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1919.

THE 606TH ORDINARY MEETING,

HELD IN COMMITTEE ROOM B, THE CENTRAL HALL,
WESTMINSTER ON MONDAY, FEBRUARY 17TH, 1919,
AT 4.30 P.M.

PROFESSOR W. P. KER, M.A., LL.D., IN THE CHAIR.

The Secretary read the Minutes of the previous Meeting which were confirmed and signed, and announced the Election of Mr. E. R. P. Moon, M.A., as a Member.

*THE PERSONAL INFLUENCE OF GREAT COMMANDERS
IN THE PAST.* By Major-General Sir GEORGE K. SCOTT-
MONCRIEFF, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.I.E.

MARSHAL FOCH, in one of his lectures at the French Staff College, in the days when he was still a professor at that institution, unknown save in his own circle, and ignorant of the great fame which awaited him, states as follows:—"History does no less than justice, when it gives the praise of victory, the blame of defeat, to the generals who have commanded armies in the field. For it is in the influence of the command, the enthusiasm communicated by it, that we must seek for and find an explanation for the unconscious movements of masses of men when an army in the field, without knowing why, feels itself carried forward, as though it were gliding on an inclined plane." And again, "The great events of history, the disasters which it records in some of its pages, such as the destruction of the French power in 1870, are never accidents, but rather the results of superior and general causes, such as the forgetfulness of the commonest moral and intellectual truths, or the abandonment of the activity of mind and body which constitute the life and health of armies."

No more striking example of the truth of this can be given than the wonderful series of victories carried out in the months of July to November, 1918, under the great soldier who expressed

in clear language the fundamental principles of leadership. From the time when, with splendid audacity, he struck at the German flank between the Aisne and the Marne, the armies under his control moved "as though it were gliding on an inclined plane" from one brilliant victory to another until the enemy was fain to sue for mercy. It is perhaps the most remarkable example in history of a leader laying down deliberately, beforehand, the principles of success, and then himself giving effect to those principles with unerring decision.

We are too near the events of 1918, however, to judge of them in their true perspective, and we cannot tell what far-reaching effect the personal example of the leaders may have for the world in the immediate future. For, as we shall endeavour to prove, the influence, not only materially but morally, of a great commander has a far-reaching effect on future generations.

Meantime it may be said that among the many blessings which have befallen us as a nation during the past years of stupendous war, not the least are the characters of the great leaders whose victories have secured to us so high a position—Haig, Allenby and Maude especially—whose qualities of patience, endurance, chivalrous conduct and modesty have been as conspicuous as their military skill, and their inflexible resolution and swift decisive action. And is not "the Nelson touch" still a motive force in our Navy? for that great leader is not merely, as Admiral Mahan has finely expressed it, "the embodiment of sea power," but his personality is the model on which our seamen of to-day base their practice. The similarity between his message to the Fleet after the Nile, and Admiral Beatty's signal to the Grand Fleet after the surrender of the Germans, is no mere coincidence.

It may, however, be asked why the moral influence of leaders *in war* is quoted as worthy of consideration. Surely, it may be argued, the moral effect of the character of a leader in any human enterprise, whether political, industrial, commercial, scientific, geographical, or any other pursuit, must have a preponderating effect on his followers, and on the country which is identified with the cause, whatever that may be. This is true, no doubt, but it has special effect in connection with wars, because there the masses of men directly affected are great, and indeed to-day they are greater than in any previous period of history. Moreover the tremendous issues of life and death

involved in a war affect the intellectual and moral natures of men to a far more profound degree than any other form of human activity, and the results of a victorious campaign are so far-reaching, not only in the triumphs or the depression caused, but in the regrouping of nations resulting, that they cannot fail to effect a far greater result in the minds of the nations concerned than the success or otherwise of civil experience, however admirable and useful that may be. Thus it is that the moral character, for good or evil, of the conqueror or victorious leader, has a profound influence. This may be exerted for evil to a very marked extent. The victories of Frederick, for instance, have exalted him to the position of a great national hero. That he was a great soldier, one of the greatest in history, no one can deny. But the foundation of his success, in the seizure of Silesia, against every principle of international obligation, sanctity of treaty, and private gratitude, was the embodiment of the detestable principle that "might is right," and on that foundation not only his subsequent career was built, but also the malignant edifice which arose in the wars of the later nineteenth century under Bismarck, and finally found its disastrous culmination in the terrible conflict of our own day, misleading in its dire consequences an entire nation and luring them to their destruction, amid the execrations of the entire world.

