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The Islamic Paradigm of Nations: Toward a Neoclassical Approach*

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Introduction

As late as 1966 Martin Wight could still pose the question 'why is there no international relations theory?' By this he meant the absence of a tradition of speculation about relations *between* states, families of nations, or the international community, comparable to that of political theory as speculation *about* the state. To the extent that it did exist, it was marked by 'intellectual and moral poverty' caused both by the prejudice imposed by the sovereign state and the belief in progress (Wight, 1995, pp. 15–16 and 19). Unlike political theory, which has been progressive in its concern with pursuing interests of state as the 'theory of the good life', international politics as the 'theory of survival' constituted the 'realm of recurrence and repetition' (Wight, 1995, pp. 25 and 32). Essentially, therefore, it had nothing new to offer.

This challenging viewpoint spawned a dynamic of intellectual activities, which by the 1990s had enriched the discipline of international relations in ways earlier unforeseen. The assumptions of repetitiveness and recurrences, which had hindered the field's potential for expansion and risked limiting its horizons, were contested. No longer was the field constrained by a preoccupation with state survival or lack of appropriate concepts with which to theorise about global politics. The discipline drew on advancements in the cognate fields of social and political theory, which opened new horizons of theoretical unfolding. It became sufficiently enriched and diversified to be able to challenge claims to a 'consensually recognized or determined' nature of world politics and to overcome conceptual paucity and rigidity (Burchill and Linklater, 1996, pp. 7–8).

Much of what Wight had indicated in the 1960s may not be as pertinent to the current state of western international theory, given the gamut of intellectual developments that have taken place since. In surpassing the simplicity of earlier approaches, the field, in fact, became a victim of its own success. Well into the 1990s it continued to suffer from a lack of an authoritative paradigm on the one hand, and a confusing array of proliferating paradigms on the other (Holsti, 1985, pp. 1–7). Nevertheless, the dynamism exhibited in addressing these contentions reflected a positive attitude toward problem solving, the highlighting of which could perhaps inspire similar outlooks among constituents of diverse cultures.

*This article was originally published in *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 8, 2, November 2001, pp. 23–50, and is reproduced with their kind permission.

However, there appears to be a continued streak of relevance in this caveat as far as a potential Islamic theoretical counterpart is concerned. Since classical times, from around the eighth century AD, the Islamic paradigm of law of nations has basically divided the world into two opposing domains. One constitutes the Abode of Islam (*dar al-Islam* or *Pax Islamica*), comprising the 'sovereign' Islamic state ruling over both Muslims and protected non-Muslim communities (see Figure 1). The other, falling beyond the pale of *Pax Islamica*, represents the Abode of War (*dar al-harb*) (Khadduri, 1966, p. 11). This law of nations is not considered to be separate from the broader aspects of Islamic jurisprudence, but rather as an extension of the *shariah* or sacred law. As it developed over time and found its full expression under the Abbasid Dynasty (750–1258 AD), it came to acquire some kind of 'sacrosanct soundness' as part of the *shariah* itself (Al-Ghunaimi, 1969, p. 133). Hence it made no clear distinction between the sources and sanctions of domestic or municipal law, and the analogous categories pertaining to external relations (Khadduri, 1966, p. 6).¹ Islamic external outlook thus came to be persistently based on perceptions of foreign relations as guided and heavily influenced by a religiously based 'domestic analogy' (Suganami, 1989, p. 9). This was natural given the universality of Islam, and the fact that *dar al-harb* was not recognised on an equal footing as legitimate or sovereign. It was the territory yet to be brought from the 'state of nature' into the fold of the Divine (Khadduri, 1966, p. 13).

This static view had much to do with the Islamic paradigm's religio-legalistic foundation. Since absolute moral values rarely change, theory acquired metaphysical dimensions. Elevated to the religio-moral level, theory lost its essential cognitive characteristics. Despite obvious and unrelenting transformations in the nature and structure of the global system, the classical paradigm endures as the realm of recurrence and repetition. Yet it continues to shape and influence Muslim consciousness, even as it increasingly comes under heavy strains. To what limits, though, it could sustain such influence, in the face of a starkly inhospitable global reality, and without reinstating the cognitive aspects, has become a question of importance.

Its 'analogous' structure raises further questions as to the extent to which it is possible to develop an Islamic theory of international relations without having first redelineated this relationship. According to one view expressed by F.L. Oppenheim, 'international' law assimilated by a domestic legal system beyond a certain demarcation is likely to contradict its own essential qualities. Once crossing a threshold, it would cease being 'international' law, as the medium through which relations are conducted between sovereign nations (Suganami, 1989, p. 67). The dilemma this poses for Islamic jurisprudence is obvious. In conducting relations with non-Muslim




Figure 1. Representation of the simple classical Islamic theory dividing the world into the two broad categories of Abode of Islam and Abode of War.

de facto, though not necessarily *de jure*, 'sovereignties', whose law is to govern and set the conditions of interaction? To disrupt the inside/outside continuum is to subordinate sacred imperatives to positivist or non-Islamic values. This remains the case even where values may overlap, as the sanctioning source must continue, in principle, to occupy a super-ordinate position. Thus the basic structure of the paradigm does not allow for conducting foreign relations, and if any sustained relations are to be conducted, the paradigm is rendered inapplicable. Nevertheless, only limited and unsystematised speculation about expanding the theory's horizons has been pursued, allowing it to be judged by some Muslim scholars, perhaps hastily, as practically anachronistic and irrelevant (Sulayman, 1993, pp. 61 and 97).

The purpose of this paper is to introduce new elements of dynamism into the theory's static structure and hence contribute to reconstructing and reexamining its possible relevance as a neoclassical conceptual device. This highly needed 'therapy' for theoretical irrelevance aims at restoring 'intelligibility' and 'awareness' of the theory, and at founding a new, cleaned-up basis for conceptual and methodological construction and formation (Sartori, 1984, p. 50). Ability to conceptualise is a prerequisite for any possible shift from being simply an object of world politics toward being a subject and a participant. Only subsequently would it be possible to reestablish the significance of the Islamic theory of law of nations as a religious, ideological and political regime in the service of policies and strategies that touch upon world events. The purpose is to provide a guide for 'knowledgable practices', constitutive of 'subjects', as reflectivists in the field of international relations would normally put it (Wendt, 1992, p. 392).

Conceptual and Theoretical Issues

To conceptualise is to understand. "Understanding" ... means ... having whatever ideas and concepts are needed to recognize that a great many different phenomena are part of a coherent whole' (Heisenberg, 1971, p. 33). This involves a series of processes by which theoretical matrices achieve a significant measure of relative consensus and comprehension in any particular community. Conceptualisation, in other words, allows for undergoing the theoretical process by which advancement from the level of abstract ideas or constructs toward policy development and application can be made. It guards against confusion and *ad hoc* decision-making, and serves to set and sustain subsequent policies within a congruous strategic framework. It follows, therefore, that a lack of conception or of a conceptual reference entails an inability to understand or comprehend. It also means that the ability to tackle the flow of information becomes acutely diminished, as does also the capacity to judge or make decisions of a strategic nature. Failing to process information preempts the competence to act.

In discussing matters of strategy and war, B.H. Liddell Hart emphasises the crucial importance of conception as a guiding principle in peace and/or conflict. He underscores the fact that distracting the mind and expectations of opponents deprives them of their freedom of action as a sequel to their loss of freedom of conception (Liddell Hart, 1967, pp. 341–42). The effectiveness of a strategic vision depends more 'on the ability to paralyze an enemy's action rather than the theoretical object of crushing his forces' (Liddell Hart, 1967, pp. 341–46). Such is the significance of this that in many instances of strategic or grand-strategic contestation it takes only conceptual manoeuvring to determine a winning or losing outcome. Fighting becomes secondary or redundant as opponents lose their sense of self-representation and consequently

change their purpose, consciously or otherwise. Conception and strategy in the logic of this argument compose two mutually consolidating and fortifying constituents of reality. The absence of one almost invariably undermines the other.

