

Father could be perfected only by His assent to even this experience, the maximum of suffering possible to Him. The prayer was granted, not in the Resurrection, although that followed in necessary sequence, but in His recovery even on the Cross, of His communion with, and confidence in His Father, as the words of self-committal show (Lk 23⁴⁶). It was surely thus that He was 'saved out of death.'

3. The last incident referred to in this Epistle has not yet come under our consideration; but it is interesting to note that the ascriptions of Sonship and even of absolute divinity to Christ in 1⁵⁻¹⁴ in contrasting Him with the angels are related not to the eternal existence, or the temporal incarnation of the Son, but as vv.^{8,4} show, to the Ascension. 'When he had made purification of sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high; having become by so much better than the angels, as he hath inherited a more excellent

name than they.' There can be no doubt that the author of the Epistle does assign pre-existent Sonship and divinity to Christ; in the quotations in vv.¹⁰⁻¹² he applies to Christ words used of God Himself. But as little doubt is there, those in agreement with Paul in Ro 1⁴ and Ph 2⁹⁻¹¹, he regarded the Ascension as not merely a return to previous glory (as in Jn 17⁶), but as an increase of the glory and the honour, an enhancement of the dignity and authority of the Son of God. In his view the earthly life, work, and suffering of Christ has an eternal significance and value for the very being of God Himself; its result is taken up into the relation of the Father and the Son; it is no temporary episode unrelated to, and not affecting, the inner life of God Himself, but it is a moment and a movement of the very being of the Supreme Himself. Thus in Christ idea and image, noumenal and phenomenal, invisible and visible, eternal and temporal, God and man are one reality.

Literature.

THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONS.

THE volume on the *History of Christian Missions* for the 'International Theological Library' has been entrusted to the Rev. Charles Henry Robinson, D.D., Hon. Canon of Ripon Cathedral and Editorial Secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (T. & T. Clark; 10s. 6d.).

It is an immense subject for a single volume, for Dr. Robinson begins with St. Paul and ends with Dr. Mott, and he takes all the churches, all the societies, all the men and women (without naming them all) with him as he goes. There is no confusion. The work has been mapped out as if it were an Encyclopædia article. And so far as we have been able to test the book, there is no respect of persons or of agencies. Every man, woman, and movement that has accomplished anything for the progress of the Kingdom gets an equal share of attention and a place in this great roll of honour.

The statistics are up to date. They are very many, but no weariness has deprived them of their

necessary verification. There are lies, blank lies, and statistics, said the pessimist. The statistics in this book are too startling to be untrue; they are too startling both in their bigness and in their littleness. What accounts for it? Why here progress and prosperity like the rushing mighty wind, there stagnation and derision? God only knows. But sure it is that the missionaries are of the very salt of the earth. Even in these business-like statistical pages one can see that, and it is all the same whether they are preaching or teaching or healing; they all see of the travail of their soul, whether they are satisfied or not. There is no book that says more for the race than this book.

Canon Robinson has opened his book with a chapter on Methods. That was a good thought. Where does he find the best methods and the best account of them? In the Book of the Acts of the Apostles. How often do you return to that book—the Book of the Acts of the Apostles? It is the barometer of the New Testament. If you read it much and pray much over what you read, it will make a missionary of you, and when the next Survey of Missions is written your name will be written there.

THE CROWD.

'One day at a watering-place the rumour went about that the "sea-serpent" was lying outside, some few yards from the beach. Everybody rushed to the shore, and all saw clearly the monster's head, as it stuck out of the water from time to time. Even sceptics felt themselves being convinced little by little of the existence of the mythical monster. Some photographed the beast; others talked about rowing out in a fishing-boat to get a nearer look at it. A cod-fisher came on the scene, and explained that the sea-serpent was nothing but a brown stone, which now was covered by the waves, now came to light again. For years the visitors had watched the stone, without its having occurred to anyone that it resembled a sea-monster; but so soon as someone asserted that it was a living beast everybody else saw it in the same light, until the illusion produced by the suggestion disappeared before the cod-fisher's explanation as abruptly as it had arisen.'