"Not all the perfumes of Arabia," nor the eulogies of Carlyle, can sweeten the character of the great leader who thus debased the morality of his nation, and though history has done full justice to his military leadership, it must necessarily record the baseness of his methods.

Where the political as well as the military leadership rests in the same man, it is obvious that his influence, for good or evil, must exercise a more marked effect than in cases where the political power is in the hands of another. Thus to take the case of two great contemporaries, Cromwell and Turenne, both of whom were able and successful generals, the work done by the former had far greater effect on the English nation, not only at the time, but in subsequent years, than the work of Turenne had, and has had, in France. Yet of the two, Turenne was probably the greater soldier, possessed of somewhat similar noble qualities of character that were conspicuous in the great Englishman, though undoubtedly not to the same degree.

In comparing, therefore, the moral influence exerted by great

leaders, it is fair to take into account not only their characters and their circumstances, but also the freedom of action, political as well as military, which they enjoyed.

For the purposes of this paper, therefore, I venture to take for consideration a comparison between the careers, character and influence of two of the greatest military leaders on the pages of history, men of very similar personal qualities, both of them possessed of supreme political as well as military authority in their own country, both of them extraordinarily successful in their campaigns, and therefore eliciting profound admiration and respect from their contemporaries, both of them far in advance of those contemporaries in their appreciation of military and political science. These two leaders are Alexander of Macedon and Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. I do not forget that the greater space of time which separates us from the former, as compared with the latter, may lead us to a less favourable appreciation of his life's work, but it is at least remarkable that the records of his personality and his exploits are as full and clear, if not more so, than those of the great Swedish leader. That the moral influence of the latter was greater than that of the former is, I think, unquestionable, and that I venture to think is due to the foundation of sincere Christianity which actuated him, whereas in Alexander's case that was inevitably absent, though he had the advantage of the highest and noblest of the Greek philosophers and moralists as his guide and to a great extent lived up to their teaching.

There is much that is similar in the characters of these two great leaders. Both were, by accident of birth, rulers over small countries, and were called in youth to take up their rule. Both were sons of capable and strong fathers, both had energetic and vigorous mothers, both were men of active, hardy nature, delighting in exercise and in feats of skill. Both were in their element in the fierce excitement of battle, reckless of wounds and of danger, but both could be cautious and patient in their preparation for a decisive blow. Both had the advantage of the best education that their time afforded, and both had benefited thereby to the fullest extent. The task that confronted each seemed to their contemporaries beyond the power of human skill to accomplish, and though in the case of Alexander the fulfilment of the task was complete before his death, in a sense which was not so apparent in the case of Gustavus, yet the work which the latter did when he fell at Lützen was really

accomplished to a far greater degree than either he or his contemporaries were aware. Finally, it is remarkable that both these great leaders died in early manhood.

A brief *résumé* of the careers of each of these seems essential to a proper presentation of the subject. I feel I owe an apology to such an audience as this for presenting such a summary of well-known historical facts, but it is necessary to have the broad outlines fresh in memory if we are to derive from them the deductions which we seek. In thus reviewing the careers of the two great leaders, endeavour will be made to avoid purely technical details, and confine attention to the main operations and the nature of the tasks presented.

In the middle of the fourth century B.C., when Alexander was born, the Persian Empire extended from the *Ægean* to the Indus, and from the Caucasus to the Sudan. It had endeavoured to extend its sway over Europe too, and had made various partially successful efforts in this direction, but at the time to which we refer, the Greek confederacy had resisted the Persians, and the Kingdom of Macedon under Philip, which extended from the Euxine to the Adriatic, was the most powerful of the Greek states, and possessed a well organised and disciplined army. The Persian rule, immensely powerful though it was, had degenerated from the days of Cyrus and Darius Hystaspes, and was not the vigorous vital force that it had been a century or so earlier. Philip, indeed, so far realised this that he was contemplating a campaign against this formidable power at the time when he had consolidated his own kingdom from being a small province to the most thriving and powerful state in Hellas. But his warlike intentions against the Persian Empire were cut short, for he died, leaving to his son Alexander, then only twenty years old, the heritage of a great cause, and to some extent the means of carrying it into effect. The cause was the freedom of the civilised world from the menace of the Persian tyranny; the means was the army of Macedonia, organised, armed and disciplined in a better fashion than any then existing.

