

Theology on the Web.org.uk

Making Biblical Scholarship Accessible

This document was supplied for free educational purposes. Unless it is in the public domain, it may not be sold for profit or hosted on a webserver without the permission of the copyright holder.

If you find it of help to you and would like to support the ministry of Theology on the Web, please consider using the links below:



Buy me a coffee

<https://www.buymeacoffee.com/theology>



PATREON

<https://patreon.com/theologyontheweb>

[PayPal](#)

<https://paypal.me/robbradshaw>

A table of contents for *The Evangelical Quarterly* can be found here:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_evangelical_quarterly.php

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS*

Modifying the well-known words of Schiller: "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht,"^(a) Theodore Lessing referred to history as a "Weltgedicht."^(b) This is but one of the expressions used by this scholar to emphasise the fact of the subjective element which enters into all study of history, and the writing of history. But he has overdone it. What else can history be, then, than the "Vorurteile der Historiker in Erzählung gebracht"!^(c) Or, to go still further: we do not only not know the sense of things, but things have no sense! History is "Sinngabung des Sinnlosen"!^(d)

Although these ideas were presented with a glow of conviction on the part of Lessing, they were not accepted by the large majority of people. Even since 1919, when Lessing uttered the statement made above, we have continued to speak of the sense of history. The need for doing this, and the certainty that in the study of history we were concerned with objective reality, simply will not permit itself to be shoved aside by some theory.

I

The idea that humanity "im Grossen und Ganzen"^(e) moves from the lower to the higher, is not the only idea that has found support in the attempt to explain the development of things. To be sure, there are not many companion ideas. Setting aside for the moment the specific-Christian view, there is—if I see things correctly—but one: the idea of the *μέγας ἐνιαυτός*, of the eternal cycle of things,² in which the world-process repeats itself in great periods of time, or, à la Spengler, divides itself into a

* This Article is an English translation of Professor Dr. Van Schelven's Article ("De Idee van den Vooruitgang"), that is to say, originally written in Dutch. In the text of the English translation it was thought better to allow quotations from French and German authors to appear in the original form of those quotations. Nevertheless, we deemed it expedient to give in the form of footnotes translations of the French and German quotations. Small roman letters in brackets point to translations. Arabic numerals give the author's references, which, in this instance, will be found at the end of the article.—END.

(a) The history of the world is the judgment of the world.

(b) a world poem.

(c) prejudices of historians introduced into narrative.

(d) Enlightening of the senseless.

(e) On the whole.

group of cycles lasting more or less ages, running parallel with each other, and independent of each other, rising into glory and then receding into nothingness again. Rousseau's negative answer to the prize question of the University of Dijon, concerning the consequences which the advance in the arts and sciences have for morals, may make the impression that there is still another attempt to explain the problem; but upon closer investigation it appears not to be the case. For Jean Jacques, notwithstanding all his pessimism, was just as much an advocate of the idea of progress as any of his contemporaries. Palissot de Montenois did not unjustly poke fun at his affective glorifying of an Arcadian pre-historic time when, in his *Les Philosophes* he has one of his characters, crawling on hands and knees, say :

“ En nous civilisant, nous avons tout perdu,
Le santé, le bonheur et même la vertu,
Je me referme donc dans la vie animale ;
Vous voyez ma cuisine,
(Il tire une laitue de sa poche)
elle est simple et frugale.”³ (4)

Still keeping aside the Christian view, the choice in finding an idea that can be said to control the multitude of historical phenomena, must be between the world-year or cycle and progress. The latter one carries us much further into the question of the sense of history than does the former. At present it occupies the stage.

Some sing the praises of progress up to this very moment, although hesitating perhaps to guarantee it for the future, or else limiting it to the leading peoples of the earth. And there are also different shades. The French and the English defenders of the idea of progress usually look at it as a task: through purposive action we must see to it that the world progresses. The Germans are accustomed to speak of it as a destiny that is reached by the ruling of forces outside of ourselves, and without our assistance. One pictures progress in the form of a spiral, and the other pictures it as a series of ups and downs, or as a hop, skip and jump process of three steps ahead and two steps to the rear. But all this does not alter the fact that the belief in the idea of progress is practically a universal belief. A man like Spengler with his: “ Ich sehe keinen Fortschritt, kein Ziel,

(4) With civilisation we have lost everything, health, happiness, and even virtue, and so I live the simple life of the animal; see my fare (he draws a lettuce from his pocket), it is simple and frugal.

keinen Weg der Menschheit, ausser in den Köpfen abendländischer Fortschrittphilister,"⁽⁶⁾ "really stands alone with his grim pessimism. At least, over against the ten of his contemporaries who stand by him, there are a thousand who agree with the sentiment of Ferdinand Tönnies, expressed some three years ago in his *Fortschritt und Soziale Entwicklung*^(h): "Nach allen Voraussetzungen und bisherigen Erfahrungen der Menschheit muss erwartet werden, dass ein Zeitalter vieler Jahrhunderte bevorsteht worin Dissolution über Evolution das Uebergewicht erhält, und dass in diesem Prozess die heute noch fruchtbare Kultur Europas, die sich auch ferner auf die übrigen Erdteile verbreiten wird, ihrem Verderben und Tode entgegen geht . . . Aber die Geschichte der Menschheit wird damit nicht beschlossen sein. In dem Untergange selbst werden von den unzähligen Keimern, die in den zerfallenden Früchten enthalten sind, einige einen neuen und fruchtbaren Boden finden, innerhalb des Unterganges selbst und darüber hinaus. Es scheint ein weiter Raum für die Vermutung offen zu liegen, dass auf die Zeitalter der immer umfassender gewordenen Volkskulturen eine universale Kultur der Menschheit folgen wird, in der die Menschheit einer gemeinsamen Sprache und anderer gemeinsamer Zeichensysteme sich bedienen, in der sie von einer gemeinsamen Wissenschaft sich wird leiten, in der sie eine wahrhaft platonische Religion der Verehrung des Wahren, Guten und Schönen pflegen wird und gelernt haben wird, ihre echten Güter zu verwalten und im ewigen Frieden nicht mehr ein entferntes Ziel mit unzulänglichen Mitteln zu erstreben, sondern eine unmittelbare und von selbst verständliche Notwendigkeit ihres Daseins zu erkennen . . . Nach vielen Jahrtausenden wird die Menschheit vielleicht einem Zustande der Vollendung entgegenreifen. . . . Dieser ferne

(6) I see no progress, no goal, no path of mankind, except in the minds of the progressive Philistines of the West.

