

Theology on *the Web.org.uk*

Making Biblical Scholarship Accessible

This document was supplied for free educational purposes.
Unless it is in the public domain, it may not be sold for profit
or hosted on a webserver without the permission of the
copyright holder.

If you find it of help to you and would like to support the
ministry of Theology on the Web, please consider using the
links below:



Buy me a coffee

<https://www.buymeacoffee.com/theology>



PATREON

<https://patreon.com/theologyontheweb>

[PayPal](#)

<https://paypal.me/robbadshaw>

A table of contents for *Bibliotheca Sacra* can be found here:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_bib-sacra_01.php

But already the Article has exceeded the limits which it was designed to occupy. It may, however, be permitted to cite, in support of this view, a name, than which no higher uninspired authority can be urged,—the name of Calvin. “Baptism is a sign of initiation;” “it is proposed to us by our Lord, first, as a symbol and token of our purification”; second, “it shows us our mortification in Christ and our new life in him;” third, “it affords us the certain testimony, that we are not only engrafted into the life and death of Christ, but are so united as to be partakers of all his benefits.”

If the view taken in the above remarks is just, it renders needless any enquiries as to the proper subjects of this rite. The question is already answered. Can we with propriety baptize any save those who are now capable of an intelligent entrance upon the Christian life, those who are believed to have entered upon the new life, of which baptism is the inauguration?

ARTICLE IV.

HOMERIC IDEAS OF THE SOUL AND A FUTURE LIFE.¹

BY JOHN PROUDFIT, D. D., PROFESSOR OF GREEK LITERATURE IN RUTGERS COLLEGE.

*Homer once more!*² Such was the title which Goethe prefixed to a short lucubration on the great poet, implying

¹ Ueber die Bedeutung von $\psi\chi\hbar$ und $\epsilon\theta\omega\lambda\sigma$ der Ilias und Odyssie, als Beitrag zu der Homerischen Psychologie. Von Dr. K. H. W. Voelcker, Giessen. 1825.

On the Signification of $\psi\chi\hbar$ and $\epsilon\theta\omega\lambda\sigma$ in the Iliad and Odyssey. By Dr. K. H. W. Voelcker. Giessen, 1825. Translated from the German by C. P. Mason, B. A. (Classical Museum, Vol. II.), 1845.

Die Homerische Theologie in ihrem Zusammenhange dargestellt von Carl Friedrich Naegelsbach, Professor am K. B. Gymnasium zu Nürnberg. Nürnberg im Verlage von Johann Adam Hein. 1840.

² Homer noch einmal, Sämmtl. Werk. Vol. XXVI. p. 356.

an apology for troubling the world any further on so old a topic. But the world has not done with Homer yet. Like his old hero-rambler, he is πολύτροπος, and will turn up in new aspects, so long as past and future are common factors in the problem of history and humanity. Or, to use a little of his own freedom in changing figures, that ocean which washes the shores of "all human knowledges;" out of which were exhaled and into it flowed again, as the old critics affirmed, all the fountains, streams, and rivers of Greek song, eloquence, and art,¹ has depths not yet explored, in which slumber undiscovered pearls, which men will be still diving after, so long as intellectual pearls hold a price in the world's market. Homer was the fontal genius of Greece; and the more her later literature is studied, the more earnestly will Homer be explored in search of the *prima materies* of her language and her marvellously rich and varied intellectual manifestations. He has a profound moral and philosophic interest, too, for those who delight in studying the development of ideas and opinions. This tendency grows stronger daily. Everything is now studied *comparatively*; — the human mind thus revealing the force of that inward law which impels it to complete, to harmonize, and reduce to unity the multifarious products of its activity. And what would the comparative study of antiquity be without Homer? His myths are the staple of its poets; his ideas, the germs of its philosophical systems; his verses, the metrical norms of its prosodians; his phrases, the ground-work of its syntax; his stories, the starting-point of its history; his beauties, the never-failing theme of its critics. We have not had the last of him yet, therefore. So long as the admirable splendor and variety of his poetry shall stimulate criticism, and the wide range of his genius and knowledge furnish new material for antiquarian and philosophic research and comparison, so long we shall continue to have *Homer once more*.

The latest German philosophy has given a fresh stimulus to Homeric speculation. And here is an entirely new phase

¹ Dion. Hal. de Comp. Verb. Op. II. p. 28 (Sylb.) Eustathius. Proem.

of the long-waged "controversy." Sceptical criticism has grown tired of debating the personality of Homer, and has now gone to work to blot from his immortal verse the doctrine of the soul's immortality and to prove him a mere materialist, who looked upon the whole conscious existence of man as included within the present life. Of all the Homeric heresies with which Germany has teemed since the days of Wolf, this is the boldest departure from all ancient belief, and the most abhorrent to those feelings of veneration and love with which all true scholars have regarded the father of song for nearly thirty centuries. It is, however, the theory of the works before us. "When a man departs from life," says Dr. Voelcker, "the $\psi\chi\nu$, according to the Homeric belief, leaves the body, and this $\psi\chi\nu$ continues to exist in Hades. *The word $\psi\chi\nu$, however, in Homer, signifies only the breath and the life; never, as in the language of later times, the spirit or soul.*¹ . . . We arrive at this result, that according to the belief of the Homeric age, it is not the soul or spirit which continues to exist after death. . . . Homer nowhere shows a knowledge of the mind as something separate or separable from the body.² Nowhere is the idea of spirit conceived more independently than that of life itself. So corporeal indeed is the mind, that the dead in Hades are said to be destitute of mental faculties. . . . The mental faculties appear only as properties and powers of the whole man, which live so long as the body lives, and in death leave it and cease to exist. . . . It is the $\psi\chi\nu$ therefore, and not the soul, which continues to exist. . . . It alone has gone, and it alone, therefore, can be in Hades; it is the origin of life, it will therefore continue to live and last.³ (*Er ist der Grund des Lebens, er wird also auch fortleben und fortdauern.*)

What is this $\psi\chi\nu$, which "continues to exist," which "will continue to live and last?" Dr. Voelcker has abun-

¹ Das Wort $\psi\chi\nu$ bedeutet bei Homer nur den Atem und das Leben, niemals . . . den Geist oder die Seele.

² Homer kennt den Geist nirgends als etwas Selbständiges und als solches dem Körper entgegengesetztes, das von ihm getrennt oder trennbar fortlebte.

³ Pages 45—47. (Our figures refer to the English translation.)

dantly informed us what it is not. "It is," he says, "not the soul," "not the spirit," not "the mental faculties," (for these, says Dr. V., "in death cease to exist");¹ it is "des-
titute of *everything corporeal*";² and yet it "goes into Hades;" it "continues to exist," to "live and last;" "it is a pro-
longation of life;—on that point there is no doubt." What kind of "existence," still more of "*life*," is that which includes neither soul, spirit, nor mental faculties, and is des-
titute of *everything corporeal*? What is the nature of that $\psi\nu\chi\eta$ which "will continue to live and last," and yet is not "any of these?"

The answer is hard, but Dr. Voelcker undertakes it. "The word $\psi\nu\chi\eta$, according to its derivation from $\psi\nu\chi\omega$, is primarily the breath, the air, which we exhale and inhale; and this idea lies at the bottom of all the significations of the word in the language of Homer. But as the *breath* is one visible condition of *life*, which, with the second principle of life according to the conceptions of the ancients, the blood, has its seat in the breast, the word came to signify, more ordinarily, *the life*, without however altogether giving up the secondary meaning of *breath*. . . The $\psi\nu\chi\eta$ with which, in the upper world, we have become acquainted under the forms of air and life, meets us in Hades; and it must be the same, for it is said to go into Hades."

"In what way, then, are we to conceive the continued existence of this psyche?"³ We await the disclosure with profound interest. "The word $\epsilon\iota\delta\omega\lambda\omega$," continues Dr. V., "conducts us to the right explanation; a word which, with reference to this point has hitherto been entirely neglected, and yet makes everything clear. Formed from $\epsilon\iota\delta\omega$, $\epsilon\iota\delta\omega\mu\alpha i$, it comprehends the three significations of $\epsilon\iota\delta\omega\mu\alpha i$, *being seen, seeming, and resemblance or similarity*."⁴ Dr. V. cites the $\epsilon\iota\delta\omega\lambda\omega$ of Iphthime which Athene presented to Penelope in a dream (Od. 4. 795 sqq.), and that of Æneas placed before the eyes of the Trojans and the Greeks by Apollo (Il.

¹ Ihr seyn hört auf mit der Existenz des Körpers.

² Die (die Todte) sind also ohne alles Körperliche.

³ Wie ist die Art der Fortdauer jener Psyche zu denken.

⁴ pp. 47, 48.

5. 449–51). No one will dispute the sense which Dr. V. attaches to *εἴδωλον*.

“If it be true,” he continues, “that *εἴδωλον* contains the explanation of *ψυχή*” (which, by the way, Dr. V. has not yet proved, nor even attempted to prove, but from which mere assumption he proceeds quietly to deduce his whole theory of the Homeric psychology), “the above three characteristics” (i. e. *erscheinung*, *scheinbild*, *ebenbild*) “must also belong to the *ψυχάι* of the dead. And such in reality is the case, and they denote precisely the nature of them. They are *apparitions* . . . *only phantoms and deceptive appearances*, although in all respects completely like the original.”¹

“The nature of the *εἴδωλα* is still more precisely defined by the ideas of *air* and *life*, which, in accordance with its etymology, have been pointed out in the word *ψυχή*. . . . The airy nature of these beings . . . admits of further confirmation by Homeric passages. The usage handed down in the language, of explaining *εἴδωλον* by *νεφέλη* would of itself be sufficient to attest that these forms were *composed of air*. . . . The airy nature of these beings is denoted by several epithets. They are called *ἀκήριοι*, *νεκύων ἀμετηρὰ κάρηνα*, etc. The immaterial nature of these forms is further confirmed by the circumstance that they are devoid of sense and consciousness till they have drunk blood. . . . With the blood, consciousness returns.”²

“To the shade of Teiresias alone, as a mark of special favor, is it granted to retain his understanding; . . . all the rest are destitute of it.”³

“From the idea of *εἴδωλον*, as exhibited above, it naturally follows that the dead took with them, into Hades, the external form and figure of the once real man whom they represented. This is completely confirmed.” Dr. V. appeals to the appearance of Patroclus, in a dream, to Achilles (Il. 28, 65 sqq.) . . . “It is always the exact copy of the real man, and that too as he was at the time of his death. Their *mental state* is, in like manner, transplanted beneath the

¹ p. 48.

² pp. 49, 50.

³ p. 51.

earth. All in that region are represented, by Homer, as having remained the same."¹

Such is Dr. Voelcker's theory of the Homeric psychology. The positive attributes of the $\psi\chi\eta$ are breath, air, life, continued, perpetual life ("it will continue to live and last"); it has "external form and figure," and "is always the exact copy of the once real man;" even "the mental state is transplanted beneath the earth."

Negatively viewed, the Homeric $\psi\chi\eta$ is "not the soul," "not the spirit;" "it is destitute of understanding," "destitute of mental faculties," "immaterial," "destitute of everything corporeal?"

If these $\psi\chi\eta$ are "destitute of everything corporeal," how can they have "external form and figure?" These are attributes of body and of body only. How can they "drink blood" or thirst for it? If they are "destitute of understanding" and "mental faculties," how can their "mental state" be "transplanted beneath the earth?" Can there be such a thing as *mode* without substance? — "mental state" without "mental faculties?" If they are "destitute of understanding" and "mental faculties," how is it that with the (drinking of) "blood consciousness returns?" Returns to what? To that which is "destitute of understanding and mental faculties!" An attribute, again, without a subject. A psyche which is "destitute of everything corporeal," bears "external form and figure," thirsts for blood and drinks it, and thus exhibits corporeal *quality*, *appetite*, and *capacity*! A psyche which is "destitute of understanding and mental faculties," carries along with it its "mental state beneath the earth," and experiences a *return of consciousness* with the *drinking* of blood. A psyche which is neither soul nor spirit, which is "destitute of mental faculties" and "of everything corporeal," "continues to exist, to live and last;" it even "ascends out of Hades and shows itself" to a friend still in the flesh — acts which involve volition and of course consciousness, and imply the possession

¹ pp. 52, 53.

of such properties as were necessary to make it apprehensible to sense !

Surely Dr. Voelcker is setting up pins for the mere pleasure of rolling them down, or demolishing speculative sand-towers of his own building,

ὡς ὅτε τις ψάμαδον πᾶς ἀγχι θαλάσσης,
“Οοτ’ ἐπεὶ οὖν ποιήσῃ ἀθύρματα νη πιέησιν,
“Αψ αὐτίς συνέχενε ποσὶν καὶ χερσὶν ἀθύρων.¹

or he is diverting himself by poising the critical scales with *Gegensaetzen* so nicely adjusted as to neutralize each other ! No such thing. Dr. Voelcker is gravely proposing a psychological theory in order “to bring more prominently into notice, and define with greater precision, some points in the Homeric psychology respecting which, the opinions adopted in the commentaries, and the writings relating to this subject,” he says, “appeared to me either incorrect or vague and indeterminate ;”—to correct, as he afterwards tells us, the “indistinct or false conceptions” which “have been formed of the nature of the Homeric shades in Hades.”

