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xvii. 24). The following factor only needs to be mentioned in explanation. The colonists in southern Egypt used Aramaic partly because they entered into correspondence with Persian officials, and partly also they wrote Aramaic as Israelites abroad, where Aramaic was a more familiar Semitic dialect than Hebrew.

We see, then, that both the events out of which Naville seeks to derive an entirely new conception of the origin of Old Testament literature (*Arch.*, pp. 9, 139, etc.)—the discovery of the Amarna correspondence and of the papyri of Elephantinê—have no such significance as he attributes to them. The Hebrew language and the Phœnician old Hebrew script are robbed by him of their importance for the origin of the Old Testament. But they will not permit themselves to be set aside.

I do not now criticise the numerous observations made by Naville in the course of his work on the origin of the Pentateuch. For it is unmethodical to scatter by the way such isolated passages throughout an investigation, in order to arouse suspicion against a great conviction—the newer theory as to the Pentateuch (*Arch.*, pp. 24, 71, 118, 130, 204). It is the less needful for me to discuss in detail these remarks of Naville, which have no direct concern with the answering of the question as to the relation of the Old Testament to the language and script of the Babylonians, because this subject, “Modern Criticism of the Pentateuch and its Latest Opponents,” has recently been elucidated by me in a special book.

ED. KÖNIG.

BOLDNESS IN THE DAY OF JUDGMENT.

(1 JOHN iv. 17.)

IN the fine collect for St. John Baptist's Day the Baptist is characterised as speaking the truth and boldly

rebuking vice—a true note of greatness in preacher and prophet, and essentially characteristic of the Christian life as manifested immediately after the day of Pentecost. In contrast to the cowardly attitude which impelled them to forsake their Master the Apostles now “spake the word of God with boldness” (Acts iv. 31), so that “the rulers marvelled when they perceived the boldness of Peter and John, and had perceived that they were unlearned and ignorant men” (Acts iv. 13). Again, Barnabas commends Saul to the Apostles in Jerusalem because “he had preached boldly in the name of Jesus” (Acts ix. 27). In the mission work of the Church “speaking boldly” continues to be the characteristic note, as at Antioch in Pisidia, at Iconium and at Ephesus (Acts xiii. 46; xiv. 3; xix. 8).

In these and other passages the Greek words used are *παρρησία*, and the verbal and adverbial forms *παρρησιάζεσθαι* and *παρρησία*. The literal meaning of *παρρησία* is open, unreserved talk, what Shakespeare calls “free speech and fearless.” Although in at least one passage—John xi. 53—the word, in its adverbial form, has the meaning of doing a thing openly and without concealment apart from any suggestion of speech it does not in itself connote necessarily courage or audacity, as its rendering in the English Version seems to imply. It is used of our Lord speaking plainly in contrast to teaching by parable (John xvi. 20), and of St. Paul “using great boldness of speech”—i.e. plain, intelligible speech—“not as Moses, who put a veil upon his face” (2 Cor. iii. 12).

But as speaking without reserve either to friend or foe, often needs courage—in the former case it is often at the risk of losing friendship, in the latter at the risk of a penalty—the idea of “boldness” is generally present. Plutarch, for instance, who has much to say upon the word, discusses the question how far it is wise and right to speak plainly

to a friend about his shortcomings, and advises caution. Euripides, who uses the word rather frequently, connects it with the thought of freedom. It is the glory of the Athenian citizen to be unrestrained in speech (see Ion. 421 f., *ἐλεύθερο | παρρησία θάλλοντες οἴκοιεν πόλιν | κλεινῶν Ἀθηνῶν*), as it is the glory of the Christian freely to preach the Gospel.

But although those thoughts of outspokenness, of courage and of freedom, implicit in *παρρησία* are typical of all that is best and greatest in the history of Christian thought and action the further use of the word in connexion with the relation of the human soul to God brings us into a region of deeper and more spiritual interest, and one in which the suggestiveness of *παρρησία* has hardly been sufficiently considered.

All great thinkers have recognised that the best and purest human happiness is centred in that unrestrained and unreserved converse which is only possible in close and intimate friendship. One of our novelists writes, "All estrangement was for ever at an end between them: forgiveness meant joy unspeakable, even above every earthly joy. They understood one another, seldom found much to say, but were always at ease in each other's company." Such unreservedness of friendship is the supreme aim of life.