(h) *Progress and Social Development*. "In accordance with all suppositions and previous experiences of mankind, it must be expected that an age of hundreds of years, in which Dissolution gains the ascendancy over Evolution, is imminent; and that in this process, the still productive culture of Europe, which is to spread even further to the other continents, is going to its ruin and death . . . But the history of mankind will not end there. In the ruin itself some of the innumerable germs which are contained in the falling fruits will find a new and fruitful soil within the ruin itself and above it. A wide space for the conjecture appears to lie exposed, that a universal culture for mankind will succeed the age of the cultures of nations which has become more comprehending, a culture in which mankind will make use of a common language and of other common signs; systems in which they will be guided by a common knowledge, in which they will enjoy a truly platonic religion of worshipping whatsoever is true, good, and beautiful, and in which they will have learned to manage their individual gifts, and in eternal peace not to strive after a distant goal with inadequate means, but to recognise an immediate and clearly intelligible necessity of their existence. After many thousands of years mankind will perhaps attain to a state of consummation. . . . This distant point of time might perhaps denote its death and happy end—'eine Euthanasie.'"

Zeitpunkt würde vielleicht ihren Tod und ihr seliges Ende bedeuten—eine 'Euthanasie.' ”

Did you notice how I tried to direct your thoughts in a very definite direction in the sentences preceding this quotation? I mentioned the “faith” in the progress of mankind and life. With a purpose! For this is, to my mind, the very first thing that must be mentioned concerning the idea of progress: we have to do here not with an idea that is based upon scientific certainty, but with an idea that is a postulate of the feeling of its advocates.

As soon as science (wissenschaft) is asked for her opinion in this matter, insofar as science can speak here, we notice a negative reaction. This is equally true when science confines itself to a scholarly research of the facts of history, as when science goes on to philosophise in general.

If science is to do the first, then, it appears to me, she may not allow the opinions of von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff any rights, opinions which he expresses as follows: “Der Schakel heult in Ephesos, wo Heraklit und Paulus gepredigt hatten: in den Marmorhallen von hundert kleinasiatischen Städten wuchern die Dornen und kauern nur vereinzelt verkümmerte Barbaren; Wüstensand wirbelt über den Göttergarten Kyrenes. Doch wozu Bilder aus der Ferne? Wer einmal mit Nachdenken über das Forum Roms gewandert ist, muss inne geworden sein, dass der Glaube an den ewigen, kontinuierlichen Fortschritt ein Wahn ist”!⁽¹⁾ Let this all be true; but the power of proof which the writer finds in it, is lacking. The fall of a sphere of culture does not necessarily argue for the decay of the culture itself. It is entirely possible that that culture lives on in another sphere, in another place, even while the shell in which it was originally contained, is broken to pieces. Does not the preaching of St. Paul, of which mention was made, offer evidence for this? The only way, it appears to me, which does not lead to disappointment, is the following: I must assure myself of the norm which guides one's speaking of progress, and of the goal toward which one thinks progress is going. Having established that, I must ask myself whether the study of the facts really does show a progress, in harmony with the norm and goal which have been asserted.

⁽¹⁾ The jackal howls in the city of Ephesus where Heraclitus and Paul had preached; in the marble halls of a hundred small Asiatic cities thorns grow in profusion and only some detached groups of stunted barbarians cower there; sand from the desert whirls in clouds above the garden of the Gods in Cyrene. But why do we take illustrations from the past? Any person who has in thought wandered through the Forum of Rome must have realised that belief in eternal and continual progress is a delusion.

Let us turn first to this problem of a norm. Things are pretty well confused here, and we shall have to go to work carefully. Scholars interested in this problem have most certainly given such a norm. Hegel said that the measure of freedom of which successive generations have been conscious, was the norm. Herder measured the various periods of culture especially by the quality or content of their humanity. Rickert asks the question of the degree in which a period realises values. And so we might go on. But these are things which interest us very little just now. For we are not concerned here and now about the idea of progress as it is experimented with abstractly in the laboratories of the various investigators, but we are viewing it as a historical reality, as an *agens* in the life and world view of the great mass of our contemporaries. But again, we do not find unanimity of opinion.

Looked at from the outside, the idea of the progress of culture and humanity exists entirely loose from an interest in a norm. The world progresses, voilà tout! People are not asking questions, as, for instance: From which viewpoint is it progressing? In all of them? If not, in which is it, and in which is it not? Or does a possible reversion compensate the advance in another field? Neither are they concerned about the goal toward which we are progressing. "Den Fortschritt um des Fortschritts willen zu bejahen," and, "immer weiter in unendlichen Fernen und Weiten hinaus zu bilden und zu schaffen an einem Werk, das niemals seinen Abschluss erhält"⁽¹⁾—this is the way Mehlis states the attitude which has been taken by people.⁷

But it is not sufficient merely to have pointed out that people are usually not concerned about norm and goal in this matter of progress: I must also show that they have used norms and goals just the same. They do so unconsciously, but they do it.

One's attention need hardly be drawn to the fact that much of the writing about progress, even in our popular books, centres itself about the idea of progress in the field of technique. Mention is made of the progress in traffic affairs, progress in all discoveries, briefly, the reigning over inanimate nature by the cleverness of the human spirit. Does not this show that—even

⁽¹⁾ To stand for progress for the sake of progress, and, to build ever outwards in unending distances and spaces, and to be occupied with a work which never has an end.

though unconsciously—this proposition is being defended: man progresses in enlightenment because he approaches more and more a state of culture wherein his perfect technique will evidence his unlimited rule over nature? And next to this can we not see two other threads of the same kind in that progress-weave? We can best state them as follows: humanity advances in happiness, because it is constantly coming into an enlarging of the comforts of life, and to such a state of culture in which the Hutchesonian utilitarianism with its "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" shall be realised. And: humanity is progressing in morality, for it is coming closer and closer to a state of culture in which the good nature of man shall be able to reveal itself without any hindrance; and humanity is coming to this state, because a constantly increasing number of people are admitting the fact of a natural code of morals, even though they do not always abide by it.

Are these propositions supported by a definite research into the facts of history, or not? George Mehlis tells me, "ob die Philosophie des 19 Jahrhunderts unserer grossen klassischen Philosophie gegenüber als Fortschritt bezeichnet werden kann und darf, das möchten wir billig bezweifeln"^(k)⁸; and an authority like Dupréel warns me not to allow the progress in technics to blind me⁹; and Ranke, speaking about the conquering of the East first by the Turks and later by the Mongolians, adds: "die Barberei, welche damals über den Orient sich ergoss, beherrscht ihn noch heutzutage, und wir sehen hier an einem eklatanten Beispiele, wie wenig an einen allgemeinen Fortschritt des menschlichen Geschlechts zu denken sei"^(l)¹⁰; and Theodor Lindner, when speaking of the general praise of progress, and the conduct of our own contemporaries, can say nothing better than: "Jede Uebergangszeit . . . bringt hässliche Erscheinungen hervor . . . Die allmähliche Gewöhnung an das Neue, an den Gebrauch erlangter Freiheiten wird hoffentlich Abhilfe bringen und die jetzt versagte Anerkennung des Geleisteten einer besseren Erkenntnis weichen"^(m)¹¹; and when,

(k) We might justly question whether the philosophy of the 19th century in opposition to our great classical philosophy can and may be classed as progress.