This story is told by Arthur Christensen in a work which has been translated into English and published under the title of *Politics and Crowd-Morality* (Williams & Norgate; 7s. 6d. net). This Crowd-morality is very much the same as that which Professor Gilbert Murray speaks of as Herd-instinct. It is a new study, or nearly new, and there is something in it. According to its students, there is much in it, and much more has already come out of it than we have taken notice of. Let us say, for example, that this horrible war has come out of it. Let us say that all wars in all the ages of the world have come out of it. Surely it is time we had studied it a little that we may watch its ways in the future and curb its evil inclinations.

The great danger lies in the fact that the crowd is subject to suggestion, and that when a suggestion catches on, anything may follow, a harmlessly silly thing or a most harmful and disastrous thing. 'A single example will be enough to show the power of social suggestion. The refined social world of the eighteenth century had cultivated the art of dying with the same mild, harmonious calm as it had shown in life. The women in particular understood how to die stylishly. They left the world with tact and dignity, without a sign of fear or pain which might grate upon the survivors.

'It was the century in which the death-struggle had passed the stage of nonchalance and reached that of epigram, the century in which a dying princess summoned her physicians, her confessor, and her steward to her bedside, and said to the physicians: "Gentlemen, you have killed me, but in doing so, you have been true to your rules and principles"; to the confessor: "You have done your duty, by frightening me out of my wits"; and to her steward: "You are here by the wish of my people, who desire that I should make my will; you all play your parts very well, but you must admit that I am not playing mine badly." The woman's soul went appalled in wit to meet Death, while the Princess of Talmont's body was carried in a blue and silver robe to the grave.'

All this would be only absurd, if crowds were only mobs or mere cliques and coteries. But States are crowds, 'enormous and very heterogeneous crowds,' and when a State catches an infection—the infection of some suggestion of hatred or envy of another State—the evil may be incalculable, the misery untold. It is wise then to study the crowd. It may be studied with sufficient interest and alarm in this book.

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

When a lectureship in Comparative Religion was founded at Oxford, the first lecturer appointed was Mr. Clement C. J. Webb, Fellow of Magdalen. Mr. Webb has now published the first three courses of lectures delivered by him during the academical years 1911-12 and 1912-13. The book is called *Studies in the History of Natural Theology* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press; 10s. 6d. net).

In the first lecture Mr. Webb seeks to discover the meaning of Natural Theology. That is not easy. It is easy enough to say what Natural Theology is when we know what is Natural Religion. In Mr. Webb's own words, Natural theology 'must denote the reasoned and articulated account of what is implied in the existence of natural religion.' But what is natural religion?

To answer that question takes practically the whole of the first course of lectures. Mr. Webb proceeds in two ways. First he asks what is meant by 'Nature' in philosophical discussion, and finding that it means a great many different things he tries the other way. The other way is to see what natural religion is contrasted with. In the oldest

discussions it was contrasted with civil or political religion, in the later with revealed religion. But these two mean much the same thing. So it is natural as contrasted with revealed religion that forms the subject of the three courses of lectures contained in this book.

The second course describes and criticizes the 'Natural Theology of Plato.' With the third we pass to the Middle Ages, and consider Anselm, Abelard, St. Thomas Aquinas, Raymond of Sebonde, Pietro Pomponazzi, and Lord Herbert of Cherbury as natural theologians.

The work is both independent and unbiassed. Its scholarship is above reproach. The interest grows as the lectures proceed. Without doubt Mr. Webb has made a most valuable contribution to the history of the Philosophy of Religion.

CITIZENS TO BE.

Citizens to be is the title of a social study of Health, Wisdom, and Goodness, with special reference to Elementary Schools, which has been made by Miss M. L. V. Hughes, late Exhibitioner of Somerville College, Oxford (Constable; 4s. 6d. net).

Principal Viriamu Jones used to contend that two things were necessary, not one only—character and knowledge. Miss Hughes agrees. For her, knowledge is necessary as a matter of course. But character also, even in elementary schools. She might be content to see knowledge swallowed up in goodness, but she will never pursue knowledge for its own sake. To her as to all great teachers, 'art for art's sake' is of the Evil One.

