

# THE EXPOSITORY TIMES.

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## Notes of Recent Exposition.

MR. GLADSTONE'S articles in *Good Words* on the "Impregnable Rock of Holy Scripture" came to a close with the issue for November. The last is the most effective of them all. The attitude of defence hitherto most fully adopted, is not, we submit, the most successful either for Holy Scripture or for Mr. Gladstone. Content with defence, one runs the inevitable risk of conceding and conciliating till the rock either gets too narrow for foothold or too commonplace to be worth the struggle. But here Mr. Gladstone proceeds to the direct attack; and immediately the victory gets immensely more hopeful and more worth hoping for.

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Singling out Professor Huxley, "the Achilles of the opposing army," as the representative of the scientific agnostic, Mr. Gladstone proposes "to inquire pretty strictly whether the professors of science are sometimes apt to push their legitimate authority beyond their own bounds into provinces where it becomes an usurpation, and whether the weapons which they hurl are then always 'weapons of precision.'" (This phrase is Professor Huxley's own. In the *Nineteenth Century* for July 1890, Professor Huxley fluctuates between pity and a good-natured contempt for "the old-fashioned artillery of the churches" in contrast with "the weapons of precision" used by the advancing forces of science.) First, then, as to usurpation, "What right," he asks, "has Professor Huxley to close this question? The question whether the Creation story of Genesis describes solar days or not, is no more a scientific question

than whether Parliament should or should not meet in November, or whether Shakespeare wrote or did not write the whole of *Henry the Eighth*." There is heart and courage here, of another order than that of the forlorn hope. There is victory for us as well as for him. But to secure a victory, it is well to spike the enemy's guns. Accordingly, "I have now to ask," says Mr. Gladstone, "whether the weapons used by this most distinguished scientist are always 'weapons of precision.'" He chooses the narrative of the Deluge. The Mosaic account assigns a period of one hundred and fifty days (the Tablets give only seven) for the subsidence of the waters. Against this statement Mr. Huxley advances a *dictum*, of which the subject-matter is unquestionably scientific. He gives the length of the Mesopotamian plain at 300 to 400 miles, and the elevation of the higher end at 500 to 600 feet. Had this plain been so covered with water, says Mr. Huxley, a 'furious torrent' would have rushed downwards, and, instead of a hundred and fifty days, the plain generally would have been left bare in a very few hours. The case, says Mr. Gladstone, is one of elementary hydraulics, and he very properly adds that "if we may not ask from the scientific man that when he touches questions of the innermost feelings of believers, and of the highest destinies of man, he should be reverent, yet surely we are entitled to require of him that he should be circumspect; that he should take reasonable care to include in his survey of a case all elements which are obviously essential to a right judgment

upon it." Professor Huxley has not done so here. For a fall of 525 feet in 350 miles gives one foot and a half per mile, or a gradient of  $\frac{1}{3420}$ ; and Mr. Gladstone is informed by "an engineer, who is in charge of a portion of one of our rivers," that such a fall would probably produce a current of about two miles an hour. Thus to represent as a "furious torrent" what is in truth an extremely slow stream, is not to use a "weapon of precision," at least it will require all Professor Huxley's resources to show that it is.

Professor Huxley's gibe about "the Gadarene pig affair" does not prevent Mr. Gladstone from using the miracle at Gergesa as a further illustration of his contention that Mr. Huxley sometimes thrusts his weapon where it has no right to be, and that it is not always a true weapon he handles. Mr. Huxley observes that in the record of this miracle the evangelist has no "inkling of the legal and moral difficulties of the case;" that the devils entered into the swine "to the great loss and damage of the innocent Gerasene or Gadarene pig-owners;" and that "everything that I know of law and justice convinces me that the wanton destruction of other people's property is a misdemeanour of evil example." "So then," is Mr. Gladstone's reply (and here again we think he is at his best, though he afterwards discusses the legal and moral questions with skill and effect),—"so then, after eighteen centuries of worship offered to our Lord by the most cultivated, the most developed, and the most progressive portion of the human race, it has been reserved to a scientific inquirer to discover that He was no better than a law-breaker and an evil-doer. It is sometimes said that the greatest discoveries are the most simple. And this, if really a discovery, is the simplest of them all. So simple that he who runs may read, for it lies on the very surface of the page. The ordinary reader can only put the wondering question, How, in such a matter, came the honours of originality to be reserved to our time and to Professor Huxley?"