(l) Barbarism, which at that time spread to the east, governs it even at the present time, and we have here a striking example of how useless it is to think of a common progress of the human race.

(m) Every time of transition brings to light ugly appearances . . . The gradual accustoming to what is new and to use of acquired liberties will, it is hoped, bring redress, and submit the recognition of things accomplished, the recognition which is at present denied, to a better perception.

added to all this, questionnaires formulated in harmony with scientific methods, show how the industrialising and the Taylorising of our social life lead to an amazing drying up of the human in man, and how the increasing ease wherewith the comforts of life can be reached by the masses, does not seem to increase the harmony between man's desires and the satisfying of them—considering all this, surely no one can honestly claim that a careful searching of the facts supports the assertion that there is evidenced in history that which supports the idea of progress.

I reach the same result, namely that the idea of progress does not rest upon scientific ground, when I admit arguments which are more purely speculative. Berdjajew, the Russian exile, says: does not the doctrine of progress continually make the last generation a vampire, which takes away the meaning of every former generation by calling them mere means for the bringing forth of the last one; and is the continual robbing of the soul of the past for the benefit of the last generation, acceptable?¹² And then, too, do not they who think that they may argue for the idea of progress from the facts of history, confine their conclusions entirely to facts as they see them in western Europe and North America? But is this right? Can a hypothesis which is submitted to explain an infinitude of phenomena have any value when I leave out of consideration, in the forming of the hypothesis, three-fourths of the material which I give as basis for the hypothesis? Truly, the euphoristic philosophy, which is a learned name for this idea of progress, may often give the impression that it is based upon facts and rational reasoning: in reality it is a notion to which one clings in spite of the fact that it does not agree with the visible things of life any more than with simple judgments of a more theoretical nature. It is a postulate of the feeling of man, not at all the result of learned research.¹³

II

Some fifty years ago every city in the Netherlands, and even the small villages had their local branch or unit of the Liberal political party. These units were called by the name: Progress. The relation between the name: Progress and the Liberal Party can easily be seen. We have to do here with the fruits of that great tree which¹⁴—since about the latter part of the seventeenth

century—cast its shadow increasingly over all of European life. It had three large branches: Deism in England, the Encyclopedists in France, and the *Aufklärung* in Germany. To be sure, Jules Delvaille has tried to deny this by placing the origin of the idea of progress back in Ancient times.¹⁵ But *omnium consensu* he has not succeeded in proving his case. The fact of progress with which we are concerned in this study is not found wherever the word progress may be found. There may have been the idea of progress before 1700, since history never shows a sudden change. But the idea of progress did not appear upon the stage of the world before the great thinkers such as Hobbes (d. 1679), Locke (d. 1704), Leibnitz (d. 1716), and Christian Wolff (d. 1754, but already professor at Halle in 1706), began to exert their influence; nor before the ideas as taught by these men were brought into practical activity through the great discoveries of Newton (d. 1727), Huygens (d. 1695), Van Leeuwenhoek (d. 1723) and others. These were the days of Iselin (d. 1768) and Condorcet (d. 1794), and Turgot (d. 1781) who wrote so enthusiastically:

On voit s'établir des sociétés, se former des nations qui tour à tour dominant d'autres nations où leur obéissent. Les empires s'élèvent et tombent; les lois, les formes du gouvernement se succèdent les unes aux autres; les arts, les sciences se découvrent et se perfectionnent. Tour à tour retardés et accélérés dans leurs progrès, ils passent de climats en climats. L'intérêt, l'ambition, la vaine gloire changent perpétuellement la scène du monde, inondent la terre de sang; et, au milieu de leurs ravages, les mœurs s'adoucissent, l'esprit humain s'éclaire, les nations isolées se rapprochent les unes des autres; le commerce et la politique réunissent enfin toutes les parties du globe; et la masse totale du genre humain, par des alternatives de calme et d'agitations, de biens et de maux, marche toujours, quoiqu'à pas lents, à une perfection plus grande.¹⁶

The relation here is so intimate that the idea of progress may be called the theory of history which has its origin in the new life and world view.

(¹⁵) One can see societies being established, nations being formed which, alternately, rule over other nations or obey them. Empires rise and fall; laws, forms of government, succeed each other, the arts and sciences are discovered and perfected. Sometimes helped and sometimes hindered in their progress, they pass from country to country. Self-interest, ambition and vain glory continually change the scenery of the world and flood the land with blood; and in the midst of their ravages, manners become sweetened, the human mind becomes enlightened, nations beforetime apart are brought together again; commerce and politics finally reunite all parts of the globe, and the whole mass of the human race, by alternatives of peace and tumult, of good and evil, ever advances, though slowly, to a greater perfection.

For a long time this theory has been called unhistorical. It is not difficult to recognise in it a great carelessness for the past. Because of its rationalism it preferred to draw out one thesis after another in a doctrinal way out of the accepted basic thesis, rather than keep its eye on the manifold facts. And there was lack of piety there. Nor is that all. As in every great spiritual movement there is here also a composite character. So that alongside of this rationalism, there is also a tendency running through it, which is more friendly toward history.¹⁷ For instance, the idea of the history of culture which is so important to-day, originated with Voltaire. And there is Hume's *History of England* which came forth out of this period, and Gibbon's *Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire*, a book which Moritz Ritter calls "eine bahnbrechende Leistung," and—notwithstanding its attack upon Christianity—"ein bis dahin noch unerreichtes Muster einer auf selbständigen Urteil beruhenden, ein weites Gebiet der allgemeinen Geschichte bewältigenden Geschichtsdarstellung."^{(o)18}

The idea of progress originated in this historical tendency in the new culture-movement. As to the manner in which this happened, we refer to what Erich Seeberg has written.¹⁹

According to this scholar the roots of the new theory of history must be found in the two main tendencies in church history. There is first of all the "Verfalls-idee" which is supported by people who think that the church has fallen from the ideal condition of the apostolic time, a fall which dates either from the time of the death of the apostles, or from Constantine the Great, or from the sixth century. Then there is the "Traditions-idee"^(p) which expresses the idea that the church has continually kept the truth unchanged; if anything, the light of the truth has become brighter.

