punishment for our sins; for it has not happened through their own fault that they are liable to corruption." Can we doubt that men are punished for Adam's crime, and that Christ was punished for ours, when the term is used with this loose signification? The Hopkinsians will agree with the Calvinists, except on the propriety of using an important word with so much looseness in a didactic treatise; for in this vague sense God punishes as a Sovereign.

³ Hodge's Com. on Romans, First Ed. p. 229.

that which will not be followed by the second death, unless some *other* sin be added? It is a putative punishment, as the sin which occasions it is a putative sin. It is no proper punishment at all. The whole is a metaphorical, and in some states of mind an interesting mode of expressing the solemn truth, that God as a Sovereign has connected our destiny with Adam's character. We agree with our Reviewer, so far forth as he advocates the distinctive theology of New England. Nothing but a reverence for our mother tongue prevents us from saying with him, what we believe as "substantially" as he does: "That there is a very just and proper (?) sense in which we should *repent* of the sin of Adam we readily admit; and are perfectly aware that old writers insist much upon the duty. Not, however, on the principle that his sin is personally ours, or that its moral turpitude is transferred from him to us; but on the principle that a child is *humbled* and *grieved* at the misconduct of a father."¹ Now this use of humility for penitence, of grieving for repenting, is intensely figurative; it belongs to the theology of the heart, and in a didactic treatise would be condemned by Dr. Blair.

We do not mean to imply, that we always find our Reviewer in agreement with ourselves, or with himself. For, like other men, circumvented with technical, especially when figurative, terms, he often becomes entangled in them, so as to plunge into an error like that of our moral guilt for sinning before the flood. He has a sliding scale of definitions, down which he lapses from the high Calvinism of other times, into the biblical Calvinism of New England. At least five meanings of imputation are given by him. First, we find that manly one by which imputation is the antecedent ground of our being regarded and treated otherwise than we are in ourselves. This is Dr. Owen's view; and according to it, the imputation includes two things, the "grant or donation of a property," and then the consequent "dealing with us according unto that which is so made ours."² Thus, our Reviewer says, "His [Christ's] merit is so given, reckoned, or imputed to them, that they are regarded and treated as right-

¹ Bib. Repertory, Vol. VII. pp. 460, 461. This article is universally imputed to our Reviewer.

² Owen's Works. Vol. XI. p. 207, etc. It is a great mistake of modern writers to suppose that, according to the old standards, imputation of holiness or sin, is merely the regarding and treating of men as if they were holy or sinful. Imputation involves the *ground* of their being thus regarded and treated. See Riveti Opp., Tom. III. pp. 799, 806, 812-16, etc.; also Gill's Body of Divinity, Vol. I. p. 522, and Andrew Fuller's Works, Vol. III. p. 722. "To bear the punishment of sin, is not the same as to have sinned" in Adam, says Bucer.

eous."¹ To be so regarded and treated, *follows* the imputation. But, secondly, we find that this grant or donation is dropped, and imputation comes to mean merely the result, the regarding and treating us otherwise than we are in ourselves.² But, thirdly, even this is soon modified, and the imputation of the first sin means the regarding us sinful, *in such a way*, or *so far forth*, as to treat us like sinners.³ Still, fourthly, we have a new amendment, and this imputation is "nothing more nor less" than for one man to bear the iniquity [i. e. the punishment] of another."⁴ And then, fifthly, we learn that the word punishment is not used here in its "most strict and rigid" meaning, and does not imply any moral demerit in us.⁵ Now, we avow before the wide world our hearty belief that our ancestor's crime is *so* communicated to us, that we are regarded and treated as sinners on account of it; by all which we mean simply that we are regarded and treated as sinners for it; by which we mean that we are regarded sinful only so far as to be treated like sinners; by which we mean no more than that we are punished for it; by which we mean, *at length*, that we are not punished in the most proper sense, but are merely afflicted with evils which are designed by our Judge to vindicate the sanctity of the law broken, not by ourselves, but by Adam. And thus, after so long a time, we come out of this forest of improper terms, venerable for its shade, and *bewildering* by its mazes, into the clear and open sunshine, where both the Reviewer and the author meet and walk in the same straight path of New England theology. When out of the underbrush of that forest, neither of them looks like a *Pelagian*. That word belongs to a "language of feeling." Both of them adopt "for substance" the teachings of Emmons and Dwight in regard to this theme. Soon after that amiable and excellent divine had gone home to his kindred in the skies, the Princeton Review contained an elaborate criticism upon "old Dr. Emmons," as it denominated the venerable saint, and while it charged him with "confusion of ideas," and of course with "Pelagianism," it was compelled to acknowledge for a time that his doctrine concerning our relation to Adam, contains "*the very thing* which the old Calvinists called the imputation of Adam's sin," and that "it is *really nothing*

¹ Bib. Repertory, Vol. XVII. p. 87. Dr. Hodge on Rom., p. 228, first ed

² Dr. Hodge on Rom., p. 221, etc..

³ Dr. Hodge on Rom., p. 226. "For if the word [impute] means *so* to ascribe an action to a man as to treat him as the author of it."

⁴ Bib. Repertory, Vol. VI. p. 459.

⁵ Bib. Repertory, Vol. VI. p. 441.

short of the imputation of his first sin."¹ Now that doctrine of Emmons is in essence the same which we have advocated in this discussion, (Bib. Sac. VIII. pp. 174-5); but our doctrine is Pelagianism according to the Princeton Review, and therefore, according to the same authority, Pelagianism "is *nothing short of*" Augustinism on this "fundamental" doctrine, and contains "the *very thing* which the old Calvinists *meant*;" and hence our Reviewer lapses in one point when he says of our own assertions: "It is now asserted, for the *first time*, so far as we know, *since the world began*, that these two modes of representation [the Augustinian and Pelagian] mean the same thing."² When *did* the world begin? Eight years before the sermon was conceived to which that assertion has been falsely imputed, the Princeton Review asserted, (and *not* for the first time, *so far as we know*), that the doctrine which is now termed Pelagian means "nothing short" of the doctrine which is now termed Calvinistic. For ourselves we have uniformly believed that Pelagianism differs in essence from theories like those of Dwight and Spring, and that while the old Calvinists have, as practical Christians, been satisfied with such theories, they have as metaphysicians demanded a different scheme.

The learned Reviewer is in a trilemma. Either he believes that the old Calvinists, acting as logicians and as practical men, said what they meant in literal terms; in which case he contradicts himself; or, secondly, he believes, that as logicians, they said literally what they meant, and as practical men, they merged their language into bold figures; in which case he agrees with the proscribed sermon, and this will never do; or, thirdly, he believes, that both as logicians and as practical men, they used the language of their creeds as intensely figurative; in which case, he is as much more latitudinarian than the sermon, as he supposes the sermon to be more latitudinarian than the system of Dr. Gill. And he does in fact go beyond that discourse in thus "philosophizing away" the ancient standards. For, according to his theory, we must conceive of the giants of Calvinism as arguing, in their philosophical treatises, that we cannot be rightly punished unless we be previously exposed to punishment, that the liability to an infliction secures the justness of that infliction, that we

¹ See Bib. Repertory, XIV. pp. 543, 544. That Review also avers that Dr. Emmons and all the New Divinity men "not only reject the doctrine, but speak of it in the same contemptuous manner as did the Pelagians," p. 542. This is only one specimen of the self-contradictions into which a "figurative theology" winds its course.