Further on in this important article, Mr. Gladstone states a conviction which, as he says, it is difficult to express in an unexceptionable manner, but which, nevertheless, really stands in no need

of apology, for thinking men everywhere admit the truth of it, and it is a commonplace in theology. It is that the cause, "the main operative cause," of negation or scepticism is not intellectual but moral. Mr. Gladstone does not mean that the elevation of moral character in individuals varies with and according to the amount of their dogmatic belief. Such a statement would certainly be "Pharisaical in the worse sense of the word." What he does mean is, that negation or scepticism is essentially the choice of things seen in preference to things unseen,—a scriptural statement,—and that is manifestly a moral and not an intellectual choice. To make a modern and individual application of the principle may be dangerous in the extreme (though one cannot forget a recent intensely painful admission on this head), but we may recall the very striking instance recorded by St. John (xi. 47-53) of Caiaphas and the Jewish Sanhedrin. With them the choice lay between the reality of the claims of Jesus, claims which penetrated into the unseen and had their validity there, and their own present authority, their seen and felt prosperity and comfort. Whereupon Caiaphas uttered his one true oracle, choosing for himself and the rulers (though the word he used was "the people") the seen rather than the unseen; and in so doing he made a moral, and in no sense an intellectual, choice. Indeed, the intellect was all on the side of Jesus and His claims. "This man doeth many signs"—it was not denied, it was the occasion of their assembling, it was the argument that made Christ's death an urgent necessity. It is an instance in which the immorality of the negation is clear and crushing. In modern life it is not always so clear and crushing, but it is true now, for it is true always and everywhere that faith—watch the word, it is not *belief*, a word which the Scriptures scarcely know—has no relation to the accumulation of proofs which appeal to the intellect; it is true now, for it is true always and everywhere, that after rejecting the evidence of the "signs," including the resurrection from the dead, we can be inconsistent enough to cry, "If He be the Christ, let Him come down from the Cross and we will believe Him;" it is true now that if we believe not Moses and the prophets neither will we be persuaded though one rose from the dead.

Mr. Gladstone's introduction of the "engineer" recalls the paper of the Dean of Armagh, read at the recent Church Congress. To Dr. Chadwick it is the weapons of the Higher Critics that are not "weapons of precision"; and he too, like Mr. Gladstone, seeks the aid of an expert. The point being one of military engineering, Lord Wolseley is the authority chosen, who sends "a calculation in detail with a diagram." The point is Kuenen's objection to the narrative of the fall of Jericho, that "it is utterly impossible that Israel's fighting men, 600,000 in number, could have marched round the city for six consecutive days, and on the seventh day even seven times." Dr. Chadwick's answer is that 600,000 is the aggregate given in Num. v. 46, not of the warriors but of the whole number capable of bearing arms. Comparing Num. xxii. 21 with Josh. iv. 12, he shows that the two tribes and a half had 108,000 armed males, yet they entered Palestine only 40,000 strong. A like proportion would give not 600,000 but 222,000 men to march round Jericho; and Lord Wolseley proves that, apart from special difficulties of ground, an army of 300,000 men or more, moving in three columns, "might easily encompass" an eastern town as stated.

Dr. Chadwick's paper formed one of a most interesting series of papers and speeches at the Congress on the Inspiration of Scripture and its relation to Modern Criticism. Another was by Canon Tristram, who chose as his special subject the testimony of recent Monumental Discovery to the truth of the Old Testament. It is a subject full of interest and importance, especially in respect of its bearing upon the methods and results of the Higher Criticism. Professor Sayce, who has just gone to spend the winter in the East, will contribute one or more papers upon this subject to THE EXPOSITORY TIMES. They will be more valuable from being written in the very presence of the monuments, whose secrets Professor Sayce has done so much to reveal.

It is often said that the problems of the Higher Criticism of the Old Testament belong to experts in Hebrew scholarship, on the ground that they can be decided only by an examination of the language of the various books "in its original

form." But it is not so. No one can read either Kuenen's *Religion of Israel* or Wellhausen's *History of Israel* without perceiving that the points most fully relied upon are such as any person who possesses a fairly accurate translation of the Hebrew, such as the Revised Version, may fully appreciate. Indeed, it is increasingly felt that the form of the language is that upon which the least confidence of all must be placed, and that for the simple reason that "in its *original* form" it can no longer be seen. This was put with clearness and force at the Church Congress by Dr. Rawson Lumby, Norrisian Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, in a speech which, unfortunately, has been far too much condensed in the reporting. That we do not possess the Book of Genesis in the very language in which it was written—not to speak of the earlier documents which were incorporated into it—he showed to be more than probable, from the fact that the written characters were certainly not the same as those in which the Books of the Old Testament have come down to us; and from the still more significant fact that one Hebrew grammar serves to instruct a person in the language (with a few remarkable exceptions) from Genesis to Chronicles. It is perfectly possible, therefore, he said, that after the Captivity the books were transcribed throughout, and the phraseology and forms of the words altered and made very much alike, and that without impairing the truth of the records themselves. He holds, therefore, that the Higher Criticism must rely upon other evidence than that of language, for, though the Book of Deuteronomy can be shown to have a phraseology which corresponds with the time of Jeremiah, there are other differences which, in his judgment, mark it as the composition of a time far anterior to that of Jeremiah. Thus, in the literature of the Psalms and the Prophets, there are anticipations of a future state and references to rewards to be given elsewhere than in this world: in the Book of Deuteronomy there is an absence of all such reference, which shows that it belongs to a time when this revelation had not yet been made.