The same underlying principles apply to matters cultural and religious. Whereas Liddell Hart stresses the organic relationship between conception and strategy in the military realm, Edward Said highlights the corresponding categories of culture and imperialism in the intellectual-ideological domain. The connection between the two categories rests on the power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging. Cultural narratives reflect conceptual constructions which, from opposite vantages, justify or condemn imperial domination. Predators and preys become narrations in and of themselves, each in their own way (Said, 1993, p. xiii). The very grand narratives of emancipation and enlightenment produced by the colonial predators serve to mobilise colonised people against their former dominators, and herein are unveiled their inherent contradictions. Yet in adopting the very idioms of their colonial masters, the populations actually culminate in perpetuating and reproducing the very power relations of those narratives, and thereby reveal the dynamic consistencies of imperial discourse.

Out of these combined and seemingly paradoxical manifestations, loss of conception leads to strategic disarray, cultural/religious dissipation and hegemonic resurgence. Commensurately, imperial repression invites the return of the repressed (Sayyid, 1997, p. 3). Countereruptions categorised under the rubric of 'religious nationalism' are the most conspicuous result (Juergensmeyer, 1993). In their inflamed exposition, these take the form of both random and/or organised violence. In their more sober manifestation, they induce a renaissance-like intellectual effort that aims both at reinstating and reexamining a people's own identity, thought, history and experience. At the heart of this effort is a concern, under constraints and conditions of globalisation and uncertainty, with the nature of the interaction between and among diverse cultures, religions and consciousnesses.

There is a commonality of concerns and issues among humanity at large, yet the diversity of priorities, agendas, interests and above all consciousnesses and world-views find their expression in different narratives or conceptual schemes. These refer to the manifold 'languages' used in expressing, representing and reflecting collectivities' distinct ways of perceiving or thinking about the world and of 'ordering' the 'data' of experience. People with different conceptual schemes are frequently concerned with the same properties of objects or with corresponding data. The 'given', though, is 'somehow "organized", "ordered", "interpreted", differently' (Walton, 1973, pp. 1, 3). The 'givens' of international and global issues are no exception. Both classical Islamic and western traditions regarding relations among nations have been largely cognisant of analogous matters. This can be observed from the early treatise (*siyar*) of the eighth-century Muslim jurist Muhammad bin al-Hasan al-Shaybani (750–804 AD),² through Hugo Grotius, down to contemporary Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz (see Waltz 1979). Broadly speaking, common themes that animate juristic and intellectual interests in the subject revolve around three overlapping considerations: (1) the causes and justifications of war and the conditions of peace, security, and order; (2) power and position as an/the essential actor (unit of analysis) in the community of nations; (3) conceptions and images of the international system and of the rôle of the 'state' in that system (Holsti, 1985, p. 8). These considerations of power and politics came to be largely articulated in the modern western theory of (neo)realism. However, embedded in an Islamic theoretical counterpart, an alternative conceptual categorisation is rendered essential in order to depict

the ensuing substantive differences.

For this purpose, Abdel-Rahman bin Khaldun (1332–1406 AD), a Muslim philosopher of history, sociologist and political theorist, and his concept of *assabiyya* may be of significant help.³ He identifies three broad types of regimes. They reflect different forms of domestic leaderships: (1) a government/leadership based solely on natural social solidarity (*assabiyya* as unmitigated power); (2) a government/leadership based on reason and natural law in conjunction with *assabiyya*; and (3) a government/leadership based on Divine Law (*shariah*), again in conjunction with *assabiyya* (Mahdi, 1963, p. 263). Within those three regime typologies, *assabiyya* figures prominently in all, while the rational and religious dimensions are introduced in the second and third classifications respectively. Should the purpose of *assabiyya* or core leadership mitigated by reason be solely concerned with the worldly or mundane good of both the rulers and their subjects, then this polity would fall into the category of what Ibn Khaldun terms rational regimes. Should, however, the religious dimension be introduced such that the leadership is concerned as well with the good of the subjects in the hereafter (*akhira*), then a Regime of Law (*shariah*) unfolds as the superior order of existence. The latter regime, according to Ibn Khaldun, is superior since its purpose is to maintain a balance between both life dimensions, providing for moderation against excessive mundanity. Above all, it becomes a community (*umma*) upon which God's favour and pleasure is bestowed (Sabet, 1994, p. 587).

In light of this Khaldunian classification and in extension into the international domain, realism and neorealism would fall into the category of rational regimes, and not too infrequently into that of pure domination. Classical Islamic theory would fall under the regime of Law. Like the rational category, the Islamic law of nations constitutes a way of thinking about the world, a conception of 'order', and a research programme with its own set of assumptions and premises from which Islamic derivations and arguments can be developed and analysed (Mastanduno, 1999, p. 19). In contradistinction to regimes of the rational category, however, it designates an entirely different conceptual worldview and moment of history with its own autonomous and independent discursive engagements. *Assabiyya*, as a corresponding conceptual device grounded in the regime of Law, constitutes in the Islamic theory of nations what the concepts of power and capability are to realism and structural neorealism. Just as 'power' serves the purpose of bridging the gap between international structures and processes, so is the concept of *assabiyya* crucial in linking international-global understanding to Islam. Such linkages help incorporate a religio-political theory about the part that can be 'played by conceptions of the world and their associated values' in bringing about a desired change (Bockock, 1986, p. 83). (Neo)realism and Islamic theory, together with their concomitant concepts of power/capability and *assabiyya* respectively, do not only comprise analytical devices, but are in fact constituted and constitutive elements of distinct philosophical and religious discourses which influence and structure both conceptions and actions. Rationality/realism and *shariah/assabiyya*, in other words, infuse power with differentiated substantive bases of action and hence reflect two categories of political behaviour. The former constitutes 'relational power', which seeks to maximise values, influence behaviour and control outcomes from within a given institutional structure or regime. The latter reflects a 'meta-power' concept and refers to efforts and behaviour that seek to change existing institutional structures and alter the rules of the game (Krasner, 1985, p. 14).

Assabiyya is rooted in three types or categories of belief structures: (1) worldviews;

(2) principled beliefs; and (3) causal beliefs. These embody cosmological, ontological and ethical notions respectively, rendering them broader than mere normative outlooks (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, pp. 8–10). Worldviews merge with peoples' conceptions of their identity, beliefs and focus of loyalties. Islamic law or *shariah* falls in this class, and when it is compared with secularism, for instance, it is clear that they comprise two different and largely opposed worldviews. The second category, or principled beliefs, embraces normative conceptions about values. Frequently, though not always, these take the form of binary opposites such as justice versus injustice, right versus wrong, falling within the pale versus falling without, or Abode of Peace versus Abode of War. Principled beliefs interpose themselves between worldviews and policy outcomes by translating key doctrines into guidance for present human conduct. This is equivalent to Islamic jurisprudence or *fiqh*, as the 'media of making the *Shari'ah* accessible to common believers' (Al-Ghunaimi, 1969, p. 133).⁴ The Islamic law of nations constitutes one manifestation of such an exercise. Thus it falls short of a totalising worldview and its full sanctity, but is more than a mere theoretical construct or policy guideline, to be subjected nonchalantly to allegations of irrelevance or variability.