² Bib. Repertory, XXIII. 126.

should not have been thus "exposed to punishment," i. e. guilty, unless we had "sinned in Adam;" or, which is the same thing, unless we had been "treated as sinners;" or, which is the same thing, unless we had been punished! And did the sturdy Calvinism of the schools swing thus backward and forward in an incessant motion, without progress? Did those stern metaphysicians *think* that they were inferring man's exposure to punishment, i. e. his guilt, from the fact that man was punished, i. e. was treated as a sinner?¹ If so, then we have a new proof of the tendency of bold metaphors to "*bewilder*" a theorist? In his Commentary on Romans 5: 12, "Wherefore as by one man," etc., Dr. Hodge has exhibited what he regards as the metaphysical, as well as the practical, view of those dialectical writers. The word "sin," in the first phrase, "*by one man sin entered into the world*," means imputed sin, and thus the entire phrase means, "On his [Adam's] account all men are regarded and treated as sinners!"² The word "death" in the phrase, "*and death by sin*," means "the penalty of the law, or the evils threatened as the punishment of sin."³ "Of course, as sin means imputed sin, this second phrase means: Because all men are regarded and treated as sinners, i. e. punished, therefore all men are exposed to "the penalty of the law, or the evils threatened as the punishment of sin." The third phrase, "*and so death passed upon all men*," means, "All men became exposed to penal evils, or the penalty due to sin."⁴ The fourth phrase, "*for that all have sinned*," means, "All men are regarded and treated as sinners!"⁵ Combining, then, the four phrases, we have the following argument: On account of one man, all men are regarded and punished as sinners; and because they are regarded and punished as sinners, they are subjected to punishment; and so all men become exposed to punishment, because all men are regarded and punished as sinners! Now, *if this be* the didactic Calvinism of the creeds, can we blame the New England writers for aiming to clear up the *phraseology* of those creeds? And can we avoid the necessity of admitting, that a calm intellect would never have devised such a metaphorical style for repeating over and over the same idea, and also that "the well schooled divine *may*, although he seldom *does*, escape the confusing ('bewildering') influence of this ambiguous nomenclature?" (Conv. Sermon, p. 567.) *Is it not true* by our Reviewer's

¹ Even in their practical meditations, they did not always *thus* denude their argument of meaning, but used justice, etc., for fitness, etc. See pp. 618, 621, above.

² Com. on Rom, First ed. pp. 180, 190.

³ *Ib.*, pp. 180, 190.

⁴ *Ib.*, p. 181.

⁵ *Ib.*, p. 183.

own showing, that if men be over-charmed with favorite words, they will see Pelagianism where these words are missed, and if they only hear the grateful sounds they will care too little for the "*substance of doctrine*, and will be sometimes led to nullify the internal signs of inspiration, by emasculating the vigorous thought which it embodies? The plain fact is, that our Reviewer does not often venture to expose the old theory of imputation; nor even to state the biblical truth in the clear language of Mr. Stuart and Mr. Barnes, and he therefore hides the doctrine within a *nest* of technical terms. He uses the ancient phraseology, and denudes it of its theoretic meaning; he tacitly yields to the objections of New England divines, but like the ancient buyer, he cries, "it is naught, it is naught," and hurls at these divines the hard epithets of Neology, Rationalism, Röhrr, and especially Pelagius; and all this, while he likens himself to "a man behind the walls of Gibraltar, or of Ehrenbreitstein." Bib. Repository, XXIII. p. 319.

Having now seen that the old writers, in their better hours, have been wont to give up their doctrine of a literally imputed sin, let us pass to the doctrine of involuntary sin. This includes the second and third parts of original sin, as anciently defined. The three parts were, first, our participation in Adam's offence; secondly, our involuntary want of original righteousness, and thirdly, our involuntary depravation of nature, (see pp. 609—614 above). These last two divisions constitute original sin in its more recent and restricted meaning. They are sometimes called inherent and passive, in distinction from active and imputed transgression.

In the first place, let us inquire, What is the true doctrine with regard to the nature of sin? Both Inspiration and common sense reply: Sin is that which in and of itself, apart from its causes and results, deserves to be condemned by the conscience, to be repented of, to receive the eternal punishment inflicted by the Judge at the last day; and it consists in the choice or preference of that which the conscience requires us to refuse, or in the voluntary refusal of that which the conscience requires us to prefer.—When it is said that sin is the transgression of the law, the objector replies that sin lies deeper than in an outward, overt act. Very true, it involves the covert, deep preference for a wrong outward act. But the objector adds, it lies deeper still; not in the executive volition but in the inclination, disposition, propensity to choose wrong. Very true. It does not lie in the executive volition, but in the inclination, disposi-

tion, propensity to choose wrong, provided that these words be used, as they often are, to denote a generic choice or preference, lying deeper than the specific choices. The objector misrepresents this doctrine, when he supposes that it confines moral agency to the individual, subordinate preferences, or, still worse, to the imperative volitions. By no means. It asserts that sin consists in all preferences which the conscience condemns, and especially in those ultimate governing, predominating preferences which are often termed, loosely however, inclination, disposition, propensity. Every choice which the conscience disapproves, deserves eternal punishment, and it only is sin. But the objector replies, Sin goes deeper still; it belongs to the *man* who sins, and not to his acts alone. Just so; for acts *alone* cannot be conceived of. An act of a man is the man himself acting, just as "a form of theology is theology in a certain form." This is the distinctive New England divinity.

The fact that all men previously to Regeneration do sin and only sin in all their moral acts, implies, what our consciousness also teaches, that there is, lying back of our sinful choices and occasioning them, a disordered state of the sensibilities, or an involuntary corruption.¹ Part of this is called by Storr, Flatt, Reinhard and many others, "a preponderance of the propensities of our nature for the objects and pleasures of sense." The whole of it is called by Turretin, Calvin, and others, "vitiosity," "the depravation of nature formerly good and pure," "natural, native, hereditary depravity," the "disorder of nature," the insubordination of the lower to the higher nature, the disease, sickness of the soul, *lues, fomes, ἀραξία*, etc. A man is sinful in harboring, indulging, complying with his evil tendencies, but he is not sinful for the mere fact of their natural existence, of their existence antecedent to his choice. "Mankind are not themselves to be blamed for being born with a depraved nature."² Still this nature is so odious in itself and so pernicious in its influence, that our emotions often prompt us to stigmatize it as itself sin.³ It is wholesome to form this con-

¹ Our critic has more than once confounded this truth with the Pelagian error, that all men have a nature precisely like that of Adam before he sinned! He also declares, p. 311, that in logical accordance with the sermon under review, Regeneration "cannot be the production of a new nature," but must "consist in some act of the soul."! A moment's reflection will convince him, that according to that sermon, the nature inclining to mere sin is changed in regeneration into a nature inclining to holiness, and that by the omnipotence of the regenerating Spirit.

² Storr and Flatt, B. III. § 57.