One avenue only seems to offer itself out of this wilderness of absurdities. Was the *ψυχή* of Homer a purely subjective thing ?—a mere *impression* on the senses or the imagination of the beholder whether sleeping or waking ? No. Dr. V. does not so conceive of it. These *ψυχαι* “continue to exist after death ;” they “ascend out of Hades and show themselves to Odysseus or manifest themselves in dreams, as Patroclus to Achilles ; they continue to live and last ; there is a *prolongation of life* ;—on that point there is no doubt.”

Is Homer, then, or Dr. Voelcker, the poet or the critic, chargeable with flat and ridiculous contradictions ? We shall see presently. If the Homeric psychology had consisted of such a mass of incompatible ideas, it would not have been worthy of the criticism of sane men. Such mockery of the common sense of mankind would never have survived the age in which it was uttered, nor have been lis-

¹ IL 15, 362 seq.

tended to with patience then. Much less could it have taken and kept that profound hold on the popular mind of all the branches of the Greek race, which caused it to be cherished in the general memory of men for four or five hundred years; least of all could it, after being reduced to a written form, have so pervaded and moulded the whole education, philosophy, and literature of the most acute and cultivated race of antiquity, and held its undisputed place in all later forms of civilization, as the greatest work of human genius. The Homeric poetry was regarded by the Greeks as the "royal achievement"¹ of human intellect; by the Romans its author was adjudged (for his personality was not yet doubted) "in omni genere eloquentiae facile princeps," and the title of *poeta sovrano* was accorded to him by the Middle Ages. This kingly title and sway, so widely acknowledged and long perpetuated, seems quite irreconcilable with such degraded, confused, and utterly material ideas of the soul as Dr. V. has assigned to him — a psychology which would reduce man to the mere *pulvis et umbra* of Epicureism.

Nor is the theory a mere personal eccentricity of Dr. Voelcker. It is held at this hour by many, probably by most, of the eminent Greek scholars of Germany. It is, in fact, merely a psychological application of the philosophy now dominant in Germany. That philosophy was first applied to history by Herder. His theory may be stated, for the sake of brevity, in the words of Bunsen.² "Herder is the founder of the philosophy of history . . Man, according to him, evolves reason, humanity, religion organically, in consequence of the faculties divinely united in his mind." This theory of historical development demands that everything come out in due form and order. It will not consent to any premature "evolutions," in the onward march of "reason, humanity, religion." Homer lived quite too early to have any spiritual ideas of the soul, any distinct conception of a future life. One might as well expect to find ripe apples in April as

¹ Ἀληθῶς βασιλικὸν τράγυμα ἡ Ὁμήρου ποίησις. — Eust.

² Hippol. Vol. II. pp. 12, 13. London, 1852.

spiritual ideas in Anno Mundi 3000. As well might we affirm that Cæsar plunged into the Rubicon before he crossed the Po, as that humanity "evolved" such ideas at that early stadium of its progress. Dr. V. distinctly announces the *cue* which suggested his theory, as follows: "if we consider how far acquaintance with, and reflection on, the nature of mind had been *developed*, such a result will not be unexpected." Certainly not. No "result will be unexpected," if we first adopt a theory which requires that ideas were unfolded in a certain form and order, and then apply it to facts and history, with a determination to overbear or reject all conflicting testimony; if, in other words, we make philosophy the dictator of history, instead of its exponent and interpreter. "Reflection," adds Dr. V., "then had *not advanced so far* as to conceive the soul existing *independently* after death." That is the very question at issue. And it is to be decided, not by applying the dictum of Herder, but by a fair and unprejudiced examination of the Homeric poetry.

Nitzsch, Nägelsbach, and K. O. Müller have taken substantially the same ground on this subject with Voelcker. Nitzsch entitles this treatise "an accurate investigation¹ of the nature and state of the departed in the Homeric underworld." Nägelsbach pronounces it a "sehr verdienstliche Abhandlung;"² and his own theory of the Homeric psychology in its relation to life and death is, shortly, as follows: "The proper individual man, the true *ego* of the man, is the body. The corporeal principle of the intellectual life is the *φρένες*; feeling, thought, and will have their seat there. The spiritual principle of the same inward life is the *Ὥμοös*; the fore-named intellectual functions are seated as well in the *Ὥμοös* as in the *φρένες*. The two higher powers of the soul (*hauptseelenkräfte*), *μένος* and *νοῦς*, have their seat in the *Ὥμοös* as well as in the *φρένες*. The *ψυχή* is the animal soul; the *Ὥμοös* is its spiritual correlate, the spiritual soul; the *φρένες* are the only *bearers* of the spiritual nature (die alleinigen Träger des Geistes). "In death, the *φρένες*

¹ Eine genaue untersuchung.—Nitzsch, Vol. III. p. 188. ² p. 331, note.

go to the ground ; and thus not only the body of man is dead, but *his spirit is dead also.*" . . " As the whole spiritual life rests upon the φρένες, when these are no more, *mind, feeling, thought, will, are no more.* These are lost (demolished, ruined) in death, either extinguished by the fire of the funeral pile, or no longer vivified by the ψυχή, and thus *the spirit of man is dead* ; nothing is left of him, strangely enough" (strangely enough, verily), "but the animal life ; for the ψυχή, and that alone, rests not in the φρένες ; that alone, therefore, can go into Hades." ¹

The "animal soul" survives, the "spiritual soul" is extinct. The fire of the funeral pile demolishes spirit, feeling, thought, and will ; the animal life bears its force uninjured ! Sonderbar genug !

K. O. Müller seems fully to adopt this theory by pronouncing the ψυχαῖ of Homer "destitute of understanding and will."

One feature of the theory must be borne in mind. "The dead are capable," says Nägelsbach, "of momentary re-animation. The φρένες can, indeed, return no more. Another corporeal organ is therefore formed, to be the bearer of the newly-recovered consciousness — the blood. . . . As the life of the mortally wounded streams out with the blood, so with the blood it comes back again to the ψυχή, and, with the life, consciousness, speech, and all human sensibility." ² "With the blood," says Voelcker (i. e. when drunk by the ψυχαῖ, cf. Od. 11. 35 seq. and *passim*), "consciousness returns."

We have thought it right that a theory propounded by such eminent names should be stated connectedly. It will at once be seen that the same philosophy of history and the

¹ So beruht denn alles geistige Leben auf den φρένες. Wenn diese nicht sind, ist auch kein Geist, kein Gefühl, kein Denken, kein Wille. Gehn also diese verloren im Tode, durch das Feuer des Scheiterhaufens oder nicht mehr animalisch belebt durch die ψυχή, so ist von Menschen der Geist gestorben : Nichts ist von ihm übrig als, sonderbar genug, das animalische Leben ; denn die φύση, und nur diese, ruht nicht in den φρένες ; nur diese kann somit in den Hades gehn. — p. 341.

² pp. 342, 343.

same method of criticism must make materialists of Job, Moses, and David. If "reflection had not then advanced so far as to conceive the soul existing independently after death," of course it had not some four or five centuries earlier. The death shade of this philosophy falls alike on all the early remains and records of the race. "Man" had not yet "evolved reason, humanity, or religion," so far as to catch a glimpse or form a conception of his own immortality. Inspiration, it will be recollected, passes with the philosophers of this school for a *psychological impossibility*.

A theory which includes such manifest contradictions might safely be left to dissolve and explode itself. But a glance at the arguments adduced in its support, may show how indomitable Homer proves himself in the hands of the sceptics, and how weak and puerile the reasonings which able and learned men are forced to resort to in order to make out a theory which is as contrary to plain history and sound criticism as it is to Christian faith; it may possibly serve, too, to moderate somewhat the over-ardent admiration of German criticism and German philosophy, which just now leads so many to drink at the streams in preference to the fountains.

"The word $\psi\chi\rho\jmath$, according to its derivation from $\psi\chi\omega$, is primarily the *breath*, the *air* which we exhale and inhale, and *this idea lies at the bottom of all the significations of the word in Homer*. But . . . the word came to signify, more ordinarily, the *life*, without however altogether giving up the secondary meaning of *breath*. *The latter meaning is preserved in those passages where it is said of the $\psi\chi\rho\jmath$ that it escaped from the $\epsilon\rho\rho\kappa\sigma \delta\delta\sigma\tau\tau\omega\sigma$.*" Such is the first argument Dr. V. cites in support of the assertion, that "the belief in a future existence then rested on material notions, and had been formed and fashioned entirely out of rude inferences from sensible impressions." It is mere common-place, except the two passages which we have italicised, and they (if taken in the restricted sense which alone gives them any force in the argument) simply beg the question. If the derivation of psychological terms from words bearing origi-

nally a material sense, is proof that the belief in a future life "rests on material notions" and "sensible impressions," all language, even in its most scientific and spiritual form, gives evidence of materialistic ideas. The Hebrew **רוּחַ**, the Greek *pneuma*, the Latin *animus*, *anima* (from *āw* and the Sanscrit *an*) and *spiritus* (from the Sanscrit *spae*), *ex* *ti* *etym-i*, denote simply *breath*, *wind*. Even the Greek *νοῦς*, the pure intellect (from *νέω* to move and the Sanscrit *ni* or *nei* with the same meaning), "rested," in this respect, "on a material notion," and "was fashioned out of sensible impressions." These words, denoting the most subtle, powerful, and widely-diffused of material things, were used also to signify *mind*, *life*, *immaterial energy*. It is commonly said that they *first* bore a material sense; but there is no proof of it; nor can it, of course, be refuted. It is possible that men began to think and speak of *mind* as soon as they did of *matter*. The first use of **רוּחַ** in written discourse happens to be in its highest and most purely spiritual sense, to denote the Spirit of God; and it just afterwards occurs denoting that Spirit¹ in his influence on the *mind* of man. And *ψυχή* first occurs signifying the "mighty souls"² which "the wrath of Achilles sent to the invisible world." And whatever Dr. V. may think of them, we fully believe and hope to show, that these "mighty souls" were *souls*, and not the "airy," "unconscious," "immaterial," and yet quite corporeal, "beings," which "are dreamed of in his philosophy." Whether, however, the material and spiritual senses of these words (and among them *ψυχή*) were *transitions* in their history and use, or merely different *aspects* or *applications*, in which they were *always* used, *ψυχή* undoubtedly bears the three senses of *breath*, *life*, *soul*. But when Dr. Voelcker says that the meaning of *breath* "is preserved in those passages where it is said of the *ψυχή* that it has escaped the *ἔπειος ὁδόντων*," he contents himself with asserting what it was necessary for him to prove—and what the Homeric usage makes it impossible to prove.

¹ Gen. 1, 2. coll. 6, 3.² Il. 1, 3

"The word *εἴδωλον*," says Dr. V., "conducts us to the true explanation of *ψυχή*. . . . *Εἴδωλον* and *ψυχή* are synonymous, or rather *εἴδωλον* is the explanation of *ψυχή*." An extraordinary assertion truly!—the fallacy of which is exposed by a single passage of Homer. Odysseus, deeply touched on learning from his mother, in Hades, that sorrow for him had caused her death, "longed earnestly to embrace the soul of his dead mother." "Thrice," he says, "I rushed forward, for my heart prompted me to embrace, but thrice she escaped from my arms, like to a shadow or a dream. Keener anguish then arose in my heart, and I thus addressed her :

Μῆτερ ἐμὴ, τί νύ μ' οὐ μίμνεις ἀλέειν μεμαῶτα,
*'Οφρα καὶ εἰν 'Αΐδαο, φίλας περὶ χεῖρε βαλόντε,
'Αμφοτέρω κρυεροῦ τεταρπώμεσθα γόιοι;
*'Η τὶ μοι εἴδωλον τὸ δ' ἀγανὴ Περσεφόνεια
*'Ωτρυν', ὄφρ' ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁδυρόμενος στεναχίζω;
*'Ως ἐφάμην· ἡ δ' αὐτίκ' ἀμειβέτο πότυνα μῆτηρ.
*'Ω μοι, τέκνον ἔμδον, περὶ πάντων κάμμορε φωτῶν,
Οντὶ σε Περσεφόνεια, Διὸς θυγάτηρ, ἀπαφύσκει,
'Αλλ' αὐτῇ δίκῃ ἔστι βροτῶν, ὅτε κέν τε θάνασιν.
Οὐ γὰρ, ἔτι σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα ἔνεις ἔχουσιν.¹

Finding that the *ψυχή* of his mother yielded nothing substantial to his embrace, he exclaims : "Is this some *εἴδωλον*, which awful Persephone has sent to me only to aggravate my sorrow?" His mother replies : "My unhappy son! Persephone, daughter of Zeus, by no means thus *deludes* thee (*οὕτι σε ἀπαφίσκει*); but this is the state of mortals after death. They have no longer *flesh and bones*." This explains why he could not embrace her. Still she assures him it was the reasoning and loving *soul* of his mother which held all this communion with him, and not a mere *phantasia σώματος*²—*αν εἴδωλον*." To have sent an *εἴδωλον* instead of a *ψυχή*, Antikleia admits would have been to *dupe* and *delude*

¹ Od. 11, 209 seq.

