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sores, and all his personal weaknesses? O Lord, who can save so amazingly—save us from this, and this, and this, that still besets and threatens us: O Lord, who can bring success where it looked impossible—prosper us here, and here, and here, where we have failed, and lost heart, and ceased even to try. There is a moving scripture in which God, passing before Moses, proclaims Himself as the Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin. And we read how Moses hearing this made haste and, seizing on that proclamation, applied it instantly to his own wants and needs. If Thou art merciful and gracious, since Thou forgivest iniquity and sin, pardon our iniquity, forgive our sin.

So Paul, too, standing at the Cross, feels in his heart that this finally settles it, that if God has gone this length for us there is nothing that He will not grant us. If He has given us His Son, will He not freely give us anything and everything that we can need? Well, here are we, face to face with this bewildering proof of what God means when He says that He loves us, of the lengths to which He goes, of the bewilderments He does, let us make haste, and before we pass into the world and it all fades away, grows dim and far off, and an unreal, shadowy rumour blown vaguely to and fro about the world, let us apply it to our own case —this overwhelming grace, this so illimitable love, this immeasurable power to help—to our temper, our ill-humours, our touchiness, our engrained selfishness, to our besetting sins, to the temptations that have so often broken us that, daunted, we make small show of resistance now, slink tamely to heel, obedient to their first truculent whistle. Save us, O Thou whose name is Saviour, and who hast wonderfully and most surely earned Thy title, save us from this, and this, and this; and prosper us in our endeavours to be done with our too fatally familiar self; to grow into Christ's mind and heart and characteristic ways, till, naturally and instinctively, we think His thoughts, and will His will, and live after His fashion. When the Lord Christ passed through a village everybody felt that here was a God-given and enormous opportunity that might not come again, and laid hold on it with both hands; clutched at Christ's power, applied it to their individual weaknesses, translated it into the terms of their own personal wants. The blind cried give me sight; the deaf pled make me hear; the impotent besought Him for strength to be done with helpless, weary lying—to stand up, to live a full, whole, interesting life, the life of a real man. And this is a day that God Himself has contrived for us, and we must make haste to appropriate it, use it, think it out, apply it to our individual and personal case. No doubt we are here to give Him thanks for an amazing act of condescension, for a fulness of grace that staggers us, and takes away the breath, and leaves one dazed and stunned, if we see it at all from God's side. But then, when a wise Psalmist felt like that, and came up to the Temple of set purpose to make some return to God for His bewildering goodness, thinking things out, he came to the conclusion that the truest gratitude is to be willing to accept still more. 'What shall I give to God for all His benefits?—I shall take,' he said. And Pope—found, of all men, among the prophets—tells us bluntly he was right. 'For God is paid, when man receives'; the way to thank Him is to take yet more, and more, and more.

The wonder and amazement of the facts! our attitude in view of them; a practical use of them! And so, let us sit down with the Master at His Table.

Recent Foreign Theology.

Theology and Religion.

THE firm of Hinrichs in Leipzig is issuing this year a new series of a monthly journal, known for more than thirty years as the *Kartell-Zeitung*. Its new title is *Theologische Blätter*, and its editor is Dr. Karl Ludwig Schmidt, New Testament Professor in Giessen. A specimen copy, received from the publishers, makes a favourable impression, alike for the varied interest of its contents and the quality of its articles. Amongst the subjects treated at length are 'The History of the Synoptic Tra-

dition,' and 'Prolegomena to the Psychology of Religion.' There is also a résumé of recent works on 'New Testament Criticism,' in which satisfaction is expressed that in England and America, as well as in Germany, attempts are being made to bring to the knowledge of scholars, independently of their nationality, the work that was done during the war in the various departments of biblical and theological study.

The editor writes on 'Theology and Religion,' and distinguishes them as particular examples of the two categories 'Science' and 'Life.' Theology is not religion, but it is the science of religion. Therefore the distinction must not be represented as opposition. 'In the sermons, personal confessions, and above all in the prayers of great theologians, there is often revealed a quite naïve religious experience, although in the writings by which they are known to us the speculative element predominates.' Nevertheless, the history of religion introduces us to creative personalities who have been critics of theology, as, *e.g.* mystics, prophets, missionaries, and reformers. The religion of such men is their life, but they do not feel that it is necessary to harmonize their religious experience with the teachings of science.