³ "That inherent depravity is truly and properly sin, is a different intellectual

ception at certain times, even more so than to conceive of corporeal acts as themselves blamable, or of a cathedral or a chalice at the altar, or a baptismal font as themselves holy.— But these effusions of a pious heart are congealed by some into the stiff and literal expressions of a theory unlike the preceding. Therefore,

We will, in the second place, inquire, What is the theory of passive, inherent, involuntary sin. Our Reviewer frankly defines this doctrine, when he says, that we have “an innate, hereditary sinful corruption of nature;” that we have derived from Adam “a nature not merely diseased, weakened or predisposed to evil, but which is ‘itself’ as well as ‘all the motions thereof truly and properly sin.’”¹ Having already admitted that many theologians have believed in our moral guilt for the crime of Adam, we also admit that some have believed in our moral guilt for the very *make* of our souls. The two themes have been by some indissolubly blended, and it has been, therefore, maintained that our inherent as well as our imputed sin is ill-deserving, and is justly punishable with the second death. Men have spoken of this inherent sin as propagated from parent to child, and have characterized it, in this relation, as the sin of nature distinct from the sin of person; “because the immediate subject of this [propagated] sin is not a person, but human nature vitiated by the actual transgression of a person; which nature being communicated to posterity, there is also communicated in it this inherent corruption. As therefore in Adam the *person* corrupts the nature, so in his posterity the *nature* corrupts the *person*.”²

In the third place let us inquire, how can these two theories be harmonized? As two theories literally stated they cannot be; for the notion of a literally passive sin belongs to the theology neither of a right intellect nor of a right heart. Still the evangelical system which includes the one doctrine, may be essentially like that which includes

proposition from the statement that it is not properly sin.” Bib. Rep. XXIII. 338. In this sentence, as also on p. 341, our Reviewer soberly represents us as endeavoring to show, that sinful and not sinful mean the same thing; and in the next sentence, that ability and inability mean the same thing! No wonder, that, having invented this design for us, he should find it necessary to say that we made use of some German theory to accomplish this design. The truth is, that we have represented the word “cannot” as often meaning the same with “will not,” and the word “sinful” as often meaning the same with “odious and certainly inducing sin.” Does not the Reviewer perceive his misstatements on this subject? They are but one specimen of the general style of his *critique*.

¹ Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 310, 311, 314, 315.

² Turretin, Inst. Theol. Elenct. Pars I. p. 701.

the other, just as Homer and Milton were essentially like Virgil and Cowper, although the two former were blind, and the two latter could see the sunlight.

But this is not all. We rejoice in the assurance that multitudes who believe at times in the strict sinfulness of our involuntary and passive states, do still at other and better times contradict themselves, merge their proposition back into the mere language of feeling, whence it first came out, and then they agree with their adversaries. As architecture has been called "frozen music," so many a scholastic proposition may be called frozen eloquence, or poetry which often melts again into its primitive and impressive form. The following are some proofs of the substantial unity among disputants on this theme.

First, many who insist that our passive sin is the punishment for our imputed sin, do yet often betray a belief that it is not so in any proper sense of the terms, for they often affirm that one sin is never the punishment of another. What! does a pure Father inflict iniquity upon his children? The very phrase "God inflicts sin" is, as Sir James Mackintosh would say, one of those "uncouth and jarring forms of speech not unfitly representing a violent departure from the general judgment of mankind." Will a wise God punish sinners by sentencing them to sin, the very state which as sinners they love more than all things else! Yet if there is one expression of technical theologians, more common than another, it is, that God inflicts our in-born iniquity upon us as a punishment for our iniquity in Adam. Spiritual death is a punishment for our imputed sin; our native corruption is part of our spiritual death; this corruption is sin, therefore sin is the punishment of sin.

Dr. Twiss, the learned Prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly, justifies the declaration that "the original sin which the children of Adam contract is a punishment of the actual sin committed by the same man." Beza says, "There are three things which make man guilty before God; first, the fault flowing from the fact that we all sinned in the first man; secondly, the corruption which is a punishment of that fault, and was imposed upon Adam as well as upon his descendants," etc. The renowned Chamierus writes: "Whence also Augustine calls original sin *the punishment of the first sin*. But how can it be a punishment, unless that first sin itself be imputed to us." Strackius describes "the actual defection of all the descendants of Adam, who assuredly, in the loins of their progenitor, revolted from God to the devil; and on account of that revolt a corruption or vitiosity of nature has been *inflicted* on man by the Deity in just judgment; both of which make man miserable and obnoxious to the anger of God, and to eternal damnation," etc. etc. See Riveti Opp. Tom. III. pp. 802, 804, 806, 809. Turretin (Inst. Theol. Elenct. Pars I. p. 693) quotes with approbation the words of Peter Martyr, "when he teaches that our original corruption is a punishment for the sin of Adam:

'Truly there is no one who doubts,' says Martyr, 'that original sin is inflicted upon us for avenging and punishing the first offence.' The learned Thomas Boston says (Body of Divinity, Vol. I. p. 308): "This want of original righteousness is a sin:—it is also a punishment of sin, and so is justly inflicted by God." See also Bp. Burgess on Original Sin, P. I. ch. 9. sec. 2.

Notwithstanding all the light reflected on this subject by New England divines, our Reviewer often adheres to the old representations. He says, "According to this view, hereditary depravity follows as a *penal* evil, from Adam's sin, and is not the ground of its imputation to men. This, according to our understanding of it, is essentially the old Calvinistic doctrine. *This is our doctrine*, and the doctrine of the standards of our church."¹ Again, after quoting with approbation the old Lutheran creeds, which declare that our defects and our concupiscence are punishments, the Reviewer sums up the whole by saying, "Hence, the loss of original righteousness, and corruption of nature, are *penal* evils. This, we are persuaded, is the common Calvinistic doctrine on this subject."² He often says, that our native corruption is the "effect," "result," "consequence," of God's withdrawing His Spirit from our race; and all this is explained by the remark: "We think the position of Storr is *perfectly* correct, that the consequences of punishment are themselves punishment, in so far as they were taken into view by the Judge in passing sentence, and came within the scope of his design."³ The Reviewer, then, is resolute at times in clinging to the old statement that original sin is the punishment of sin. But, are there not better hours in which his reverence for the moral government of God prevails over this artificial logic? He takes great pains to say in repeated instances, "*We do not teach, however, that sin is the punishment of sin.* The punishment we suffer for Adam's sin, is abandonment on the part of God, the withholding of Divine influences; corruption is consequent on this abandonment."⁴ And what are we to believe? *Now*, original sin is a penal evil, but *then* "we do not teach that sin is penal? *Here* it is, as Melancthon says, a punishment, but *there* "we *hardly* teach" that it is a punishment. (Bib. Rep., Vol. VI. p. 456.) In

¹ Bib. Repertory, Vol. VII. p. 410.

² Bib. Repertory, Vol. VII. p. 430, 431.

³ Bib. Repertory, Vol. VI. p. 464. This article is also unanimously ascribed to our Reviewer.

⁴ Bib. Repertory, Vol. VI. p. 453. It is interesting to remember that Augustine abounds with repetitions of the remark, that *sin is the punishment of sin*; see Wiggers's Hist. Presentation, Ch. V. VI. *Pelagius denied* it. What does our Reviewer infer, whenever he detects a New England divine in any agreement with Pelagius?

conflict with one objection, original sin is "truly and properly sin," *deserving* the Divine wrath; in conflict with another, it is a consequence of a penal abandonment; and with still another, the foreseen intended consequence of a punishment is itself a punishment; but still, human nature at last breaks down this frail metaphysics, and the Reviewer has the manliness to avow that "sin is not the punishment of sin." We knew that he did not practically believe it to be a real punishment, when he asserted that it was so. A good man can never hold out in such a belief. He may adopt various modes of explaining his inconsistencies, but the true mode is to confess that a pious heart triumphs over erring syllogisms. If any pious divine should venture to say in his prayers,¹ "Thou hast inflicted sin upon me, as a punishment for my having a previous sin imputed to me," he would mean that the primal sin was imputed to him in a figure, and the inflicted sin is likewise metaphorical, and the punishment is equally a trope, and the solemn import of the whole is, that a holy Sovereign, in testimony of his opposition to Adam's crime, has entailed appropriate evils upon all Adam's descendants. And in this style often impressive, but alas! how far from the "simplicity of the Gospel," we believe with tears, that our Judge has inflicted a peculiar kind of sin (i. e. evil) upon us in a peculiar kind of punishment (i. e. appropriate suffering), for another kind of sin which was in a peculiar way chargeable upon us, before "the first man-child was born into the world."