Seeberg then adds the question: Has not the "Verfalls-idee"^(q) continually tried to undermine the authority of the past; and has not the "Traditions-idee," by its glorifying of the present, sought to create the impression that the golden age is in the present? So that negatively and positively these two ideas have helped to establish the idea of progress. After that the "Verfalls-idee" had cleared the ground, the "Traditions-idee," which, by the nature of the case, was supported more by the

(o) . . . a hitherto unsurpassed model of an interpretation of history, resting on independent judgment and mastering a wide field of general history.

(p) traditional idea.

(q) the idea of the ruin (fall).

organised Church than by smaller sects, gradually, via the contra-reformation, grew into the idea of progress.

I find it difficult to admit the correctness of this contention of Seeberg. Were the historians the first to work with this idea of progress? It appears not. At least, what Seeberg says of Voltaire is not true.²⁰ For in his case Englishmen, and especially the leaders in the natural sciences, are responsible for his belief in the idea of progress. And as far as the others of whom Seeberg makes mention, it seems to me that he will not easily prove his case. He has substituted a logical association for an historical one. To me another interpretation seems much more acceptable.

Before 1876 Nietzsche placed the idea of progress in the category of the "flausenhafte Begriffe,"⁽²¹⁾ judging it so unfavourably because he felt that a Christian Theodicy in disguise was being formed through it.²² Is it not possible that this qualification helps us unto the right track? Can it not be true that the efforts to support the doctrine of the perfection of God in the midst of the suffering and sin in the world, have played a very definite and controlling part in the origin of the idea of progress?

A strong life of faith does not stumble over this question. But as soon as rationalistic tendencies begin to influence religious certainty, this all changes. And so it occupied a large place in the new life and world view. Where this new life and world view broke radically with Christianity, this question did not arise. But when this new life and world view hesitated (as, for instance, in English Deism and the German Aufklärung) to draw the logical conclusions from its first principle, the question did most certainly arise. Leibniz, the founder of the German Aufklärung, devotes special attention to it. But this Leibniz was the man who, philosophically speaking, plowed and dragged the land for this idea of progress! In his book *Essais de théodicée de Dieu etc.* this doctrine of progress and Theodicy are very intimately related: there is much woe and much evil in the world, but this is nothing compared to the good we find there: it is merely the dissonant bringing about a contrast; after a while the harmony of the universe will be heard much clearer on account of it; and not only this harmony of the universe, but also a "perfectio" of the human race, such as we had never dreamed.

⁽²¹⁾ false conceptions.

To what extent this relation between the idea of progress and a Theodicy has influenced the practical writing of history in the generation following Leibniz is still a matter for research. But it does seem that the truth is here rather than where Seeberg thinks he finds it.

It is no surprise that the idea of progress—advanced systematically by the Free Masonry and the Order of the Illuminated—gained ready entrance in the eighteenth century. How well it fitted in with the ideas of the social life of Europe which was reaching so high. It is remarkable that it outlived the days of the French Revolution, and the régime of Napoleon, and even the march to Russia. At the same time, all this misery did bring about modifications. The idea of progress had lost its attractiveness for the ruling and the aristocratic classes. It was only for the citizenry and the working class that it remained the lodestar. But even there it is showing itself with two distinct phases. In Anglo-Saxon countries there is developing a liberal-citizen party, while in France, and since Marx and Engels also in Germany, it reveals itself in the proletarian-social-democratic form, with all its positivism and materialism and a looking forward to the ideal state.²²

Neither of these two phases would have experienced the growth which they have experienced, had it not been for the favourable influences of German idealism, especially that of Hegel, and the doctrine of evolution which, although begun in biology, soon reached out in influence over all the spheres of human culture. Through all this the idea of progress seemed to secure for itself a scientific legitimacy. Not only the approval of philosophy and science, but even of the natural sciences! And that at a time when the natural science methods still wore the halo of infallibility.

In practice the ideas of progress and development are usually considered to be identical. Naturally, this is not correct. Development is not much else than movement in the same plane. Whether we construe that movement as "Développement," as "explicatio," as unfolding of the talent and the possibilities which were always there, although dormant; or whether we construe it as a mechanical reaction to all chance stimulations coming from the outside—it is all movement on the same plane. But progress means the going from bad to good, from lower to higher. The idea of progress originated in the eighteenth

century, whereas the idea of development is of a much earlier date. There could be no study of history were this latter not there. But in the first periods when this development was first spoken of as a ruling factor in the world process, it missed every scientific quality. It was used naïvely and unconsciously. Philosophical Idealism became master of it at last, using it as the best medium to help in the answering of the questions of history, namely, how a few great spiritual factors could manifest themselves in an infinite variety of historical phenomena, and to tabulate those phenomena. This Idealism was superseded when later on Darwin's doctrine of descent seemed to establish the truth and the exactness of that development. Directly, of course, for biology. But indirectly also for other sciences, including history. This evolution, and also the idea of progress, appeared at last to be an absolutely guaranteed, undeniable truth, concerning which no person with brains could possibly cherish a doubt.

Boehmer in his "Moderne Apokalyptik" says that this faith in progress is: "in vollständiger Auflösung begriffen."^(s)²³ But is this true?

It is true that the doctrine of evolution which supported this idea of progress so strongly during the second half of the nineteenth century, has suffered a dethronement in the really scientific circles. In 1894, Ratzel already pointed out in his *Völkerkunde* how untenable it was for his branch of science.²⁴ Since then further investigation and clearer thinking has showed that in other regions of scientific research it clashed with the facts presented.²⁵ While this is all true for biology, ethnology, and the history of religions, it is equally true for history. And this is the point of interest for us just now.

I need not mention here the real historians. They have never yielded their heart either to Hegel or to Darwin. F. Chr. Bauer, the historian of Dogma, is the great exception; Heinrich Leo, on the other hand, while he followed the philosopher from Berlin for a while, soon retraced his footsteps. Von Below says very correctly²⁶: "Jede selbständige Forscherarbeit liess die Formeln Hegels als Zwang erscheinen."^(t) And as far as Darwin is concerned, you will not find the name of a real historian (*vakhistoricus*) among his followers.

^(s) *Conceived in complete dissolution.*

^(t) Every independent piece of research made Hegel's formula appear as coercion.

While representatives of several historically orientated sciences such as theologians, sociologists, historians of philosophy and others, did, at the time, greet the evolution doctrine as a new gospel, they are practically all marching back to their former position. On the one hand, perhaps not all of them will speak as strongly as Th. Lessing who once spoke of Hegel and Darwin as "Kopfeverwüster des 19 Jahrhunderts"²⁷; on the other hand, it is possible that Hegel with his idea that history has as its task—and is able to perform it!—the laying bare of the providential plan of God in the development of mankind,²⁸ has a larger following in the popular-Christian view of history than one would expect: but, as a rule, they are turning in another direction. They are paying more attention to the main-currents and contra-currents, the under-currents and the top-currents in the march of events, rather than to one straight constantly progressing line. They are returning to Ranke's idea of a vertical meaning of each period alongside the horizontal meaning which the period has.²⁹ Or, if you will, they are going back to Augustine's idea which states that the polarity of two opposite spiritual factors plays the leading rôle in the movement of things, rather than a continual progress, even though one pictures that progress as having the ups and downs of a wave.