From quiet homes and first beginning,

Out to the undiscovered ends,

There's nothing worth the wear of winning

But laughter and the love of friends.¹

And some have seen that this earthly enjoyment and confidence of friendship finds its counterpart in "heavenly places." Of John Smith of Harrow it has been said: "His master passion was to know God, to depend upon Him, to do His will; to whom God was as near and as

¹ Mrs. L. B. Welford.

dear as his best known friend." In common with many other mystics Brother Lawrence uses the same language. "We ought," he said, "to act with God in the greatest simplicity, speaking to Him frankly and plainly and imploring His assistance in our affairs just as they happen. God had never failed to grant it, as he had often experienced."

This conception of interchange of thought in ideal human friendship, and the possibility of transferring the same quality of friendship to our relations with God is justified by a further use of *παρρησία* in the New Testament. As a term of friendship it is necessarily reciprocal. For all true friendship implies co-operation :

Our hands in one, we will not shrink
From life's severest due;
Our hands in one, we will not blink
The terrible and true.
What each would feel a heavy blow
Falls on us both as autumn snow.¹

The possibility of bringing this human joy of perfect friendship and mutual converse into a divine relationship was created by the words of Jesus when He called His disciples friends. "Ye are my friends if ye do the things which I command you. No longer do I call you servants (or slaves); for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth; but I have called you friends; for all things that I heard from the Father I have made known unto you" (John xv. 14, 15). Here was *παρρησία* indeed, an unreserved declaration to "friends" of *all* that the Father had revealed to the Son. The manumission of the slaves or bondservants of Christ to be His friends was a momentous event in the history of religion, in the relation of God to man. And the first incident in that newly revealed relation is one which was impossible before. It marks the transition from the law to the Gospel. There can be no true converse between

¹ Monckton Milnes.

master and slave, no freedom of discourse or mutual confidence and trust. Friendship implies community of interest, perfected sympathy, even at its best and highest, identity of personality (*καθὼς ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ*, "As He is, so are we in this world," 1 John iv. 17). Although, therefore, the word itself does not occur in this passage it is a signal instance of its exercise and throws important light on its use in the passages of the Epistles which we are about to consider.

In three passages the word is used in reference to awe-inspiring moments, in which fear and not confidence (*παρρησία*) might be expected to be present, namely, the solemn entry of the High Priest into the Holy of Holies (Hebrews iv. 16), and the Day of Judgment (1 John ii. 28; iv. 17). On both of these occasions the believer is entitled to cast away fear and to have the confidence which perfect love and the sense of pardon alone can give.

The first of these passages (Hebrews iv. 16) is rendered in R.V., "Let us therefore draw near with boldness (*μετὰ παρρησίας*) unto the throne of grace, that we may receive mercy and may find grace to help us in time of need." Although the derivative sense of "boldness" is predominant here, the primary thought of unreserved converse is implied both by the character of the High Priest, who, like a sympathetic earthly friend, "can be touched with the feeling of our infirmities, and hath been in all points tempted like as we are," and also by the fact that the "boldness" expresses itself in prayer for "help in time of need." The same sense of confidence in prayer occurs in 1 John v. 13 foll. There the confidence arises from the conscious possession of eternal life (v. 13); and again the parallel is found in the confidence with which we approach a beloved and intimate friend when we make request of him. We know with the certainty of experience that he will grant the request because we have

the same views and purpose and will. So the believer is assured that his prayer will be answered, "if we know that He heareth us whatsoever we ask" (v. 15). The unusual grammatical construction (*ἐὰν οἴδαμεν*) must signify that we *do* know. It is hypothetical only in form.¹

In 1 John iv. 17 we have a definition of *παρρησία* (*parresia*) which places it on a still higher level as an expression of Christian thought. It is the word used by St. John here and in ii. 28 to bring home to his readers and disciples the attitude of the believer's soul in the presence of God in the day of judgment—whatever the reality may be which that symbolic phrase is intended to convey.