Alexander had already shown his aptitude for the task before him. As a lad of sixteen he had been left as regent at the capital when his father was absent on a campaign, and had not only conducted the business of the State wisely, but had put down a revolt of a Balkan tribe. Later on, when eighteen years of age, he had been entrusted by his father with the command of the cavalry of the left wing of the Macedonian army against

the Athenians and Thebans at Chæronæa, and had shown then his splendid qualities as a cavalry leader. So when he came to the throne he had already served his apprenticeship both in civil and military rule. He had been, also, carefully educated. His tutor from his thirteenth year was Aristotle. He had a great delight in the classic writers of Greece, and he had the great advantage of recent Greek military experience and authors—Miltiades, Xenophon, and Epaminondas—to stimulate his military education. This breadth of training enabled him to utilise the lessons of the past in the conditions of the ever varying present.

Before he could engage on his great task the young king had to face gigantic difficulties at home. For the Greek States, on Philip's death, considered themselves absolved from Macedonian jurisdiction, the tribes to the north and west rose in revolt, so that from all quarters danger threatened. In one year, in a series of brilliant and original operations, he made himself master of Greece, utterly defeated the Danubian tribes, had reduced the Illyrians to obedience, and had welded the shackles on Hellas. He was now free to turn his attention to the vast problem before him.

The resources at his disposal were ridiculously inadequate. He had only 30,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry, one month's supplies, no fleet worth mentioning, and a heavy load of debt, to cope with the mighty forces of Persia with untold resources and the command of the seas. But morally Persia was rotten to the core and torn by petty factions and jealousies, moreover without any leader of merit.

Alexander marched along the coast to the Gallipoli Peninsula, and unmolested crossed at Abydos and opposite Troy from ground in our own times the scene of terrific fighting.* On the Asiatic shore he found the Persian army drawn up to await him, in numbers, especially in cavalry, far superior to the Macedonians and with the advantage of position covering the fords of the Granicus. The result was, thanks to skilful tactical handling and great personal leadership on the part of Alexander, an overwhelming victory, which opened for him the whole of the southern provinces of Asia Minor. He pushed on at once through these, securing the principal towns and leaving representative governors to assist him in his magazines and lines of communication. He behaved towards these cities and provinces with generosity, restoring ancient rights and reducing taxation. Later on he turned towards the upland plateau of Asia Minor where, not without

severe struggles, victory was secured. Everywhere he adopted the generous policy of friendly treatment of those who surrendered to him or helped his cause. His victorious career again brought him to another struggle in force with the main Persian army at the battle of Issus, at the northern limit of Syria. At this battle Darius himself, who commanded in person, lost heart and fled, a complete victory for the Macedonians resulting in the opening up of Syria and the acquisition of large treasure. Before venturing inland Alexander moved south, without opposition until he reached Tyre, then in the magnitude of her pomp and power. Here a siege lasting eight months, in which wonderful defensive power was met by indomitable perseverance and engineering skill, finally resulted in the capture and destruction of the city. The position of Tyre, it may be parenthetically observed, was very much like that of the free cities of Germany in the seventeenth century. The Phœnician cities furnished not only centres and outlets of trade, but bases for the Persian fleet, still dominant in the Mediterranean. With some of them Alexander made terms, on their surrendering their independence. Tyre, however, would not give way absolutely, and braved the consequences. The terrible doom that befell this proud city is only matched by the horrors at Magdeburg in the Thirty Years War—unless indeed recent atrocities have surpassed even that terrible exhibition of bloodshed and cruelty. That Alexander should have sanctioned such excesses shows how far his usual chivalrous character was stained by the motives of revenge, and how far short he fell of stainless example.

Gaza, too, the outpost of Egypt, made stern resistance but was captured after two months' siege. Thence Alexander went to Egypt, which presented no difficulty. His restless activity took him into the western desert to the oasis of Siwa, and true to his policy of consolidation and settlement he founded Alexandria. By this the conquest of the eastern Mediterranean shores was complete, and he needed no longer to fear the Persian fleet on those waters. He had a fine sense, too, of ruling the people in lands conquered, assuring to them their ancient customs and carrying forward their well-tried laws—only he put one of his own choice, one of his trusted Macedonians, as ruler, with a sufficient garrison of disciplined soldiers. As a rule the people gladly accepted him, knowing that his rule brought them greater freedom and justice than they had under the Persians.