She says: 'The more we can identify wisdom and goodness, the knowledge of what is with the love of what is right, the more are we in touch with our Masters. It is only the false narrowing of the intellectual aim to mere information that could warrant any hard-and-fast demarcation of it from the moral. Judgments of value are judgments of fact, and, for the Humanist, these facts are of the highest order, taking precedence of scientific facts just so far as these are made to exclude value. Accordingly we find that Humanist educators do consistently set the moral aim above the intellectual, or else refuse to distinguish them. Comenius, who most exalts "Pansophy," is assuredly convinced, with Socrates, that virtue is knowledge. His own definition of the educational ideal is "se (et secum omnia) nosse, regere, ad

Deum dirigere." Herbart most nearly approaches him in this exaltation of knowledge for the sake of goodness. "The stupid man cannot be virtuous." Others lay less stress on the means, and are even, comparatively, careless of information. "The one and the whole work of education," says Pestalozzi, "may be summed up in the concept, morality." And this is the spirit of Arnold and of Thring, whose was "the ever-present conviction that the business of a school is to train up men for the service of God," and to whom "in a peculiarly vivid way life presented itself as a battlefield between good and evil." Most interesting is Luther's position, who puts the religious and moral purpose first, but asserts more forcibly than any one the supreme value of education for the whole of life, "were there neither soul, heaven, nor hell." A few years later Ascham, the typical English Humanist of the earlier School, sets down in order the schoolmaster's objects: "God's fear," "honesty of life," "perfectness of learning," and adds the requirement of gymnastics for all, and of much recreation for the "best wits," though he thinks that "base and dumpish wits can never be hurt by continual study." We are brought back to our first and foremost principle of balance, and it is needless to multiply the quotations of Humanists. Professor Laurie's summarising words are our best conclusion: "If the intellectual aim is always the same with the best writers, so even still more are they at one on the supreme importance of the moral aim and the value of gymnastic."

Professor Muirhead has contributed a preface to the volume. It is worth that, although it needs no sponsor. In the preface, however, he has the good taste to leave the book to speak for itself. He says something of his own. He appeals for the place of the humanist (who is the enemy of the militarist) in the lean years that are to succeed the war. 'One of the chief lessons of the war, it is generally held, has been the unpreparedness in which we were caught at the outset, and for which the vague Humanism that has hampered patriotic effort in the past is largely responsible. After the war, moreover, we may be sure there will everywhere be a call for the strictest economy, and the country will be in no mood for increased expenditure on education. I believe that these arguments, so far from deterring, ought to act as an incentive to reformers to make themselves articulate. With regard to the first, I am prepared to agree that

things are no longer what they were. The old policy of splendid isolation, I believe, is no longer possible. With the rise of great democratic nations sharing the same ideals, new obligations have arisen for each—more particularly that of enforcing treaties and maintaining public law in the common interest. If, as may be hoped, the more advanced nations more and more recognise the necessity of organising themselves for this purpose, England will have to play her full part in the future policy of the world. This will not mean the acceptance of the continental system of conscription; but it may mean some form of universal compulsory military training in schools and colleges, factories, businesses, and warehouses. If this comes to pass in an educational atmosphere imperfectly permeated with humanistic ideas, there may be a real danger of fostering the military spirit. There is only one effective way of meeting this danger—to complete the permeation. This is the answer to those who would have Humanists lie low at the present juncture.'

Messrs. Allen & Unwin have issued a new edition of Annette M. B. Meakin's *In Russian Turkestan* (3s. 6d. net). It is issued 'to meet the sudden demand made by the British public for information about Russia.' It is not likely to satisfy that demand, for it deals with only a part of the vast empire, and it is so pleasantly written that it will whet the appetite for more.

There is scarcely a New Testament problem, if there is any life in it, that has escaped the Rev. W. Douglass Reid, B.D., and every problem is dealt with fairly and masterfully. He tells us that his original purpose was to discuss simply the doctrine of the Person of Christ in the Pauline Epistles. But the book grew, and now he calls it comprehensively *Jesus the Christ and Paul the Apostle in the Light of Modern Criticism* (Brown & Sons; 2s. 6d. net). At the end of the book—it is one of the few books that come to an end just when the interest is keenest—there are many pages of references and a most useful and accurate bibliography.