Secondly, divines who contend that our passive nature is itself sin, often disown their doctrine by affirming that God is not the author of any sin. This argument is in a short compass. Our Reviewer says, "that we have derived from Adam a nature not merely diseased, weakened, or predisposed to evil, but which is '*itself*' as well as all the motions thereof '*truly and properly sin.*'"² The first question is, Who made our nature? Did Adam create us? Did we create ourselves? The general belief of Calvinists is that God creates every human soul. Does not then the involuntary, inborn nature of the soul belong to the soul when made? It is the soul. The Maker of the spirit is the Maker of that nature. If that nature be sin itself, He is the author of sin. Does our Reviewer, in his calm hours, believe that? We presume not. Why not? Only because, in his calm hours, he does not believe that our nature as distinct from its

¹ Whatever is strictly true, may be expressed to the God of truth.

² Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 314, 315.

"motions" is "truly and properly sin." Every body knows that when Calvinists are charged with making God the author of sin, they deny that our nature is sin, just as positively as our Reviewer has affirmed it. When Pelagius accused Augustine of believing in a "natural sin," the pious bishop resented the accusation, and would not even sanction the phrase "natural," but insisted on the phrase "original sin." Turretin is clear in avowing that "the Bible makes a distinction between *nature* and the *sin* adhering to it," that "human nature is termed lawless, *not because it is itself sin*, but because having sin in itself it is well denominated sinful," and that such phrases as imply that our nature itself is sin are used "for expressing the magnitude of our corruption the more *forcibly*,"¹ i. e. they belong to the theology of feeling. So the sharp-sighted Pictet denies, just as pointedly as our Reviewer affirms, that the nature of man is itself sin; for he says that if it be sin, the author of our nature must be the author of sin; see *La Theologie Chretienne*, Liv. VI. chap. VII, VIII. Will our Reviewer, in order to reconcile himself with these Geneva divines, admit that he spoke in the language of feeling?

Thirdly, many who dispute for the doctrine of passive transgression, expose their habitual want of faith in it, by denying that we can strictly feel either penitence or remorse for it, or deserve on account of it the condemnatory sentence of the last day. What kind of iniquity is that in view of which we are to have no repentance or compunction? This involuntary sin is said to be the "causal iniquity from which all other comes, and which is therefore more dreadful than any other." Bishop Burgess calls it "in some respects more grievous and heavy than actual sins," and yet he makes the following confession: "Now in this strict sense, though it be our duty with sorrow to be humbled for original sin, yet we cannot be properly said to repent of it, because it was not a sin ever committed by us *personally*, or through our own *actual* will. So that although we may not so properly (it may be) exhort men to repent of this original sin, yet we must press them to a deep and daily humiliation under it, and that not as a punishment or an affliction only, but as a true and proper sin."² Is not Pictet an authority on this subject? When an-

¹ See, among other passages, Turretin, *Inst. Theol. Elenct. Pars I. p. 702*. Still, Turretin admits occasionally into his dogmatic style the same improper use of terms which we find in our Reviewer. But what does he mean in his more considerate hours?—Augustine contradicted himself in the same way.

² *Treatise on Original Sin*, Part I. Ch. II. Sect. 8. "Men," says Bishop Burgess, "may use words as they please."

answering the objection that we have no compunction of conscience on account of Adam's or our own involuntary sin, he says, "that as we ordinarily feel remorse on account of that only which we have done ourselves, when we see that we could have abstained from it, we must not be surprised if we feel no remorse on account of this original corruption."¹ Hundreds of the like confessions are to be found among such polemic writers even. They agree in declaring that the evil which God himself has inflicted on our natures, and inserted within them, is to be mourned over, but not repented of; that it calls for humiliation, but not remorse. This evil is therefore a very peculiar kind of sin, if it be sin at all. And, we put it to the conscience of preachers, What must be the moral influence of saying, in didactic style, that there is a real and literal *wickedness* of which men both *cannot* and *need* not properly repent. Does Inspiration thus speak of any *iniquity* "which needeth not to be repented of?"

It follows, of course, that if our native and passive state deserve not to be viewed with remorse in this world, it will not be punished with remorse in the world to come. The sure test of wickedness is, its moral desert of the condemning sentence at the last day. If any condition do not merit the final sentence it is not criminal. A nature may be intimately associated with iniquity, and as such may, like an instrument of death, be viewed with dread. But if it be precisely such as God made it, and if it have never transgressed any rule of action, how will it be condemned to the punishment which the law threatens? Where is the verse of the chapter which specifies the legal penalty threatened for no act of disobedience? Imagine that a new-born or an unborn child has never indulged or felt one wrong emotion;—such a state can be imagined, whether it have or have not been ever real;—and *in that state* the infant is summoned before its Judge, to give an account of itself just as it was made. In what words would be pronounced its sentence to an eternity of strict punishment? Repeat the words of its moral condemnation to the remorse which is the worm that never dies.—"Because I was an hungered, and thou gavest me no meat!"—"Inasmuch as thou didst it not to one of the least of these my brethren, thou didst it not unto me!"

In order to maintain the *ill-desert* of infants as soon as born, some divines especially in New England have maintained, with Clement, Origen and other Greek Fathers, that an infant commences its actual transgression on the very day of its birth. Thus they renounce the theory of a passive sin. Others maintain that an infant will de-

¹ La Theologie Chretienne, Liv. VI. Chap. VII.

velop its evil nature as soon as it leaves the world, and will deserve to be punished for this development, and so *they* renounce the theory that the undeveloped nature deserves to be strictly punished. Others maintain that an infant merits the penalty of the law, because and only because it actively sinned in Adam, and thus *they* too renounce the theory of a passive sin, ill-deserving in itself. Some affirm with Augustine, who has been named *durus pater infantum*, "that infants dying without baptism will, on account of their imputed sin, be in the mildest punishment (in *mitissima damnatione*);" but the great majority of modern Calvinists are indignant at being accused of believing that infants *will* be punished at all. Whence come these doubts? If infants are guilty of real wickedness before their own personal choice, why will they not be punished for it? Are men who found their whole theology upon "justice," to be shocked at the idea that justice will be executed? Is not this attribute an amiable and a glorious one? Shall Calvinists recoil from it? And besides, men speak of original sin as the source, the fountain of all pollution, and therefore as in many respects the most flagitious of all. From it all our choices derive their vile character. They would be innocent, if it were not for this. Why is it, then, that this fountal sin deserves less punishment than do the outflowings of it? Why is the superlative transgression to be most mildly avenged? The plain truth is, that human nature and sanctified nature give out under the notion of a criminality in which the criminal has had no choice, and every sign of shrinking from the idea that infants will be punished for their passive wickedness, is a sign of a practical unbelief that such wickedness deserves punishment. The Hopkinsian theory that they choose wrong as soon as they are born, is indispensable to the fixed conviction that they are ill-deserving as soon as born. Without that theory their ill-desert is a mere fitness for receiving certain insignia of disgrace; their punishment is that disgrace; it is appropriate suffering inflicted, like the pains of this life, by a sovereign for the sake of manifesting-abhorrence for all the occasions and concomitants of sin. *If* infants have *not* transgressed the law, they will certainly transgress it, unless saved by him who came to rescue the *lost*, and in this view they need the blood of the sacrifice. Now it is easy to see that such a loose idea of ill-desert and punishment is very common among those who deny the actual, and contend for the passive wickedness of infants. It is an idea which meets the moral taste. When Cranmer, exclaiming, "This right hand has offended," thrust it into the flames, he illustrated this vague and poetical notion of

penalty. The fire consuming that hand first of all, emitted light on the odiousness of the wrong choice which had prompted the evil movement of that hand. It was *justice* as a sense of fitness, which inflicted this evil upon the erring member. The sin of the hand was figurative, the punishment figurative, the justice figurative; but it is this very kind of punishment, justice, and sin which Calvinists often mean when they speak of the just penalties of involuntary sin. Their theology on this theme is often the sound theology of the heart.¹