² Nitzsch, citing Mich. Apost. Plov. III. 82, thus defines : *ἔστι δὲ εἴδωλον, σκιάθες δροίωμα ἡ φαντασία σώματος ἀέροιδής τε σκία.* Od. 11, 212—214.

him; but she calms and comforts him by telling him that his inability to embrace her arose from the absence of *flesh and bones*, and that it was a real *ψυχή*, and not at all (*οὐτις*) an *εἴδωλον*, which was before him. And yet Dr. Voelcker, echoed by Nitzsch and Nägelsbach, pronounce *εἴδωλον* and *ψυχή synonymous!* The very thing which Homer tells us, if substituted for a *ψυχή* would have been a sham, a trick, and a delusion, Dr. Voelcker triumphantly affirms, “conducts us to the right explanation;” a sort of “explanation” which, if applied to the only other instance in which *ἀπαφίσκω* is used by Homer,¹ would lead us to the extraordinary conclusion that a disguised adulterer is a “synonyme” for a true husband; since Homer there expresses the relation between these two characters by the same word, which here denotes that of an *εἴδωλον* to a *ψυχή*. And yet Dr. V. is so well pleased with this “explanation,” that he is disposed to appropriate the whole merit of the discovery to himself; “*εἴδωλον*,” he says,—“a word which, with reference to this point, has *hitherto been entirely neglected*, and yet *makes everything clear.*”

Εἴδωλον, then, was used simply in the way of comparison, to denote the *physically unsubstantial* nature of the *ψυχαι*. And so of the other similes, *ἥτις ὄνειρος, ὡς σκιά, ἥτις καπνός, σκιῇ εἴκελος*, by which the poet simply presents the departed soul as destitute of *material substance* and *physical force*, but which these writers produce as evidence that they were “destitute of *mental faculties*,” as they do also the epithets *ἄκιριοι, ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα, ἀφραδέες νεκροί*, which Dr. V. cites as proof of “the airy nature of these beings,” but which Homer plainly uses as *negations of physical qualities*, indicating that the dead were destitute of bodily *κῆρ*, *μένος*, and *φρένες* (these terms being used of the living man, both in a *physical* and *mental* sense). They are so interpreted by Eustathius.² To understand them as these writers have done, is a plain violation of the simplest laws of tropical lan-

¹ In the coll. form *ἀπαφάω*, Od. 23, 216 coll. 217. Crusius defines thus: *ἀπαφίσκω, betrügen, täuschen, hintergehen.*

² On Od. 11. 212, 13.

guage, by which Shakspeare must stand convicted of asserting that the human soul was nothing but air, since he makes Marcellus pronounce the ghost of Hamlet

————— “as the air invulnerable.”

By such criticism, metaphors become strict definitions. In the sacred writers, “a shadow,” “a flower,” “a vain show,” instead of being illustrations of the transitoriness of our earthly life in certain aspects, must be regarded as *synonymes*, “right explanations,” “making everything clear,” as to the nature and substance of man; and Isaiah and Peter may be cited as “confirmation strong,” that the sole component and material of humanity is “*grass*.”

The distinction between Teiresias and the other dead (which they also cite as an argument), certainly presents a graver difficulty. Kirke sends Odysseus and his companions to Hades,

Ψυχὴ χρησομένους Θηβαίου Τειρεσίαο,
Μάρτιος ἀλαοῦ, τοῦ τε φρένες ἔμπεδοι εἰσιν.
Τῷ καὶ τεθνῆτι νόον πόρε Περσεφόνεια,
Οἴω πεπνύσθαι· τοὶ δὲ σκιὰς ἀσσονοτι.¹

Strabo, Lucian (cited by Dr. Samuel Clarke), and Eustathius² considered the peculiarity of Teiresias to consist in the *gist of prophecy*. But this does not seem fully to satisfy the language of the poet. The expression *φρένες ἔμπεδοι* would seem to denote the retention of some *physical* vitality and substance; for *φρένες*, at once a *bodily organ* and *mental faculties*, is nowhere else predicated of the dead. But *νόον πεπνύσθαι* forbids this restriction. Interpreted by itself, the passage would certainly convey the idea that Teiresias alone retained his intelligence in the other world. But when we find the other souls talking quite as coherently, and some of them quite as wisely as Teiresias, we perceive that the poet must have meant something else than mere intelligence, or else that he here inadvertently used words the strict and separate construction of which would make this

¹ Od. 10. 492 seq.

² On Od. 10. 495.

passage a *solitary exception* to his general system. We do not think it necessary to resort to the easy remedy of supposing an interpolation or corruption, though it is far from improbable. This is one of the passages which Plato says he could have wished to blot from the Homeric poetry,¹ a plain proof that he considered it not in the spirit of that poetry.

"The usage handed down in the language of explaining εἰδῶλον by νεφέλη would, of itself, be sufficient to attest that these forms were composed of air, even if expressions in Homer himself did not sufficiently demonstrate the point." Dr. Voelcker is put to a desperate shift for an argument. Homer compares a disembodied soul to an εἰδῶλον. Εἰδῶλον was, some centuries after, "explained by νεφέλη" in the Helen of Euripides and the Pythia of Pindar. This, Dr. V. denominates "a *usage*," "a *usage handed down in the language*;" and he says it would, *of itself*, be *sufficient* to attest that these forms" (i. e. the Homeric souls) "were *composed of air*, even if expressions in Homer did not sufficiently demonstrate the point!" Whither would such criticism lead us? Not only are Homer's own *similes* to be received as *synonymes*, but the gravest theories about him are to be "attested" by the metaphors of poets who lived five hundred years after him?² With much better color of reason might Dr. Voelcker have cited the ridiculous *philosophemes* which Antisthenes and Chrysippus spun out of his necrology.

"When Achilles desired to embrace the form of Patroclus, which had appeared to him out of the lower world, it *sunk into the earth like smoke*." Thus Dr. Voelcker has translated

———— κατὰ χθονὸς ἤύτε καπνός
"Οχετο·"

¹ Rep. 111. beg.

² And observe how Dr. V. annotates on his own text: "In these passages of Euripides indeed, εἰδῶλον no longer denotes an airy image; but that it can nevertheless be called νεφέλη shews of what kind we are to suppose the Homeric eidola to be, since the expression νεφέλη was justified by the usage of the language!" p. 49 (E. T.) note. Thus his note demolishes "the airy fabric" of his own "vision" and "leaves not a rack behind."

"a further confirmation," he thinks, of "the airy nature of these beings." Was then the soul of man, according to Homer, "composed of" *air*, *cloud*, or *smoke*? For in the theory of Dr. Voelcker, "each seems either." But let us try this construction of a simile elsewhere. Homer has used surprisingly similar language in describing and illustrating the movements of *divine persons*. Thetis, coming to the interview with her son,

— ἀνέῳν πολεῖς ἀλός, ἡύτ' ὁμίχλη.¹

Must we conclude, then, that she was an "airy being," "composed of" "fog," a "mere phantom," a "deceptive appearance," "destitute of mental faculties?" Athene

— ὅρνις ὡς ἀνοπαῖα διέπτατο.²

Does this indicate what she was "composed of?" Or was the expression in each case, whether used of a god or a human soul, a mere *similitudo ex levitate et celeritate?* By Dr. Voelcker's critical process, Aias must at once, have been "composed of" mason-work and brute matter and nature; for Homer has, on different occasions, likened him to a *tower*, a *lion*, and an *ass*.

"Among the expressions in the Iliad and Odyssey," says Dr. Voelcker, "for the animating and spiritual principle in man, the most important are ἡτορ, στῆθος, κραδίη and φρένες. They denote different localities of the vital powers in the body; and as in all languages, for reasons easy to be understood, usage mostly unites the animating and the spiritual in the same expression, they comprehend the mental part in their signification; but being organs of the body which are annihilated with it, they cannot pass into Hades."

It can hardly be that Dr. Voelcker intended this as an argument for his materialistic theory of Homer. *Ἡτορ*, *κραδίη*, and *φρένες* undoubtedly signify (like the *reins* in Hebrew, the *brain* in English, and the *heart* in all languages) at once bodily organs and mental or spiritual faculties. "They can-

¹ Il. 1. 359.

² Od. 1. 320.

not pass into Hades." Of course not. This impossibility is common to Homer with all writers and all languages. The laws of speech and of thought would not allow it to be said of a dead man that his *breast*, *reins*, *heart*, or *brain* had departed to the invisible world. These terms represent spiritual faculties in the case of the living man, but not of the dead; because the very ground of the metaphor lies in the intimate connection supposed to exist between certain mental faculties and bodily organs, and is lost when that connection ceases in death.

But why does Dr. V. pronounce these "the *most important* expressions for the animating and spiritual principle in man?" Probably they enjoy this distinction in his scale, because they are *borrowed from the body*, and their spiritual sense is supposed to be only secondary; thus deriving from his classification a little aid to his theory of the materialistic and mortal nature of the soul. Few readers of Homer will agree with Dr. V., that these *ἀμφίβολα* are "the most important" Homeric terms for the mind and its operations. Στῆθος, in Homer, never signifies "the animating and spiritual principle" at all. It is simply a bodily *seat* or locality of the mind or feelings, nothing more. Θυμός, πνεῦμα, νόος ἐνὶ στῆθεσσι are of constant occurrence, but never στῆθος as itself an "expression for the animating and spiritual principle."¹

The remaining terms on which the Homeric psychology turns cardinally are Θυμός, νόος, and μένος. As these writers have decreed the extinction of the Θυμός, they can afford to exalt it at the expense of the ψυχή. Nägelsbach (as we have seen) makes it "the *spiritual soul*," "correlate to the *animal soul*, ψυχή." If he is right, it is the *spiritual soul* which prompts a man to drink (*πιεῖν ὅτε θυμὸς ἀνάργοι*).² It is the *spiritual soul* which finds satisfaction in a hearty dinner (*οὐδέ τι θυμὸς ἐδεύετο δαιτὸς εἰσηγῆς*).³ It is the *spiritual soul*

¹ Nägelsbach defines it more correctly. Στῆθος ist lediglich dass ausserliche Behältniss der Seelenkräfte. p. 339, n. So Damm. and Crusius. In the singular, it is only the *material breast*.

² Il. 4. 263.

³ Il. 1. 468.

which animates lambs,¹ oxen,² horses,³ stags,⁴ and *swine!*⁵ Or rather, the term which often denotes these and many other purely animal ideas and functions, is the distinctive and pre-eminent Homeric word to express the “incorporeal, the soul-principle of the spiritual life!” Such absurd and impossible psychological ideas would this theory fasten upon the greatest of poets. The truth is, Θυμός, one of the “most important” and general psychological words of Homer, denotes the vital energy,⁶ and all its conceivable forms and manifestations. Plato defines it *from its derivation*, “the *rush, outflow, or boiling up* of the ψυχή.⁷ According to him, therefore, it differs from ψυχή as a part from the whole, an attribute or operation from its subject. This will be found generally to square with the Homeric usage. In mere animals, it is mere animal life. In man, too, it is *life* or any of its energies or faculties, whether lower or higher, whether *sensual* or *spiritual*. It is the mind, the seat of thought,⁸ the heart, the seat of the affections,⁹ of anger,¹⁰ of pity,¹¹ of hope,¹² of *sensual* love,¹³ of gladness.¹⁴ In fact, there is no sort of vital function, impulse, or manifestation, from the lowest animal longing to the highest and purest mental or spiritual operation which is not performed by the Homeric Θυμός. It can often be rendered by the English *spirit*, and is only inferior to ψυχή in comprehensiveness. Its departure is death: ἀπὸ δὲ ἔπτατο Θυμός, describes the death of a horse and of a bird, just as Θυμὸν ἀποπνεῖσθαι does that of a hero. Death is Θυμοραΐστης, *life-destroyer*. Νόος in Homer, as elsewhere, is “the thinking and reflecting faculty,” and is so defined by Dr. Voelcker. Μένος is *force, energy*. It is the *projectile force of a spear*;¹⁵ the *elemental force of fire*;¹⁶ the *material force of rivers and of winds*;¹⁷ the *animal force of a horse*;¹⁸ and the combined *physical and moral force of a hero*,¹⁹ which is

¹ Il. 3. 294.² Il. 13. 704.³ Il. 16. 469.⁴ Od. 10. 163.⁵ Il. 12. 150.⁶ Ἡ ζωτικὴ ψυχικὴ δύναμις. Damm.⁷ Θυμὸς ἀπὸ τῆς θύσεως καὶ ζέσεως τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχοι ἀν τοῦτο τὸ δύναμα. Crat. 419. E. (Ed. Stabb).⁸ Il. 11. 411.⁹ Il. 9. 482..¹⁰ Il. 16. 616.¹¹ Il. 24. 467.¹² Il. 15. 701.¹³ Il. 14. 316.¹⁴ Il. 7. 189.¹⁵ Il. 13. 444.¹⁶ Il. 23. 177.¹⁷ Il. 12. 18. coll. 5. 524.¹⁸ Il. 23. 524.¹⁹ Il. 5. beg.

exhibited in its highest form when his sagacity, valor, and strength are exalted by a special inspiration (*ἔμπνευσις*) from God. This word figures largely in the *ἀριστεῖαι* of the several Homeric heroes.