At the Cambridge University Press there is published the first number of a new quarterly journal—*The Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking*.

It is one of the numerous periodicals issued by the University of Chicago. Could such a periodical have been published in this country? Would it have been thought of? No, because we have never supposed that the public speaker could be made any more than the poet. The Americans believe that he can. How far ahead America has gone will be painfully evident to the British reader on looking into this handsome first number. Two of its articles deal with 'Research in Public Speaking.' Did you ever hear of such a thing? Another article is on 'Preparing Literary Material for Public Utterance.' We can understand a little about that. But then what has Public Speaking to do with 'An Experiment with the Referendum'?

The seventeenth Hartley Lecture was delivered by the Rev. James P. Langham. Its title is *The Supreme Quest* (Hammond; 2s. 6d.). There is also a subtitle: 'The Nature and Practice of Mystical Religion.' So it is another volume on Mysticism. Is it any the worse of that? It depends on what sort of mysticism it recommends. We have had books enough on a kind of mysticism that has nothing to do with Christ. That is not the mysticism of Mr. Langham. Christ is the only real and living way to the Father, as Dr. Moffatt translates the text in St. John. There is no passing Him by as if superfluous. Indeed, Mr. Langham scarcely distinguishes 'mystical' from 'spiritual'; and his book is an earnest appeal for a new and spiritual life, a life which is to be obtained only by faith in Jesus Christ. He does not stay with Christ—if the words may be used inoffensively. He comes to the Father. The supreme quest, he says, is 'to know the love of God, which passeth knowledge.' And the end of that, we know, is to be filled up to all the fulness of God. This is 'mystical religion.' To the practice of it Mr. Langham offers many suggestions, such as the religious use of the Bible, interior prayer, and daily use of pure intention.

There are three great preachers of our day whose name is John MacNeill. There may be a difference in the way the Mac is printed, or in the number of the l's, but the pronunciation is the same. One is a Scotsman, one an Australian, one a Canadian. The Canadian has published a volume of war sermons. From first to last they are war sermons, with all the joy of battle which

a Canadian congregation approves of, and with all the indignation which a righteous Canadian pastor feels for the enemy 'that hath done this.'

Mr. MacNeill has a wonderful gift for discovering the appropriate text. Does he determine to preach on 'A Place in the Sun'? His text is, 'And I saw an angel standing in the sun' (Rev 19¹⁷). Is his theme 'The Day'? His text is, 'Woe unto you that desire the day of the Lord: to what end is it for you? the day of the Lord is darkness, and not light' (Am 5¹⁸).

The title of the book is *World-Power: The Empire of Christ* (Hodder & Stoughton; 6s.).

The Epistle to the Ephesians is extraordinarily rich in Commentaries. Nevertheless we welcome gladly a new commentary by the Rev. J. Scott Lidgett, D.D. For it does not follow on the lines of any of the commentaries which have gone before it: and its own line is highly important. The title is *God in Christ Jesus* (Kelly; 5s. net).

Dr. Lidgett's method is to find out first what is the leading theme of the Epistle, and then to keep it clearly before him in all the exposition. 'Just as the unity of the Epistle to the Romans is to be found by treating it as an exposition of the Righteousness of God as revealed in the gospel, so, as it appears to me, the Epistle to the Ephesians will be seen to possess an even more closely integrated unity if it be treated as an expatiation on the subject of God in Christ Jesus. It is from this point of view that I have dealt with the Epistle in the following pages.'

This introduces the question of the authorship. For Dr. Lidgett sees clearly enough that the question of the Pauline authorship of Ephesians turns, not on matters of language or style, but on the ideas that are governmental in it. In the Epistle to the Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, and Romans the outstanding term is Righteousness. This is absent from the Epistle to the Ephesians. 'Grace, indeed, is magnified and the experience of the forgiveness of sins is set forth, but the term righteousness and the cluster of words springing out of it are not employed. Instead, the whole emphasis is laid upon life, and salvation is treated as a quickening by which believers enter into the resurrection of Christ and share His risen life. In connexion with and in subordination to this governing conception salvation is portrayed under the conception of spiritual illumination.'