Causal beliefs pertain to 'cause-effect' relationships based on the opinions or consensus of members of 'recognised elites', through whom authoritative rulings or decisions are made. They come closest to being the detailed paradigmatic judgments or *ara/fatawa* (singular *ray/fatwa*) of an Islamic epistemic community or *ulama*, the consensus of whom constitutes *ijma*.⁵ Causal beliefs fall at the interface between the normative and the cognitive. They entail strategies of attaining goals 'themselves valued because of shared principled beliefs, and understandable only within the context of broader worldviews outlooks' (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, p. 10). Thus changes in the conceptualisation of this latter category tend to be more flexible and frequent than in the former two, which reflect constants and continuities. All three categories, however, constitute a closure based on symmetric relationships among *shariah*, *fiqh* and *fatawa*, for which *assabiyya* becomes the operationalised or cognitive *praxis*. What is meant by closure is the domain within which the micro is related to the macro, and where political and strategic insights fit into a larger Islamic whole. Whereas 'normative closure requires symmetrical relations between the components of the system where one element supports the other and vice versa, cognitive openness ... requires asymmetrical relations between the system and the environment' (Luhmann, 1990, p. 230). Normativity maintains its symmetry by being nonadaptive (that is, 'closed to information and control'). By linking with a cognitively open framework it could nevertheless remain 'open to energy' and non-entropy (Ashby, 1956, p. 4). Normative closure and cognitive openness constitute the systemic self-referential unity of the reconstructed Islamic theory of nations.

The Modern State as a System of Durable Inequality

Beliefs and ideas play an important tangible, though sometimes less visible, role in the differing ordering, organisation and interpretation of 'data', beyond the mere justifications of pure interest. By providing order and conception of the world, they contribute to shaping agendas and programmes. Particular ideas and beliefs chosen rather than others act as 'blindness' or 'invisible switchmen' influencing policies and possibly effecting their transformation. They serve to reduce the number of conceivable alternatives, and to channel action onto certain tracks while obscuring other outlooks (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, p. 12). They can further assist in

unsettling discredited institutional frameworks, old or extant, in favour of alternative formations (Jackson, 1993, p. 119).

Modern state structures and currently emerging blocs are congruent with particular international and global designs and their constitutive and/or constituted interests. They thus incorporate certain symmetrical ideas, beliefs and concerns while excluding others. The crucial question from the Islamic theoretical perspective is who and what has been excluded by international and global structures, and what role the modern state plays in such exclusion. Ian Clark, for instance, observes that 'a theory of the global is itself an integral dimension of a more plausible theory of state'. Theorising about the latter structure thus carries us over the 'great divide' between the inside and outside, to how we think about relations between states. According to this vision, the state is 'the common but contested ground that brings the national and international together, rather than ... the barrier which marks the line of separation between them' (Clark, 1999, pp. 17–18). This is in stark contrast to the assumptions of the realists and neorealists about power and anarchy; the neorealists have yielded to the international system a distinctive and virtually autonomous existence.

Neoliberals in their turn have come to perceive the state as the instrument through which external demands of capital flows are imposed on domestic target groups. This constitutes both a reversal in its earlier role of projecting national economic demands into the international system, and an alternative form of structuralism to that of neorealism. Instead of the latter's 'anarchic/power configuration' organisation shifts to the 'competition/neoliberalism' of global economy (Clark, 1999, p. 94). State formation in its modern structural sense is further attributed by Charles Tilly to war. Demands imposed by violent conflict promote the dynamics of state-making processes, which range from territorial consolidation and centralisation to administrative differentiation and monopoly over the means of coercion. 'War made the state', as he put it, 'and the state made war' (Tilly, 1975, p. 42). In contrast, Ibn Khaldun perceives the rise of the state as an outcome of human cooperation rather than anarchy. People cooperate because they stand to benefit more, and out of such cooperation, which represents the 'human condition', emerges the state. This human condition is based on reason, social reproduction and social cohesion; or *assabiyya*. Unlike Thomas Hobbes, Ibn Khaldun rejects the 'state of nature', which pits all against all, rendering man willing to accept tyranny rather than live under conditions of sheer self-help (Pasha, 1997, p. 60).

The purpose here is by no means to present a theory of the state or its origins. Rather, it is to stress that the concept of the state is both contingent and variable, simply reflecting the varying empirical realities with which theory and practice concern themselves (Nettl, 1994, p. 11). 'Competing theories of the state, in effect, invariably come perilously near to being competing ideologies' (Ferguson and Mansback, 1989, p. 4). To challenge the territoriality of the state thus does not contest the concept's abstract necessity. Rather it simply affirms its contingent structural underpinnings and vested inside/outside interests, and by the same token denies any inherently 'natural' existence of the form that the modern state has taken. The 'universalisation' of the 'sovereign' equality of states, for instance, was a contingent development based on pressures from newly independent and weak states hoping to protect their new freedoms, analogies made to domestic politics of juridical equality, and great power calculations of interest (Krasner, 1985, p. 74). This suggests that inferences derived in each historical setting about political conduct are unique (Ferguson and Mansback, 1989, p. 3).

Religio-political reconceptualisation of the modern state as contingent rather than

necessary is a prerequisite for the effective representation of an updated Islamic theory of nations, yet one which retains the essential qualities of its classical antecedent. As a first step this entails the deconstruction of the modern state concept and its normative connotations, which served to reflect this relatively novel structure as a competing consciousness and discourse. Contingency of the state allows us to deconstruct it as a structure of domination and better to perceive the underlying sources of tension between Islam on the one hand and the modern state and the ensuing international-global system on the other. This helps expose the violent hierarchy of opposites (territorial/nonterritorial, progressive/regressive, equality/inequality, for example), in which the former controls the latter both axiologically and logically (Derrida, 1976, p. lxxvii).

Landscapes, of which the modern nation-states are constitutive structures, have come to be seen as 'texts' and discourses combining narratives, as well as conceptual, ideological and signifying representations (Barnes and Duncan, 1992, p. 8). In this light the 'state' constitutes an intertextual artifact actualised to reflect a particular self-image constructed and reconstructed through historical and political processes. The contemporary meaning it has come to bear has been produced from 'text to text' rather than between 'text and the real world'. The consequence is that

writing is constitutive, not simply reflective; new worlds are made out of old texts, and old worlds are the basis of new texts. In this world of one text careening off another, we cannot appeal to any epistemological bedrocks in privileging one text over another. For what is true is made inside texts, not outside them. (Barnes and Duncan, 1992, p. 3)

Both western theory and the 'nation-state' are examples of spatio-temporal intertextuality, which has rendered the state 'like virtually all concepts in the field of international relations ... drenched with normative connotations' (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1989, p. 3). Since one is more or less the product of a common western civilisational matrix, one can refer to an intertextuality that is intratextual. R.B.J. Walker was to the point when he indicated that theories of international relations are aspects of contemporary world politics, which need to be explained rather than being an explanation. They are to be comprehended as a typical discourse of the modern state and a 'design' for constitutive practice which seeks to limit and delineate the horizons beyond which political action by 'others' would be risky or prohibited (Walker, 1993, p. 6). Imperial and hegemonic constitutive designs require the support of structures of power, which sustain their greatest impression by availing themselves of clearly articulated ideas. The outcome has been a conception of 'order', which inherently benefits some at the expense of others (Paul and Hall, 1999, p. 3). The modern state is the vital instrument of that order. Initial hopes that the principle of state sovereignty would protect the weak through the universalisation of legal 'equality' have proven false as many states crumble and collapse under the weight of the global system. This is the logical consequence of a western international order, which reflects not only leading states' power and material interests, but also the constitutive aspects of their identities (Ruggie, 1988, p. 14). In this sense Frantz Fanon perceives notions of 'respect of the sovereignty of states' as a colonial 'strategy of encirclement' (Fanon, 1963, p. 71). Whereas before nineteenth-century European nationalism Muslims defined their 'self' first and foremost in religious terms, as Islam would normally have demanded of them, the subsequently superimposed nation-state structure introduced competing secular-western instruments of identity formation. Islamic autonomy, conception and self-referentiality were

challenged at the normative level, and behaviourally at the state and systemic levels. With the current wave of hegemonic neoliberalism this portends to reach down to social structures (family, for example) and individual attitudes. Very few of the Muslim failed pseudo-state structures are likely to be able to meet this challenge, nor does the global system afford them a substantive change of policy in response. The 'state' in the Abode of Islam remains a constituted object not a constitutive subject, existing as a contingent by-product of outside formations and not as a necessary sign of inside principles. It has receded into a self-reinforcing condition of dependency, penetrated by external actors, and a reflection of extratextuality. As such, it continues to strike at the very identity of this abode, the most conspicuous manifestation of which has been the recognition by those states of the region's antithetical identity: Israel.