Leaving Egypt early in 331 B.C., Alexander retraced his steps to

Tyre and thence to the upper waters of the Euphrates. Darius had meantime approached him with a view to dividing the Empire, leaving the western portion to the Conqueror, but Alexander would have all or none. Nor can we wholly attribute this to ambition and vainglory. It is more than probable that he saw that the conflict was one between two distinct ideals, *viz.*, of militarism and liberty, and that compromise was impossible. Darius then gathered his armies once more, and prepared for battle in Mesopotamia, where he hoped to deliver a crushing blow on the invader. At Arbela, to the east of the Tigris Valley, the great and final battle between the Greeks and Persians took place, and again Alexander won an overwhelming victory against tremendous odds. Darius fled towards the N.E. mountains.

Pushing on to Babylon, which surrendered without resistance, Alexander reformed his army, made a fresh base, and after due rest for the troops pushed on to Susa, Persepolis, and in pursuit of Darius. Through Persia he pursued the fugitive, at one period performing wonderful marches of endurance, at another time—indeed often—showing marvellous skill in mountain warfare, but he was baulked of his capture of the Persian king by the murder of that fallen monarch near the S.E. shores of the Caspian.

From this period, for the next two years, Alexander carried on a series of the most marvellous operations in history, pushing on to and crossing the Oxus and Jaxartes, then coming south to the modern Herat and Kandahar. Thence he marched to Kabul, wintered there, pushed forward to the Hindu Kush and advanced on India, not by the comparatively easy route of the Kabul river, but by infinitely more difficult passes and defiles farther north, ultimately debouching on the Peshawur Valley, crossing the Indus above Attock, pushing through the tangled ravines near the modern Rawalpindi to the Jhelum, where he defeated Porus in a battle showing consummate skill and leadership, then farther east to the watershed between the Indus and the Ganges, where his Macedonians refused to advance farther and he had to turn. From a military point of view these campaigns are full of instruction and interest. For our present purpose, however, they need only a brief allusion, because it would appear evident that after the fall of Darius, Alexander seems to have somewhat changed his aim, which no longer appears to have been the liberation of civilisation from the tyranny of the Persian rule, but the aggrandisement of himself as the supreme war lord. He assumed Oriental pomp and customs, and there seems to be

little doubt that he was frequently overcome with drink. Moreover, his sense of justice and gratitude appears to have been blunted, and the execution of Parmenio, his trusted general, and Clitus, one of his best "Companions," stain a character otherwise marked by noble qualities of personal generosity. Of the remainder of his active career, little need be said. He marched down the Indus to the sea, undertaking, always with success, and often with much personal risk, various operations. He transported his troops partly by sea, partly through the Baluchistan and Persian deserts, to Mesopotamia, and he settled in Babylon to consolidate his empire. There, possibly from imprudent feasting, possibly from long exposure in travel, he died at the early age of thirty-three.

Such is a bald outline of his career. Before we consider what his influence (apart from the military ardour which was so vital a feature in his leadership) was on the countries he subdued, and the world in which he lived, let us turn to Gustavus Adolphus, so as to retain in our minds the main features in the career of both, so that we may more adequately consider the problems of their personal influence.

Gustavus Adolphus, son of Charles IX of Sweden by his second wife, Christina of Schleswig Holstein, a woman of imperious nature, came to the throne in 1611 when he was only seventeen years old. He had already had, not only the advantage of very careful parental education and capable example, but experience both in administration and in war. A portion of the kingdom had been committed to his youthful charge, and there he was encouraged to act on his own responsibility, in the king's name. He had from the earliest taken the keenest interest in military affairs, had learned all that he could assimilate from books, and, what was of greater value, had been entrusted with command in a campaign against the Danes, where he had shown marked capacity and that absolute fearlessness which was afterwards so characteristic. In all these respects his career so far closely resembles that of Alexander.