And yet Dr. Lidgett believes that St. Paul wrote the Epistle to the Ephesians. His reasons do not need to be repeated. It is enough to say that they are good reasons and temperately set forth.

But the triumph of the book is in this, that while the central theme of the Epistle is always present, each step in the elucidation of it is treated with distinctness, so that a passage can be chosen anywhere and the exposition of it detached and enjoyed almost as if it were complete in itself.

The most recent of the Liverpool Diocesan Board of Divinity Publications are: (1) *Religion and Morality*, by the Bishop of Winchester (6d. net); *The Sacraments of the Gospel*, by Canon J. G. Simpson (1s. net); and *The Verification of Christian Faith in Experience*, by Canon J. T. Mitchell (6d. net). Canon Simpson offers a powerful plea for an evangelical interpretation of the Sacraments, especially of the Eucharist. It is a small book to be seriously reckoned with.

The Eternal Saviour-Judge, by the Rev. James Langton Clarke, M.A., D.D., was well received on its appearance in 1904, and received considerable attention in THE EXPOSITORY TIMES. A shortened, simplified, and cheaper edition has now been issued (Murray; 1s. net).

A valuable book on *The Cure of Self-Consciousness* has been published by Messrs. Andrew Reid & Company of Newcastle upon Tyne (3s. 6d. net). The author is Mr. James Alexander. It is valuable because its rules and recommendations are all based on a good psychological knowledge of human nature, and call constantly upon the human will for co-operation and conquest. Every variety of self-consciousness and every result of it is diagnosed and prescribed for. Mr. Alexander is sorry for the man or woman who blushes too easily, but he is still more sorry for the man or woman who never blushes.

The Rev. W. E. Sellers has been in communication with the chaplains at the front—the chaplains of all ecclesiastical denominations—and he has gathered from them their experiences, to which he has added his own, and has produced a remarkably interesting and sometimes quite thrilling volume, which he has published under the title of *With Our Fighting Men* (R.T.S.; 2s. 6d. net). For

the most part it is the record of the reception of Christ, whether slowly, after much thought in the trenches, or suddenly, in the act of daring or even the article of death.

Mr. Robert Scott has published a cheap edition of *The Roman Catholic Church in Italy*, by the Rev. Alexander Robertson, D.D. (2s. net). Dr. Robertson has lived his life in Venice and has studied the ecclesiastical situation all the time. This is the seventh edition of the book.

In the year 1911 the Rev. G. B. H. Bishop, Vicar of Cardington, Salop, spent five months in a remote district of 'Little Russia the Blessed,' about one thousand miles from Petrograd. And now he has written a book on *The Religion of Russia* (London: Soc. of SS. Peter and Paul; 5s. net). He acknowledges that 'in so short a time it was possible to gain only a superficial knowledge of the people and their national institutions,' but he has written popularly, believing that if his knowledge is small ours is less, and he has submitted his book to experts.

He writes most sympathetically. For he is an Anglican who looks towards the East for that appreciation which is denied him in the West; and, besides, he was well treated by the parish priest. 'His eagerness to meet my wishes in every way was on one occasion a source of great embarrassment to me. I happened to be passing the church just as a funeral procession headed by cross-bearer and bannerers was setting out for the cemetery. Thinking myself unnoticed I prepared to photograph the scene, when to my horror Bátushka Johann called a halt, and the whole party, including the mourners, posed for their portraits with the corpse in the centre!'

The book is written with much simplicity and pleasantness. Its illustrations add greatly to its general charm.

From the same Society there comes a little book by Mr. Ronald Knox, Fellow and Chaplain of Trinity College, Oxford, on Impetrative Prayer. The title of it is *Bread or Stone*. Impetrative Prayer is prayer 'which is directed in the first instance, not towards the discipline of our own souls in a particular attitude, or the enjoyment of union with God, but towards the obtaining of special favours from Him, whether for ourselves or for others.'