To-day there are those who profess to renounce theology from religious motives, and history does indeed show that great religious revolutions have set aside the theology of the schools and have directed attention to new problems. In this way new material has been supplied to the systematic theologian; it then becomes his duty, so far as is possible, to assimilate it, remembering that he is called, as a faithful steward, to trade with the particular talent entrusted to him. Moreover, not all who pose as non-theologians are really without a theology. Group theology often differs from University theology rather in degree than in kind.

Theology should never be represented as *the* way to religion, but those who despise it should remember that it is *a* way to religion, and can render valuable help to the religious inquirer. Yet the systematic theologian is always a man of his own time; he must study the religious experience of his contemporaries, as the scientist must investigate life in its present-day manifestations; thus he will make his own contribution to the solution of the religious problems of his age. To do this effectively he must himself be a religious man. It may be said, however, that a scholar to whom religion is an illusion may undertake and successfully carry out investigations yielding results which are of great service to theology. 'But just as one who lacks the artistic temperament can never understand a great artist, though he may have written historic treatises on art, so it is impossible for an irreligious man to fathom the depths of religion.' Rightly to investigate the Christian religion a theologian must be a true Christian. In conclusion, Dr. Schmidt insists that exegesis should be at once edifying and scientific, and that piety is an essential element in the equipment of the Christian theologian, whether he is dealing with history or with dogma.

The attention of students of the Synoptic Gospels may be called to a recent publication of the J. C. Hinrich'sche Buchhandlung, entitled *Pneuma Hagion: Der Ursprung des Geistbegriffs der synoptischen Evangelien aus der griechischen Mystik*, von Hans Leisegang (Leipzig; 9s.). It is No. 4 of the publications of the Institute for research into the comparative history of religion in the University of Leipzig. Herr Leisegang published in 1919 (Berlin: Teubner) Part I. of a comprehensive work on *The Holy Spirit*. The difficulties of publication at the present time have prevented the issue of Part II. in its entirety. The main results of his investigations have, therefore, been condensed into the present volume. In the preface Herr Leisegang states that it is far from his intention to relegate to the background the Jewish and other Oriental influences that have affected the Synoptic tradition by a one-sided emphasis on the Greek contribution to it. The question he endeavours to answer is not: What words, ideas, and representations in the Gospels can ultimately be traced either to a Greek or to a Semitic origin? The questions he asks are rather these: What would a Greek understand by those words, ideas, and representations? What did he actually take them to mean? What did he make of the Synoptic tradition? What did he read into it? Herr Leisegang says that his constant aim has been to penetrate through the dead letter to the spirit which animated the tradition. The conception of the Spirit as it finds expression in the Synoptic Gospels is examined in great detail under six headings. Material is furnished which deserves the consideration of experts who, whether they

accept all the author's conclusions or not, will appreciate his extensive researches.

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The New Strasbourg.

STRASBOURG has had a change of masters, and its University has been affected by the change. The reorganized seat of learning appears to be making a strong effort to achieve for itself a 'place in the sun,' and it seems to us that it is in a very fair way to do so. An extraordinary literary and scholarly activity is in progress. The mere extent of the published programme is amazing. Fine fruits have been yielded already, and more are in prospect. Mere quantity, of course, goes for little, but if we may judge by the samples we have received, the quality delights no less than the quantity surprises. We have one from what in this country would be known as the Faculty of Arts, and one from the Protestant Faculty of Theology.

I.

The former is a collection of Essays on Medieval Philosophy by Étienne Gilson, Professor of the History of Philosophy.[1] In the phrase 'medieval philosophy' each word constitutes a problem. When exactly did the Middle Ages end? and had that period a philosophy in anything like the modern sense at all? To the former no easy answer can be given. There is no year which can be taken as a watershed between medieval and modern times. History knows little of sharp distinctions. To-day, even if it be a day of revolution, still bears some features of yesterday, its parent. Most true is that of the history of thought. And Gilson is right in finding that while medievalism extends its grasp as far as Descartes—please note, *Descartes*, not *Cartesianism*—Modernism, on the other hand, has its roots far back in the introduction to Europe of the Sciences by the Arabs. Can we speak of the *philosophy* of the Middle Ages? Not quite in the modern sense. But there is one great figure whose 'travail of thought' made philosophy possible and led towards it, and that was Thomas Aquinas. Round Aquinas and Descartes, therefore, the essays centre. The exposition is clear and thought-provoking; the style is limpid, the whole is most readable. Whether Gilson is discussing the theory of 'double truth,' or Cartesian innate ideas, or the curious controversy of Hervey and Descartes on the circulation of the blood, or Campanella's interesting view of Analogy, he carries one along both by weight of scholarship and lightness of literary touch. It is entertaining to find that while Descartes had the true scientific spirit which prompts a search for 'real causes' in explaining a phenomenon, he lacked the preliminary scientific caution which makes sure that there is a phenomenon to be explained. In consequence he sometimes gave a most satisfying explanation of natural happenings that did not happen at all.