Dr. Voelcker thus proceeds to kill off these remaining faculties of the Homeric soul. “It is worthy of remark that they” (*Ὥμοις, νόος, and μένος*) “are *never said to go into Hades.*” The assertion is, in itself, a sufficient proof of the inaccuracy of Dr. Voelcker. Homer distinctly expresses the idea of death by the passing of the *Ὥμοις* into Hades :

Θυμὸν ἀπὸ μελέων δῦναι δόμον Ἄϊδος εἰσα, ¹

and predicates both *Ὥμοις*² and *μένος*³ of those who are in Hades. These, however, are rare instances. We do not remember any other. For their rare occurrence, there is an obvious and sufficient reason. The departed man — man spoken of as surviving death and existing in another state, is not denominated by any *one* of his vital functions, however important, but by that which expresses his whole incorporeal personality, *ψυχή*. As little would the nature of language, or the apprehensions we form of the condition of the departed, permit us now to say of a dead man, that his *mind, will, or understanding* had taken its flight to the invisible world. To express this conception, we occasionally use the word *spirit*, but generally *soul*; and so does Homer. Once he has used *Ὥμοις* to denote humanity as it passes through and survives the change of death; in all other cases, as nearly as we remember, *ψυχή*.

In the mere act of departing, it is used in common with *Ὥμοις, μένος, αἴων*, etc. But as *gone* and *disembodied*, that which survives of humanity is (with this one exception) only called *ψυχή*. Achilles thus discourses of its final and irrevocable departure :⁴

Ἄιδοὺς δὲ ψυχὴ πάλιν ἐλθεῖν, οὔτε ληστῆ,
Οὐδὲ ἐλεγή, ἐπεὶ ἄρ τε κεν ἀμείψεται ἔρκος ὁδόντων.

¹ Il. 7. 131.

² Od. 11. 39. and 561.

³ Od. 11. 561.

⁴ Il. 9. 408 seq.

- And Antikleia (having herself passed through it) thus describes the process and consequence of dying :¹

— αὐτῇ δίκῃ ἐστὶ βροτῶν, ὅτε κέν τε θάνωσιν.
 Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα ἔνεις ἔχουσιν,
 Αλλὰ τὰ μέν τε πυρὸς κρατερὸν μένος αἰδομένοιο
 Δαμνῆ, ἐπεί κε πρῶτα λίπη λευκὴ ὀστέα θυμός·
 Ψυχὴ δὲ ἡὗτ' ὄνειρος, ἀποπταμένη πεπόγηται.

The whole question, then, of the Homeric soul and post-mortem state turns upon this point : What is the *ψυχή* which “passes from the lips” with the last breath, “flies away,” and “leaves the flesh and white bones,” no longer animated by the “nervous energy” and “motive force”² to be decomposed or “demolished by the powerful force of glowing fire,” and when it has once gone, can never be *brought back by force, nor return of choice?* What are the nature and attributes of this *ψυχή*? Is it, as Nägelsbach assures us, something “bewustlos,” “wesenlos,” possessing “kein Geist, kein Gefühl, kein Denke, kein Wille”—*sans everything*, in fact, but a sort of shadowy visibility and immaterial animality,—“with respect to physical existence unapprehensible and *ungraspable*,³ and with respect to spiritual state doomed to unconsciousness?”—or, as Dr. Voelcker describes it, “neither soul nor spirit,” “destitute of mental faculties,” “destitute of everything corporeal;”—was the Homeric *ψυχή* thus a “being” *without any of the attributes of being*, or was it the soul of man, the whole life of humanity, except “this muddy vesture of decay,” which it puts off in death?

That it survives, the concessions of these writers are as full as we could desire. “It outlasts the fire of the funeral pile,” says Nägelsbach. “It continues to exist after death,” says Voelcker; “it will continue to live and last.” “There is a *prolongation of life*,—on that point there is no doubt.”

¹ Od. 11. 217 seq.

² — Ἱγα μὲν τὴν ἐκ τῶν νεύρων ἰσχὺν . . . κίκον δε τὴν τοῦ κλειν δ ἐστι πορευέσθαι δύναμιν, Eust. on Od. 11. 212, 13.

³ Nicht Fassbares nicht Greifbares mehr. pp 341, 2.

It is admitted, then, on all hands, that in the Homeric poetry something of man survives death, under the name of ψυχή, which is indestructible and immortal. What is it?

Let us escape from tiresome verbal analysis, and join one of these *ψυχαί* in its mysterious migration to “that undiscovered country” which lies beyond death. The Homeric necrology is so ample and circumstantial as to enable us to observe it in almost every conceivable stage of its existence. Let us, then, take our stand beside the expiring Patroclus. Pierced by three wounds, he has sunk at the feet of the exulting Hector. The faintness of death already palsies his tongue, but the mind, so far from suffering any obscuration or weakness, rises to a strength, clearness, and dignity unknown before. He sees into the future. He foretells to Hector (as Hector does afterwards, under the same circumstances, to Achilles) his own quickly approaching death, and the very hand which is to inflict it:¹

Τὸν δ' ὁλιγοδρανέων προσέφη, Πατρόκλεις ἵππεῦ,
*Ηδη νῦν, Ἐκτορ, μεγάλ' ἔνχεο·

*Άλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, σὺ δὲ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῆσιν, .

Οὐ θην οὐδὲ αὐτὸς δηρὸν βέγη, ἀλλά τοι ἥδη

*Αγχι παρέστηκεν θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταιή,

Χερσὶ δαμέντ' Ἀχιλῆος ἀμύμονος Αἰακίδαο.

The impending stroke of death, then, under which the physical energies were already “drooping,” did not impair, but rather exalted, the intellectual and spiritual faculties. Not such a prelude as might be expected to their *instant and utter annihilation*.

And here let us notice a peculiarity (not without significance) in the Homeric description of death. In the act of

¹ Il. 16. 843 seq. The reader will be reminded of the dying words of Hotspur (K. Hen. IV. Act 5):

“O, I could prophesy,
But that the earthy and cold hand of death
Lies on my tongue!”

The idea that the soul, in the moment of death, has an insight into the future, has been general from the earliest times. Cf. Plat. Apol. Soc. near the end.

dying, the *ψυχή*, *μένος*, *Ὥμοιος*, or life-principle, by whatever name designated, *goes out* and *forsakes* the body in brutes as well as in men. But in the former case, *that is the last of it*. There is no hint of its continued existence. In man only and always, the vital principle outlasts death. Was it only the animal vitality that remained? Why then did it not survive in mere animals? Homer makes the possession of intellect (*νόος*) the distinction (as Dr. Voelcker admits) between men and beasts.¹ It was a distinction which even the wand of Kirke could not demolish; for *νοῦς ἦν ἔμπεδος*, *ώς τὸ πάρος περ*, even in those whom she had transformed;² a plain proof that the sinking from a human to a mere animal nature was a transformation which the intuitively delicate discrimination of Homer rejected as monstrous and impossible. But these writers have charged him with so gross a psychological blunder. According to them, the stroke of death is more powerful than the *ῥύβδος* of Kirke. That which is common to man and beasts (die animalische seele) survives, while that which is peculiar to man (*νοῦς*) perishes in the Homeric death!

But to return to Patroclus:

“Ος ἄρα μιν εἰπόντα τέλος θανάτου κάλυψε
Ψυχὴ δὲ ἐκ ρεθέων πταμένη Ἀϊδοσδε βεβίκει,
“Ον πότμον γοώσα, λιποῦσ’ ἀνδροπῆτα καὶ ἥβην.

The *ψυχή* here escaping from *overshadowing death*, “flies from the limbs,” and “takes its way towards Hades,” “*deploring its lot*,” “the manly strength and youthful bloom” which it had “forsaken.”

It is clearly not “unconscious” yet. *Recollection, anticipation, comparison* of the past and future, *sorrow* for lost life and happiness, and *consciousness* of course, as the nexus or rather basis of all these operations, are affirmed of the disembodied *ψυχή* in this terribly magnificent picture of *a soul on its flight to the invisible world*. That “large discourse,

¹ Nägelsbach, too, calls it the “specifisch Unterscheid zwischen Menschen und Thieren.” p. 338.

² Od. 10.

looking *before and after*,” which are supposed to indicate the “capability and godlike reason” of man, is yet in full force.

The *ψυχή* of Patroclus afterwards “ascends out of Hades,” as Dr. Voelcker expresses it, “shows itself to Achilles,” and addresses him in one of the most eloquent passages of the poem.¹ We can only insert it in scraps, but to feel its full force, one must read it entire.

Εῦδαις, αὐτὰρ ἐμεῖο λελασμένος ἔπλευ, Ἀχιλλεῦ;

Θάπτε με, ὅππι τάχιστα

Οὐ μὲν γὰρ ζωό γε φίλων ἀπάνευθεν ἔτακρων
Βουλᾶς ἔξόμενοι βουλεύσομεν· ἀλλ' ἐμὲ μὲν πήρ
Αμφέχανε στυγερῆ, ἡ περ λάχε γυγνόμενόν περ.
Καὶ δὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ μοῖρα, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ,
Τείχει ὑπὸ Τρώων εὐηγενέων ἀπολέσθαι

He gently upbraids his friend for sleeping and forgetting him; entreats immediate burial; laments that they shall no longer alive hold sweet counsel, apart from other dear friends; “me,” he says, “a mournful fate has swallowed up, which indeed is the lot of him” just “born;” “and thy lot, too,” he adds, “immortal Achilles, is to fall beneath the wall of the noble Trojans.” He reminds him of their early friendship and *even of the circumstance which caused his father to take him from home and place him in the palace of Peleus, and so give occasion for that intimacy which lasted till death.* In memory of that life-long friendship, he entreats that the same “golden urn” may enclose their ashes. Dr. Voelcker regards this as no illusion, woven by the morbidly excited fancy of the hero, but as a real and objective affair. Such was evidently the poet’s conception of it. *Consciousness and every mental faculty and susceptibility are still in possession of the ψυχή.*

But says Dr. V. “an exception is formed” to the general unconsciousness “as in the cases of Patroclus and Elpenor,

¹ Il. 23. 65 seq.

by those whose bodies are yet *unburned* and *unburied*, and therefore their corporeal part has not been annihilated." Has Dr. Voelcker forgotten his theory? It was that "the mental faculties, *in death*, leave the body and *cease to exist*." Now he supposes the mental faculties to survive so long as "*the corporeal part* has not been *annihilated*!" What, then, would have become of the *ψυχή* in the case of those whose "bodies" were never either burned or buried? They must doubtless have wasted away with the slow decomposition of "the corporeal part." Homer shows himself well acquainted with the usages of the Egyptians. What would he have done with the *ψυχή* of an embalmed body? It would be a curious problem, to what substance and dimensions the soul of man would be reduced in the course of thirty or forty centuries of connection with a mummy. We leave it for the authors of this theory to solve. Homer has nothing to do with it. He nowhere hints at any *connection between the dead body and the departed soul*, save that while the former is unburned and unburied, the latter cannot fully enter into Hades nor associate with the other dead. The *ψυχή*, it is true, desires sepulture also for the body *as a memorial to future men of its former existence on earth* (*σῆμα . . καὶ ἐστομενοίσι πυθέσθαι*); and therefore a sepulture characteristic of its former pursuits (e. g. the sailor Elpenor desires the oar with which he rowed when alive, to be set up at his grave (*πῆγξαι τ' ἐπὶ τύμβῳ ἐρετμὸν, τῷ καὶ ζωὸς ἐρεσσον*)¹ — a complete proof by the way, in itself, of continued consciousness and of those complex mental operations which are involved in every act of it.

But let us pass to the general congregation of the departed. Thither the poet has sent Odysseus under divine guidance.

*Eἰς Ἀΐδαο δόμους καὶ ἐπαινῆς Περσεφονείης.*²

He there beheld an innumerable multitude of the dead (*Ἐθνεα μυρία νεκρῶν*)³ of generations long gone by (*προτέρους ἔδον ἀνέρας*),⁴ as well as his mother and those of his com-

¹ Od. 11. 778.

² Od. 10. 491.

³ Od. 11. 631.

⁴ Od. 11. 629.

panions in arms who had died before him. He saw, too, the historic women of the olden time, each of whom "related to him her extraction" (*ἡ δὲ ἐκάστη δν γόνον ἔξαγορευεν*).¹ All manifest a perfect recollection of the events which had taken place during their abode on earth. Those who had recently departed show that all human affections and sympathies still live within them. Achilles² inquires how his son bears him in the war :

'Αλλ' ἄγε μοι τοῦ παιδὸς ἀγανοῦ μῆθον ἐνισπε,
*Η ἔτερ' ἐσ πόλεμον πρόμος ἔμμεναι ἡὲ καὶ οὐκέ.

and how it fares with his old father :

Εἰπὲ δὲ μοι, Πηλῆος ἀμύμονος εἴ τι πέπισσαι,
*Η ἔτ' ἔχει τιμὴν πολέσιν μετὰ Μυρμιδόνεσσω,
*Η μιν ἀπιμάζουσιν ἀν' Ἑλλάδα τε Φθίην τε,
Οὐνεκα μιν κατὰ γῆρας ἔχει χεῖρας τε πόδας τε.