Fourthly, many who contend, with our Reviewer, that our "nature itself" and "*all* the motions thereof," are "truly and properly sin," evince their practical disbelief of their doctrine, by confessing that we have by nature many amiable sentiments. Is there an amiable species of wickedness? They confess that Christ loved the unregenerate young man. Did he love sin? Is it to be said in a figure, that our great High Priest "was a sinner," and then literally that he loved a person whose "nature itself" and *all* whose motions, were "truly and properly sin"? The fearful question arises, *what* did Christ love in such a person? There is a limit, beyond which our Reviewer must not indulge in such extravagant language. When unguarded, it is full of danger. It drives men into Pelagianism. It has ruined thousands of souls. He must and will modify it into the assertion that Christ was pleased with a man whose nature was *on the whole* unlovely, and all whose VOLUNTARY "motions" were sin, but many of whose instinctive feelings were beautiful. What does the Princeton Review itself declare, when it approaches the truth "*at another angle*"? It says more than once, as in Vol. XI. p. 369, "*Every* one performs a multitude of acts, because they are right." But every one is not regenerate. Therefore, millions of unregenerate men, whose nature itself and "*all* whose motions are sin," perform right acts. Hence, as that Review divides original sin into imputed and inherent, and then subdivides inherent sin into negative and positive, it must complete its analysis by dividing our actual sin into right sin and wrong sin. That Review insists that its theology is not "philosophical." It is not; but it is far more philosophical than biblical, save when it turns back its theories into "intense expressions of the New England divinity."

Fifthly, many who contend for the doctrine of involuntary sin, virtually confess that they use the term, sin, in a metaphorical sense. Our Reviewer has abundantly shown that this word is often used as a figure of speech; for the whole doctrine of imputed sin is, accord-

¹ See pp. 618, 619 above.

ing to him, a doctrine of sin without any moral demerit. If, then, the first and fundamental part of original sin, be thus metaphorical, it is easy to show that the second and third parts of it have the same nature with their foundation.¹

Many use the word, *sin*, to denote the occasion of a wicked choice. When asked whether the involuntary occasion, apart from the choice itself, deserves eternal punishment, they will often reply, or rather, He who made them, replies through them, No. We say the same. The natural tendency of an excited mind is, to indulge in the metaphor of "the cause for the effect." Thus we speak of a cannon as cruel, on account of the pain which results from it. Much more, then, may we speak of our disordered nature as sinful, because it so infallibly tempts us to transgression. But of such a style we say in our calmer hours, as Turretin says of Ezekiel 18: 20, "Non est absolute et simpliciter intelligendus prout sonat." Alcohol tempts men to iniquity, and is itself iniquity — in a figure of speech. Turretin, conceding that the law does not prohibit our being born with inherent corruption, yet affirms that this corruption is legally condemned, "because it opposes that righteousness and sanctity which the law does exact of all;"² i. e. the law requires holiness, but not a *native* freedom from corruption, *in and of itself*. It is a sin, because it opposes holiness, i. e. because of its tendencies, not its nature. The renowned Pictet has the following note-worthy passage: "It is objected that God has not, in his law, forbidden original corruption, and therefore it is no sin. I reply, that *we must not be surprised if the law has not at all forbidden original corruption, because the law supposes*

¹ Here we may observe, in passing, that none are more inclined than our Reviewer to interpret certain phrases as figurative, and none are more inclined to complain of others for doing the same thing. He sometimes evades, for example, the biblical doctrine of General Atonement, by pleading the metaphorical character of the passages in which it is plainly taught. He opposes the commentators who do not infer from the Bible, that Christ was literally punished. But, why? Because the Bible plainly declares that he was punished. In what passages? "He bore our *sins*," etc. Are those passages literal? Then some venerable divines are right in affirming that Christ literally took upon him our *iniquities*; see p. 598 above. But, no, our Reviewer says, those passages are figurative; sin is used in a *metaphor*, for the punishment of *sin*. Indeed! Then the very phrases which affirm that Christ was literally punished, are, after all, metaphorical! Why was not this thought of before? So turns the kaleidoscope. Nothing, however, can be more natural than all this. It is a proverb, that we are willing to speak of our own favorite *words* or *friends*, as we are unwilling to hear others speak of them.

² Theol. Inst., Pars I. p. 699.

man innocent, and it forbids only actual sins, such as Adam could commit. Further, it cannot be denied that the law requires perfect holiness, to which this corruption is adverse." ¹ What are we to infer? Plainly that our passive sin becomes a transgression of the law, merely as it induces that which *only* is a transgression of the law, and which *only* is sin in the biblical sense. This is the theology of the Convention Sermon.

But, again; these divines often confess that they use the term passive sin, to denote a mere result of wrong preference. When asked whether the result, apart from that choice, merits everlasting punishment, they will often give way to the inspirations of Heaven, and answer, just as we answer. No. Nothing is more natural than for a man, grieving over the dire effects of his perverse will, to exclaim, they are sinful effects, just as he speaks of the peace flowing from a good life, as a holy peace, just as he uses, in any other instance, the metaphor of the "effect for the cause." In this manner our involuntary evil propensities are termed sinful, because we have voluntarily indulged, and thereby strengthened them. If we had uniformly resisted them from the earliest period of our moral agency, we should have secured that aid by which we should have subdued these inward foes. Our sin lies in not choosing to resist, in preferring to gratify, in harboring them, in adopting them as our own, and this sin is metaphorically extended to the objects which it cherishes. ²

It is psychologically interesting to see how often our native corruption is termed sin because, according to the ancient Calvinistic theory, it is the result of our own ante-natal offence. It is so termed, not because apart from its occasion it deserves the penalty of the moral law, but because it presupposes that ourselves have in some way performed an act which deserves the penalty of that law. The judgment of man will at last wind itself through all sorts of theories into the belief that nothing can be blamable, save as it stands related to a choice. It is because original sin involves our choice in Adam, that many Calvinists have supposed it to be our real sin. It is not our inherent, as separate from our justly imputed wickedness that condemns us; but it is original sin in the large sense, including our primitive volition to incur all our present evils. ³ In Riv. Opp. Tom.

¹ La Théologie Chrétienne, Liv. VI. Chap. VII.

² So likewise it has been pretended, that we are morally guilty of Adam's sin, because we acknowledge that sin as our own, by every act of voluntary transgression. We adopt it, and so far forth are voluntary in it.

³ No source of mistake is more copious than this. We are apt to suppose that

III. pp. 801, 803, 813, 815, 817, 820 will be found nearly all the following citations, which are no less important for the mere psychologist than for the theologian.