[1] *Études de Philosophie Médiévale*, pp. 292. Strasbourg, 1921; Eng. agent, Mr. Humphrey Milford, Oxford Univ. Press.

II.

The other is a study of the spiritual development of Luther.[2] Strohl's study in certain respects confirms Gilson's. Both would have us learn to lay far less stress than we are wont upon the catastrophic significance of the period of the Reformation. Not the 16th but the 18th century marks a new age in the history of European thought, as, indeed, Troeltsch teaches. The Reformation was a very important phenomenon, no doubt, from various points of view, but it does not mark so decisive a breach with the past in the history of the human spirit as we have sometimes held. The Middle Ages, as both Gilson and Strohl show, were busied with one great problem all through: to vindicate a place for human reason as over against the authority of Dogma. The emergence of Lutheranism was not a 'catastrophe' but a 'denouement.' So, too, in Luther's own spiritual history. It has been too often explained as a series of 'catastrophes.' We have to think rather of gradual developments. Events such as the famous thunderstorm, or the reflexions suggested in Rome as he watched the Santa Scala, have been very much exaggerated and given a picturesque importance which they do not deserve. At the best they gave a little added impulse to a movement already in progress in his spirit. That the Santa Scala had any real influence at all is very doubtful.

[2] *L'Évolution Religieuse de Luther, jusqu'en 1515*, Henri Strohl, pp. 174. Strasbourg et Paris, 1922.

It is difficult to avoid the appearance of fulsomeness in attempting to estimate this penetrating and illuminating study of Luther. Were it only for the careful and discriminating discussion of recent literature, both Catholic and Protestant, the book would be indispensable to students. Recent literature, be it said, is all that a student needs, and the quantity of it is very great. The War interfered with our knowledge of a good deal of it. The main problems of Luther's earlier years are such as: Why did he become a monk? what was the nature of the bitter conflict of soul which distressed him, until about 1515 he found peace? how did he attain peace? and what precisely is signified by his 'discovery of the gospel'? These questions are put and answered in a way that is convincing. A further study of Luther is promised. We look forward to it with expectation and impatience.

'What ails ministers nowadays at the Song of Solomon? They never mention it, even at the Lord's Table.' Such was the query of a venerable elder who firmly believed that the column-headings in our A.V.—'The mutual love of Christ and His Church,' etc. — were part of the inspired text. Well, what about the Song? The allegorical view, first questioned by Herder, has gone. The view that it is a drama of sorts has gone too. Is it, as Haupt holds, a mere collection of love-ditties? No, says Thilo, it is not a mere anthology. The pearls are not separate, they are on a string. The whole is a unity and subserves a great ethical purpose which justifies its retention in the Canon.[1] According to Thilo the Song traces the development of love from the first awaking of 'soft desire' to wedded bliss. It marks an epoch in the history of morality and social progress, as teaching thus artistically a true conception of woman as a person not a chattel, and pointing the way to monogamy. This little work has a value out of all proportion to its size. The translation is striking and excellent. A few passages, such as that about the mysterious 'chariots of Amminadab,' are frankly given up as beyond skill to divine the sense.

If there is to be canonization at all, Jeanne D'Arc deserved it more than some of the semi-mythical and thaumaturgic personages who have the prefix 'Saint' in the calendars of the Eastern and Western Churches. The story of one whose faith and purity of soul guarded her as with a wall of fire amid a rough soldiery in camps and bivouacs cannot be told too often, and as a strictly historical record it is well told by Father L. H. Petitot, O.P.[2]

The author does not attempt any theory of the psychical problems of the 'prophetic' preparation of the stage on which the 'panoplied maid' appeared, or of the 'voices' which directed her. Nor does he mention the curious tale of a lady whom some took to be Jeanne years after the execution. When he hazards the opinion that, but for Jeanne, France might have been Protestant, he will not expect us to share his enthusiasm, but, frankly, we doubt very much the probability of this.