And all the son and hero revives within him, as he says : " Could I come back but a little while to my father's palace, such as I was under the rays of the sun before spacious Troy, my might and invincible hands would strike terror into every one who oppresses him and denies him reverence."

Εἰ τοῖσθ δὲ θλιούμι μίννθά περ ἐσ πατέρος δῶ,
Τῷ κε τέω στίξαμι μένος καὶ χεῖρας ἀπτούς,
Οἱ κείνον βιώωται, ἔργουσσίν τ' ἀπὸ τιμῆς.

When Odysseus pronounces him the happiest of men for the incomparable glory which had attended him in life, and which he still retained in death, he replies : " do not console me for having died, illustrious Odysseus. I would rather be the hired laborer of some poor man on earth, than reign over all the dead :"

Βούλοιμην κ' ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητευέμεν ἀλλω
*Ανδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ, φὰ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη,
*Η πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν.

Antikleia³ gives her son an account of his family and realm

¹ Od. 11. 232, 3.

² Od. 11. 491 seq.

³ Od. 11. 154 seq.

during his absence down to the time of her death. Scarce anything in the Homeric poetry exceeds, in pathos and beauty, the passage in which she tells him, in reply to his inquiries after the cause of her death, “it was the thought of thee and longing after thee and thy gentle virtue, my noble son, which deprived me of sweet life :”

— με σὸς τε πόθος, σὰ τε μῆδα, φαῖδιμ' Ὀδυσσεῦ,
Σὴ τ' ἀγανοφροσύνη μελιηδέα θυμὸν ἀπηρά.

She discourses to him, profoundly too (as we have seen), of the change which the human organism undergoes at death. Among others, the *ψυχή* of Agamemnon¹ approaches him “in great anguish” (*ἀχνυμένη*), relates the horrible circumstances of his assassination, *tells him of the fond hopes he had revolved in his mind on his way homeward*,² warns his friend to return in secrecy and disguise, that he may escape a like catastrophe; tells him, however, that his wife is true to him, and that he will get back safely; contrasts the constant and loving Penelope with his own “abominable wife” (*οὐλομένη ἀλόχω*); compares the joys which he will feel in the embraces of his son with his own bitterly disappointed hopes; admonishes him, however, still to use all precautions, for “*there is no longer any trusting to women*” (*οὐκ ἔτι πιστὰ γυναιξὶν*).

These will do for examples. Now is there any conceivable operation of the intellect, will, or emotional nature of man, which the poet has not predicated of disembodied *ψυχai* in the account he has given of these interviews? *Memory* stands forth in the perfect presence of the earthly life, not only of its events, but even of the trains of thought, the emotions and anticipations which had passed through the mind of the living man; *reason*, in all sorts of comparisons, deductions, discriminations, and judgments; the *Will*, in equally various acts, e. g. when Achilles declares his

¹ Od. 11. 386 seq.

² — Ήτοι ἐφη γε Ἀσπάσιος παῖδεσσιν, ιδὲ διάβεσσιν ἐμοῖσιν Οίκαδ' ἐλεύσεσθαι.
429, 30.

preference of the humblest lot on earth to monarchy in Hades; the *heart* or susceptibility in joy, sorrow, anger, desire, and love. Here, in fact, is the whole inner life, the whole *man*, divested only of bodily organs and substance, and animal energy (*σάρκες, ὄστρα, λίς* and *κλικνός*).

There are yet nicer shades in this marvellous picture of post-mortual existence. Personal identity is preserved, even to the most delicate shades of individual character. The living Achilles, for example, was distinguished, not only for fiery valor and superhuman strength, the consciousness of which, inseparable from his personality, is finely expressed in the passage beginning

Ἐτ τοῖος δ' Ἐλθομι . . .

but for certain gentler traits, among which were filial and parental love and intense attachment to life. Even from the midst of war he had longed, too, for domestic quiet and *rural life*.

*Ην γὰρ δή με σώσωι θεοὶ καὶ οἴκαδ' ἵκωμαι,
Πηλεὺς δὴν μοι ἔπειτα γυναικά γε μάσσεται αὐτός·
Πολλαὶ 'Αχαιῶν εἰσὶν . . .
Τάν φη κ' ἐθέλοιμι, φῦλην ποιήσομ' ἄκοιτιν·
*Ἐνδια δέ μοι μάλα πολλὸν ἐπέσσυτο θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ,
Γήμαντι μητρὶ τὸν ἄλοχον, εἰκυῖαν ἄκοιτιν,
Κ τὴ μασι τέρπεσθαί.¹

Once indeed, strange as it may seem, he broke out in passionate longings for *universal peace*, among gods and men :

*Ως ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν, ἔκ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο,
Καὶ χόλος.²

This *ἀνώμαλον ήθος*,³ even to its finest touches, re-appears in the sentiments uttered by his *ψυχή*. He desires military glory for his son, but he would rather be the drudge of any

¹ Il. 9. 393 seq.

² Il. 18. 107, 8.

³ Other eminent examples will, however, readily occur, in which military talents of the highest order have been combined with a passionate love of *peace, home, and the country*.

poor farmer, among the living, than reign over all the dead. His characteristic generosity, too, is preserved. On earth he was willing to die that he might avenge his friend;¹ now he desires to live that he may protect his father. The sensitive and querulous Agamemnon (who, of all the Homeric heroes, had the least of self-forgetting magnanimity), and the unmitigable wrath of Aias for having been defeated in the competition with Odysseus for the armor of Achilles, in consequence of which *νόσφιν ἀφεστήκει, οὐδὲν ἀμείβετο*,² and alone of the dead refused to hold any communication with him—are equally obvious, though not so interesting, indications of identity. Every personality, in fact, reproduced by the poet in this *νεκυία*, exhibits with surprising fidelity the characteristic traits of its former self in the body; and that not in a way to justify the later notion that the soul retained forever the exact character and state in which it left the body—a sort of spiritual petrifaction. The Homeric ideas were, in this respect as well as others, degraded and materialized by the metaphysicians oftentimes long after. His *ψυχή* exhibits the flexibility (if we may so call it), the capacity of new thoughts and emotions which belongs to nature and life. This manifestation of identity, down to the last conscious acts and words of our earthly life, has been regarded as a solid and important proof of immortality. And its full preservation after death certainly shows that Homer did not conceive of the after-state of man as that of a mere animal breath, an unconscious shadow, but of a veritable human soul.

Nägelsbach cites Il. 22. 389, 90 as a proof that the Homeric *ψυχαι* do not recognize each other. On us it makes just the opposite impression. Achilles, mourning the death of Patroclus, says: "Even though the dead forget one another in Hades, yet there too will I remember my dear friend."

Εἰ δὲ θανόντων περ καταλήθουτ' εἴν 'Αΐδαο,
Αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ κάκεΐθι φίλου μεριήσορ' ἔταιρον.

¹ Il. 18. 98.

66*

² Od. 11. 543. coll. 562.

The loving and sorrowing heart *feels sure* that it will know hereafter those whom it has loved here. A singular proof that the dead will not recognize one another! As a *presentiment* of consciousness and mutual recognition in a future life, it is as strong as possible. The rest is purely hypothetical. But there is no lack of direct proof that mutual recognition was part of the Homeric conception. The souls of the dead recognize the living, and are recognized by them (they, for example, Odysseus; and Odysseus, them); which shows, on the one hand, that the faculty of recognition was perfect in themselves; and, on the other, that they presented such evidence of personality, whatever it was, as to be instantly recognized by those who had known them in the body. Since, then, they know and are known, how can they fail to know one another? No example (as far as we remember) of *mutual* recognition among the dead occurs in the 11th book of the *Odyssey*; and that for the plain reason that the whole book consists of conversations between Odysseus and the dead, not of the dead with one another. Voelcker admits that "in the 24th book of the *Odyssey*, the dead recognize each other."¹ But as he regards that as belonging to "the spurious part of the *Odyssey*" (a point not yet quite demonstrated, by the way), we have relied on other evidence.

The departed soul is conscious even, to a certain extent, of what is going on upon earth. It receives pleasure from the manifestation of love and fidelity by surviving friends. So Achilles, presiding over the magnificent funeral rites of Patroclus, exclaims :

Χαῖρέ μοι, ὦ Πάτροκλε, καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαι δόμοισι,²

and goes on to tell his friend that he was now fulfilling his pledges of sepulture, and would duly fulfil his promises of vengeance; for these παλίντιτὰ ἔργα were, according to the ideas of a martial and rude age, necessary to the satisfaction and repose of the dead. So the poet makes Automedon,

¹ P. 51, note.

.I. 23. 179.

after having slain Aretas, exclaim :¹ “ Verily, I have a little, at least, relieved the heart of the slain son of Menœtius (Patroclus) of its anguish (*κῆρος ἄχεος μεθέηκα*).

The Homeric Hades, then, is the residence of conscious souls. Incorporeal humanity passes into it entire. Nothing is left behind but the material organism which the soul inhabited and animated while the man was a dweller upon earth, and the animal forces which vivified it. The bodily *seats* of the intellectual and spiritual faculties (*ὑπόρ,* *φρένες,* *στήθος,* *καρδία*) are, of course, gone, for the body itself has perished. But the faculties themselves survive and attest their perpetuated life by every operation which was, or could have been, predicated of them while in the body. They remember, reason, judge, and will. They do all these with increased power. No man can read the eleventh book of the *Odyssey*, without perceiving that Homer meant to represent the higher faculties of the soul as exalted by death. As a single example, what was sagacity is now *prescience*. The emotional nature, too, is all alive. The disembodied soul cannot receive or return the embraces of a living friend. But it still loves, still longs for friendly communion, and dwells on the memory of past affections and joys, in a way which shows that the susceptibility has been in no way impaired by death. A mother's love breathes in every line addressed by Antikleia to her son ; though she calmly tells him that the living cannot embrace the dead, and why. Agamemnon (perhaps from his recent death not yet adapted to the habitudes of his new state) “ extends his hands, passionately desiring to touch ” his friend ; “ but nervous and muscular force were wanting ” (*οὐ γάρ οἱ ἔτ' ἦν ἵς ἔμπεδος, οὐδέ τι κίκνυς*),² and the attempt was vain.

“ The animal life,” then, instead of being the only thing which survives death, is the only thing, besides the mere material mass, which perishes. And Homer acquits himself of the enormous absurdity of conceiving (as these writers assert) that the funeral fire burns up spirit, feeling, thought, and will, and leaves the animal life untouched.

¹ Il. 17. 535-9.

But if it be an absurdity to conceive of intellect being consumed by fire, it were no less to conceive of it as re-animated by blood. This, too, is affirmed to be a part of the Homeric psychology. The *ψυχαί*, says Voelcker, “are devoid of sense and consciousness until they have drunk blood.” “With the blood consciousness returns.” Nägelsbach, too, ascribes a “momentary re-animation” (“momentaner wiederbelebung”) “a newly recovered consciousness” (“neuzugewinnen Bewusstseyn”) to the drinking of blood. Marvellous potency must there have been in a draught of sheep’s blood¹ to *re-animate* a *dead spirit*, to restore consciousness to a soul which, after death, has “no spirit, no feeling, no thought, no will!” Inconceivable indeed the process by which “consciousness *returns* where “the mental faculties” have “ceased to exist!” Among the “speciosa miracula” of Homer,

Antiphaten, Scyllamque et cum Cyclope Charybdin,

is no such monstrosity as “the dead spirit of man” re-animated and restored to the possession of “mental faculties” which had “ceased to exist,” by means of drinking the blood of a beast! Homer has not left a syllable to make him responsible for a notion which is as unpoetical as it is unphilosophical and absurd. He ascribes no other effect to the drinking of blood by the *ψυχαί* but the recognition of Odysseus:

Ἐγνω δ' αἷψ' ἐμὲ κεῖνος, ἐπεὶ πίει αἷμα κελαιὸν.²

It is quite plain, however, that it was not indispensable even to that. Achilles,³ Aias,⁴ and Hercules⁵ are said to have recognized Odysseus, without any mention of the drinking of blood. Patroclus, too, recognized and accosted his living friend without any such previous condition.

The desire of blood seems to have been common to the *ψυχαί*. That Achilles and Aias did not touch it, may have

¹ It was “a ram and a black ewe” (*ὕην ἀρνεῖδν . . . θῆλύν τε μέλαιναν*), which Odysseus by direction of Kirke immolated to the dead, and the blood of which he permitted them after Teiresias to drink (Od. 10. 527. coll. 11. 34–6).

² Od. 11. 389.

³ 470.

⁴ 542 seq.