It raises a picture of the soul brought, not before the tribunal of an offended judge, but into the presence of an intimate and familiar friend—a different note from the mediæval presentment of the "Rex tremendæ Majestatis" before whose judgment seat

Quantus tremor est futurus
Quando iudex est venturus
Cuncta stricte discussurus.

In chapter ii. 28 St. John bids us view this assured confidence in the day of judgment as a result of the divine indwelling love. Here it is the fulness and completion of love (*ἐν τούτῳ τετελειώται ἡ ἀγάπη ἵνα παρρησίαν ἔχωμεν*). Love has resulted in an approach to identity between the believer and God Himself (see chap. iv. 17, as cited above), just as intimate friends become closely assimilated in character. In such an attitude fear can have no place (*ἡ τελεία ἀγάπη ἔξω βάλλει τὸν φόβον*), because, as the Apostle says, fear brings with it corrective punishment (*κόλασιν*). Fear would be the natural feeling of a criminal in the presence of a judge, or of a slave in the presence of his master, but not in the intercourse of a friend. Even constraint and shyness are a kind

¹ The conditional particle suggests a doubt, the indicative mood removes it.

of fear involving the possibility of correction and so inconsistent with perfect friendship. The ideal friend is one

Who never found fault with you, never implied
Your wrong by her right.¹

It will be seen, then, that *παρησία* or confidence takes rank, as the expression of the best and holiest and most impressive of Christian thoughts, side by side with *ἀγάπη*, of which it is a necessary consequence, and with *κοινωνία* (fellowship or communion), of which it is the expression. Boldness in the day of judgment is the confidence of loving friendship.

ARTHUR CARR.

THE CREED AND DR. SANDAY.

THE following thoughts on the mental crisis which has been brought about by the publication of Professor Sanday's Reply to Bishop Gore's Open Letter are in all humility commended by a learner and teacher, who believes in the Apostles' Creed, to the consideration of other learners and teachers who so far forth share a common faith.

In this article I take my stand on the Apostles' Creed for the following reasons :—In the first place, in the Anglican communion, of which I am a member, the Apostles' Creed has a primary and personal appeal such as attaches to no other formula except the Lord's Prayer. And what I have to say on this occasion is intended to appeal to the ordinary man. The longer Creed, which is recited by the congregation in the Service of Holy Communion, is of course also an expression of individual belief; but it is the Apostles' Creed that is repeated by the individual at his baptism, confirmation and on the bed of sickness.

Again, if I mistake not, this Creed is very generally accepted by the large Protestant communions that have,

¹ Mrs. E. B. Browning.

on various grounds, separated from the Church of England, yet still adhere to the Catholic faith in the Trinity and the Incarnation. And to the members of these communions I also address myself. The Apostles' Creed embodies the minimum of what is necessary to an adequate answer to the question, "What think ye of Christ?" and that is the essential thing in Christianity. Whatever makes Jesus Christ seem to us less near, less living, dimmer, is rightly rejected by the man that is "in Christ," even though he has not the learning or the skill to defend logically the grounds of his rejection. When we are hard pressed by the tempestuous winds called Criticism or Reunion, and are considering which of our cherished beliefs or practices we may, or must, cast overboard, we shall do well to steady our judgment by recalling the memorable words of St. Ignatius of Antioch, "Wheresoever Jesus is, there is the Catholic Church."

Bishop Gore's *Open Letter on the Basis of Anglican Fellowship in Faith and Organization* deals, as we all know, with three burning questions. But, in connexion with what I have just said, I think it quite necessary to appeal to my readers not to allow their prejudices on questions B or C to affect their opinion of what Bishop Gore has to say on question A. It is, I am sure, possible to disagree with a man on one issue and agree with him on another; unfortunately there are few evidences of this fairness and detachment of mind in our religious Press.

Bishop Gore's position is that "the claim which is being made by certain of our clergy in the name of Liberal Christianity," that disbelief in what are called "nature miracles" "is no bar to the exercise of the ministry"; this claim, Bishop Gore maintains, is incompatible with loyalty to the Church of England.

The Modernists whom Bishop Gore has in view maintain

that such miracles as our Lord's feeding of the five thousand, or His own birth of a virgin mother, and the resurrection of His dead body from the grave, are for us to-day incredible.