It is surprising, in view of all this, how little the attitude toward the idea of progress has been changed. There have been modifications, to be sure. The hopes of the "Fortschrittler" are not as high as once they were. Especially in the Anglo-Saxon world the continual asking as to whether the facts upon which the idea of progress is based, are really being interpreted correctly, does not add at all to the certainty of it. But even at that, we cannot speak of a disappearing of the belief in the idea of progress. One sees in this the truth of the distinction of Chantapic de la Saussaye that faith in evolution is not directly nor absolutely a product of the doctrine of evolution.³⁰ While the doctrine could have been done away with, the attitude toward it, and the faith in it still abides. We have already quoted Ferdinand Tönnies. Here are other witnesses: Did not F. Müller-Lyer in the second edition of his *Der Sinn des Lebens*, published in 1919, say that it was "unendlich förderlicher"^(u) to have the growing youth read Condorcet's *Progrès de l'esprit humain* than the *Iliad* or the *Anabasis*? And listen to these words of one of the

(u) infinitely more beneficial. . . .

century, whereas the idea of development is of a much earlier date. There could be no study of history were this latter not there. But in the first periods when this development was first spoken of as a ruling factor in the world process, it missed every scientific quality. It was used naively and unconsciously. Philosophical Idealism became master of it at last, using it as the best medium to help in the answering of the questions of history, namely, how a few great spiritual factors could manifest themselves in an infinite variety of historical phenomena, and to tabulate those phenomena. This Idealism was superceded when later on Darwin's doctrine of descent seemed to establish the truth and the exactness of that development. Directly, of course, for biology. But indirectly also for other sciences, including history. This evolution, and also the idea of progress, appeared at last to be an absolutely guaranteed, undeniable truth, concerning which no person with brains could possibly cherish a doubt.

Boehmer in his "Moderne Apokalyptik" says that this faith in progress is: "in vollständiger Auflösung begriffen."^(s)²³ But is this true?

It is true that the doctrine of evolution which supported this idea of progress so strongly during the second half of the nineteenth century, has suffered a dethronement in the really scientific circles. In 1894, Ratzel already pointed out in his *Völkerkunde* how untenable it was for his branch of science.²⁴ Since then further investigation and clearer thinking has showed that in other regions of scientific research it clashed with the facts presented.²⁵ While this is all true for biology, ethnology, and the history of religions, it is equally true for history. And this is the point of interest for us just now.

I need not mention here the real historians. They have never yielded their heart either to Hegel or to Darwin. F. Chr. Bauer, the historian of Dogma, is the great exception; Heinrich Leo, on the other hand, while he followed the philosopher from Berlin for a while, soon retraced his footsteps. Von Below says very correctly²⁶: "Jede selbständige Forscherarbeit liess die Formeln Hegels als Zwang erscheinen."^(t) And as far as Darwin is concerned, you will not find the name of a real historian (*vakhistoricus*) among his followers.

^(s) Conceived in complete dissolution.

^(t) Every independent piece of research made Hegel's formula appear as coercion.

While representatives of several historically orientated sciences such as theologians, sociologists, historians of philosophy and others, did, at the time, greet the evolution doctrine as a new gospel, they are practically all marching back to their former position. On the one hand, perhaps not all of them will speak as strongly as Th. Lessing who once spoke of Hegel and Darwin as "Kopfeverwüster des 19 Jahrhunderts"²⁷; on the other hand, it is possible that Hegel with his idea that history has as its task—and is able to perform it!—the laying bare of the providential plan of God in the development of mankind,²⁸ has a larger following in the popular-Christian view of history than one would expect: but, as a rule, they are turning in another direction. They are paying more attention to the main-currents and contra-currents, the under-currents and the top-currents in the march of events, rather than to one straight constantly progressing line. They are returning to Ranke's idea of a vertical meaning of each period alongside the horizontal meaning which the period has.²⁹ Or, if you will, they are going back to Augustine's idea which states that the polarity of two opposite spiritual factors plays the leading rôle in the movement of things, rather than a continual progress, even though one pictures that progress as having the ups and downs of a wave.

It is surprising, in view of all this, how little the attitude toward the idea of progress has been changed. There have been modifications, to be sure. The hopes of the "Fortschrittler" are not as high as once they were. Especially in the Anglo-Saxon world the continual asking as to whether the facts upon which the idea of progress is based, are really being interpreted correctly, does not add at all to the certainty of it. But even at that, we cannot speak of a disappearing of the belief in the idea of progress. One sees in this the truth of the distinction of Chantapie de la Saussaye that faith in evolution is not directly nor absolutely a product of the doctrine of evolution.³⁰ While the doctrine could have been done away with, the attitude toward it, and the faith in it still abides. We have already quoted Ferdinand Tönnies. Here are other witnesses: Did not F. Müller-Lyer in the second edition of his *Der Sinn des Lebens*, published in 1919, say that it was "unendlich förderlicher"^(a) to have the growing youth read Condorcet's *Progrès de l'esprit humain* than the *Iliad* or the *Anabasis*? And listen to these words of one of the

(a) *infinitely more beneficial.* . . .

representatives of public opinion of a people who, more than any other, show a uniformity of thought and life—the American people: “the human race is susceptible of improving to a higher state of excellence than the world has yet known!” And then, although showing a bit of hesitation, he adds: “Until we have tried seriously and systematically . . . we do not and cannot know how far the world can be made a better and a sweeter place to live in.”³¹

Does this persistent toughness of the idea of progress have a special reason? I think it has!

III

It is a remarkable phenomenon that the belief in the idea of progress has an unmistakably strong similarity with the picture which the Christian philosophy of history gives, upon the basis of the Bible teachings, of the course of the world-drama. Even as the idea of progress, so, too, does the Scripture picture the course of the centuries as a movement toward a kingdom of eternal peace and paradisaical happiness. This is not always the case in Scripture, for this is not the only picture it gives.