⁵ 614. Ἐγνω δ' αὐτὶκα κεῖνος ἐπεὶ ιδειν δόθαλμοῖσι.

been intended by the poet to re-produce that indifference to mere animal gratifications which characterized them among the Homeric men. Even Teiresias, in whom by special divine ordinance the φρένες remained ἔμπεδοι, and the νοῦς ἔμπεδος, partook of the general thirst. A plain refutation (if any were necessary) of the notion which ascribes to it the *new creation* of an *annihilated* intellect. “The soul of the Theban Teiresias,” says Odysseus, “approached me, bearing a sceptre of gold, and he knew me and accosted me thus: ‘Why, O unhappy one, hast thou left the light of the sun? . . . But turn away thy keen sword *that I may drink the blood and [fore] tell to thee true events.*’ He spake, and I sheathed my sword, and *after he had drunk the dark blood, then the far-famed seer addressed me.*”¹

If, then, the drinking of blood was a *necessary* condition of recognition to the other dead, we have the same ground for concluding that it was a *necessary* condition of foresight and prophecy to Teiresias. But the poet probably intended it to be neither. The desire seems rather to have been an intense longing, which made them regardless of everything else till it was gratified. So of Antikleia, the strongest case that can be cited.² This theory requires that, prior to the drinking of blood, she was a mere εἴδωλον, a “scheinbild,” a *bodily resemblance impressed on the air* (*σωματοειδὲς ἐναπομεμαγμένον τῷ ἀέρι*, as Democritus defines εἴδωλον). How does this agree with the account of Odysseus: “I see the soul of my mother sitting silent near the blood; nor does she bear to *look her son in the face* nor to *accost him*. Tell me, royal sir, how she may recognize me:”

Μητρὸς τήρος δρόω ψυχὴν κατατεθητίνεις·
‘Η δ' ἀκένος' ἥσται σχεδὸν αἰματος, οὐδὲ τὸν νιὸν
Ἐτλη ἔναντα ἰδεῖν, ὅνδε προτιμεθήσασθαι.
Εἰπὲ, ἄναξ, πῶς κέν μ' ἀναγνοίν τοῖον ἕόντα.

“Thus I spoke, and he replied: I will easily explain the matter to thee. . . . Whomsoever of the dead you allow to

¹ Od. 11. 90—8.

² Od. 11. 140 seq.

approach the blood, he will veritably speak to you (*νημερτὲς ἐνίψει*). But to whomsoever you refuse the boon, he will withdraw and leave you." Presently "she approached and drank the dark blood and immediately recognized me."

The recognition, then, which followed upon the drinking of blood, may have been merely what we see result from extreme and fainting thirst or bodily *inanition* of any kind (as when Jonathan put to his mouth the rod dipped in an honey-comb and "his eyes were enlightened").¹ The same word denotes Hector's *perceiving* his companions around him on his recovery from a *fainting fit* (*ἀμφὶ ἐγγυώσκων ἑτάρους*), and is there exegetical of *νέον δὲ σαγείρατο θυμὸν* in the line before.² Many theories have been proposed to account for this dismal and inexplicable myth, i. e. the drinking of blood by departed souls. Plutarch³ thinks the poet meant to ascribe to it the *power of speech* (*δείκνυσι τὰς ψυχὰς φθεγγομένας ἄμα τῷ πιεῖν τοῦ αἵματος*); Eustathius ascribes to it the *gift of prophecy*. Dr. Voeleker says, "even Teiresias wished to *refresh* himself with it," a theory which, if extended to all the *ψυχαί*, would not probably be far from the truth. Or if we will find a profounder *έννοια* veiled under the circumstance, we may regard it as an attempt, on the part of the poet, to invest the soul with such corporeity as to make the actions he proposed to ascribe to it predicable and intelligible. Eustathius thought that many of the Homeric fictions of the state of souls after death, were merely designed to *assist the description* (*πρὸς χορηγίαν γραφῆς*), and this might be of them. Be this as it may, Homer, while he abstractly presents the *ψυχή* as destitute of all corporeal qualities, is forced into the violation and contradiction of his own idea by the simple impossibility of describing, or conceiving of, the operations of a pure bodiless spirit. His *ψυχαί* hear, speak, "shrink from the keen sword," "stretch

¹ Lit. "his eyes saw," certainly not implying that he was *blind* before. — 1 Sam. 14: 27.

² Il. 15. 240, 1.

³ Or more probably, an unknown writer, whose treatise "de Vita et poesi Homericā," has found a place among his works. Op. Moral. (Ed. Wyttēb.) Tom. V. p. 1167

forth their hands," and "shed the gushing tear;" and all this, though he has told us that they are so destitute of bodily sense and substance as to be comparable to a *σκιά*, *κάπνος*, *ὄνειρος*, or *εἰδωλον*. But we must not judge the old bard too harshly for an inconsistency into which we fall ourselves as often as we attempt to speak or think of the state and employments of disembodied souls. When we say that they *see* the glories of the heavenly world, that they *hear* and join in the songs of the blessed, and use the like expressions, we ascribe the operations of sense to those whom we suppose theoretically to have left all sense behind in death. We know, by the word of him to whom all worlds are present, that "a man" may be "in the body or out of the body," and retain, in both states, his personality and identity; and that "the *spirits* of the just made perfect" form part of the heavenly congregation; and thus, all Christians recognize the sublime and consoling truth, that "with God do *live* the *spirits* of those who depart hence in the Lord," and that "the *souls* of the faithful, after they are *delivered from the burthen of the flesh*, are in joy and felicity; but it is a matter of simple *faith*. When we attempt to think or speak of the employments of those who are in that state, we unavoidably fall into conceptions and phrases which belong only to a corporeal condition.

That Homer should fall into a like confusion, or even admit more palpably contradictory circumstances into his *vekvía*, is no matter of wonder. Whatever theory we may form about this drinking of blood (save only that which ascribes to it the power of *creating* anew an *annihilated intellect*), or of any other circumstance of the mere *ποιώτης* with which the poet clothed his ideas to bring them within the sphere of physical apprehension and sympathy,—it does not in the least affect our doctrine, that in the Homeric poetry the soul, denoting the whole immaterial man, lives after the death and destruction of the body, in the full and even exalted possession of all its intellectual and spiritual faculties.

And when we take a higher and wider view of the Home-

ric psychology, we find all its general aspects in full harmony with the doctrine of immortality, and utterly irreconcilable with the materialism which has been lately ascribed to him.

In the Homeric poetry, man is the offspring of God. Zeus is πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, "father as well of men as of gods."

Thus descended from God, man is the object of profound interest and love to his divine parent. He is "dear to God" (*Διὸς φίλος*); God "greatly pities him and cares for him (*μέγα κήδεται ἥδ' ἐλεαίρει*)," "yearns over him when he hears his cries, sees his tears (Il. 8. 245) or witnesses his peril (Il. 22. 169), distress (Od. 4. 364), or impending death (Il. 16. 433 coll. 450). All this, it may be objected, is said of men of the higher rank and nobler stamp who specially boasted a semi-divine extraction. But the divine *φιλανθρωπία* is not so limited. The good man as well as the great man is "divine," in Homer. Eumaeus, the loyal and generous swineherd of Odysseus is decorated with the epithet of *δῖος* (to the sore perplexity of the critics), as well as his lord. Homer clearly had an idea (though a rude one) of *moral* sonship. The chaste and truthful Bellerophon he designates as θεός γόνον (Il. 6. 191), while there is no god in the long *repetitio* of his genealogy. God "hears the prayer of the afflicted man everywhere" (Il. 16. 515-16); "all poor men and strangers are under the special guardianship of Jove" (Od. 14. 57-8); he accompanies (is in attendance on) strangers," who are therefore "objects of reverence" (*Ζεύς . . . ξενοίσιν ἄμ' αἰδοῖοισιν ὀπηδεῖ*—Od. 9. 270). The humblest of mankind are, therefore, objects of regard to God. It is the race which he loves. He delights himself in surveying the actions of men (Il. 7. 58, 61), delights himself in hearing the hymns which they sing to him (*μολπῇ Θεὸν ἵλασκοντο — οὐ δὲ φρένα τέρπετ’ ἀκούων*—Il. 1. 472. 4); he "loves to hold fellowship with man" (*φιλατόν εστιν ἄνδρι ἔταιρός ται*—Il. 24. 334, 5); every action, thought, and emotion in men is traced to an ever present and active divine influence. God is

¹ Il. 24. 174.

present to man in his secret conflicts and perplexities; suggests to him expedients (Il. 8. 218-19), inspires him with courage and strength (Od. 1. 321), warns bad men of the consequences of meditated crimes (Od. 1. 37 sqq.), opens to men a path through unseen dangers (Od. 9. 142-3), determines their choice of pursuits (Od. 14. 227), allots their endowments and privations (Od. 8. 63-4), and in fact presides over their whole interior as well as outward life (Od. 18, 125-6). The Homeric man holds an infinitely higher position and a nearer relation to the divinity than merely animal existences. Nature, while all its developments and forms of life are under the control of Zeus, is governed in complete subordination to human interests — administered for the reward, the punishment, the various discipline of man. The whole attention and affection of the Homeric divinities is concentrated upon man. The divine and the human, though each is kept personal and distinct, are presented in Homer with an astonishing intimacy of union. Paul expressed the spirit of the Homeric as well as of the later Greek poetry, when he said at Athens: “in’him we live and move and exist — as, in fact, some (*ώς καὶ τινες*) of your own poets have said.”

Homer illustrates the celerity of a divine being by that of “the mind of man:” Here passed across the sea, from Ida to Olympus —

‘Ως δ’ ὅτ’ ἀνατέξῃ νόος ἀνέρος, δοτ’ ἐπὶ πολλὴν
Γαῖαν ἐληλουθὼς, φρεσὶ πευκαλύμησι νοήσῃ
“Ενθ’ εἶην ἡ ἔνθα, μενοωῆσει τε πολλά.’¹

So true and noble a conception of the nature of intellect, could hardly be expected from one who, if Dr. Voelcker be right, “nowhere shows a knowledge of the mind as something independent,” and whose notion of “the mind” is quite “*corporeal*.” “*Swift as a wing or thought*” (*ώκεια οὐσεὶ πτέρον ἡὲ νόημα*²) is a comparison, too, which somehow conveys the impression that Homer could conceive of thought and intellect as something distinct from body, and

¹ Il. 15. 80 seq.

² Od. 8. 36.

that "reflection on the nature of mind had been developed" in his time, further than Dr. Voelcker is disposed to allow. It would not be a proof, in itself, that Homer had reached to the idea of a *separable* and *immortal* soul, but it certainly belongs to that order of psychological ideas which stands opposed, at all points, to materialism. Socrates reasoned from this same rapidity and ubiquity of human thought, to the omnipresence and universal providence of God¹ (which is merely an inversion of the Homeric order), and long after it was regarded as a proof of the celestial origin of the human soul ("unde," says Quintilian, "*origo humani animi celestis creditur*").²

Was man, then, the offspring of God, *near, dear, and like* to God (*ἀγχίδεος, ἀτ φίλος, θεοῦ ἐναληκιος, ἐπιείκελος ἀθανάτοις*), possessing an intellect of divine vigor and activity, by which he was distinguished from beasts and resembled God—to suffer an extinction of this very intellect in death, while his "animal soul" was to survive? Was that *νόος* which he had in common with divine and immortal natures (*Θεοὶ ἀθάνατοι; αἰειγενέται*), to "die," "perish," "cease to exist," while that which he had in common with brutes was to "continue to live and last?" Apart from the overwhelming positive proof to the contrary, we may pronounce such a combination of ideas, in such a mind as Homer's, impossible.

The proper and entire *personality* of men is represented as going into Hades, the world of souls. A great deal has been made of the relative use of *ψυχάς* and *αὐτός* in Il. 1. 3, 4. "It is said of Achilles," says Dr. Voelcker, that "he sent the *souls* of the heroes to Hades, but gave *them* as a prey to the dogs and birds," where Dr. V. interprets the *αὐτός* to signify "the whole man;" and Nägelsbach regards the passage as proof "that the true and proper man is the body" (dass der eigentliche Mensch der Leibsey). But let the Homeric antithesis stand in full:

Πολλὰς δὲ φρίμους ψυχὰς Αἰδί προτάψει

¹ Xen. Mem. I. 4. 17.

² Tanta *celeritas animorum*," is Cicero's first proof of immortality (Cato 21). May it not have been associated in the same manner in the mind of Homer?

'Ηρώων, αὐτὸν δὲ Ἐλύρια τεῦχε κύνεσσιν
Οἰωνοῖσι τε πᾶσι.

The “mighty souls” of the heroes, then (Dr. V. has not thought it necessary to retain the Homeric epithet) were sent to Hades. Was the *aὐτός* which was left “the *whole man*,” or even “the true and proper man,” or was it the *visible self*, the once living *δέμας*, but now dead *σῶμα*, the man as apprehended by those who had known and survived him? We are quite content to take issue on this very passage on which the materialistic interpreters of Homer are ringing perpetual changes. Was, then, the *valiant (or mighty) soul* (*ἱφθιμός ψυχή*) which had gone to Hades, or the putrefying carcass devoured by dogs and birds, the proper seat of personality? The latter, say Messrs. Voelcker and Nägelsbach. “The whole man, the *aὐτός*,” says Dr. V.; “sie selber, d. h. ihr rechtes, wahres Ich,” says the latter. We shall not dispute their theory of personality. But that it is not Homer’s, is quite apparent when we attend (as we have done) these *ψυχά* into their disembodied state, and find them retaining possession of every attribute of the man, save those which were strictly bodily. It is quite plain, too, from the multitude of passages (left quite unnoticed by them) in which he speaks of the entire man, the true and proper *ego*, as entering or existing within the invisible world. “I think that *he* (*μν* equivalent to *aὐτόν* as a simple designation of person) will go down within the abode of Hades.”¹ “The two *sons of Antenor*, having accomplished their destiny, went into the abode of Hades.”² Agamemnon, after he had become an inhabitant of Hades, relating the circumstances of his death, says: “when I was taking my departure to Hades,” etc. (*μοι . . . ίόντι περ εἰς Ἀΐδαο*).³ Odysseus⁴ addresses the *ψυχή* of his mother as her true and proper person:

Μῆτερ ἐμή . . .
Τίς νύ σε κῆρι ἐδάμασσε τανηλεγέος θανάτου;

She on the other hand, and in fact all the dead who accost

¹ Il. 14. 456, 7. ² Il. 11. 262, 3. ³ Od. 11. 424. ⁴ Od. 11. 164 seq.