What applies to the western world in a changing global system is thus different from what applies to Muslim nations in the same system. In contrast to the former, for the latter there is no mutual global and state reconstitution that would allow for intratextuality or even for a measure of intertextuality. In many ways, the relationship between globalisation and the international system resembles that between post-modernity and modernity. As far as the Muslim world is concerned, globalisation seeks to deconstruct their 'state' structures, along nonterritorial precolonial 'pre-organisational' lines, if possible, so as to reinscribe them. In this sense, globalisation seeks neither to destroy nor to consolidate the state, but basically to reconstruct it in a particular image. The question hence is not whether the 'modern state' as a sovereign entity is going to be undermined as such, but rather which states will be dismantled, deconstructed, consolidated, nominalised, reinscribed and how. Like postmodernity, globalisation may be postinternational, coming after, yet representing a return to and questioning of, earlier constructs (backward-looking) in order to reconstruct (forward-looking). It is an act of restoration and a forward-looking dynamic simultaneously, still within the normal progression of western history. Despite all the uncertainties associated with globalisation, it remains simply the autonomous linear sequel of that history, reflected in the form of continuation of an American hegemonic order (Ikenberry, 1996, pp. 89–91; Ikenberry, 1999, p. 125).

The world this gives rise to will be likely to be based on intratextuality versus extratextuality, or what some observers have termed 'a tale of two worlds' (Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992; Singer and Wildavsky, 1993, p. 3). One world consists of a core or 'great power society' of nonunitary actors, focusing primarily on maximising wealth, sharing common liberal norms, and a horizontal relation of cooperative interdependence. The other world, into which Muslim societies fall, consists of periphery states, largely dependent on the core, and conducting their policies among themselves according to the tenets of anarchy and structural realism (Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992, pp. 468–70). Essentially, then, there will be two separate worlds with horizontal co-operative and anarchic relations respectively, and which stand in a vertical-hierarchical relationship *vis-à-vis* each other. A relationship, that is, of inequality.

'The state', as Michael Walzer once observed, 'is invisible; it must be personified before it can be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived' (Walzer, 1967, p. 194). Deconstructing the modern state structure in the Abode of Islam requires developing a discourse and an ideological thrust, which while undermining its force as it stands constructs a conceptual alternative. This calls for the reconstitution of the state by changing its dimensions, signification and content, and from thereon its meaning (Zartman, 1995, p. 267); an 'essentially ... normative' as well as a 'scientific question' (Holsti, 1985, p. 7). While it is not

uncommon in western discourses to come across arguments supporting such transformations the significance and implications for the two worlds remain worlds apart. To the great power society such transformations will mean more integration and unity in the style of the European Union (EU) or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, Mexico and the US, or the consolidation of the power and hegemonic influence of the Jewish state of Israel over its neighbours. Israel, according to this discourse, would become the Trojan horse for a regional, imperial neoliberal power structure.

For the Muslim world, in contradistinction, the same western discourse regarding the state translates into 'humanitarian intervention', 'minority rights' and 'right to secession (self-determination)' among other supposedly lofty yet practically fragmentary principles. For, as Barry Buzan has indicated, 'the idea of the state, its institutions, and even its territory can all be threatened as much by the manipulation of ideas as by the wielding of military power' (Buzan, 1991, p. 97). Whereas for the society of great powers the above values are mutually constitutive and therefore inter- and intratextually sovereign, for the Muslim *umma* they represent an authority over their Islamic values and their social and political structures. The practical outcome of this extratextual discourse is to reconstitute notions of 'sovereignty', 'recognised borders' and entitlement to 'independence', allowing for a new and massive wave of colonial expansion to proceed unhindered by formal legalistic encumbrances. The purpose is to serve global neoliberal interests as the supreme loci of power. This not only further delegitimises Arab/Muslim pseudo-state structures but also deconstructs them for the purposes of new inscriptions. Sovereignty of Islamic values is further undermined as a stepping-stone toward their total marginalisation, depriving them in the process of any possible domains of competing domestic or external functioning space. The consequence, as the Islamic landscape readily manifests, is social and political fragmentation, identity crisis, splintering, diminution, conflict, and, in the final analysis, colonisation.

As a prerequisite to expanding the horizons of an altered meaning of sovereignty under global conditions, transformation in the 'epistemic dimension' of social life, or the system of meaning and signification embedded in collective mentalities, is required. In order to allow for relational changes between the inside and the outside, the extratextual apparatus, which ruling regimes in Muslim countries have come to draw upon in imagining and symbolising forms of political community, will have to undergo a fundamental reorientation (Ruggie, 1988, p. 184). So will their very conception of problem solving. No longer is the state simply a means to power and wealth from the inside shielded by sovereignty from the outside – which some may call corruption – but a structure of 'durable inequality' of which the former predicament is but one source (Tilly, 1999).

Self-referential standards of 'civilisation' set by a European model of statehood and state organisation, serving what were basically European interests and reflecting their own moment of history, are all congenial to the structuring and perpetuating of a world system of inequality (Kingsbury, 1999, p. 74). Binary oppositions associated with the state correspond to 'invisible' discursive categorical differences locking groups in permanent structural relationships of contrasts. Categories of inequality, even when evidently employing cultural labels, justifying for a particular group its own inferior position, relative or absolute, thus rendering it natural, always depend on far reaching socio-political organisation, belief and enforcement. In the field of international relations these translate into the structural-global, the ideological-neoliberal, and the power-imperial respectively. Durable inequality among categories develops

because great powers that control access to 'value-producing resources' solve defined systemic problems by means of categorical distinctions based on constructed systems of closure, exclusion and control (Tilly, 1999, pp. 7–8).

Policies that sought to maintain colonial rule over 'nonsovereign' territories came to depend increasingly on the structuring of categorical and binary distinctions among ethnic and racial groups (civilised/uncivilised, for example). Many of those excluded and controlled, on the less privileged sides of the categorical divide, eventually developed and acquired stakes in the formulated solutions, despite their dominant hierarchies. Afro-American civil rights activist Malcolm X had this point in mind when he gave the example of the slave in the field versus the slave in the master's house. When they met in their free time, the latter would tell the former about the joys of serving at 'home'. In his speech he would use the first person plural: in 'our' house, 'our' mansion or 'our' palace, whatever the case may be, 'we' do so and so. Unlike the slave in the field who recognises the reality of his status and resents it, the slave in the house is doubly enslaved: once by the fact of being a slave and twice by acquiring a stake in being a slave.