The Rev. J. Politeyan, B.A., has written a book on *Biblical Discoveries in Egypt, Palestine, and Mesopotamia*, and Canon R. B. Girdlestone has introduced it to its readers (Elliot Stock; 2s. 6d. net). Mr. Politeyan believes that the Old Testament (he says nothing about the New) cannot be understood until its setting, its geographical and historical setting, is caught and comprehended. And he is very right. *East is East and West is West*, even though Mr. Kipling said so. We have to obtain the proper angle, more than that, almost a new personality, if we are not grievously to misjudge the Hebrews and their God. This it is that Mr. Politeyan provides. His book is thoroughly well illustrated.

From the Student Christian Movement there comes *A Book of Prayers for Students* (1s. 6d. net). It contains three parts. Part I. consists of a Service for each day of the week, which may be used either privately or for corporate prayer. Part II. contains a few Litanies; and Part III. a collection of Collects for use in relation to special needs or on special occasions.

The Implications of the Golden Rule.

BY THE REV. E. W. HIRST, M.A.(LOND.), B.Sc.(OXON.), GLASGOW.

I. It is at the outset a matter of great significance that the Golden Rule distinctly contemplates man in society. The classical moralists have been far too prone to consider the individual *in vacuo* abstracted from all relation to his fellows. They have regarded him as though he were the inhabitant

of a desert island, and as if he could be 'good' all alone. But according to the N.T. idea of goodness, and according to the implication of the Golden Rule in particular, a Robinson Crusoe could not, strictly speaking, be 'good.' Religious he might be. Day by day he might fall down on

his knees and pray to God. But as for 'morality,'—there would be no one round him with whom he could practise goodness, no one to whom he could act as he would have them act to him. And it is the defect of the text-books on ethics, and of the classical moralists, that these books and teachers view man as an individual, whose conduct is supposed to be as individual a thing as his health. Even Kant is an offender in this respect, in that he considered the essence of goodness to lie in actions which all other individuals besides the doer have merely to imitate or 'universalize.' No doubt he does seem at times to treat other individuals somewhat less externally, especially in the formula that says: 'So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, in any case as an end withal, never as a means only.' Indeed, Professor Votaw (Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, Ext. p. 42a), likens the Golden Rule to this version of the Categorical Imperative.

And yet it is far from clear that this Kantian formula relates the *alter* to the *ego* in anything like the intimate way in which their connexion is regarded by the Golden Rule. In fact, the whole ethical teaching of Kant is vitiated by an imperfect doctrine of personality, by the idea that all selves are impervious, and are so many spiritual monads. It is claimed that each of these selves is an 'end' to itself because each possesses 'reason.' When, however, we inquire what it is to treat other persons as 'ends,' we are told by Kant that we cannot directly further their 'perfection' or 'self-realization,' but may contribute to their happiness only, though in treating ourselves as 'ends' we must seek our own 'perfection'—a purely individual pursuit. In spite of appearances to the contrary, Kant never establishes between ego and alter any intimate relationship. The underlying implication throughout is that selves are atomic and independent, and that morality is mono-personal. Therefore the identification of the Golden Rule with the Categorical Imperative seems hardly justified. For the former regards goodness, as the latter does not, as essentially inter-personal and social.¹

¹ No doubt Hegel emphasized the close relation of the individual to his fellows, and regarded society as a 'moral organism.' But in becoming 'organic' in Hegel's sense, the individual ceases to have existence for self, and the 'whole' for which he exists is not strictly 'moral,' inasmuch as its nature is at any time inevitable.

II. The Golden Rule has had plenty of critics. Perhaps the criticism that is most frequently urged is the one mentioned by Professor Henry Sidgwick, to the effect that the rule does not forbid reciprocity in evil. Each member of a band of thieves—to take the usual instance—shows to his comrade in crime the same loyalty which he desires to have shown to himself. Little discernment, however, is required to see that such robbers do not apply the Golden Rule in any real and universal way. They refrain from robbing one another just because they are thieves and desire each their share of spoil, not because they are men. If they refrained from robbing one another on the ground that they are men, for the same reason they would refrain from robbing any one else. We are to do, not simply to five or six particular men just the particular thing we want them to do to us, but we are to do unto man as man anywhere what we would have any and every man do to us.