For centuries the Biblical metaphysics of history spoke of a continued retrogression. Following that which Daniel describes in the dream of Nebuchadnezzar wherein he saw an image with a head of gold, a breast of silver, belly and thigh of brass, legs of iron, feet part of iron and part of clay (Daniel ii. 31 ff), and that which Daniel himself saw when one after the other there came up out of the sea a lion with the wings of an eagle, a bear, a leopard and a beast with ten horns (Daniel vii. 2 ff), the Christian philosophy of history spoke of the world history as of a history of four great kingdoms each overcome in turn by a lesser kingdom. But since then this Christian philosophy of history has come to see that the idea of “*translatio imperii*,” whereby it had explained all of history by prophecies which concerned only a part of history, is untenable; and that the idea that the Roman Empire and all its power had been carried over from the emperor at Byzantium to Charlemagne and his successors, and that this should continue to be the case up to the end of the world, is contradicted by the facts of history. In a book published in 1712 by the Wittenberger theologian Jan, this theory gives its last gasp.³² In these days a combination of the thoughts from Paul’s letters and the Revelation of St. John give the characteristics of the Christian

philosophy of history. It is here that it secures the nature and the measure of the rythm of the process of history. The content for this philosophy it finds in the Revelation of St. John, while the writings of St. Paul suggest the framework in which this content is placed.³³ And perhaps even more than in the writings of the Apostle, it is found in the address delivered on the Areopagus at Athens. There he speaks of the nations of the earth made from one blood, for to dwell upon the entire earth, living and moving and having their being in God, moving forward to a day in which the Eternal shall judge righteously by a man whom He has ordained thereto, assuring this to all; since He has raised him from the dead (Acts xvii. 24-31). Rochol gives in a nutshell that which interests us most here: "Der Anfang der Geschichte, das eine Blut, der Schluss der Geschichte, der eine Tag, begegnen sich in der Mitte der Geschichte, dem einen Mann, und finden hier ihre Erklärung."^{(v)34} "Der Schluss der Geschichte, der einen Tag"! And remembering now how that day is pictured in the painting of Isaiah xi. as a day when all disharmony will be done away: then there is—is there not?—a very striking similarity between this Christian conception of the meaning of history and the idea of progress.

Naturally, there are also points of difference. The idea of progress rests upon a basis of optimism, and says with Leibniz, "tout est bien," or with Voltaire in his *Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne* :

"Un jour tout sera bien, voici notre espérance ;
Tout est bien aujourd'huy, voilà l'illusion."

On the other hand, the Christian philosophy of history, remembering the fact of sin, really does not know any more than Augustine did, whether life should be called "vita mortalis" or "mors vitalis." It can conceive of the coming era of happiness only in terms of the *palingenesie* and the *anakephal-aiosis* in Christ (Eph. i. 10). In the idea of progress we see the development, even though there are greater or less reversions or retrogressions, going steadily upwards. The Christian philosophy of history says that the law of the grain of wheat is followed, which dies in order that it may bring forth fruit; the development must go through such a fierce crisis that it all but ruins it. And finally, the Christian philosophy of history

^{(v)34} The beginning of History, the one blood, the conclusion of History, the one day, meet in the middle of History, the one man, and here find their interpretation. The conclusion of History, the one day.

conceives of the march of things as being an *explicatio* of the potentialities which are within the God-made plan, while the idea of progress speaks of evolution. So there is so much wherein these two views resemble each other that it is not out of place to ask a question about their mutual relation.

This question becomes necessary because in speaking of "das eine Blut," "der eine Tag," which meet in "dem einem Mann," we have to do with a specifically Christian conception of history. The ancient historiography has had some great representatives. Herodotus, Thucydides, Polybius, Trogus Pompei and others are names which sound well even to-day. But even in the best of them there is no arriving above the recording of one people and the idea of the incessant cycle of things. The ideas of "humanity" or of "development" did not exist for them. Christianity brought these ideas into circulation.

But what is the relation between the Christian philosophy of history and the idea of progress? It seems to me that this question has two phases: a purely historical and a sociological phase. Historically, I ask whether there is a mutual dependence between these two; sociologically, I ask whether the fact that there are these two ideas in the human race is to be regarded as inexplicable, or whether it is transparent.

Dependence between these two phenomena? Certainly. One proof for this is given in an article in which ten years ago Von Martin compared the motives and tendencies of Voltaire's recording of history with the work of Bossuet.³⁵ Voltaire refused to have anything to do with the idea of "l'aigle de Meaux," that the *providentia Dei* rules the process of history. But he could not remain standing at this point of denial. After having dethroned God, he needed another power, or rather, another intelligence whereby the events were guided. And so he postulated the influence of the human *ratio* and the continual increase of this *ratio*. We can speak here of an "Umkehrung Bossuet's." "Die neue Geschichtsauffassung . . . erblickt den Sinn und Inhalt der Weltgeschichte nicht mehr in dem ewigen Kampf des Glaubens gegen den Unglauben, sondern in dem grossen Kampf der Vernunft gegen die Unvernunft. Ein intellektualistisches Ideal hat das religiöse in der Herrschaft abgelöst."^(*)

(*) The new understanding of history no longer discovers the sense and content of the history of the world in the eternal struggle between belief and unbelief, but in the great struggle between reason and irrationality. An intellectual ideal has set the religious ideal in the government free.

A clear proof—but only one! I admit that. On the other hand, it seems to me that I may emphasise here that it is Voltaire who shows the relation between the idea of progress and the Christian philosophy of history—Voltaire, who was more than an original thinker; Voltaire, whose utterances, according to Victor Hugo, represented much more “un siècle” than “un Homme.”

Is this dependence to be shown only from the side of the idea of progress? Or is it mutual? It would not be surprising if it were so. Even as the dogma of the Church has usually been called into existence because of some heresy, so does the Christian life and world view usually come to a clear consciousness of her convictions because some idea arising outside of her boundaries forces her to think things through and to incorporate that strange idea in harmony with her fundamental principles, or to condemn it. Could that not be the case here? The scheme of the four kingdoms as taken from Daniel's prophecy, was retained by the Christian historiographers until the eighteenth century, and finally let go. But did they drop this idea of their own accord? It seems that other things led them to it. During the Renaissance it had already been bombarded by Bodin; in the seventeenth century Chr. Lehmann broke down the companion doctrine of the “*translatio imperii*,” causing the original doctrine to undergo various modifications; and finally, the death blow was given by way of a concession to the Enlightenment.³⁶ So that, while much remains still to be studied, it does seem that the facts at least indicate that the idea of history which attaches itself to Paul, and which replaced the theory of the world-kingdoms, really underwent the influences of the historiographic ideals of Voltaire and others.

By way of a discussion of the sociological aspects of this case, I reach my conclusion.

In spite of all that I have said, I have surely left here and there a feeling of dissatisfaction. I have said so little concerning that which for most students of this subject is the most vexing part of the problem, namely, whether this faith in progress really is right. Does the improvement which they postulate, really exist or not? I admit that this dissatisfaction is justified, for I have left this question alone. I have limited myself and have only wanted to point out that a careful research of the facts does not give a sufficient basis for a belief in progress;

reminding you of what I have already stated above, that we are absolutely dependent here upon the norm which we accept as to the purpose of history, and upon the question whether we conceive of progress as being in a straight line or a broken line.