Categorical institutionalisation of this kind serves to sustain relations of durable inequality, as the master divides and conquers. Should the slave in the field rebel, his counterpart at 'home' can have only the limited option of being his antagonist. This condition is the inevitable outcome when debilitated Muslim states feel obliged to sign a human rights convention, a peace treaty or clauses of specific gender 'empowerment', all supposedly bearing connotations of universal equality. Not only do they submit to the bidding of a great power like the USA in such instances, but also in so doing they tie down their future options as they face greater prospects of exacting compliance. Lacking significant influence on the principles of international commitments to which they put their signature, they become exposed to both outside impositions and inside structural fragility. 'Globalisation affects not just their bargaining power at the time of negotiation, but more widely, their relative power to make choices in the future' (Hurrell and Woods, 1995, p. 456). It is thus inextricably intertwined with the propagation of inequality. Globalisation, in other words, negates in practice what universalisation of values demands in theory. Thus any 'relationship between globalization and human rights', for instance, becomes 'far from straight-forward' (Clark, 1999, p. 131). Or perhaps it is if the latter is nothing more than an instrument of the former. As 'particular' identities are being developed with reference to the neoliberal vision of the 'universal', and as globalisation is being universalised as a system of durable inequality, then it is clear that human rights is nothing more than the ideological underpinning of such a global order. It is basically an old/new colonial project aimed at reinscribing Muslim 'state' and society, by justifying intervention and enforcement. After all, as Andre Beteille has insightfully observed, 'Western societies were acquiring a new and comprehensive commitment to equality at precisely that juncture in their history when they were also developing in their fullest form the theory and practice of imperialism' (Beteille, 1983, p. 4). W. Michael Reisman has recently provided a consistent sample of this pattern. Attempting to build a legal case for foreign intervention he argues that national sovereignty in its classical sense has become 'anachronistic' and that it is legitimate to intervene in countries deemed 'undemocratic'. Human rights constitute the basis for such intervention. State sovereignty is no longer to be a protective shield if popular sovereignty is suppressed. Much in the same fashion that the 'wealth of a country can be spoliated as thoroughly by a native as by a foreigner' so can popular sovereignty be 'liberated as much by an indigenous as by an outside force'. He adds, however, that such

suppression constitutes only 'a justifying factor' for intervention, 'not a justification *per se* but *conduit sine qua non*' (Reisman, 1990, pp. 871–72). American global interests no doubt would be the determining factor.

Like any political system, globalisation requires mechanisms of control, which in a global hierarchy function as sources of durable inequality. These include exploitation, opportunity hoarding, emulation and adaptation. The first two come at the systemic level of analysis, and are largely responsible for the installation of the categorical boundaries of inequality. The latter two, at the state and also the individual-leadership levels, reinforce, consolidate and generalise the former arrangements (Tilly, 1999, p. 10).⁶ Exploitation occurs when powerful actors in the global system (insiders) command the resources and values from which they draw increased returns. This takes place by coordinating the efforts of weaker actors (outsiders) who are excluded from the full value added by that effort. Opportunity hoarding provides stakes to the latter categories. It offers monopolised rewards or values resources selectively to the segregated structures of the 'sovereign' state in order to undermine the force of revisionist tendencies, while keeping the 'unequal' divided. Emulation generalises the state system not only by copying or imposing it as an established organisational model, but also by attempting to transplant its concomitant yet alien social and political relations from one cultural and historical milieu to another. It further serves to lower the costs of maintaining the status quo below the costs of any of the modern states' potential or theoretical alternatives. Adaptation articulates and elaborates regimes of systemic interaction among states on the basis of presumably recognised categorical inequality. The purpose is to render the costs of moving to theoretically available alternatives prohibitively high. Adaptation thus locks categorical inequality by taking it for granted. Emulation multiplies categorical inequality by producing 'homologies' of form and function. Together, these create the illusion of the 'ubiquity' and therefore the 'inevitability' of the modern state, rather than its variability (Tilly, 1999, pp. 10, 190–91).

Each of the above four mechanisms constitutes a 'self-reproducing element' and together all lock neatly into a 'self-reproducing complex' (Tilly, 1999, p. 191). Their impact can be clearly followed in the historical process of emulation and adaptation which had taken place in the Muslim Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century (it was abolished in 1924) and subsequently by the fragmented Arab states during the twentieth century. The aim of achieving parity and equality with the West in fact achieved the very antithesis of those goals. Yet this process is still under way as a 'state' project increasingly being opposed by societal forces. Consequently, and in contrast to the European 'nation-state', the outcome has been a 'state' against the 'nation', to use Burhan Gholyun's adept depiction (Gholyun, 1994, pp. 27–28). In the former historical experience the state affirmed the nation; in the latter, it negated it. Infusing this same structure with new ideas, sound or mistaken, while possibly mitigating or exacerbating the effects of the four mechanisms described above, will neither stymie nor necessarily initiate them.

Democracy applied within the modern state – the structure that has come to embody those elements – will not contribute to rectifying this systemic configuration of inequality. Allowed to function seriously, democracy is likely to bring Islamist forces to power, which both religiously and ideologically cannot accept such a global order or state structure. This helps explain the absence of any real systemic interest in having a functional democracy in the Muslim world, and the intense American hostility to Islamic values. Nor, by the same token, would the mere implementation of the *shariah* provide a ready solution as the 'state' would inevitably come to confront a

hostile environment. Being constitutive of Islamic identity, the *shariah* means neither emulation nor adaptation. By extension it challenges the control and distribution of resources and values undertaken by exploitation and opportunity hoarding. Yet the holistic dimensions of the *shariah* cannot be fully expressed as the force of those mechanisms come into play. A change in organisational forms – the installation of different categories, or the transformation of relations between categories and rewards – therefore becomes necessary (Tilly, 1999, p. 15).

Defining those alternative organisational structures is part and parcel of any possible autonomous and self-referential conceptual change. The crisis that the Muslim world faces thus extends beyond the issue of the legitimacy of regimes to that of the legitimacy of the 'state' structure itself. The Muslim 'states' will have to relent reciprocally on what is by now a fictional sovereignty – a seemingly paradoxical dynamic of surrendering intra-sovereignty to gain in inter-sovereignty. Despite inevitable systemic resistance this will have to proceed in such a fashion so as to make it necessary that 'the "domestic" is as much a part of the fabric of the international system as any abstracted "structure" of the relations between states' (Clark, 1999, p. 5). If a theory of state is largely a theory of its external environment, and if the international-global order as it stands is not what Islamic values and Arab and Muslim people would readily accept, then it follows that to alter or significantly influence that system they will have to transform their extant state structures as well. Much in the same fashion that a domestic change in the attributes of the family, as the basic unit in society, would lead to transforming society and social relations and vice versa (agent-structure), so would a change in the attributes of the state, as the basic unit of the international-global system, alter the system and its relations, and vice versa. With form and content in the Muslim world no longer coinciding, either the state structure must be altered to fit the *umma's* principled beliefs, or the Islamic worldview must be diluted to suit the requirements of this structure. Between an Islamic choice opting for the former, and global forces opting for the latter, the modern Muslim 'state' and its contradictions have reached a historical impasse.

Toward a Neoclassical Islamic Framework

Much like globalisation, Islamic theory merely induces a particular conceptualisation of the meaning of state. It does not necessarily negate statehood as such even as it challenges its territoriality, but rather contests the association of identity formation with bounded territory. The state in this new/old conception is a means toward securing an Islamic or 'good' life and not an end in itself. Islam, as Ayatollah Muhammad Hussain Fadhlallah has put it, was not revealed in order to establish a state as an end, but to spread a message based on which a state would come into existence only as a subsequent means toward achieving this goal (Fadhlallah, 1996, p. 28). Whereas globalisation is currently increasingly setting the state in service of transnational flow of capital, goods and information, Islam sets it in the service of religious values. The equality of Islamic universalism is about to confront the inequality of primarily American globalisation. A new binary dichotomy is taking shape, not just between historically fixed categories, but more so among dynamic flows of forces and values. The trajectory of the previously marginalised Islamic law of nations seems to be catching up with the flow of current history.

Within the Abode of Islam, the nature of external relationships between states will have to be transformed. This means that Muslim states cannot continue to maintain the structure of their relationships on the basis of supposedly unitary actors engaged

in an anarchic self-help power setting. They must move to an 'abodic'/macro level based on meta-power or *assabiyya*, as an endogenous/cooperative-exogenous/conflictive concept. Unlike mere Third Worldism, which sought to guard security and independence by jealously defending the pseudo-'nation-state' structure, notwithstanding calls for transnational unity of one kind or the other, *assabiyya* seeks to promote those very objectives among others, by challenging the very imagery and conception of the modern state. Substantive issues of this kind pose both theoretical and practical revisionist challenges to the status quo, particularly so as issues of identity come to the forefront. The crucial and most central issue hence is to determine where the *assabiyya* of Islam lies and to coalesce around it, transcending territorial and vested or modern state interests. It is the rational and reasoned tackling of primarily political and strategic questions of this kind that will determine answers in the light of which categorical provisions of the *shariah* and determination of Islamic interests could be made.