The country over which he was called at this early age to reign was in grave difficulties. Denmark still ruled some of its southern provinces. Poland had a bitter cause of complaint against Sweden in that the latter country had refused the rule of the Polish king Sigismund, who, though the representative of an older line of the Vasa dynasty, was a Roman Catholic and therefore refused by the Protestant Swedes. Russia, too,

had causes of irritation and quarrel. The personality and energy of Charles IX had to some extent held back these public enemies, but on his death it appeared that with a young lad on the throne there might be a weakness which would serve as an opportunity for his foes to gain their ends. Moreover, the country was poor, and torn by factions between the Crown and the nobility. On the other hand, there was a very sound system of military organisation bequeathed by the late king, a warm attachment to the young ruler by the masses of his people, and a discipline founded on moral teaching and on Christian principles. For Gustavus was as careful of the religious training of his people as he was of any other phase of national life. He appointed chaplains to his regiments, assembled the men daily to morning and evening prayer, knelt himself with them and frequently addressed them with stirring exhortation. He had, like Alexander, to begin his reign by consolidating his position at home. In the first two years, before he was twenty, he had freed Sweden from the Danish invaders, and secured terms with Christian IV, giving Sweden an honourable independence. In the next four years, warring with Russia, he had secured for Sweden the whole of the Eastern shores of the Baltic, and consolidated the hold on Livonia and Finland. Then followed campaigns with Poland, in which frequently he endeavoured to secure peace on honourable terms, but though this did not come for some ten years he had at least arranged freedom from Catholic aggression for Sweden, and free commerce between the two countries, and freedom of conscience for all the Baltic regions.

We have seen how Alexander took up the great cause of liberty which his father had bequeathed to him, and after securing his position at home, at once proceeded to wage battle against overwhelming odds. This was not quite the case of Gustavus, for though his father had been one of the foremost champions of religious liberty, he had not bequeathed to his son any definite charge of waging war against the Emperor of Germany. Essentially, however, the causes for which these two great captains fought were similar. In the one case liberty against the encroaching tide of Oriental despotism, in the other freedom of conscience, and the right to worship, unfettered by priestly intolerance.

The Thirty Years War was partly religious, partly secular. Germany had, in the Treaty of Augsburg in 1555, arrived at a *modus vivendi* between the Catholics and the Lutherans (not,

however, with the Calvinists, who bitterly opposed both the others), but on the election of the Emperor Ferdinand in 1618, a series of bitter persecutions were enacted against such of his subjects as disagreed with him. But admittedly the spirit of mutual forbearance was absent on both sides. Yet the war was not entirely religious, indeed the Pope refused to give his sanction to it. It was largely the endeavour of the Hapsburg dynasty to rule Germany absolutely, from the Baltic to the Adriatic and from the Rhine to the Oder. Now a powerful German Empire under Roman Catholic rulers on the Baltic would be a serious menace to the independence and commerce of Sweden, and this was, from the purely Swedish point of view, a reason for her entry into the war. It was not, however, until 1630 that Gustavus took an active part. Meantime Denmark had tried, and failed, to drive back the Imperialists under Wallenstein. The Protestant electors of Brandenburg and Saxony were supine and treacherous. The military leaders of the Imperialists, Wallenstein, Tilly, and Pappenheim, were far superior to any of those on the Protestant side. Except the fortresses of Stralsund and Stettin and some of the Hanseatic towns, all Germany was under the heel of the Hapsburgs. Then Gustavus came in. He was the leader of a cause which seemed hopeless. He was incurring tremendous risks, for to the west the Danes were his ancient enemies, and to the east was Poland smarting under defeat. His country was poor, and, as he had laid down as a cardinal principle in his wars that under no circumstances should the cost fall on the innocent people of the country, but all supplies must be honestly paid for, so he needed ready funds for his operations; but his confidence in the sound discipline, stout hearts and moral ascendancy of his troops never wavered, and he felt confident that he could and would lead them to victory. Thus he started with the immense power of moral influence, and in two years drove his armies, like an iron wedge, through the heart of Germany, from the Baltic to the Danube. He had behind him the unanimous weight of public opinion in his own country which, from experience of his personal rule during eighteen years, had learnt to admire the man for his noble and lofty private character, and for the wisdom and courage he had evinced in all his public actions.