We reverence Jeanne so much that it hurts to find her deathless story set forth in such poor outward form, on bad paper, with narrow margins, and so many misprints.

Italian translations of the Scriptures have been few. There have been only two versions of the whole. That of Diodati was good in its day; that of Martini was always mediocre; both need amendment. But a new translation is being published. One scholar is translating and annotating and writing introductions to the entire Scriptures, including the Apocrypha. It is Professor Giovanni Luzzi. He has undertaken a big task, but to judge by his *Genesi con una Introduzione Generale al Pentateuco* (pp. 149, Firenze) he is doing it right well. He places before the '*lettore di media coltore*' in simple form the generally accepted view of modern scholars as to the composition of the Pentateuch, and indicates in the margin what parts are from *J*, *E*, *P*, or *JE*. The notes are to the point. The book is beautifully illustrated with maps and pictures of antiquities which we note are reproduced from the publications of the Oxford University Press. We wish the Professor all success in his great enterprise. The Publishers appeal to the Italian public, 'If you have a library, add to it the Bible; if you can have only one book, let it be the Bible.' Splendid!

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[1] *Das Hohelied neu übersetzt u. ästetisch-sittlich erklärt*, Lic. Dr. Martin Thilo, pp. 48. Bonn, 1921.

[2] *Sainte Jeanne D'Arc*, pp. 504. Paris, 1921.

Wobbermin.[1]

This solid and interesting work forms the second volume of Wobbermin's 'Systematic Theology,' the first having appeared in 1913. Like its predecessor, it is full of knowledge, fairness, and good sense, and may well rank as a standard book of reference about the recent discussions of its subject. Schleiermacher is throughout the point of departure; Wobbermin aspires, not improperly, to continue and develop the master's work. We again hear much of the religio-psychological method as the only right one; but by this, let us note, is not meant the method of the empirical psychology of religion, but a sustained attempt to elicit the specifically religious element in experience, interpreted in the light of one's own religious life, and especially to get at the inner meaning of religious conviction and the crucial interest of the religious man in the *truth* of his beliefs. Emphasis is laid upon the fact that a purely historical comparison of the faiths of mankind gives us no real help in fixing what in them is strictly religious, and not rather to be put down to the account of magic and mythology. To the question, *e.g.*, Is animism a religion? it affords no reply.

From a book of such compass I can only select a few matters of more than usual significance. The author brings out freshly a point on which much has lately been written, viz. that in Schleiermacher 'feeling' denotes a mode of apprehension, and is no mere subjective state of mind. God, the Infinite, is for it an immediate object, not simply the term of a causal inference. Its nature is conceived as the opposite of rational reflexion *about* feeling. Wobbermin holds that to define religion as the feeling of utter dependence means that in the last resort our definition of religion need not include the word 'God,' and that thus we escape from a circle. But do we want to escape? I cannot myself see that Wobbermin's repeated assertion that not 'God' but 'a higher world' is the true object of the religious relation comes to very much, more especially if Luther is right in saying, in famous words, that 'a God means what one looks to for all good and makes a refuge in all trouble.' This is wide enough to cover all genuine religions; and if Buddhism is properly a religion, as Wobbermin contends, it will somehow cover it also. Religion and God imply each other, and the circle is inescapable because religious experience has to be assumed. Still, in spite of previous workers, there is something that is original and much that is wholly satisfying in this new discussion of Schleiermacher's basal ideas. It is good to have it proved that the great pioneer is not a 'subjectivistic' thinker, as many of us have been wont to say, largely by his own fault. He did not really isolate feeling; and in feeling, or immediate self-consciousness, God for him is *given*, and need not be searched for as the ground of this or that.

It is, however, necessary to build higher on Schleiermacher's foundations, and in proceeding to this Wobbermin enters on a careful study of Mysticism. He rejects Heiler's view that Mysticism involves the radical negation alike of the Ego and the world; not even in Eckhart is there anything of that kind. What Christian mystics at all events have aimed at is the closest possible relation of unity between the soul and God. The unity is at the same time a relation. Buddhism holds a unique place in the history of religions, for the question can quite fairly be put whether it is a religion at all. Wobbermin decides in its favour, on the ground largely that Nirvana is essentially positive in content, though this, of course, has been denied. I am not sure that Wobbermin's argument on the point takes account sufficiently of the fact that even although a state were conceived as purely negative—as Nirvana probably was—yet it could not be *described* at all except at the cost of importing certain positive elements into the description. He is right, however, in urging that what led Buddhism into inextricable difficulties was the conflict within it of belief in a higher world with a thoroughly sceptical metaphysic.