Theorising about the state, under such conditions, must itself begin by subverting the framework of the great divide, whether between the inside and the outside or between the Abode of Islam and the Abode of War. This does not mean eliminating categorical distinctions, but rather recognising that the stability of fixed categories under conditions of fluidity and transformation is likely to experience powerful pressures (Clark, 1999, pp. 16, 31). Fixed categories are inherently disposed toward maintaining closures. Closure generally leads to entropy as loss of energy and openness to entropy as loss of identity. The seeming opposition between both forces frequently contributes to distress and uncertainty, particularly so as elements of conservatism creep in, opting in response for the security of static norms to the insecurity of dynamic interaction. This is problematic because systems of thought, as well as geopolitical structures, which seek to seal themselves off from outside forces, will tend to exhaust their ideas as well as their human and natural resources respectively, and hence undergo high levels of entropy (Demko and Wood, 1994, p. 28). A branchless tree may continue to grow for some time until it reaches certain limits, beyond which it cannot go. Only the branches, however, can allow it to 'procreate' and in a sense reproduce itself. Manifesting closure, recurrence and repetition, the Islamic law of nations collapses theory into law, the branch into the stem and the part into the whole. Its potential evolutionary and contributive energy is thus exhausted.

Shifts in the systemic order and capabilities are strongly intertwined with qualitative and quantitative factors ranging from conceptual change and political, economic or social structural organisation to an increase in space, resources or more favourable external conditions. Non-territoriality, as one such organising principle, is linked to relative and absolute power changes in the international-global system, not simply as a matter of stretch or expanse, but also in terms of the concomitant changes necessary for the effective management of space. To talk about non-territoriality is thus to incorporate qualitative as well as quantitative transformations both at the state and 'abodic'/macro levels. If successfully constitutive of a new geopolitical and strategic reality, the impact could eventually translate into a broader measure of global influence or better internal control over the external environment, and hence a relative reduction in conditions of inequality.

Two 'postulates' may help in justifying the principle of non-territoriality, and perhaps in developing further in harmony with rational Islamic theoretical underpinnings and religious principles. First, that 'a state's relative capability in a system will increase when its rate of absolute growth is greater than the absolute

growth rate for that system as a whole (the systemic norm)'. Second, that 'a state's relative capability for growth will accelerate for a time and then (at a point of inflection) begin a process of deceleration' (Doran, 1991, p. 4). Both assumptions transcend the divide between the inside and outside in that intra-Muslim state borders and sovereignty lose much of their significance while at the same time new reorganising principles of state are introduced. Reforms which may cause positive increase in a state's capabilities are likely to be constrained and limited by territoriality and thus will reach their limits long before being able to attain an essential actor role. Conversely, in the hypothetical situation where two or more Muslim states happen to unite without internally reorganising, the same sources of failure will simply be transposed from what was previously a smaller structural failure to a larger one. Should both reform and unification occur simultaneously, then a situation might emerge in which the absolute growth of the 'Islamic State' could be greater than that of the system. This is one important reason why the US is hostile to Islamic geopolitical conceptions and values, which seek to change the connotations of the state. These considerations have much less to do with Islamic 'radicalism' or 'moderation' as such and more with systemic idiosyncrasies. This is illustrated by American policy toward the experiences of two countries, Iraq and Egypt. When the US mobilised to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 it was, among other reasons, to protect the ultimate structure of 'sovereign' states, and the mechanisms serving that purpose – the arbitrarily bordered Arab 'state'.

Breaking the borders 'taboo', irrespective of intentions, would have allowed for a change in conception regarding the ubiquity and inevitability of the state structure, and an increase in the relative autonomy and power of an emerging regional power. This was not only in the case of Iraq. When Egypt attacked Libya in 1977, with the prospect of taking over the oil fields of that country, the USA made its disapproval amply clear. Despite American hostility to Muammar Qadhafi's regime and its friendly relations with the Egyptian counterpart, a warning was conveyed to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat indicating opposition to such a takeover. The USA would not countenance an increase in Egypt's capabilities at an accelerated rate once it had laid its hands on Libya's oil (Heikal, 1996, pp. 228, 247). This might have been explained by reason of international law had the USA not previously supported Iraq's invasion of Iran, and had not American international behaviour in other cases been similarly aggressive. In addition, it remains highly unlikely that the USA would at any point of time look favourably on, say, a possible union between Egypt, Libya and Sudan, even if it were to be consummated peacefully. The reasons have much to do with the idea of global order and the bordered state system 'switching off' that of a unified Arab and/or Muslim nation as well as with considerations of absolute and relative power.

Robert Gilpin has observed that 'a more wealthy and more powerful state (up to the point of diminishing utility) [can] select a larger bundle of security and welfare goals than a less wealthy and powerful state' (Gilpin, 1981, pp. 22 and 23). Whereas the consolidation and mobilisation of a collective Islamic-Arab identity in response to globalisation would have been required, systemic interests have sought instead to impose the state secular identity as the highest value. As a result primary and/or secondary identities are imposed not chosen. Supporting a tribal emir in Kuwait, perpetually in a state of fear of an 'inside' neighbour and in need of permanent 'outside' protection to stay in power, constitutes a self-reproducing mechanism of regional control and durable inequality. Even by the standards of primacy of state values, the Muslim 'state' has been a failure. Yet Muslim states continue to pursue contradictory and conflicting state policies ultimately leading to a progressive

dynamic of fragmentation, bringing them under total systemic colonisation and domination. The tragedy of the Muslim community/*umma*, if one may paraphrase Rousseau, is that it is in all Muslims' religious and values interests to unite under a commonly agreed-upon sovereign/imam in order to have a better chance of attaining a larger security bundle. Yet it is in the interest of each single regime or state to obviate that authority when it is to its own expediency (Williams *et al.*, 1993, p. 100).

Calls for Muslim states to develop policies of cooperation and mutual assistance in different forums and at different levels (Sulayman, 1993, p. xiv) while continuing to maintain their structures of durable inequality are unrealistic and naïve to say the least. First, global imperatives may render such cooperation untenable, and may compel its norms in such a fashion that Muslim regimes may find it more rewarding and in their interest not to cooperate – most such regimes being highly penetrated and dependent, if not outrightly colonised. Second, as Geoffrey Garret and Barry Weingast have put it, 'to assert that institutions help assure adherence to the rules of the game is to overlook a prior and critical issue. If the members of a community cannot agree to one set of rules, the fact that institutions might facilitate adherence to them would be irrelevant' (quoted in Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, p. 18).

Mere cooperation, therefore, is no substitute for unity, both functional and political. As a matter of fact, in a world of realism the former is highly unlikely without the latter. Only the ability of a centralised (federal or otherwise) authority to extract the collective resources of the *umma* would allow the state to exert more control over its external environment. The resources at the disposal of the Muslim world cannot be mobilised or extracted through goodwill, moral exhortations or sympathy. Notwithstanding the necessity of the former bona fide factors, they must be translated into centralised and structured imperatives. Fareed Zakaria makes an insightful point when he distinguishes, in his politico-historical study of the USA, between state and national power. Only when the 'state' was able to establish centralised control over the extraordinary resources of the American 'nation' by 1890 was it possible for the USA to pursue a coherent foreign policy, which would serve that country's purpose of exerting control over its external environment well into the twentieth century and beyond. Until such a hold could be established, despite its tremendous resources, the USA remained a 'weak divided and decentralized' state, providing policymakers with 'little usable power' (Zakaria, 1998, p. 55). The same could be said about the EU. Despite the abundance of resources at the EU's disposal, which matches if not exceeds that of the USA, the EU remains limited in the amount of control it can exert on the external environment, whether in terms of foreign or military policy. No effective sovereign and/or centralised extractive institutions so far exist which could translate wealth into power. Both the US and EU federative experiences thus provide comparative empirical evidence in the light of which Islamic unifying religio-political concepts such as the imamate and the caliphate could be reformulated and operationalised geopolitically. The modified restoration of the caliphate as an institution, contrary to claims projecting this as a return to the past and unrealistic, constitutes the Islamic, though perhaps yet unarticulated, equivalent to the secular EU project and even to that of the US 'federation'. Yet it is dubbed regressive even as it transcends the modern 'state', and is hence visionary and futuristic.