It is not only said by Cardinal Toletus that "all in Adam were forbidden to eat of the tree," but Protestant Molinaeus declares that "we sinned in Adam and therefore in him we *willed* this depravation." N. Hunnius teaches, that as the first sin "was committed voluntarily by Adam, so likewise it was committed *voluntarily* by all individuals, and as all were voluntarily made sinners in Adam, so all coming from him are born *voluntary* sinners." "They who pronounce that sin (of all men in one) simply involuntary," says Francis Junius, "are very much deceived, since the same thing may be said to be voluntary and involuntary in various respects, whether you regard its generation or its constitution. For, on account of our common origin, it was the voluntary offence of all men in Adam sinning (although it was not voluntary in respect of our individual origin); and it is voluntary in respect of ourselves as individuals on account of what we are, (although it arose from a corrupt nature brought upon us and not from our own will); that is, from the origin of our individual nature and not from our *volition*." Grossius, speaking of the sin which *all human nature* committed in and with the first pair, says "For the will of the progenitors was the will of their descendants, and the descendants *willed* in their progenitors, in whom as in the root of the entire human race, the descendants sinned and transgressed the law." Pfeilen says, that the sin of the first man, which may be regarded as a sin of nature rather than of a person, "cannot be termed involuntary in respect of infants, because it took its origin from a vicious will, and the first will of sinning man was, as it were, the will of the entire human race." The phrase "as it were" means that the will was that of the race virtually, though not in their separate individuality; see pp. 614-15 above. The noted Transylvanian

when the old writers ascribe a bad moral quality to our passive nature, they always do it without regard to our having willed that nature. Sometimes they do so; but the *theory* is, that original sin as a whole is blameworthy, because it involves our Paradisiacal choice.

There is another theory which may here be mentioned as illustrating the fundamental law of human belief, by which men are *compelled* to admit the indispensable connection between all blameworthiness and choice. It is the theory of the *scientia Dei media*, according to which God foresaw how all men would have acted, if they had been in Adam's place, and he therefore holds them ill-deserving for what they would have done if they had existed then, there, and in those circumstances. He *interpreted* Adam's act as if it had been theirs, because it would have been theirs if they had been in the condition to perform it, and thus they did perform it "*interpretatively*," and are punished justly! This theory is often resorted to as a temporary refuge from the absurdities of our really sinning in Adam. But why flee to these fictions of a *presumed* or a real choice? Why not say, that we are guilty without any choice, real or presumed? It is because every body knows, maugre all his theories, that our choice is *essential* to our guilt. Suppose it be said that we cannot be blameworthy, unless we be poets. Would our divines endeavor to prove that all men are poets in Adam, or were *presumed* to be poets? Why not? Because there is no law of the mind *demanding* such a belief. All these fictions of our Paradisiacal sin are the signs of our constitutional tendency to believe in the voluntariness of all sin.

Catechism expresses the doctrine with singular clearness. The question stands: "Is original sin a punishment or a sin?" The answer follows: "*It is a sin (culpa), if you consider the whole human race to have been in Adam as the root, (Rom. 5: 12); but it is a punishment if you regard the corruption which inheres in each individual.*" That is; it is a sin so far forth as, and in the sense in which we existed in Adam, but as our individual attribute it is not a sin but a punishment. As a mere passive state it is not blamable, but as involving our original choice it is so. That stout English champion for inherent sin, Bishop Burgess, frequently contradicts himself by admitting that it "doth necessarily imply," has "an inseparable connection" with, and "is always to be looked upon as a relative to" imputed voluntary sin. Bishop Burgess on Original Sin, Part I. Chap 9. Sect. III.; also Chap. 2. Sect. X.

Did such great men practically believe, that we had put forth a moral choice before the birth of Cain? Believe it? They believed it, just as they believed that an equitable ruler requires us to accomplish literal impossibilities, and will punish us eternally for not doing what no being in the universe can do; for not even an omnipotent Being can accomplish impossibilities. Believe it? They founded a theory upon it. They reasoned at times as if it were true; and their theory was, that "our voluntary participation in the crime of our first parents" is the cause of our inborn corruption, and therefore we are blamable for that corruption, and that corruption is our sin, so far forth as it is the result of our own voluntary sin, for all our sin is voluntary in its origin, voluntary on our part, and all our corruption is sin only as it was thus originally willed by us. That original will being given up, the corruption ceases to be our sin. The wickedness of the cause was thus metaphorically extended to and over the result. Even the diluted Calvinism with which our Reviewer contents himself, recognizes the principle that our evil nature is the effect of our antecedent sin, of a voluntary sin imputed to us. So far forth as it is imputed, it is our own voluntary transgression, and the cause of our corruption. Therefore he says, "if the doctrine of imputation be given up, the whole doctrine of original sin must fall."¹ Why so? No other reason can be divined, than that our disordered nature is not sin except as related to our causal imputed crime; i. e. it is not sin in and of itself. We are born with this disordered nature. This is a fact. No metaphysics can explain the fact away. Is this nature sin? '*It is sin, if the doctrine of imputation be true; it is not sin, unless that doctrine be true.*' Exactly right. The passive sin depends on the imputed sin, and our Reviewer confesses at times that the sin, as imputed, is not a moral, ill-deserving one; and therefore, if he be self-consistent, he must confess that the passive sin has the same figu-

¹ Bib. Repertory, Vol. VI. p. 93. See also Dr. Hodge on Rom. 5: 12-21.

rative character. It is reprehensible, just as our sinning in Adam was reprehensible, and our critic, in certain states of mind, abandons the doctrine that our Paradisiacal crime was a reprehensible one. By a single application of his match, he has exploded that ingeniously articulated system of imputation which ancient theorists imagined would be more durable than the Kremlin itself; and now he must not attempt to hold firm the superstructure of an edifice which he has shattered to its foundations. It is a plain case. There is no help for our Reviewer. He must agree with us so long as he does not retract his reiterated concessions. Here it stands. Is sin a transgression of the law? Yes. What law was addressed to our nature before our birth? No law except that addressed to our nature in Adam. Then there was no real sin, except as we were once in Adam. But our Adamic life was figurative, as our critic admits; then the resultant sin is figurative; and this is our passive sin. How can there be a literal transgression of a figurative law? How can the embryo child be ill-deserving for its nature, viewed as opposed to a command addressed to it impersonally, i. e. metaphorically? We by no means imply, that the masters of Calvinism have never represented a passive state to be blamable, apart from its voluntary origin. They have done so. Often, too often. But they have not seldom detected the absurdity of the representation, and have then allied the passive with the first voluntary sin, and have derived from the latter all the guilt of the former. They have conceded, that the nature was culpable because the result of a blameworthy cause; and if the voluntariness of the cause be denied, the criminality of the effect ceases. If a corporeal movement is wicked, merely as the result of an antecedent will, then it is not wicked in itself; and if our senses and intellect and entire nature are wicked, merely as related to the crime which we virtually committed in Eden, then they are not wicked in themselves. Here again Calvinism and Hopkinsianism coalesce in denying the criminality of any state which does not involve our own choice. Here, too, we see the inconsistency of those who believe in a passive, in-born wickedness apart from our own fault in the first man. They sever the branch from its root. They cherish the result of a principle while they discard the principle from which alone that result can rightly spring.