In his reply to Bishop Gore, Dr. Sanday openly takes the side of these extreme Modernists, and explicitly says that his own present belief about the Birth and Resurrection "is not all that the Church of the past has believed. I must not," he adds, "blink this fact." That is to say, although he speaks of "the Supernatural Birth and the Supernatural Resurrection," he makes it quite plain that he believes that Jesus had a human father, and that His dead body saw corruption.

Here a little plain speaking is necessary to meet plain thinking. A conception caused by the action of a human father does not result in a supernatural birth, no matter how holy the father and mother may be, no matter how much their union may be sanctified by the approval and even the direction of God. The children of Christians are holy (1 Cor. vii. 14); but their births are not supernatural. There is a similar ostrich-like attitude towards obvious facts in talk of the Supernatural Resurrection of a man, no matter how great morally and spiritually, whose dead body is believed to have "turn'd to clay."

Symbolical language is necessary when we are picturing that which is not in the sphere of the bodily senses. Thus the names "Father," "Son," "Holy Spirit" are symbolical; so is the idea of heaven being a place into which one ascends, and Hades a place into which one descends; but the virginity of Mary is no more symbolical than is the procuratorship of Pontius Pilate.

The negations of Catholic belief published by Dr. Sanday have of course been made before. They were made, as regards one nature-miracle, by the Jews, as St. Matthew

tells us, the moment the disciples of Jesus proclaimed His resurrection; they have been made by Muhammadans, infidels and heretics ever since. Within the last few years these negations of elementary Christian doctrine have been more or less boldly, more or less ambiguously, expressed within the Christian Church by those who are called Modernists; but never before by a leading Professor of Divinity of the Church of England, a great scholar, regarded with respect and affection by an immense circle of readers all over the world. There has been nothing like it since the perversion of John Henry Newman to Rome. If Dr. Sanday's fall has not produced as great a splash as did earlier theological sensations, it is because Christian doctrine has been crowded out of the minds of many intellectual Christians by the fascinating and bewildering details of criticism, and also because the proportion of the general reading public that takes an interest in religious questions has been growing smaller and smaller since the date of the publication of *Essays and Reviews*.

I have compared the cases of Newman and Sanday. The two cases are alike, not merely in the extent of disturbance of individual beliefs caused by them, but also in the inevitableness of the fall in each case. I shall not again bring in any personal element into the discussion; but this must be said: that just as Newman's *Apologia* showed that his mind had always had a Romeward bent, so anyone reading Dr. Sanday's pamphlet can perceive how his purely intellectual and critical attitude towards Christianity was bound to lead a sincere and candid mind to a shipwreck of faith.

The following passage (p. 21) is most illuminating in this respect: "All my career has really been leading up to this subject; but I made up my mind from the first to approach it in a deliberate and gradual way. I thought that I would not attack the central problem first, but last.

Whatever might be the best method for others, I had little doubt that this was the best for me. I began at the foot of the ladder. I first sought to make myself at home in the field of the Lower Criticism, and then to rise to the Higher. I thought that the first thing we wanted was accurate texts, and then to assign these texts to their proper surroundings in place and time. This was preliminary to the construction of an historical background. But everything that could be regarded as *a priori* or philosophical I was content to leave in suspense."

From the critical point of view these sentences are admirable; they speak of a noble purpose which has been faithfully carried out; but, at the same time, they betray a fundamental divergence between the views of Dr. Sanday and of St Paul, let us say, as to the place of faith in the Christian consciousness. The Christian faith does not bid us to be "content to leave in suspense everything that could be regarded as *a priori*"; as the apostolic writer says, "He that cometh to God must believe" about Him much that is *a priori* and philosophical.

It would be improper, as it is unnecessary, for me to speak of this matter as it affects the sincerity of the officials of the Christian Society. But it is not out of place to attempt to say something that may help to confirm the faith of the ordinary members of the Christian Church in statements of the Creed which have been always held to be essential to an adequate conception of the Person of our Lord. The ordinary man has not acquired the subtlety of mind which enables some people to live comfortably in the top storey of a house the foundations and lower storeys of which have been removed.