It is with sorrow we notice the death of Mr. James Fyfe, of Bradford, the author of the recently issued and really valuable book, *The Hereafter*. Three

important and appreciative reviews of the work come to hand together,—one in the *Church Quarterly Review*, one in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, and one in the *Theological Monthly*. The second of these reviews, though it makes a mistake when it describes Mr. Fyfe as a British clergyman, gives an admirable conspectus of the work in a single sentence: "Its general aim is, first of all, to bring out into full view the entire teaching of Scripture in regard to the eternal world, and then to discuss in the light thus furnished by Revelation the several problems of annihilation, of conditional immortality, of restorationism, and of eternal retribution."

But the notice to which we wish specially to refer is that of the *Church Quarterly*. Here a criticism is made which, if true, involves us in a doctrine, of which it is not enough to say that there is a "long-standing Protestant prejudice" against it. We believe there is a Christian objection to it of longer standing; and a scriptural repudiation of it that goes back to the very beginning. It is the doctrine of Purgatory. The criticism arises over the word *Sheol* (שְׁאוֹל), the Hebrew word which corresponds with the Greek word *Hades* (αἵδης). Both are translated sometimes "hell" and sometimes "grave," and in the Revised Version they have been frequently left untranslated, simply transliterated. Mr. Fyfe holds that, in so far as *Sheol* is the place of the departed righteous, it is identical with the heaven where God reigns. "Such an idea," says the *Church Quarterly* reviewer, "was contrary to all Bible notions, *Sheol* being the under world, whereas the heaven where God reigns is the upper world." The fundamental notion in the Jewish mind was, he says, deliverance from *Sheol*—"Thou wilt not leave my soul in *Sheol*"; and the doctrine of the resurrection was nothing else but the doctrine of this deliverance. *Sheol*, therefore, is the intermediate state—in one word, *Purgatory*. And if we are to get rid of the great stumbling-block to eternal punishment, which, he says, is not its eternity, but its immediacy, the doctrine that heaven and hell are the immediate issues of this life, we must return to "the primitive doctrine of Hades, or the intermediate state with all its possibilities."

Primitive or not, if the doctrine of Purgatory is a scriptural doctrine we *must* return to it, and we cannot return too soon. But what is the proof? We find here these two—(1) That the devout Hebrew pleaded that his soul might not be left in *Sheol*; and (2) that Christ went down to *Sheol* at His death, from whence he returned at His resurrection on the third day, and it was forty days before He ascended into heaven. As for this second proof: What, then, is the meaning of Christ's words to the penitent robber, "*To-day* shalt thou be with me in Paradise?" But we believe both "proofs" are fully met by the simple statement that it is the believer's *body* that finds its place in *Sheol*, while the spirit goes direct "to God who gave it." Numerous are the passages which at once yield this result, a result which alone agrees with the Apostle's desire "rather to be absent from the body and to be present with the Lord." But it is of more importance to notice one which seems to contradict it; that is to say, the Psalmist's words, "Thou wilt not leave my *soul* in *Sheol*" (Ps. xvi. 10).

The best discussion of the doctrine of *Sheol* which we have seen is by Professor Shedd, of New York, in a small book entitled *The Doctrine of Endless Punishment* (Nisbet, 1886, 5s.). There an important note may be found on this passage, of which the main points are these:—First, the Hebrew word *nephesh* (נֶפֶשׁ) translated here "soul"—"Thou wilt not leave my soul in *Sheol*"—is sometimes used of the *body* of a dead man. It is so used in Num. vi. 6, "He shall come at no dead body (נֶפֶשׁ מֵת)," and in several other places. Again, the word *Sheol* frequently signifies no more than the "grave" where the dead body is laid, without regard to retribution or reward. Thus, "Ye shall bring down my gray hairs with sorrow to the grave" (Gen. xlii. 38). Of the former of these two positions, there can be no question; an examination of scriptural usage puts it beyond doubt; and it is not confined to Scripture. Says Augustine: "That, under the name of *soul*, the body only should be meant, is in accordance with a style of speaking which designates the thing containing by the name of the thing contained." In English we say that "a hundred souls were lost when the ship went down," by an exactly parallel metonymy. As to