But again, and more in general, the believers in a passive sin often virtually confess, that they use the term *sin* to denote all the concomitants of transgression; not only the cause and the result, but also the other adjuncts of it. Deep emotion prompts us to call a plat of

ground holy, when it is connected with holiness, and to call a nature sinful, when it is connected with sin. Unregenerate children are termed "holy," in 1 Cor. 7: 14, by the metaphor of an adjunct for the main subject; much more, then, may an uninspired man venture on the same metaphor, and term such children criminal, when in point of fact, "they have done neither good nor evil," Rom. 9: 11. Now, that standard writers have often employed the phrase, inherent sin, in this tropical sense, is obvious from the fact, that they represent this sin as existing in the reason, the judgment, the appetites, indeed in all the powers and states of the intellect and body. Sin is in our blood. Augustine often describes our wickedness, as belonging not merely to the soul, but to the "whole man," soul and body.¹ Calvin speaks of the intellect, will, and *flesh*, the entire person, as being "nothing else than concupiscence," which is sin;² and he speaks of sin as "spread over our *senses* and affections," and "all parts of our nature," "every part, without exception,"³ of course physical and intellectual. Turretin often calls the body corrupt, and calls corruption sin; he denies that sin is propagated either into the body or the soul, as separate from each other; he denies that the body, apart from the soul, is the subject of sin formally and completely, but he affirms that it is so, initiatively and radically.⁴ The Symbols of the Reformers describe original sin as "a corruption of the whole nature, and of all the powers, but especially of the higher and principal faculties of the soul, in mind, intellect, heart, and will;" "the mass out of which men are now made by God, has been corrupted and perverted in Adam;" the elements of our bodies are "contaminated by sin;" "concupiscence is not only a corruption of the corporeal qualities, but also," etc.⁵ Bishop Burgess not only "anatomizes the sinfulness of the memory, and other intellectual powers," but he also admits the sinfulness of "the whole body." Sometimes, however, he explains himself to mean that "sin is not properly, till the soul be united to the body, yet because that (the body) is part of man, sin is there inchoatively and imperfectly, because it is in tendency to make up man," etc.⁶

Our respect for the good sense of these writers, forbids us to be-

¹ Wiggers's Hist. Pres., Ch. V.

² Inst. L. II. C. 1, § 8, 9.

³ Com. on Rom., 7: 24.

⁴ See among other places, Tur. Inst. Theol., Pars I. pp. 706-710.

⁵ Form. Con., pp. 640, 647. Con. Aug., 55, [25.]

⁶ Treatise on Original Sin, Part I. Ch. I. § 1. See also Boston's Body of Divinity, Vol. I. pp. 309-321. Gill's Body of Divinity, Vol. I. pp. 523, 529, 530.

lieve that they fell into the habitual absurdity of supposing the intellect or the body to be sinful in the literal sense. In fact, they *could* not have forced their minds up to such an anomalous conviction, without long intervals of rest. Nature will not bear it. For a man to act on the principle that his nerves and bones are in themselves criminal, is no more consistent with mental sanity, than for him to act on the principle that they are intelligent; and, out of Laputa, a man can no more persevere in practically believing his mere intellect to be criminal, than in believing a rock or a clod to be so. And yet, a thorough Calvinist can no more believe in the passive sin of the heart, than he can believe in the sin of the muscles and veins. It must habitually be regarded as a figurative sin.¹

Sixthly, the advocates of the doctrine that our nature is itself sin, often virtually confess that they use the word *nature* in a figurative sense. Properly it denotes that which is distinct from action and, above all, from voluntary action. It denotes either our faculties and sensibilities themselves, or the mutual relation between them, or both. But when divines affirm that this nature is criminal, they often tacitly conjoin with it a state of action, and especially of voluntary action. Thus they all appeal to "the flesh" and to the "law of the members," in Gal. 5: 17 and Rom. 7: 23, as illustrations of the corrupt nature; but this "flesh" and this "law in the members" are not generally conceived of as a dormant state or condition, but rather as an energetic principle, not indeed identical with a wicked choice, but yet intimately allied with it, and often comprehending it. At times we distinguish the tendency from the preference. In general we confound them. It is very difficult, especially for untrained minds, to imagine the youngest infant as altogether inactive and involuntary. Andrew Fuller goes farther than this, too far, and substitutes *impossible* for *difficult*. "To talk of an involuntary propensity in the mind of a rational being," he says,² "is to talk without meaning, and in direct contradiction to the plainest dictates of common sense. If, then, the concurrence of the will denominates a thing blameworthy, we need have no more dispute whether an evil disposition in a rational being be in itself blameworthy; seeing the concurrence of the will is included in the very nature of a propensity." This, although an extreme statement, is yet sufficient to show the tendency of men to

¹ Pres. Appleton says, "Intellects, simply considered, are not the seat of moral disorder, [i. e. sin.] The understanding, if we speak with precision, cannot be depraved, [i. e. sinful.] Lectures, Vol. I. pp. 443, 444, 447, etc.

² Fuller's Works, Vol. II. p. 527.

include a choice in a propension, and to ascribe the sin of the propension to the choice which it includes, rather than to an involuntary state.

Seventhly, many who dispute for a sin of nature as distinct from one of choice, expressly declare, that they do not mean by sin a moral quality. What was the opinion of that authoritative bishop from whom, more than from any other man, the doctrine of original sin has been derived? Augustine, especially during his later years, taught, with as much emphasis as our Hopkinsian divines, that all moral character consists in preferences; that all iniquity has and must have its origin in the will;¹ also, that the "sin in the members" of the baptized "is not called sin in the sense of making us guilty, but because it was produced by the guilt of the first man; and because, by rebelling, it strives to draw us into guilt," etc. etc. "As far as respects us, we should always be without sin, until the evil (our concupiscence) were cured, if we were never to consent to evil."² He often denominates this evil an infirmity, but not of itself our fault; and says of concupiscence that "though called sin, it is not so called because it is itself sin, but because it is produced by sin, just as writing is called the HAND of some one, because the hand produced it. But sins are what are unlawfully done, said, or thought, according to carnal concupiscence or ignorance, and when committed they, unless forgiven, hold the persons guilty."³

Our Reviewer represents us as attempting to accomplish a "feat" in reconciling Augustinism with the "radical principles" of the sermon which he has assailed. Did he not know that Augustinism has been repeatedly explained by its great author, as in essential harmony with those radical principles? Did he not know that Augustine often wrote in the language of feeling, and that after all his eloquent expressions in regard to passive sin, he declared them to be only figurative expressions? Does our Reviewer agree with Augustine? If not, is he ready for his favorite inference, that whoever differs from the African bishop is a Pelagian? Does our critic now see any need of his stating or rather mis-stating a German theory, as one by which we might be suspected of harmonizing Augustine's reiterated assertions that all sin is voluntary, with the same assertions in a New England discourse?

A volume might be filled with similar testimonies from ancient

¹ See his Unfinished Work, IV. 103

² C. Jul. II. 9, 10.

³ C. Duas Epp. Pel. I. 13, a work written only ten years before Augustine's death, and eight years after he commenced his controversy on original sin.

worthies. Notwithstanding all that our critic has imagined (p. 319) about "the names of all generations of saints inscribed on" the walls of his own Gibraltar, yet even he must confess that the Alexandrine and Greek Fathers stood upon no such fortress of strife and tumult, but occupied the same broad and peaceful ground which the Dwights and Appletons of New England have enlarged and enriched as the garden of the Lord, and on which the sword will soon be beaten into the ploughshare.—But leaving the fathers, let us listen to the voice of the clearest thinker among the Reformers. Zuingli, in his *De Peccato Originali Declaratio*, says, that he will not contend about a word, that he will permit men to call our native tendency to self-love by the name of sin, and, if this be not sufficient, by the name of wickedness also, crime and profligacy; but he insists that so far forth as it is passive and inborn, it is "not a sin but a disease."¹ "Original sin I have called a disease and not a sin, because sin is conjoined with fault, but fault arises from the transgression of one who has chosen wickedness."² "Our original fault is not called a fault truly, but metaphorically on account of the offence of our first parent."³ "Therefore that propension to sin through self-love is original sin, which propension indeed is not properly a sin, but is a source [of it] and natural bent [to it]. We will give an example from the young wolf. It is in all respects a wolf as to its natural bent, and by its ferocity would be led to commit all depredations. But as yet, it has borne away no plunder, because it could not on account of its age. In consequence of its nature, however, the hunters no more spare it than they would spare a wolf from whose jaws they seize the prey;⁴ for although young, yet even now its nature is so thoroughly understood by them that they know it will, when grown up, follow the ways of its species. This native bent, then, is original sin or vitiosity, but the act of plunder is sin, which comes from this native bent; this itself is sin in the act, which more recent authors call actual sin, and which properly is sin."⁵ So in his celebrated *Confession of Faith*, Zuingli says: "Whether we will or not, we must admit, that original sin, as it exists in Adam's descendants, is not properly a sin, as has now been shown; for it is no wicked act

¹ Huldrici Zuinglii Opera, Vol. III. p. 628.