As to the real question, I see no sense in following it any further, for all the time spent would be lost time. A conflict of centuries has certainly made this very clear: that it is impossible by all manner of argumentation to arrive at a conclusion which would be binding, since every judgment in this matter is an individual judgment. Supposing I should add my judgment to the many that have already been given, what would that help us? We can only advance when we succeed in making clear for ourselves how this idea of progress—although the facts give it so little support that one could deny it—still always thrusts up its head with an incomparable vitality; how the “no” to which many come on the basis of scientific research, always is drowned by the “yes” which pays no attention at all to the scientific results.

Could the statement of Friedrich Paulsen offer the key to the solution: “Freilich, wir träumen alle einmal den Traum von einem Lande, in dem es keine Arbeit und keine Unruhe, kein Uebel und kein Böses gibt, den sehnlichen Traum vom Paradies” ^{(*)37} It seems quite probable to me. A millenium idea lives in the soul of man. Alongside the mourning over a lost golden age, such as we find in the ninth century before Christ in the writings of Hesiodus, there is also a longing for an era of happiness in the future. Fritz Gerlich, in his *Der Kommunismus als Lehre vom tausendjährigen Reich* (Munchen 1920) has given an illustration of this in the words of the Communist Weitling, the predecessor of Karl Marx: “Einen neuen Messias sehe ich mit dem Schwerte kommen, um die Lehren des ersteren zu verwirklichen. Er wird durch seinen Mut an die Spitze der revolutionären Armee gestellt werden, wird mit ihr den morschen Bau der alten gesellschaftlichen Ordnung zertrümmern, die Tränenquellen in das Meer der Vergessenheit leiten und die Erde in ein Paradies verwandeln” ^{(*)38} (pages 18, 19). But this is not the only one of whom we could remind you. Think

(*) Of course, we all dream once of a land, in which there is no work and no unrest, no evil and no wickedness—the passionate dream of Paradise.

(*) . . . I see a second Messiah coming with the sword, to bring to realisation the lessons of the former. By reason of his courage he will be placed at the head of the revolutionary army, will utterly destroy with it the decaying building of the old social order, will lead the streams of tears into the sea of oblivion, and change the earth into a paradise.

of what Bernheim and Kampers have brought to light concerning the expectations in the Middle Ages of a "Messiaskaiser der Endzeit," an expectation which was so apocalyptic in its character that they first believed it to be fulfilled in Frederick II, while later they transferred it upon Frederick Barbarossa. Or think of the ideas and ideals which Jan van Leiden and his followers tried to realise at Münster, and the Quintomonarchists during the reign of Cromwell in England, as well as the ideas of the Roozenkruizers and of Jacob Böhme.³⁹

Is it not possible to find this idea of the millenium in the idea of progress? When in 1780 Lessing published his book on *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*, Kant dubbed him a philosophical Chiliast! Does this not support the probability of the relation which I have suggested?

In the light of these things, it seems to me, we can ultimately explain the remarkable relation between the Christian philosophy of history and the idea of progress.

I agree with Berdjajew when he says that the faith in progress—just as much as the "Weltwiedergeburtsidee" to which Burdach and Borinski have devoted so much careful study,⁴⁰ and the "idée Messianique" about which others have written⁴¹—has come forth out of the thought-world of the Divine Revelation, and thus has the same roots as the Christian philosophy of history. In the idea of progress there lives the Christian hope, the longing for the coming of the Saviour, of which the Old and the New Testaments speak. At the same time, it is but a shadow of that hope, a faded copy of that longing, because the original idea has broken loose from the Revelation. Or, to state it differently, it is the humanised Christian idea of the future. It is the hope of the coming of the Kingdom of God transposed, moulded into the secular, the worldly, and amounting to no more than the "diesseitige."⁴² This is the correct light in which to view it. For, since it is remoulded, cut loose from its roots, we can explain the contradictions which mark the idea of progress. On the other hand, the fact that it is ineradicable we explain by saying that this idea of progress has got to remain as long as the human expectation of the future, of which it is an expression, must still look forward to its realisation.

Unnoticed we arrive here at a point where it is clearly shown how great the significance of the Christian faith has been in the

history of the utterances of the human *logos*. Could we find a better stopping-place?

A. A. VAN SCHELVEN.

Haarlem, Holland.

¹ Zie Theod. Lessing, *Geschichte als Sinnggebung des Sinnlosen*³ (München 1921) passim.

² Vgl. hierbij Paul Hensel, *Die Lehre vom grossen Weltjahr*, in: *Erlanger Aufsätze aus ernster Zeit*. Ein dritter Gruss der Universität an ihre Studenten. 1917. Ook W. Stohmann, *Überblick über die Geschichte des Gedankens der ewigen Wiederkunft mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der "Palin-gensis aller Dinge"* (Inaug.-Diss. München 1917). Tegenwoordig wordt deze leer van den kringloop nog voorgestaan door verschillende bekende Oudheidkenners, o.a. door Ed. Meyer, door Norden en door von Wilamowitz-Moelendorff.

³ Palissot de Montenoy, *Les Philosophes*. Comédie en trois actes (Paris 1760) p. 85. Dezelfde persiflage door middel van zulk een op handen en voeten kruipen en zulk een laitue is ook bij Voltaire te vinden. Eenigszins anders spot deze weer in zijn *Timon*: "Dieu merci j'ai brûlé tous mes livres, me dit hier Timon . . . ce sont des corrupteurs du genre humain . . . Vous pensez donc, lui dis je, qu' Attila, Genserig, Odoacre et leurs pareilles avaient étudié long-temps dans les Universités? Je n'en doute nullement, me dit-il."

⁴ Osw. Spengler, *Pessimismus?* (Berlin 1921) S 14.

⁵ Ferd. Tönnies, *Fortschritt und soziale Entwicklung* (Karlsruhe 1926) S 43, 44.

⁶ U. von Wilamowitz-Moelendorff, *Weltperioden*, in zijn *Reden und Vorträge*² (Berlin 1902) S 123.

⁷ Georg Mehlis, *Lehrbuch der Geschichtsphilosophie* (Berlin 1915) S 418.

⁸ Georg Mehlis, a. a. O., S 314.

⁹ In *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie* T. VI: *La valeur du Progrès*. De artikelen zelf kon ik niet in handen krijgen. De strekking ervan bleek echter genoegzaam uit de vermelding, die ik ervan vond in *Historische Zeitschrift* Bnd 134, S 595.

¹⁰ Aangehaald bij Arv. Grottenfelt, *Die Wertschätzung in der Geschichte* (Leipzig 1903) S 132.