Modernism, in one point of view, stands for a reasonable, and indeed necessary, expression of the mind of man—the demand made by each generation that it is entitled to restate

old beliefs in the language of its own time, the only language which it understands. Moreover, it is reasonable that in the revaluation of the records of the past we should use the fresh stores of knowledge which have come to us in the providence of God through the researches of learned men.

If Modernism meant no more than the full and free application to the interpretation of ancient literature of modern methods and modern knowledge, all fair-minded men would be Modernists.

But it means much more than this ; it means the testing of religious truths not by modern knowledge, but by the assumptions of some modern men, assumptions which were made centuries ago by unbelievers.

It is this general principle of Modernism in its relation to the Creed with which I propose at present to deal. It would be impossible in one paper to discuss in detail the several articles of the Creed which are affected by the acceptance of Modernist principles.

What I desire to emphasise is, in the first place, that the denial of the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection of our Lord, in the sense in which the Church has always understood those facts, is not a result of historical inquiry or research at all, but is the immediate consequence of an assumption, or working principle, of some historical critics, the assumption that miracles have never happened.

Research or inquiry can only be made concerning persons or events that were seen and heard by the bodily senses. Thus the statement that "Jesus suffered under Pontius Pilate" is a fair subject for historical research ; but, from the very nature of the case, historical research is powerless to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the miraculous nature of our Lord's conception, or the precise nature of the change that took place in the body of Jesus after it was laid in the tomb of Joseph of Arimathea.

Again, if you begin to apply to the Creed some of the materialistic assumptions, or prejudices, of some modern historical critics, there is no logical reason why you should not go on to adopt all the postulates of materialism without exception.

A man may be an uncompromising materialist and at the same time have a great reputation as a historian; many historians and historical critics are as a matter of fact avowed and aggressive atheists. To such men the notion that there is a God in the theistic sense is just as incredible as is the resurrection of a dead man.

If, in 1914, loyalty to historical science demands the abandonment of, or explaining away of, "Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost. Born of the Virgin Mary," and "The third day He rose again from the dead," next year, with equal or more reason, historical science may compel us to explain away "God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth"; the truth being that a historical criticism that postulates the principles of materialism is incapable of being used as a test of religious truth. The application of a mathematical test to the Creed would be equally satisfactory in its results.

It has been well said that the best tonic for low spirits as regards the prospects of the Church is the study of the Church's history; and in this connexion it may be helpful to remember that even the Church of the apostolic age had its own problem of Modernism. One of the indications of this fact is a remarkable verse which has been restored to us by the Revised Version, 2 John 9: "Whosoever goeth onward and abideth not in the teaching of Christ, hath not God." Bishop Westcott notes in his commentary, "These false teachers proposed to enter on new regions of truth, leaving the old."

"The teaching of Christ," in this place, does not of course

mean that which the Church teaches about Christ, but that which Christ taught. But there is included in that which Christ taught, not merely the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, but our Lord's claims for Himself, His assertions and implications as to His own unique relationship to God the Father, to the universe and to man.

All this became at once part of what the Church teaches about Christ ; so that it is true to say that practically what is condemned by St. John is teaching which, under the specious pretext of advance, ignores or contradicts the elementary statements about the Person of Christ which the Church has always made.

I am well aware that opposition to anything that calls itself progress or advance must in these days justify itself to reason. There is a natural disinclination on the part of sensible men to the fixing of limits to inquiry and research. Heresy hunting is not a form of sport that commends itself to men of broad views and wide sympathies. Repression, even when it is effective, which it seldom is, carries with it unpleasant reactions on the character of those who are the agents in repressing.

Apart from this, it is also pointed out that experience has shown that the heresy of yesterday often becomes the orthodoxy of to-day ; we are reminded that those who denounce Modernism now were themselves denounced as innovators when they were younger men.