² *Ib.* 629.

³ *Ib.* 629.

⁴ Zuingli believed, as we do, that our native disease would expose us to future suffering, unless it were removed by Him who came to heal our sicknesses. This suffering is not a punishment, in the sense of implying any real sin. It is a punishment in a loose sense.

⁵ Huldrici Zuinglii Opera, Vol. III. pp. 631, 632. The same also is frequently repeated in this Treatise.

against the law. It is therefore properly a disease and a condition: It is a disease, because as he fell through self-love we also fall in the same way; it is a condition, because as he became a servant and guilty of death, so we are born servants and children of wrath, and consequently are subjected to death."¹ That our original sin is improperly so termed, and is merely a "disease," a "rupture," is often reiterated by this excellent reformer, in his Treatise on Baptism, his Commentary on Romans, and his Letters to Oecolampadius. And so, on this doctrine, and if on this, then on many other doctrines, Zuingli has bound together multitudes of verbal polemics; for various parties are willing to confess, that our nature is itself sin, *provided that* it be such a kind of sin as is produced by God who never produces any real iniquity; such a kind of sin as is viewed, in and of itself, with regret instead of remorse, humiliation instead of penitence, and is followed with suffering instead of *that* punishment which the law threatens against all transgressors; such a kind of sin as derives all its wickedness from its being a cause or effect or concomitant of what is truly iniquitous; such a kind of sin as, according to Augustine, the chief author of the doctrine, is properly called a disease rather than a transgression of the law. And we ask as a favor from our assailants, if they persevere in asserting that "our nature itself, as well as all the motions thereof, is truly and properly sin," to give a definition of the conscience which condemns this passive nature; and also, that they point out the inspired passage in which this inborn nature is prohibited by the law, and that they rehearse the words in which it will be sentenced to the legal penalty at the last day. *When and where*, (and if nowhere, why so) are we exhorted to "*resist the beginnings*" of this germinal iniquity? not to *enter* upon that state which to its own wickedness superadds the shame of originating all other abominations? Commit a passive iniquity? Exhort men against being born with evil tendencies? What is the passive voice of the verb, *sin*? What is the inactive form of the word, *evil-doers*? Why is language made without any such phrases as to endure or suffer a criminality without any criminal volition? The language of every man whispers the truth, that in practical life, whatever he may do among his books, he no more believes in this peculiar metaphysics of involuntary sin, than Bishop Berkeley believed in the non-existence of the material world.²

¹ Martin Luther's Sämtlichen Schriften, Band XX. ss. 1942—1943, and Huld. Zuing. Opp. Tom. IV. p. 6.

² We request an answer to these and similar questions *as a favor*. We are entitled to demand such an answer *as a right*. It may do for once, but it will not do

"Truly," says John Calvin, "I abominate mere verbal disputes, by which the church is harassed to no purpose; but I think that those terms ought to be religiously avoided, which sound as if they had an absurd meaning, especially where error is of pernicious consequence."¹ Now, it has been a great aim of New England writers, to dispense with such terms in doctrinal discussion, and confine them to their appropriate sphere. They have watched the theology of good men in its alternating forms of beauty and of power, and have tried to seize and portray, and even *daguerreotype*, those features into which it has been wont to settle down as its natural expression, after all the changes of its emotive style. Thus have they held up the enduring substance of doctrine, to be looked at not only through the stained glass of the old artists, but also in the pure light of heaven. It was natural that men who criticised the endeared phrases of other times, and condemned the errors into which those powerful phrases had often beguiled their adherents, should be repaid by volleys of intemperate words, even from those who at times make the same criticisms, and renounce the same errors. If rivers have been stained with blood by means of the verbal controversies on Nominalism, still more in theology, where the feelings of men are swift to rise, must we expect that "Gibraltar or Ehrenbreitstein" will bristle with armor, whenever the gentlest query is whispered about the safety of some figurative expressions. But, our consolation is this, that the distinctive theology of New England is not opposed at the present day, unless it be first misrepresented; and when its arguments press hard, we are often told that we say "*the very thing* which the old Calvinists" meant; and when we name the great and good men who have stood forth as champions of our "three radical principles," we are assured that "Nolo contendere" is inscribed on every gun which was once pointed against the theology of Andrew Fuller; and when we assail the old doctrine "Lumborum Adae," we are gracefully reminded that the doctrine is covered all over with fig-leaves and flowers of rhetoric, and it now lies snugly hidden "*behind the walls of Gibraltar or Ehrenbreitstein.*" Very well, if our opponents will be so kind as to qualify all the terms which we criticise, why may we not

twice, for our Reviewer to escape from all objections by the plea: "*Having failed so entirely to understand the Sermon, we shall not be presumptuous enough to pretend to understand the Reply,*" Bib. Repertory, XXIII. p. 307, and by then proceeding to discuss a theory of Schleiermacher, which has no more connection with the Sermon or Reply, than it has with an acute-angled triangle.

¹ Inst., Lib. II. Cap. II, § 7.

cultivate the pacific arts and virtues? This is our aim. With this design was an humble sermon preached on "the one theology in two forms." It was intended not to shield such men as Pelagius from the charge of heresy, but such men as our Reviewer, from the charge of remaining *steadfast* and *uniform* in an absurdity. It was meant to be an olive branch of peace. But it is now found out to be first a '*weapon*, striking a blow upon *sturdy* trees;' ¹ secondly, "the last *arrow* in the *quiver*;" ² and thirdly, if it be what its author avows it to be, then it is a "penny whistle."³ We shall not dispute about a name. We only re-assure our excellent Reviewer, that the Sermon was intended to call forth no such "*sort* of a model of candor and charity,"⁴ but to accelerate the coming of the day when every "*weapon*" of war shall be turned into a pruning hook, and when "the leopard shall lie down with the kid."

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

I. ANDREWS'S EDITION OF FREUND'S LEXICON.⁵

It is a little remarkable, that the people that are most fond of theorizing, and of daring speculation, furnish the most patient lexicographers. Holland has lost her old reputation for plodding scholarship. The mantle has fallen on the cousins beyond the Rhine. Men are found, who will devote themselves, year after year, with uncomplaining and iron diligence, to all the researches, comparisons, discriminations, re-examinations, protracted and almost endless studies, which are needed, in order to complete their great vocabularies. Scarcely had Pape come to the end of his Greek Lexicon of more than 3100 octavo pages, and while the new edition of Passow was lingering in mid course, when Drs. Jacobwitz and Seiler, moved by the want of a good Greek lexicon, brought out the "*greater Manual*" containing 208 *Bogen*.

¹ Bib. Repertory, XXII. p. 674. ² *Ib.*, XXIII. p. 320. ³ *Ib.*, XXIII. p. 341.

⁴ "We wrote a Review which we intended to make a *sort* of a model of candor (?) and charity," (1) etc. Princeton Review, XXIII. p. 307.

⁵ A Copious and Critical Latin-English Lexicon, founded on the Larger Latin-German Lexicon of Dr. William Freund; with Additions and Corrections from the Lexicons of Gesner, Facciolati, Scheller, Georges, etc. By E. A. Andrews, LL. D. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1851. pp. 1668.