His military operations were not on the same brilliant scale of successive victory and advance as those of Alexander, for these indeed are unique in the world's history. But they were

marvellously successful. They fall into regular stages: first the securing of the sea base and the establishment of the "bastion" in Pomerania and Brandenburg, next the acceptance of battle with the Imperial forces under Tilly and the overwhelming victory of Breitenfeld (one of the most decisive battles in history), then the advance on the Rhine and the occupation of Mainz, followed by the advance through the Palatinate, the victory of the Lech, and the occupation of Bavaria, then the operations against Wallenstein, the defence of Nurnberg, and the final victory of Lützen, where the great leader himself fell, but where he finally crushed the Imperialist forces.

Space forbids comment on these operations, and it is foreign to the purposes of this paper to dwell on the military skill and advance in science which led to these startling results, just as we have purposely omitted to review the purely military qualities of the great Macedonian. Both of these great captains had much in common as soldiers, both were cavalry commanders of special skill, both realised the supreme advantages of mobility and flexible tactics, both were able artillery generals, and both realised, as few have done, the powerful aid that engineering science gives to war. But on these topics it is beside our purpose to dwell.

When we come to the objects of the two great leaders we find an essential difference. Alexander may have started with the idea of relieving Europe from the Oriental menace, but certainly he had later plans of personal glory and aggrandisement, possibly as the best solution of a difficult problem, but at least not free from selfish interest. Gustavus behaved throughout with a disinterested regard for religious liberty. Those who knew him best have disclaimed for him any idea of being a rival Emperor—at all times his rôle was that of a deliverer, and at most his political aim was that of a confederacy of German Protestants with the King of Sweden as the Commander-in-Chief of their forces, charged with the duty of their protection. Whether such an idea would have been practicable is impossible now to say, for the death of the king at Lützen prolonged the ghastly struggle for sixteen more years, and the war then assumed a different aspect.

Yet, as regards the personal moral influence of Gustavus we have only to look to our own country and see how it took effect. King and Parliament were at war, and the Royalist cause at first had the better success. Cromwell seems, however,

to have grasped the fact that the striking success of the Swedish King was not only material, but due to a discipline founded on character and moral superiority. It was on this that he formed his New Army, it was this that enabled him to bring his parliamentary forces into line against the cavaliers with success. He said the old parliamentary army was made up of "old decayed serving men, and tapsters and such kind of fellows" unfit to encounter "gentlemen's sons, younger sons and persons of quality." He must have "men of a spirit that is likely to go as far as gentlemen will go," and he "raised such men as had the fear of God before them and made some conscience of what they did." "From that day forward they never were beaten." He showed in England what Gustavus had shown in Germany, that a man may read his Bible and yet use his sword like the best.

Two regiments in the British Army are the modern descendants of those days, the Coldstream Guards, the direct representatives of Cromwell's New Army, and the Royal Scots: first raised to fight under Christian of Denmark, and afterwards the flower of Gustavus' troops at Breitenfeld. It would be incorrect and invidious to say that these two splendid corps have a monopoly of the fine qualities of the Gustavus Adolphus era, but it may at least be said that they have maintained the high traditions of their ancestors, and have evinced this never more notably than in the recent terrible warfare in France, in Gallipoli and Palestine.

In conclusion, let us attempt to summarise the after-effects of the influence of these two great captains. Alexander left behind him a region permeated with Greek settlements, imbued with Greek civilisation, freedom, love of learning and philosophy. It prepared the way for Roman law and order, and for the spread of the Gospel—how rapidly we learn from sacred and secular history. Yet it was necessarily limited in its scope and its ideals. Gustavus, with the fuller light which the knowledge of Christ had brought, raised the standard of discipline to the higher ideal of the fear of God. He restored that trust in the Lord of Hosts which had been the motive power in the great Warrior King of Israel, and the influence of his own noble example has been passed on from generation to generation, sometimes forgotten, often obscured, but still advancing into greater prominence because founded on eternal verity. He was the first of a series of leaders who have exercised a profound influence in

their day and generation : men like Havelock and Charles Gordon, ready to risk their lives with small forces against overwhelming odds ; men like Stonewall Jackson, who without desire for personal glory were actuated by a faith which gave to their characters strength and beauty, and left behind them the fragrance of noble example.

DISCUSSION.

The CHAIRMAN (Prof. W. P. KER) said : The subject of Sir George Scott-Moncrieff's lecture, and his treatment of it as well, make one wish for more of the same sort. Lately I have been reading the essays of Mr. George Wyndham, a statesman who was some time a soldier, an officer in the Coldstream Guards. One of those essays is on *Plutarch's Lives*, and Alexander of Macedon of course has his place there. Why should not Sir George write the life of Gustavus Adolphus on something like Plutarch's scale ? There are other commanders, too, who might have their stories told—Turenne, for example, a famous name, whose life and achievements are too vaguely known to most of us.