But there is really no parallel between the two cases. The textual and literary criticism which has revolutionised our conception of the Bible is based on knowledge of facts which have come to light during the last century ; but no new facts have come to our knowledge respecting the manner of our Lord's birth and death ; it is inconceivable that we should ever know, with the intellect, more about these things than St. Luke or St. Paul knew ; and in point of

fact the belief of the Church has never varied on these primary fundamental points, as it has on such questions as the nature of the Atonement or of Inspiration. Research and inquiry have led to a restatement as to the meaning of the inspiration of the sacred Books, because books, from their very nature, belong to the sphere in which research can operate; but the assumption that miracles do not happen, and have never happened, is not based on research, but on a philosophy.

And this of course involves the truth of the converse statement, that belief in Christianity is ultimately based not on strict historical evidence, but on a theory of the universe and of man's place in it. We orthodox Christians act on assumptions, as well as Modernists do; we believe, however, that our assumptions are a revelation from God.

We say with truth of Christianity that it is a historical religion, meaning thereby that it is founded on facts which actually happened at definite moments of time in the world's history. In this sense the miraculous conception of Jesus Christ and His miraculous resurrection are historical. But from the materialistic point of view the only historical statements in the Creed are: "Jesus . . . was . . . born of . . . Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead, and buried."

The other statements about the manner of our Lord's birth and death are merely consistent with the transcendent position assigned to Him in the consciousness of the Church. Leaving out of consideration the tremendous assumption that there is a "God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth," nothing could be more *contra naturam* to the materialist than the notion that a man who died about 1900 years ago should be now present everywhere, all-knowing, all-powerful. This is a part of what we Christians believe about Jesus Christ. Our beliefs about Him affect our

beliefs about everything else ; and the Christian theory as to the manner of this Divine Person's entrance into the world of sense, and the manner of His exit from it, is eminently reasonable in view of the Christian estimate of Him. If you assume the tremendous miracle of a revelation given by God to man, the ordinary intelligence demands consistency all through.

The very notion of an incarnation of God in man, as distinct from the inspiration of a particular man, involves a real yet mysterious fusion of the human and divine, expressed in a bodily transaction, since we are in bodies ourselves.

Any man who is known or believed to be the son of a human father and mother, and whose dead body is known to have undergone the natural process of decay, could not be to his fellows more than a divinely inspired man ; he could not be thought of as a unique incarnation of the Supreme. Certainly no one could *begin* to believe in him as God Incarnate.

In the case of Jesus Christ, His [resurrection was the passing of the human into the sphere of the divine. The proof of this fact, this act of transition, as a fact that took place at a definite point of time, comes of necessity before the acceptance of a statement regarding His conception, which was the passing of the divine into the sphere of the human. And so St. Paul says that Jesus Christ was " declared to be the Son of God . . . by the resurrection of the dead."

But, of course, none of these matters can stand at the judgment bar of merely intellectual criteria. But human intelligence is not the judge of all things. The intellect is only a part of man's nature ; religion makes its appeal to a judgment of the whole man, his whole nature, moral and spiritual, as well as intellectual. And we have in this present crisis one more exemplification of the profound and

reassuring words of the apostle : " The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God : for they are foolishness unto him ; and he cannot know them, because they are spiritually judged."

NEWPORT J. D. WHITE.

*A NEW DOCUMENT ON CLEMENT OF ROME,
HIS RELATIONS AND HIS INTERVIEW WITH
SIMON PETER.*

I.

FOREWORD.

THE original manuscript containing the life of Clement the Doctor, or Clement of Rome, printed in this article, is preserved at Mardin, in the monastery of Deiruz-Za'faran, the ordinary residence of the Monophysite Patriarch of Antioch. This Syriac manuscript is in parchment, with Estrangelo letters ; and since it is unfortunately truncated at the end it has no date ; its general title is *Book of Lives of Saints*. By some of its palæographical characteristics, we are able to ascribe it to the tenth or at latest the eleventh century. It is in a generally bad condition of preservation, and the Syriac scholar is reduced to a guess about some words that are utterly blotted out to-day.

We think that this document can claim a certain importance by its more or less accentuated affiliation with the Clementine *Recognitions* and *Homilies* ; on the other hand, the divergence of narration which distinguishes it from the Pseudo-Clementine writings is very often so important that it deserves the serious study of critics.

In reading all these pieces of Christian antiquity, and in comparing them with one another, we are puzzled to settle categorically the question as to which of them has got in its narration the more trustworthy historical thread, and