Other relevant historical cases must also be examined and analysed, such as those of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Soviet Empire, and most significantly, the Ottoman Empire. Their rise and decline, in the framework of *assabiyya*, among other potential concepts, could provide for a fresh historical and Islamic outlook – *assabiyya* in this context referring to the right and eligibility of a particular group to

rule or otherwise, and thus strongly intertwined with legitimacy. A comparative analysis between rational regimes and regimes of law (*shariah*) as related to those empires could lead to insightful conclusions. So would examining the possible links between *assabiyya* as theory of state and corresponding increased control over the external environment as a systemic reflection – these being two aspects of a single dynamic breaking the inside/outside divide.

Breaking this divide requires the cognitive opening of the closed categories of the Islamic classical theory. This means being able to discriminate between closed normative aspects (law-stem) and the theoretical and practical underpinnings (theory and praxis-branch). Khadduri makes an important point in this respect when he distinguishes between jihad as a doctrine of permanent state of war and the condition of actual and continuous fighting (Khadduri, 1955, p. 64). A distinction of this kind is useful in elaborating and transcending the boundaries of fixed categories. The fact that the latter were considered stemic normative wholes or universals led to the diffused incorporation of the partial (branch) and contingent condition of actual fighting into the normative Abode of War category. This implied that no distinction was made between the Abode of War as a closed and necessary category on the one hand, and the open and contingent issues of peace and war on the other. The one was basically inherently implied in the other. Thus under circumstances in which fighting, as a contingent category, was neither feasible nor perhaps required, doubts were as a consequence cast on the normative category: a case in which the theoretical ‘system’ turned against itself rather than opting to evolve while maintaining its own integrity.

A neoclassical Islamic framework is needed, therefore, to provide for new conceptions of relationships between norms and values on the one hand and interests and interaction on the other. A relational distinction must be introduced between the macro-abstract worldviews and principled beliefs, and the micro causalities. This is in contrast to the classical framework, which allowed the macro and the micro to diffuse into each other. In an Islamic frame of reference, normative principles as well as cognitive interests bear an originative influence in determining action. The starting-point of a neoclassical framework is thus to reformulate the cognitive problem in terms of how to bring forth the distinctiveness of the evolutionary branch in a dynamic unity such that closure and openness reflect ‘reciprocal conditions’ rather than ‘contradictions’, thus recharging energy and consolidating identity.

In this unity openness of the Islamic value system bases itself upon self-referential closure, and closed reproduction refers to the environment (Luhmann, 1990, p. 230). This is a different way of referring to subversion of categorical inside/outside distinctions in favour of mutual adaptation of a specific kind. Synthesising Ibn Khaldun’s cyclical theory of state (*assabiyya*) and historical dynamics with the Islamic law of nations caters to a promising ontological-epistemological Islamic framework, combining theory of state with international theory, forming what may be called a ‘power cycle theory’, one which ‘encompasses both the state and the system in a single dynamic’ and which reflects structural change, at the two levels concurrently. It unites the structural and behavioural aspects of state international political development in a single dynamic and can be analysed on each level by means of a variety of approaches. These may include religious interpretations, history, understanding of international and global political behaviour, or empirical testing (Doran, 1996, pp. 19–20).

However, the fact that the concept of ‘statehood’ is also being concomitantly transformed elevates such a power cycle theory to the meta-level. In this context, introducing the leadership principle of *wilayat al-faqih* (the rule of the jurisprudent) as a




Figure 2. Diagram introducing an element of complexity and depicting the suggested neoclassical 'state' approach.

potential model and an empirical expression of *assabiyya* could help in building a commensurate theory of state.⁷ The dynamism of this contingent causal belief grounded in Islam, and its institutionalised practical and empirical manifestations, justify it as an operational Islamic conceptual construct.⁸ At this point, then, we could perhaps imagine three concentric circles including *wilayat al-faqih* (innermost), *assabiyya* (middle) and Abode of Islam (outermost) (Figure 2). The first indicates *who* is to rule (causal beliefs – *fatawa*), the second explains *why* (principled beliefs – *fiqh*), and the third delineates the nonterritorial domain or 'state' – *where* (worldview – *shariah*). A neoclassical Islamic theory that introduces these elements of complexity into its structure could help explain potential influence on global and international relations caused by the cyclical dynamic of state ascendancy and/or decline.

At the same time, the closed normative categories of Abode of Islam versus Abode of War would carry the different yet symmetrical connotations of identity (constructed) and self (inherent) rather than of permanent conflict and hostility. Branching out of them are the cognitive asymmetrical aspects of (a) peace (*dar al-ahd*), (b) tension (*dar al-sulh*) or (c) actual war or aggression (*dar al-baghy*) (Figure 3).⁹

The proposed system allows for a measure of flexibility, fluidity and inferences, and hence dynamism, as opposed to the static framework of fixed and immutable categories.

The 'West' is still to be perceived in terms of the classical category 'Abode of War', but the definition of 'War' is no longer simply 'conflict' but 'the other or separate identity', with mutual relations varying on the basis of political contingencies. The latter definition reflects the




Figure 3. Diagram representing the 'branching-out' or the cognitive opening of the normatively closed categories reflecting the different states of peace, tension or war. Peace = *dar al-ahd*, tension = *dar al-sulh*, war = *dar al-baghy*.




Figure 4. Depiction of a policy framework that, while normatively closed, is cognitively open. It is based on policies rather than generalised closed categories but also protects identity structure. The non-imperial, semi-imperial and imperial identifications correspond to the respective conditions of peace, tension and war in Figure 3.

security of social relationship, a sense of being safely in cognitive control of the interaction context. It is relational at the most basic level of interaction: that of the mutual knowledge which is a condition of action, and which derives from a sense of shared community.

Essentially it becomes a source of 'ontological security', which 'relates to the self, its social competence, [and] its confidence in the actor's capacity to manage relations with others' (McSweeney, 1999, p. 157), a condition of closure, that is, being the prerequisite for openness.

In correspondence with the above cognitive aspects of peace, tension or conflict/fighting, the 'West' may be subdivided into (a) non-imperial powers, (b) semi-imperial powers and (c) imperial powers respectively (Figure 4).

Conflict would hence shift from a fixed 'western' category toward a fluid imperial counterpart, as actors' roles might change or alter over time. Reformulated accordingly, the 'Abode of War', against which *jihad* or 'just war' may in principle be conducted, becomes imperialism and not the West as such, policies not categories. In this sense *jihad* reappropriates its just and defensive connotations. Fluidity by the same token requires the expansion of cognitive skills (*fatawa*) into fields of strategic planning, prioritisation and political analysis as categories change, mix or transform. It demands further the sharpening of dynamic theoretical inferences, while remaining at the same time cognisant of normative closures and red lines related to religious values and interests. It is perhaps this framework that has allowed the Iranian Islamic experience to evolve successfully, despite great systemic opposition, from revolution to a revolutionary state and then to an institutionalised state, while remaining loyal to Islamic principles both domestically and externally. Its normative closure was the very condition of its evolution and cognitive opening. This is in contradistinction to the Arab 'state', which is normatively open and cognitively closed. No wonder the former is dynamic and evolving, the latter static, fragmenting and decaying.