"What's Fame? A fancied life in others' breath." Pope, in his splendid, possibly not quite sincere, discourse on Fame, in the *Essay on Man*, speaks of heroes and in particular of two : "The Macedonian madman and the Swede." The Swede here is not Gustavus but Charles XII, who more than Gustavus Adolphus, I think, is the hero of his nation. One of my early recollections in Swedish is the description of the old soldier in Bishop Tegnér's poem of *Axel* : "He had two treasures, his Bible, and his old sword with Charles XII's name on it." Might not Sir George give us a life of Charles XII of Sweden ? He would be competing with Voltaire, but there is room for another version of the story. Here I cannot help observing how rich the history of Sweden is in great commanders bravely followed and obeyed and honoured. There is Engelbrekt in the fifteenth century, who raised the country, like Wallace in Scotland, to drive out the aliens ; there is Gustavus Vasa, another hero with the same patriotic task, and Charles Gustavus, a general as adventurous and daring as his more famous grandson, Charles XII.

May I put in one small piece of carping criticism ? Why did Sir George, in speaking of the Lion of the North, omit the name

of the most widely renowned of all the soldiers of Gustavus? He never mentioned Sir Dugald Dalgetty.

Col. C. E. YATE, C.S.I., C.M.G., M.P., said: I should like to support the hope just expressed by our Chairman, that Sir George Scott-Moncrieff may go on and give us more of his historical essays. We have listened to a most interesting account on the influence of those two great commanders, Alexander and Gustavus Adolphus, and we must all hope that we may have the benefit of more.

I would also like to say how much I was struck by the pertinence of the Chairman's remark about the manner in which Gustavus Adolphus was served by his officers, and especially his foreign officers. I remember being particularly struck at Stockholm by the number of coats of arms of Scottish families in the halls of nobility there, who had served and gained notoriety under Gustavus Adolphus and who apparently were most devoted to him.

As to what the Lecturer has said about "the after effects of the influence of these two great captains," I cannot say that I can accept without further consideration the contention that the after effects of Alexander's influence was less than that of Gustavus Adolphus.

The Lecturer himself has described how Alexander left behind him "a region permeated with Greek Settlements, imbued with Greek civilization, freedom, love of learning and philosophy," and, though I cannot recall at the moment the exact dates that those settlements lasted to, we know from coins and other sources that the Greek Kingdom founded by him in Bactria lasted for a very long time, and the after effects of Alexander's influence I cannot help thinking may have lasted longer than those of Gustavus Adolphus.

The latter, as the Lecturer has said, "raised the standard of discipline to the higher ideal of the fear of God," and "the influence of his own noble example passed on from generation to generation," but still I am doubtful if the effects of that influence were greater in the world than that of Alexander's.

There is one thing on which I am entirely in accord with Sir George Scott-Moncrieff, and that is his remark that "where the political as well as the military leadership rests in the same man, it is obvious that his influence for good or evil, must exercise a

more marked effect than in cases where the political power is in the hands of another."

That applies to-day just as much as it did in the times of Alexander, and I imagine most of us here to-day will agree that if the negotiations now going on at the Peace Conference in Paris had been left in the hands of the military leaders of the Allied Armies instead of in the hands of the politicians of some twenty different countries, we should have a better prospect of a quick settlement than we seem to have at present.

Lt.-Col. MACKINLAY drew attention to the fact that notwithstanding the great number of scientific mechanical inventions now used in warfare and the immense amount of organization now involved in military operations, that the man behind the gun remains the important factor, and the influence of the general on the fighting men still remains paramount.

Sir George Scott-Moncrieff has drawn attention, he said, to the good discipline inspired by great captains, and especially by the high religious ideals of Cromwell and Gustavus Adolphus, fighting for religious liberty; the Christian characters of many of our own commanders in our great war have doubtless contributed to the success, which was granted to us after the widespread day of prayer.

Lt.-Col. MACKINLAY then proposed a sincere vote of thanks to the learned Chairman, Professor W. P. Ker, for presiding, and for his helpful opening of the discussion.

Seconded by Mr. HOSTE. Carried unanimously.