the second position, it is objected that Sheol cannot mean the grave simply, since there is another word for grave—namely, *keber* (קֶבֶר). But the meanings are quite distinct. As Professor Shedd says, *Sheol* is the grave in its abstract and general sense, while *keber* is concrete and particular. *Keber* is the individual tomb or sepulchre. Moses is in the grave, but “no man knoweth of his sepulchre unto this day.”

Thus when the Psalmist pleaded, “Thou wilt not leave my soul in Sheol,” it is open for us to translate his words, “Thou wilt not leave my body in the grave,” and fix his meaning accordingly.

And that that *was* his meaning we surely have the authority of the New Testament; for it does not seem that St. Peter’s quotation and application of the words can be explained in any other way.

This, it will be remembered, is the historical proof of the resurrection of Jesus with which St. Peter closes his great Pentecostal address (Acts ii. 25–31). Premising that what has been said of *Sheol* and *nephesh* is also true of their Greek equivalents, *Hades* and *psyché*, we perceive that St. Peter regards the words “Thou wilt not leave my soul in Hades” as only another way of saying “Thou wilt not suffer my flesh to see corruption,” according to the well-known rule of Hebrew parallelism. That David could not have used these words of himself, the Apostle proves by the fact that David having died and been buried, “his sepulchre is with us unto this day.” David spoke of a resurrection,—there is no resurrection of the *soul*,—but obviously he did not speak of his own body’s resurrection; at least, in the first instance. No; “being a prophet,” he “spoke of the resurrection of Christ, that *His* body was not left in the grave, neither did *His* flesh see corruption.”

Which is the best modern book on Preaching? In reference to the note upon Dr. Behrends’ Yale Lectures in our last issue, a communication has been received from the Rev. T. S. Dickson, M.A., Edinburgh, whose knowledge of American books is very full and accurate. The most *original* course in the Yale Series, he says, was by Dr. Burton (Horace Bushnell’s successor), published, with other matter posthumously, in 1888, and not reprinted in this country: a delightfully suggestive book. Our own experience is that as much enjoyment and stimulus could be had from Dr. Phillips Brooks’ Lectures as from any; while for solid

instruction Dr. R. W. Dale’s “Nine Lectures” certainly take a very high place. But the subject is an important one, and we should be glad of some well-informed judgments. Meantime, it is with the greatest pleasure we direct attention to the re-issue, revised and enlarged, of Bishop Dupanloup’s volume (*The Ministry of Preaching: An Essay on Pastoral and Popular Oratory*, by Mgr. Félix Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans. Translated by S. J. Eales, D.C.L. London: Griffith & Farran, 1890, 3s. 6d.). A full review of the book has recently appeared in the *Methodist Times* (Nos. 305, 306), by a well-known authority on books, Professor Banks, of Headingley College. We cannot review it fully here. But we may record our own impressions in a few sentences. The Preface is the raciest thing in the book, and the best defence of popular (the word is well guarded) preaching we have met with. The Lectures deal with their subject in four divisions: The pastoral message, says the author, should be before all things a *living* message; then the pastoral message should be an *instructive* message; thirdly, an *apologetic* message; and fourthly, an *edifying* message. As a sermon to sermon-makers, the second is itself a most instructive message; but the great preacher seems most at home when delivering the “word of exhortation,” as he afterwards names the fourth division of his subject.

What meaning did the Revisers intend to convey when they translated Gal. ii. 16, “Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, *save* through faith in Jesus Christ?” Did they purposely admit what has been called “a mixed justification by faith and works?” Dr. Perowne, in an appendix to his *Galatians* (elsewhere noticed), holds that, if words have any meaning, that is what their translation teaches; for it must be remembered that their Version is a *correction* of the Authorised, which has “but by the faith,” an expression which clearly enough excludes works. There is no doubt the phrase in question (ἐὰν μὴ) always means “except” or “save.” But to give it that translation here, and bring out the Apostle’s meaning, it would be necessary, with Lightfoot, to repeat the verb; “He is not justified from works of law, he is not justified *except* through faith.” If that was not open to the Revisers, they ought surely to have left the exclusive word “but” of the A.V., or even strengthened it by “only”—*but only*, which Dr. Perowne adopts. The alternative before them was grammar or sense, and they chose grammar.