These considerations argue for the continued yet modified relevance of the classical Islamic approach to relations among nations. The respect with which it has been held by Muslims through the centuries is therefore not necessarily misplaced. Where such respect is perhaps out of place, however, is when it becomes veneration, which does not allow for intellectual expansion, elaboration and complexity, combined with a state of paralysis and immobility emanating from a feeling of insecurity about being unable to preserve religious identity in a perceived 'hostile' global environment. Fear,

that is, fuelled by the implications of being an adaptive object rather than a constitutive subject. Islamic beliefs and ideas, for a myriad of historical reasons, have been largely detached from national and global structures and processes. As such they have been unable to play an active role in shaping national and government policies or reach out beyond to influence systemic configurations. To the extent that beliefs determine and sway policy and thus are potentially constitutive of the domestic and possibly the external environment such fears could be mitigated. This would require moving beyond the simplicity of normative closures toward a dynamic relationship with the complexities of cognitive openness. A neoclassical framework heralds the end of simplicity in much the same fashion that the end of the Cold War ushered in the end of simplicity associated with a bipolar structured world.

Notes

- ¹ It is true that the Hanafi school of thought recognised that territorial implications affected religious rulings, as opposed to a purely nonterritorial personal obligation to follow such rulings. However, this hinged on a non-Islamic territorial law not contradicting any Islamic injunction (such as eating pork or drinking wine). The latter always had precedence even though a Muslim in non-Muslim territory was expected to obey local rules and laws.
- ² Al-Shyabani was called the Hugo Grotious of the Muslims by Joseph Hammer von Purgstall (Khadduri, 1966, p. 56). His works are described by Weeramantary as 'the world's earliest treatise on international law as a separate topic' (Weeramantary, 1988, p. 130). As a matter of fact, Weeramantary argues persuasively that it was the influence of Islamic international law that served as the triggering factor in the development of the western counterpart. Western scholars in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were well aware of Arab/Islamic literature and sciences through Spain and Italy. Weeramantary also provides a host of circumstantial evidence indicating that Grotious was influenced by Islamic scholarship even though he never acknowledged it (Weeramantary, 1988, pp. 149–58). Appreciative references to the Quran and to Islamic law pertinent to international relations can also be found in the writings of Montesquieu (Weeramantary, 1988, pp. 108–109).
- ³ There is a rather a negative religious connotation associated with the concept of *assabiyya* as a reflection of chauvinism and/or nepotism; characteristics which the Prophet Muhammed is reported to have condemned. Ibn Khaldun's usage of the term, however, refers not to this negative aspect but to the more general sentiments of solidarity, which bring people together in order to create society, the foundation of any eventual good. *Assabiyya* in this sense refers not only to those primordial feelings which are embedded in the natural ties of kinship and blood relations, but also to the broader context of group cohesion, affiliation and common concerns – an *esprit de corps* of sorts. It embodies both the natural and functional purposes of human social and political existence organised around those who lead and those who are led. This paper however will attempt to expand and reconstruct this concept beyond its conventional and narrow Khaldunian meaning in order to apply it to contemporary structures and contingencies.
- ⁴ Al-Ghunaimi has indicated that '... it is not accurate to include the doctrines of the various Islamic schools of thought [paradigms] in the *Shari'ah stricto sensu*. These schools, in fact represent different processes of speculation on what the divine law, *the Shari'ah* might be' (Al-Ghunaimi, 1969, p. 133).
- ⁵ An epistemic community consists of knowledge-based experts who share both cause-effect conceptions and sets of normative and principled beliefs (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, p. 11). This does not mean that members of such a community have to agree on every detail. By the same token *ijma* does not necessarily mean the absence of differences, but rather their existence within a common Islamic normative structure. In this sense, differences between, for instance, Hanafis and Shafiiis regarding details of conducting relations with non-Muslim nations need not be understood or translated into discontinuity

or an absence of *ijma* at least as far as the Islamic theory in concerned. Michel Foucault, for instance, indicates that despite all the apparent challenges which Marx's ideas presented to the power and domination of ruling classes and their ideologies, 'at the deepest level of Western knowledge, Marxism introduced no real discontinuity'. While the erupting conflict and opposition to his ideas 'may have stirred up a few waves and caused a few surface ripples ... they [were] no more than storms in a children's paddling pool' (Foucault, 1970, pp. 261–62). In the Islamic religious field, it may be possible to make an analogy with the Sunni-Shiite divide.

- ⁶ In what follows in this section I draw on the work by Tilly. However, I expand his organisational and intra-state focus to the international and global context.
- ⁷ The real significance of the Islamic revolution and its structures of authority as an empirical model have been frequently overlooked by Sunnis. As a result of ignoring that experience as well as Shiite jurisprudence, a wealth of knowledge of immense potential benefit to the debilitated state of Sunni *fiqh* and political theoretical development is simply excluded. The fact that Shiites have historically been a minority has had its effects on Shiite jurisprudence, which provides for *fiqh al-aqalliyya* (the minority). Having been persecuted and weak, it provides for *fiqh al-istidhaf* (the weak/down-trodden). Having never closed the gate of *ijtihad*, it provides for *fiqh al-ijtihad* (innovation) – a talent which Sunnis have apparently lost in favour of *taqlid* (emulation), whether of their predecessors or the West. Having represented opposition to the Sunni ruling establishment, it provides for *fiqh al-thawra/al-khuruj* (revolution), particularly in light of the Iranian Islamic revolutionary experience. Having been able not only to establish an Islamic state but also to institutionalise it under the aegis of the *wilayat al-faqih* principle, it provides for *fiqh al-dawla* (the state). Finally, having been able to deal dynamically with, and to exert increased influence on, the external environment while credibly holding fast to Islamic principles, it provides for *fiqh al-ilaqat al-kharijiyya* (external relations). All these six aspects of jurisprudence provide for a comprehensive theoretical and empirical corpus of knowledge, which rationally justifies the principle of *al-wilayat*. In a reconstructive effort of this kind, Sunni-Shiite relations must be seen through a strategic rather than historical perspective.
- ⁸ The Islamic theory of nations and Ibn Khaldun, together with the empirical experience of the Iranian Islamic revolution, provide ample opportunity for broadening Muslims' intellectual/*ijtihad* horizons of research. The 'Islamic' justification for the choice of *wilayat al-faqih* here as the most relevant leadership principle is based on the Prophetic Tradition narrated by Abu-Huraira, the companion of the Prophet. When the Quranic verse '... if ye turn back (from the path), He will substitute in your stead another people [non-Arab?]; then they would not be like you', was revealed (ch. 47:39) the Prophet was asked who those substituting people might be. He put his hand on the shoulder of Salman (the only Persian Muslim at the time) and said 'this man and his people. By him in whose hands my soul is, if the faith were to be as far as '*al-Thurayya*' [secular epoch?] it shall be brought back by men from among the Persians [The Islamic Revolution?].' Al-Thurayya is the name of a star (Al-Tabari, 1980, vv. 26, 42; Al-Qurtobi, 1967, vv. 16, 258). This does not preclude further rational justifications based on the theory and practice of the Iranian leadership. The concept will be used in this article in a more or less reified unproblematic form. On Iran, government and theory of state detailing *wilayat al-faqih* as an Islamic leadership principle, and as a praxis of Islamic *assabiyya*, see Sabet (1994), pp. 583–605.
- ⁹ *Dar al-ahd* or the abode of the covenant is used here to refer to peaceful relations of a more or less enduring kind (non-imperialists). *Dar al-sulh*, or the abode of peaceful arrangements, connotes temporality and contingency determined by less enduring more tense relations (semi-imperialists). *Dar al-baghy*, or the abode of aggression, refers to imperialist and hostile actors.

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