III. In the *Hibbert Journal* for January 1914, Sir F. Younghusband makes another attack upon the Golden Rule. 'It cannot be said,' he writes, 'that the Golden Rule represents perfection, for men have gone further still, and not in theory only, but in actual practice. There have been many men, and probably still more women, who have loved their neighbours, not merely as themselves, but far more than themselves: who have given up their lives, not only in death, but, better still, in life, for their neighbours, for loved individuals, for their country, for humanity. Now they have not merely done unto others as they would that others should do unto them, but have done unto others a great deal more than they would ever expect others to do for them.'

Undeniably, circumstances do arise in which it may be one's duty to neglect oneself for others' sake, and even to surrender life itself. And this conduct is not necessarily incompatible with the Golden Rule. Of course, such circumstances must be exceptional. For if every person died for his neighbour, soon no neighbour would be left for whom to die. Or if every person merely weakened himself in health, or neglected his business or his culture, soon there would be no one left in the position of helper, for all alike would, in such a case, have become needy and helpless. Such an unequal love of neighbour, if universalized, becomes impracticable and absurd. Self-sacrifice, of course,

there must always be, but this involves not the immolation so much as the socialization of the self.

IV. A subtle interpretation of the Golden Rule has been given by Dr. A. T. Cadoux in the *International Journal of Ethics* for April 1912. He contends that the Rule starts from, and bases itself upon the desires of the individual—'Whatsoever ye would.' It does not, however, concern itself with the satisfaction of the individual's desires in any direct manner, but of these desires after they have been 'transferred in imagination to one's neighbour'—'Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them.' Cadoux then goes on to show how different desires are modified and enhanced by such a process. For instance, the desire for the praise of others, when, in accordance with the Golden Rule, it leads us to bestow praise on them, reacts upon our own fondness for praise, purifies it into the desire for genuine as distinguished from verbal appreciation, which desire in turn leads us ourselves to bestow on others appreciation that is sincere. In this way the pleasure of both giver and receiver is increased. The same process is illustrated in the case of the love of beauty, the desire for health, and the wish for happiness.

Now it is only necessary to read between the lines to see that, in so far as such a process of comparison results in a better treatment of others, it does so in virtue of an altruistic impulse which the process assumes to exist rather than creates. And the comparison is made primarily for the purpose of modifying the desires of the individual in such a way as to bring about their increase, and maximum satisfaction. The Golden Rule is used to provide a universal social reference such as will give to the desires of the individual, form, scale, and breadth.

But the Golden Rule in being so used appears misused. It becomes merely a means to enhance personal satisfaction, and is thus quite consistent with a doctrine of Egoism. We take it to be much more than a recipe for obtaining individual 'good,' 'life,' or 'satisfaction.' For it makes no direct reference to the content of the actual desires which any one may feel. Its real concern is that desires should be socialized, and that this should be done as an end in itself. It teaches that, as between ourselves and others, there should be impartiality of regard.

V. It is an important question whether this impartial regard is equivalent to a doctrine of equality. The idea of the essential equality of men is certainly very old. It received impressive endorsement from the Stoics. Cicero, in particular, insisted on it, and, like others, based it upon the fact that all men possess reason. The doctrine was dramatically re-emphasized at the French Revolution. Indeed, throughout the history of civilization the idea has had its influence. It is, for instance, the root conception of administrative justice—which should be 'equal,' *i.e.* impartial. Politically as well as legally the idea has done good service, forming the basis of the theory of representative government. And probably for a long time we shall still have to use the notion for all that it is worth. Nevertheless it would appear to be a makeshift. Its inadequacy is inevitable; for the idea of equality is quantitative, while human nature is pre-eminently qualitative. There is, of course, no sort of physical or intellectual equality possible to men. Neither could there be an equality of circumstances. People must live in different countries and climates and conditions. Utopia, too, will need both scavengers and scholars. Moreover, the relations in which people stand to one another as master and servant, parent and child, teacher and pupil, necessarily preclude any exact similarity in the details of behaviour.