¹¹ Theod. Lindner, *Geschichtsphilosophie* (Stuttgart-Berlin 1921) S 211 ff.

¹² Nik. Berdjajew, *Der Sinn der Geschichte* (Darmstadt 1925) S 265; cf. L. von Ranke, *Ueber die Epochen der neueren Geschichte* (München-Leipzig 1917) S 17.

¹³ G. Simmel, *Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie*² (Leipzig 1905) S 145 ff.

¹⁴ Nadere, veelszins interessante bijzonderheden over dezen band van Liberalisme en geloof aan den vooruitgang in O. Ladendorf, *Historisches Schlagwörterbuch* (Strassburg-Berlin 1906) in voce *Fortschritt*.

¹⁵ J. Delvaile, *Essai sur l'histoire de l'idée de Progrès jusqu' à la fin du 18e siècle* (Paris 1910). Beter is echter het overeenkomstige Engelsche boek van J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (London 1920). In het algemeen is de literatuur over mijn onderwerp natuurlijk zóó groot, dat ik er niet aan denken kan er een lijst van te geven.

¹⁶ Turgot, *Discours sur les progrès successifs de l'esprit humain*, in *Oeuvres de Turgot*, éditées par Daire, Vol. II (1844) p. 597 sv. Het citaat is op p. 598 te vinden.

¹⁷ *Herzogs Realenzyklopädie*³ in voce *Aufklärung* (E. Troeltsch); Hugo Preller, *Rationalismus und Historismus*, in *Historische Zeitschrift*, Bnd 126 S 206 ff.

¹⁸ M. Ritter, *Die Entwicklung der Geschichtswissenschaft* (München-Berlin 1919) S 309.

¹⁹ E. Seeberg, *Über Bewegungsgesetze der Welt- und Kirchengeschichte* (Berlin 1924) S 128 f; en uitvoeriger in E. Seeberg, *Gottfried Arnold, die Wissenschaft und die Mystik seiner Zeit* (Meerane i. Sa. 1923) S 259 ff.

²⁰ E. Seeberg, *Über Bewegungsgesetze* u. s. w., S 129; cf. Jules Delvaile, l. c.; p. 305.

²¹ Zie W. Hegemeister, *Friedrich Nietzsche's Geschichtsauffassung* (Leipzig 1912) S 10.

²² Cf. de interessante artikelen van H. Boehmer over *Der Zusammenbruch der modernen Apokalyptik*, in *Allgemeine Evangelisch Lutherische Kirchenzeitung* Jhr. 56 (1923), No. 26-29. Karakteristiek voor dien burgerlijk-liberalen tak zijn bijv. H. Thom. Buckle's *History of Civilization in England* (1860) en W. E. H. Lecky's *History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe* (1865). Boeken als J. R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England* en de geschriften van den bekenden Dean Inge verwerpen de idee van den vooruitgang weer. Evenals, onder de Marxistische groep, een man als Landauer, in zijn *Aufruf zum Sozialismus*: "dieser sogenannte Fortschritt ist ein Symptom unserer abnormen Zustände, unserer Unkultur" (aangehaald bij Fritz Gerlich, *Der Kommunismus als Lehre vom tausend-jährigen Reich* (München 1920) S 66.

- ²³ H. Boehmer, *a. a. O.*, No. 28, 29.
- ²⁴ F. Ratzel, *Völkerkunde*², Bnd. I (1894) S 15.
- ²⁵ Zie A. Fleischmann und P. Grützmacher, *Der Entwicklungsgedanke in der gegenwärtigen Natur- und Geisteswissenschaft* (Erlangen, Leipzig 1922).
- ²⁶ Zie zijn *Die deutsche Geschichtsschreibung von den Befreiungskriegen bis zu unseren Tagen* (Leipzig 1916) S 47, 119.
- ²⁷ Theod. Lessing, *a. a. O.*, S 20.
- ²⁸ Cf. Arv. Grotenfelt, *a. a. O.*, S 148.
- ²⁹ Zie bijv. Nik. Berdjajew, *a. a. O.*, S 259-265; H. Bavinck, *Wijsbegeerte der Openbaring* (Kampen 1908) bldz. 105; J. Kaerst in *Historische Zeitschrift*, Bnd. 111 (1913) S 319.
- ³⁰ Zie P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Geestelijke Stroomingen* (Haarlem 1907) bldz. 274 v.v., 282.
- ³¹ Cf. J. Huizinga, *Amerika levend en denkend* (Haarlem 1927) bldz. 152, 153.
- ³² K. Heussi, *Altertum, Mittelalter und Neuzeit in der Kirchengeschichte* (Tübingen 1921) S 7, 8.
- ³³ Zie Joh. Behm, *Johannesapokalypse und Geschichtspolisophie*, in *Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie* hrsg. von Carl Stange, Jhrg. 2 (1924) S 323 ff.
- ³⁴ R. Rocholl, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Bnd. I (Göttingen 1878) S 20-23.
- ³⁵ Zie *Historische Zeitschrift*, Bnd. 118 (1917) S 1 ff.
- ³⁶ Zie E. Fueter, *Geschichte der neueren Historiographie* (München-Berlin 1911) S 375 over J. Chr. Gatterer.
- ³⁷ Friedr. Paulsen, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*⁹ (Stuttgart-Berlin 1903) S 351.
- ³⁸ Cf. Fr. Gerlich, *a. a. O.*, S. 21.
- ³⁹ Cf. E. Bernheim, *Mittelalterliche Zeitanschauungen* (Tübingen 1918) II Die eschatologischen Anschauungen, vooral S 97 ff; F. Kampers, vooral *Die deutsche Kaiseridee in Prophetie und Sage* (München 1896) S 1 ff; Hans von Schubert, *Der Kommunismus der Weidertaufer in Münster und seine Quellen* (Heidelb. 1919) S 51 en *Herzogs Realenzyklopädie* in voce *Cbiliasmus*.
- ⁴⁰ K. Burdach, *Reformation, Renaissance, Humanismus* (Berlin 1918); K. Borinski, *Die Weltwiedergeburtsidee in den neueren Zeiten*.
- ⁴¹ Bijv. M. Vernes, *Histoire des idées Messianiques depuis Alexandre jusqu' a l' empereur Hadrian* (1874); Edouard Schuré, *L' idée Messianique dans la poésie polonaise*, in *La Revue* 15 Juillet 1906; G. Mehlis, *a. a. O.*, S 381 ff; R. Reitzenstein, *Gedanken zur Entwicklung des Erlöserglaubens*, in *Historische Zeitschrift*, Bnd. 126 (1922) S 1 ff.
- ⁴² Nik. Berdjajew, *a. a. O.*, S 256, 258, 269.