Odysseus, do so in the language which implies the consciousness that the veritable *ego* survived in the *ψυχή*.

There is, however, one passage which, in itself, fixes beyond dispute the Homeric idea of personality. When Achilles stood by the funeral-pile of Patroclus and "addressed his dear friend" (*φίλον δ' ὀνόμηνεν ἑταῖρον*), he ought, on the theory of Voelcker and Nägelsbach, to have addressed the body which lay on the not yet kindled funeral-pile before him, as the *αὐτός*, the very person, of his friend. But no, he addresses that friend as now an inhabitant of the invisible world :

Χαῖρέ μοι, ὁ Πάτροκλε, καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι.¹

"It is quite plain," says Plutarch, "that Homer regarded the soul and nothing else as the man" (*ὅτι τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶδε ἄλλο η τὴν ψυχὴν νομίζει*).²

The Hesiodic psychology is here in full agreement with the Homeric. In Hesiod as well as in Homer, the origin of man is divine :

Ὦς δμόθεν γεγάσσι θεοὶ θυητοῖ τ' ἄνθρωποι . . .³

He is immortal too. The successive *soul* are represented as living, after death, in a conscious and active state, and one suited to, and in some sense the moral consequence of, their life on earth. As little in Hesiod as in Homer do we find any hint of the possible extinction of the rational and spiritual part of humanity. If Homer is hard to bring into harmony with this new theory, Hesiod will be found just as impracticable. If "reflection had not then" (that is, in Homer's time) "advanced so far as to conceive the soul existing independently after death," how are we to account for the full and clearly defined form in which the doctrine stands forth in Hesiod, a poet who lived very shortly (if at all) after him, and was incomparably inferior to him in genius and in profound and various knowledge of the soul and its operations ?

¹ Il. 23. 179. ² De Vit., etc. Hom. p. 1158. ³ Works and Days, 105—178.

The later psychology of the Greeks also, fully sustains the view we have taken. Ψυχή nowhere in the Greek language bears the degraded (might we not say *inconceivable*) sense which these writers attach to the Homeric use of it. From first to last we meet with it at once in the humblest and highest acceptations, denoting the *breath*, the *life* which begins and ends with the breath, in all animal natures, man included; and, specially in man, the *imperishable life* which animates him, which death itself does not extinguish. So far, in fact, these writers go with us. With them, as with us, the Homeric ψυχή is the *ground of life*, which *lasts and lives* forever. But then, they say, “it is not the soul, not the spirit, not the mental faculties.” Whereas not only in Homer (as we have seen), but in the earliest remains of Greek thought after him, it includes all three. In the Sayings of the Seven Sages (some six centuries b. c.), it is put for the counterpart or complement of the σῶμα, and distinctly denotes the intellectual and spiritual part of man, in opposition to his animal nature. The εὐ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν of Cleobulus, presents it in this sense as plainly as the “*mens sana in corpore sano*” of Juvenal, seven centuries after. In Pythagoras, ψυχή is the *mind*,¹ the *susceptibility*,² the *immortal reason*.³ Socrates used it to denote the whole intellectual and spiritual nature of man. “When the ψυχή,” he says, “in which alone is intelligence, goes forth [in death], (τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξελθούσης, ἐν δὲ μόνῃ γίνεται φρόντσις), men immediately carry forth and put out of the way the body of the dearest person.”⁴ A very remarkable passage, expressing as it does, the belief that the *soul* was the seat of personality, that it was the *bearer* (to borrow a German word) of all the intellectual faculties, and that it *went forth* and survived at the death of the body. Reasoning with the atheist Aristodemus for the existence and goodness of God from the admirable contrivance and adaptation of the human body, he adds:⁵ “nor was God satisfied with caring for

¹ Aur. Dict. 47.² Ibid. 66.³ Ibid. 68.⁴ Xen. Mem. I. 2. 53.⁵ I. 4. 17, 17.

the body, but (what is greatest of all) he breathed into man a great and powerful soul ($\psiυχήν κρατίστην τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνέ-$
 $\phiυσε$);” “nor must you suppose while your soul ($\psiυχή$) is able to *think* ($\phiροντίζειν$) of objects here and of those in Egypt and Sicily, that the intelligence of God ($τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ φρόνησιν$) is not able to care at once for all things.” In his last conversation with his friends (as reported in the *Phædo* of Plato), he discourses of the soul ($\psiυχή$) as including all the intellectual and spiritual faculties of man, asserts its separate existence after death, not only in full consciousness, but with faculties of increased activity and superior advantages for the pursuit of truth. He says the immortality of the soul was an “old doctrine ($παλαιὸς λόγος$), and that the founders of their mysteries had long ago shadowed it forth ($πάλαι αἰνῆττεσθαι$). He nowhere hints at such an expansion or development of the idea expressed by $\psiυχή$ as the modern school of German criticism asserts, but on the contrary *appeals to antiquity* in support of his own theory of the spiritual, separable, and immortal nature of the soul, *against the scepticism of his own age*. It is out of the question, then, that $\psiυχή$ in the Homeric poems should have meant a mere shade, a breath, a phantom, a *beingless individual*,¹ — and in the mouth of Socrates, “the seat of all intelligence,” “a great and powerful soul,” “the continent of the νοῦς,² without which the νοῦς cannot exist, which yet he held to be indelible and eternal — and that this *total change* (for it can, in no sense, be called a *development*) in the meaning of the word should not have attracted the notice of so acute an observer of the force of words, so profound a thinker on the nature of the mind, and withal one so familiar with every aspect of the Homeric poetry as Socrates.

The treatise “On the life and writings of Homer,” included among the Works of Plutarch, affirms³ that “this

¹ Thus we translate, without pretending to understand Professor Nägelebach's expression “Wesenlose Häupter,” p. 341.

² So he terms it in the *Timaeus*.

³ Ubi Sup. p. 1157. coll. de Anima, p. 722.

most noble of doctrines, that the soul is immortal, is a doctrine of great antiquity (*παυπάλιος*) ; and what is stranger yet, he affirms that *Homer taught it to Pythagoras and Plato.* (*τίς οὖν τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνεφάνησεν;* "Ομηρος.)

The view we have taken of the psychology of Homer, is fully sustained by the opinion of the early Christian writers. It is only necessary to cite a very remarkable passage in the first *Apology* of Justin Martyr.¹ In reasoning against the cruelty exercised against the Christians, he solemnly reminds the emperor and his sons of that death which awaited kings in common with all other men, and of that conscious state after death, and those future retributions, which were the ancient and universal objects of human belief. "If," he says, "death were a passage into an unconscious state,² a fortunate circumstance would it be for all unjust men. But since consciousness remains to all who have once existed,³ and eternal punishment is in reserve, trifle not with the conviction and belief of these truths." He appeals to the very superstitions of the ancients, the divinations by the dead, the universal authority of the oracles, the opinions of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Plato, and Socrates ; and, in conclusion, "*the ditch described by Homer and the descent of Odysseus to an interview with the souls of the departed,*"⁴ in order to prove the immemorial and universal belief that "*after death, the souls of men are in a perceptive (or conscious) state.*"⁵ Of the impression naturally made by the eleventh book of the *Odyssey*, to which allusion is here made, on a mind accustomed to use the Greek language and familiar with the whole system of antiquity (as Justin was, in no

¹ C. 18. Otto's edition, Vol. I. p. 46. Jenae. 1847.

² Εἰ εἰς ἄνευδοκοτάτων ἔχόμενοι.

³ Ἐπει καὶ αἰσθητοῖς πᾶσι γενομέναις μένει καὶ κόλασις αἰσθαντοῖς ἀπόκειται.

⁴ Ο παρ' Ομήρῳ βόλωρ καὶ ἡ καδύος Οδυσσέως εἰς τὴν τοῦτον ἐπίσκεψιν.

⁵ Ὡτὶ καὶ μετὰ θάνατον ἐν αἰσθησει εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ. Let it be remembered that Justin throughout this passage is boldly reasoning from the concessions of the Pagans whom he was addressing, and it will be seen that the sceptical hypothesis of which we have been treating could hardly be more precisely stated or more directly contradicted.

common degree), no stronger proof could be given. Nor would Basil, in his excellent "Address to young men on the study of the ancient Greeks," have pronounced "the whole Homeric poetry a commendation of virtue,"¹ if he had understood the great poet to have inculcated the doctrine of a mere animal soul, deprived of all spiritual attributes, and of consciousness itself, after death.

Even the caricatures of Lucian are here not without significance; for their object was to reproduce the characters and ideas of Homer in order to hold them up to ridicule. They undoubtedly show how the Homeric descriptions of the world beyond death were popularly understood. In these pictures, it is needless to say, the dead are represented as possessing perfect consciousness, remembrance of their life on earth,² the capacity of acquiring new knowledge,³ and of mental and moral expansion in every way.

We cannot allow that the German critics understand Homer better than the ancient Greeks themselves. At least it will require much better reasons than any yet produced by the authors of this new theory to prove that both the popular impression of his ideas and the opinions of the most acute and thoughtful minds of his own race, from Pythagoras down to Eustathius, were "incorrect" and "false."

The Homeric soul, then, representing the whole interior and immaterial man, survives death and is immortal. Whether it is poetically said to pass through a fatal wound,⁴ or to go out through the lips in the last breath,⁵ whatever catastrophe breaks the mysterious bond which holds it to the body, its purely mental and spiritual faculties are only disengaged and set at liberty by the change. It "quits the limbs," and "swift-winged" (*πτερένη, ἀποπτερένη*) "takes

¹ Πᾶσα μὲν ἡ ποίησις τῷ Οὐρῆῳ ἀρτίς ἔστιν Εὐαρος, c. 4. The same thought is several times repeated in this fine discourse, which is contained in the Works of Basil, Tom. II. pp. 243 seq. (Bened. Ed. reprinted by Garnier, Paris 1839).

² Μνήμη τῶν καὶ τὸν βίον. Achil. and Antil.

³ Alex. and Han. Where Hannibal says he had learned Greek since he entered Hades.

⁴ Il. 14. 518, 19.

⁵ Il. 9. 409.

its flight (*μεμόνταις*) — reflecting, the meanwhile, remembering, expecting, comparing, grieving, experiencing, in short, that various, and wondrous play of thought, emotion, and volition which bespoke its divine activity while in the body, — to the general abode of the departed. There, after long ages, it rehearses its earthly history, and enters into large and various discourse with a living man who had been divinely guided to and instructed for the interview, every utterance of that discourse manifesting (as in fact every human utterance does) the attributes of personal and conscious existence.

By what process Nägelsbach, Voelcker, and Müller have been able to persuade themselves that this thinking, reasoning, remembering, rejoicing, and sorrowing *soul* is “destitute of mental faculties,” “bewußtlos,” “wesenlos,” having “kein Geist, kein Gefühl, kein Denke, kein Wille,” passes all comprehension, unless it be explained by that habit of *substituting hypothesis for induction*, which so largely characterizes the historical criticism of German scholars under the influence of the “newest fashion” (as Sir James M’Intosh called it) of German philosophy. The theory of historical development is considered established and indisputable. Homer must bow to it. Homer, who besides all he has said incidentally of the divine birth and divine faculties and post-mortem state of man, has left a whole book of the discourses and actions of disembodied souls — discourses which instructed, warned, and guided the future conduct of “the most sagacious of men.” Homer must be made to unsay all his premature and disorderly psychological utterances, to go back to his proper place in the line of development, and humble himself to the confession that when the body dies, “the spirit of man is dead also.” But after all the critical torture to which the old bard has been put by these German inquisitors, he recants in every line, and, like Galileo, indignantly and pertinaciously reiterates: “it *lives* notwithstanding.”

The truth is, the expectation of a future life is not at all a result of development. It is not a product of ratiocination.