Equality of opportunity is, no doubt, a plausible ideal. But it would be foolish to treat all people alike without regard to sex, health, sanity, and race. And whatever initial opportunity is used for the purpose of classifying men must be crude and practically momentary, for diversity of endowment and morale will at once demand diversity of opportunity. For in Utopia different people will be doing different things and must be accorded different kinds of chances for learning these different things.

The idea which is characteristic of Christianity is not the equality but the unity of life. According to St. Paul, we all form one body, which body is none other than the body of Christ. In the New Testament, also, men are regarded as brothers in a great house of life in which God is the Father of all. And that impartial regard for one another which the Golden Rule inculcates finds its justification, not in the fact that men possess reason or personality, or have an equal capacity for 'virtue'—there appears to be nothing intrinsically grand

either in rationality or in personality—but in this great truth of the unity of all life and the brotherhood of all men.

Now the ideal principle in a perfect brotherhood is surely 'From every one according to his ability: to every one according to his needs.' Some who think this maxim rather dangerous would substitute the word 'services' for 'needs.' But in an ideal condition of things no one would be pauperized by being merely a receiver of the bounty of others, for all would be givers as well as receivers, each giving of the kind that he has, and receiving of the kind of which he is in want. Such a state would, of course, be consistent with great inequalities. Some will give more, and some will receive more. But if all are one, and realize their unity, this will neither matter nor be felt to matter. Any other principle like that of 'reward' for services it is impossible satisfactorily to apply, as Dr. Rashdall has cleverly shown (*Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. i. chap. viii.). Rashdall abandons as hopeless the maxim 'to every man according to his merit,' and adopts what he calls the principle of 'equality of consideration'—meaning thereby that the distribution of the goods of life should be according to the needs of men as these are socially determined.

And in the ideal commonwealth each one would receive eagerly in order that he might the better give. Should a gift to the uttermost be asked of a man—even the gift of his blood, as in the case of the present European war—the principle of the solidarity of life will inspire him as no abstract

principle of equality could. He will see that he is given innumerable blessings for which he never laboured, and is called to sufferings not always on his own behalf, but often for the sake of others, filling up in this way what is lacking in the sufferings of Christ.

A community inspired by the principle of unity—unity with one another and with God in Christ—will express itself through a State. That is to say, it will not be anarchist. Justice, however, will be swallowed up in love. This love will not take the form of charity, giving to your neighbours something for which he gives you no return. For all will have something to give, and love will express itself in such a system of exchange as will bless all with mutual benefits.¹

Finally, love will be not the product of such a State, but its condition. A non-competitive society is possible or ultimately successful only when the human heart has ceased to feel the competitive spirit. To merge possessions is not necessarily to merge souls. And so the hope of the future can lie only in the greater prevalence of the spirit that desires to give rather than to get. Experience leads us to expect little from a mere social instinct or 'group-mind.' But love will prevail, we believe, when there is a greater realization by all men of their essential union with each other in God through our Lord Jesus Christ.

¹ In the same way, Ruskin, following Plato, maintained that wealth is an instrument of 'life,' and is to be shared co-operatively, as in a household.

The Archaeology of the Book of Genesis.

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Chapter ix.

18. Since Shem corresponds with Samu or Sumu, the ancestral god of the 'Amorite' or West Semitic kings of Babylonia, while Japhet is Iapetos, a Cilician deity (Steph. Byz. *sub voce* "Adava), it would seem to follow that in Ham also we ought to find the name of a deity. As 'father of Canaan,' the deity would be Canaanite. Ham, however, was also the father of Mizraim or Egypt, with which in the O.T. the name is sometimes

synonymous, but there is nothing in the Egyptian pantheon with which the name can be compared. It is, therefore, possible that the Canaanite Ham has been identified with Qem, a name given to Egypt in the inscriptions, since in proper names Egyptian *q* may represent Assyro-Babylonian *kh* (*h*) when the latter stands for West Semitic *ghain*. In this case the identification would have resulted from the use of the cuneiform script. In the