Eventually, after refuting various efforts to deny the transcendent reference of piety, Wobbermin defines religion in these terms: 'The essence of religion consists in the attitude and relation of man to a Higher World—a world in which he believes, whose reality he divines in his belief, and on which he feels himself dependent.' The feeling of dependence is the deepest thing, but to it Wobbermin further attaches the feeling of 'protectedness' and the feeling of 'longing.' These

[1] *Das Wesen der Religion.* By Georg Wobbermin, Dr. phil. et theol., Professor in Heidelberg. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1921. Pp. viii, 499. Price 11s. 6d. (paper covers); 15s. 6d. (bound).

two last items represent an advance, he holds, on Schleiermacher. From the first flows the sense of obligation, from the second the impulse after blessedness. Otto is censured for abstracting wholly from morality in his wish to reach the purely religious fact; for, says Wobbermin convincingly, religion itself contains the sense of being bound to an unseen power, as is proved by the existence of prayer and sacrifice.

We cannot pause over the author's new proposals for the classification of religions. In this connexion he returns to the subject of Mysticism, pleading that as an independent form it is to be carefully distinguished from the mystical element found in every religion, and that it is not necessarily pantheistic. Ritschl's handling of the problem is now seen to have been lop-sided. In the *Bhagavad-gita* personalism and pantheistic mysticism move side by side unharmonized. While not pantheistic in fibre, Mysticism does impair the feeling of dependence and is in tendency hostile to the idea of mediation. All this is richly illustrated from the sacred books of India. In sum, Buddhism, Mysticism, and Pantheism may be described as special forms of the contemplative religion of redemption.

Wobbermin, then, enters on the problem of the truth of religion, studied in the light of its essence. Here the supreme thing is to discover and clarify the evidences of validity to be found in religion itself. All hangs on the question whether the 'higher world,' with which the believer feels himself to be in relation, is real or illusory. In an important passage it is laid down that any scientific proof of the being of God can be only indirect: objections can be refuted, it can be shown that explanations of faith which assume its emptiness and untruth are themselves unsound; and attention can be drawn to various aspects of science, morality, and art which only become intelligible if the religious hypothesis be accepted. Lang and Schmidt's theory of a primitive monotheism is rightly bowed out, on the ground that Christian influence had already touched the supposed data: this is a masterly section. Religion and magic, originally mixed up, are distinguished for familiar reasons. Leuba's attempt to discredit religion by a *petitio principii* is dealt with faithfully, though the counter-argument is rather loose. Among the best passages in this part of the work are scrutinies of Feuerbach's classic statement of illusionism, Lubbock's view that there are tribes wholly devoid of religious practice, Natorp's effort to state religion solely in humanitarian terms, and Vaihinger's able but unavailing contention that Kant can be quoted for the *Als-ob* philosophy. In concluding chapters it is urged that recent natural science is markedly teleological in tendency, and that religion as such is neither friendly to civilization nor hostile, but critical. The link which binds science and morality to religion is humility in presence of that which is infinite and commanding, be it the system of nature or the sublime fact of duty.

It may be suggested to Wobbermin and a host of present-day writers to consider whether the habit of describing religion as essentially 'irrational' has not been carried too far. No one would deny that the term contains some truth; faith is supra-logical, in the sense that there is always more in religious experience than can be turned into transparent theory. But after all there is a wider and larger sense of reason for which religion is no more irrational than morality is. Hedonism regards the categorical imperative of duty as irrational, and to this there is no reply, if we start with a hedonistic view of ethical reason. Besides, why call that 'irrational' which alone imparts *meaning*, in the ultimate sense, to human life and history. The confusions of the fashionable terminology come out with startling clearness in the following sentence: 'The core of religion, though for the individual it invariably signifies a wholly irrational fact of life, must from the supreme point of view rank as in harmony with reason' (p. 457).

The work as a whole is one of great value, and one feels it is bound to wear well. It represents the kind of middle position, between stiff conservatism and revolutionary caprice, to which a judicious mind, fully aware of the long previous discussions, may to-day come. We look forward with anticipation to the next volume, in which the author will attack the great problem of the Essence of Christianity.

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