It is a tradition, a sentiment of the heart, a primary truth of consciousness, or all the three combined. It is as old as history, as universal as humanity. It is one of those ἀγραπτά κώστφαλή of which Sophocles has nobly said :

Οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κάχθεις, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ποτε
Ζῆται ταῦτα, κοινέis οἰδεις ἐξ ὅτου φάμη.¹

It has rather lost than gained in strength and distinctness when the logical faculty has been brought to its assistance. One cannot read over Socrates' demonstration of the immortality of the soul, in the Phædo of Plato, without being struck with the feebleness and inconclusiveness of the arguments. But when the sound minded old man throws himself on the support of the original sentiment, and says : "I know, I feel that I shall live after death, that I shall meet better men in that other state than I have associated with here, and that I shall still have a kind and provident God to care for me," his words find an echo in every human bosom. Man feels his own immortality. He cannot prove it, but he need not. He knows it without proof, before proof. It is too far back, too deep down to be capable of proof. It is more certain than anything that can be brought to demonstrate it, stronger than anything that can be brought to support it. When the logical faculty goes to work upon it, we find it as hard to construct a satisfactory process for the *ergo ero* as Descartes did for the *ergo sum*. It would seem, then, that consciousness *includes* a future life among its perceptions. Just as a man knows that he *is*, he knows that he *will continue* to be. His intelligence looks *before* and *after*, just as it contemplates the *now*. It was not, perhaps, without a special meaning that our great poet called it, in connection with this peculiarity of its operation, "*godlike reason.*" For in this quality the soul bears the image of its divine Parent, who "*inhabiteth eternity.*" Wherever the natural sentiments of humanity have not been perverted or

¹ Ant. 454 seq.

bewildered by philosophical scepticism, death is not thought of or spoken of as an interruption of conscious existence, much less a ceasing to be, but merely a *going away, a change of place*. The ancients reasoned from this, that the consciousness of immortality was indicated by the very nature of language.¹ Men have no more doubt of a future life than they have of the present. This belief does not depend upon, is not necessarily strengthened by, culture, civilization, education. It is as distinct and confident in the North American savage as in the German doctor of philosophy; in fact, much more so. It was more firm and general in the age of Homer than in that of Socrates. Not one of the characters of Homer ever insinuates a doubt of a future existence. But from Socrates we learn that the majority of men in his time disbelieved the immortality of the soul, and thought it would be dissipated and annihilated at death.² This is the natural effect of culture without faith. Men had lost their hold on the primitive sentiment and could not grasp it as a logical sequence. Between the two, they fell into doubt. Scepticism is the intermediate state between nature and faith. The voice of nature spoke at first, and men believed. Then they insisted on a logical proof of that which was beyond the reach of ratiocination, and failing to find it, they doubted and disbelieved. As man "by wisdom knew not God," so "by wisdom" he knew not himself. As false and over-bold reasoning lost the true idea of the Divine, so it lost the true idea of the human. The same age and the same process gave birth to atheists and doubters of the soul's immortality—to an Aristodemus and a Simmias. True ideas of God and man always go together, and cannot be held apart. No man who believes the divine origin of the human soul ever doubted its immortality; and no man who rejects the first can hold to the last. Paul has traced the course of this mental aberration in a few masterly words, which are as applicable to the spiritual nature and future life of man as to the "eternal power and deity of

¹ Plut. de Anima, near the beginning.² Plat. Phaed.

God." "That which can be known of God is manifest in men, for God hath revealed it to them. But *in their reasonings* they went astray, and their foolish heart was darkened. Calling themselves wise, they were turned into fools."¹ Humanity doubtless underwent a vast development from the age of Homer downwards. But spiritual ideas, either of God or man, did not partake of it. Homer with all his myths and sensualities, has no word to denote an *image* or *material representation of God*.² In the age of Pericles, as afterwards in that of Paul, Athens and all Greece was *full of idols* (*κατειδωλος*). In the Homeric poetry, no one breathes a doubt that the soul would live after death. In the age of Socrates, scepticism was the fashion, and was avowed by some of his intimate friends. In fact, Homer's conception of a future life was, in one essential point, much simpler and nobler than even that of Socrates. The theory of the latter included the metempsychosis with all its revolting absurdities.³ The notion of a transmigration of souls never appears to have crossed the mind of Homer. His idea of a future life admitted no confusion of natures or of personalities. His Achilles, though stalking gloomily through the shades of Hades, is Achilles still, a properly human and individual soul, "with thoughts that wander through eternity,"—and thus far an infinitely truer and more sublime conception than the same soul animating the body of a lion or a vulture. Nor did the belief improve, either in certainty or form, as ages rolled away and civilization advanced. In the tragic poets we have, indeed, a constant recognition of the immortality of the *ψυχή* (which with them, as with Homer, is the whole incorporeal man); but it is an immortality altogether of the Homeric order. Antigone says:⁴ "for a much longer duration must I please the dwellers below than those on earth — for there I shall abide forever;"

¹ Rom. 1: 19—22.² Veith (Ant. Hom. p. 25) considers Il. 6. 270 a *probable* allusion to image-worship. But the probability is weak, the more so as it stands alone in the Homeric poetry.³ Phaed. Cap. XXXI. seq.⁴ 474 seq.

πλείων χρόνος
 Ὁν δέ μ' ἀρέσκειν τοῖς κάτω τῶν ἐνθάδε.
 Ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἡ εἰ κείσομας.

She expects a meeting and an approving *recognition* from her father, mother, and brother.

Ἐλθοῦσα μέντοι κάρτ' ἐν ἐλπίσιν τρέφω
 Φῦλη μὲν ἥξειν πατρὶ, προσφιλῆς δὲ σοι,
 Μῆτερ, φίλη δὲ σοι καστύγητον κάρα.¹

But her notions of that world were just as vague, dreary, and utterly joyless as were those of the Homeric personages. So were those which Euripides puts into the mouth of Medea in behalf of her children, and of his other characters, under the like circumstances. And four or five centuries later, Homer's ideas of the soul and its future state are reproduced, without expansion or improvement, by Virgil, who lived in the very bloom of the Græco-Roman civilization. His necrology (as to the spiritual conceptions it embodies) is nothing more than a feeble and servile imitation of that of Homer. Even the enlightened and thoughtful Cicero, after all the fine things he has put into the mouths of Cato and others on the subject, confesses his own utter uncertainty by saying, "I hope there is a place where I and all good men will meet after death, but I dare not affirm it." Nor does he draw a single argument or exhortation in behalf of virtue, from the contemplation of a future life, in his admirable Offices.

And the sentiment seems to have continued equally vague and uncertain (to have become even more so, in fact) after the coming of Christ, in those who rejected or were ignorant of, the Gospel. Still the pagan mourner "sorrowed without hope," still engraved on the tombstone of the beloved dead, "eternum vale!" The virtuous Perseus has not, as far as we remember, a hint of immortality. Hadrian exclaims to his departing soul: "quæ nunc abibis in loca?" And after some eighteen centuries more of civilization and development, there is no firm belief in the immortality of the

¹ 897 seq.

soul, but that which is the product of Christian faith. Hume played cards and joked about Charon and the Styx, almost to the last moment of life. Dr. Franklin is said to have exclaimed : " Oh, that dreadful uncertainty!" And Kant, when asked by a friend, shortly before his death, what were his expectations of a future life, after a thoughtful silence, replied : " *I have no idea of a future life!*"

So much for " the progress of reflection," as Dr. Voeleker expresses it, in its relation to the belief in a distinct, separable, and immortal soul. We do not owe it to " reflection." We owe it to the finger of God which wrote it on the heart; to the voice of God which spoke it in the ears of men (an utterance, however perverted, bewildered, and weakened, never to be forgotten by after generations); to the nature of the soul itself as it was breathed into the nostrils of man, conscious of its source and so conscious of its immortality. Whether in Homer it was an old tradition, a reach of his own powerful and deeply working intellect, a notion gathered up in his eastern travels, or a special suggestion from the Source of all truth to one who was to exert so powerful an influence in moulding ten centuries of the human race ; certain it is, that the living Agamemnon and Achilles were not more clearly or fully endowed with intellect, heart, and will, than were their souls in Hades.

That the state of these departed souls was destitute of every cheerful concomitant, is quite true. A dreary abode, a joyless existence, is that of the Homeric *ψυχαι*. But they are immortal. And the idea of immortality, in its rudest form, is one of infinite dignity and importance. It lifts man above the world of matter and mere animal natures around him, and opens a boundless future to his thoughts and aspirations. There can be no virtue, no worship, no faith nor hope, nor capacity for them without it. Without it, man is a mere animal, nobler and more susceptible only to be agitated by mightier passions and vulnerable to keener sorrows and fears. But when he expects a future life he will think of it; he will connect with it some idea of retribution. The very opening of this boundless vista before him leave

him less at the mercy of low impulses and material circumstances. Every thought of it, every glance into it, is a quickener to his faculties, a check on his passions, an incentive to his hopes.

Homer lacked the completest idea of a future life, the resurrection of the body. There can be no distinct, firm, and cheerful expectation of a future life without that. The soul, which has so long been the "hospes comesque corporis," cannot look forward to an existence in which it is to be eternally separated from that which has been the sharer of its life, the organ of all its operations from the beginning of its existence, without a desolating sense of loneliness and imperfection. The anticipation of thus surviving (like the friend of old, "nec carus æque nec superstes integer"), could yield but little comfort in looking beyond death.

— τίς βίος μοι σοῦ λελειμμένη φλος;

with a higher truth than those words were at first used, would express the emotions with which the soul must expect such an eternal widowhood, such an eternal separation from a part of itself. The dismal gloom of the Homeric picture of futurity is the inevitable consequence of this deficiency. He appears to have felt it himself. Hesiod and Pindar have attempted to depict a happy state of mere spirits. Homer's mind was of that order which demanded consistency and completeness in its own ideas. He could not conceive, at least he has not attempted to describe, *happiness without body*. To only two of mortal men has he allotted a happy life beyond death; and those he has transported, one to Olympus, the other to Elysium, *in the body*. His ψυχαί who are doomed to a disembodied existence, leave the body with lamentation and take up their abode in a region, the epithets of which, ἡρόεις, ἀμειλίχος, στυγεός, imply the absence of every element of cheerful existence. Foresightings of the future revelation may perhaps be discovered in the pious care which was paid to the body and even the ashes of the beloved dead; a consciousness of the necessity

of the body to the soul appears in the shadowy corporeity with which the poet invests his *ψυχαλ*; a conception of the possibility of a perpetual life of the body is disclosed in the transfer of Menelaus, by a special divine decree, without death, to Elysium;¹ and it is impossible to read, without astonishment, the passage in which Achilles expresses his emotions when he sees before him the living form of Lycaon, one of the sons of Priam, whom he had long before sent into captivity beyond the sea, and now probably supposed to be dead:²

"Ο πόποι, ἡ μέγα θαῦμα τόδ̄ ὀφθαλμῶσι όρωμαι.
Ἡ μάλα δὴ Τρῶες μεγαλήτορες, οὐσπερ ἔτεφνον.
Αὔτις ἀναστήσονται ὑπὸ ζύφου ηέροεντος.
Οἰον δὴ καὶ ὅδ̄ ἥλιθε;

But the thought of an actual resurrection never probably occurred to the mind of Homer; nor is it to be found, we believe, among the innumerable guesses of Greek ingenuity and inquisitiveness.³ No secret was kept more profoundly “hid from ages and generations.” Faint and occasional gleams of it broke upon the minds of pious Hebrews from the beginning. But they were only gleams. They did not shed that steady and strong illumination which was needed to see through the breakers and mists along the coast of death, the peaceful and happy shore of a better life. *Sheol* was scarcely less terrible to the Hebrew than *Hades* to the Greek. That best and brightest of revelations which announces, not an immortal *soul* (that is everywhere taken for granted in the New Testament), but an immortal *man*, was reserved for the Son of God in person, the divine Brother and Redeemer of man. It shone full-orbed on the world when he uttered those words: “I am the resurrection and the life. Thy brother shall rise again. He that believeth in me, though he were dead yet shall he live. I will raise

¹ Od. 4. 561—9.

² Il. 21. 53 seq.

³ There was, however, a strong and general conviction *τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ σῶματος στερερ δχματος δεῖσθαι*. Plut. De Vit. et Poes. Hom. above cited, near the end.

him up at the last day." This prophecy was turned into fact by his own resurrection, the first-fruits of the general harvest of restored and re-vivified humanity. Fuller light, with other circumstances and concomitants, were afterwards added. "Behold! I tell you a mystery (a secret). In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump, the dead shall be raised." Through all the earlier ages, the belief of the soul's immortality had survived, defective and one-sided though it was,—an indestructible sentiment, a part of consciousness, a perpetual and universal tradition—awaiting the happy hour when it should be completed by that of an incorruptible, powerful, and glorious body, and thus the idea of immortal humanity receive its full and perfect form—"life and immortality brought to light by the Gospel."

ARTICLE V.

CAPRICES AND LAWS OF LITERATURE.

BY REV. LEONARD WITTINGTON, D. D., NEWBURYPORT, MASS.

THE tendency of philosophical investigation is to extend the dominion of the laws of nature and to diminish the region of chance, until it dwindle to an unextended point. We behold a chip floating down a stream, or a feather floating on the air,—nothing at first view can be more apparently capricious than their motions; yet it is not more certain that they are passive things than it is that they are subjected to an invariable law, regulating all their movements and never for a moment relaxed or repealed.

When Dr. Paley, in the opening of his work on Natural Theology, was looking round for an antagonist power to his watch, he pitched upon a stone, lying on a heath, as an in-