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Literature.

PHILOSOPHY.

The preacher had better not be a philosopher. But he had better know what philosophy is. How is he to know? A simple, safe, and sufficient way is by reading Professor J. S. Mackenzie's new book entitled *Elements of Constructive Philosophy* (Allen & Unwin; 12s. 6d. net).

It is simple. Professor Mackenzie has no love for the abstract or the abstruse, his love is all for clearness of thought and concreteness of language. If he does not deliberately discard metaphysical phraseology, it must be because he is not in the habit of using it. No doubt he is not quite so simple as he seems to be. For he knows that philosophy can never become a popular pastime. He even knows that he himself knows very little about the problems that it deals with. The simplicity of the superficial is none of his. He is simple because he lets us look straight into the blue, and does not fill the air with unconsumed smoke of his own.

The book is safe. What is that? That means scholarship. It is knowledge of what is unknown (as has already been said) as well as what is known. In particular it is accurate up-to-date knowledge of what is known. Professor Mackenzie is a thinker; he is also a reader. And if he has not fitted out his pages with imposing footnotes, he has verified his references all right. The book has cost him much that does not appear on the surface of it. Like Matthew Arnold, his grey hair is within.

The book is sufficient. In its less than five hundred pages is all that the educated man who is not a special student of philosophy—the preacher, say—needs to know or is likely to care to know. The arrangement is methodical; the style is crisp and conclusive.

And now, as example, take this on 'The Significance of the Individual Life.'—'The individual who recognizes himself as a member of such a spiritual unity has to be thought of in a somewhat different way from the individual who is simply conscious of himself as a member of a group or as a self-assertive personality. Plato's *Republic*, inspiring as in many respects it is, has the fatal defect that the individual citizens are regarded in it as little more than means to the life of the whole. Each citizen is to have a special function in the life of the State, and is to be trained simply for the fulfilment of that function. When he is, for any considerable time, incapacitated for this, he is to be ruthlessly cast aside. He is a wheel in a great mechanism, and has no value, apart from that. This view is adopted by Plato in opposition to what he conceives as the democratic view, the view of Liberty and Equality—*i.e.* the view of individual self-assertion, limited only by the self-assertion of others. Against this assertion of individual rights, Plato urges that the only real right of the individual is his right to the position for which he is fitted in the life of the whole. What is *due* to him is simply his *duty*. He is entitled to secure the place in which he can exercise his special function to the best advantage, and to the education and instruments that are required for the proper discharge of that function. Similar views have been taken by more recent opponents of democracy, such as Carlyle and Ruskin; and perhaps the organization of modern Germany may be taken as the nearest approximation to the subordination of the individual to the life of the whole. Now, it may be conceded that the only right of the individual is to be allowed to perform his duty; but what Plato and others seem not to have sufficiently recognized is, that, in order to do his duty properly, he must be free to choose it and able to see that it is his duty. He must learn to realize, at least in some degree, that the life of the whole to which he belongs is his own life. In the case of the rulers Plato recognizes this; but not for the citizens in general. No doubt, even in our modern democracies, it is difficult to realize such an ideal, even in an approximate way. Perhaps it cannot be adequately realized without considerable modification in many of our institutions and modes of government. But it is at least more and more recognized that it is only by some tolerable realization of it that a properly human life can be secured.'

THE PEACE.

Mr. William Harbutt Dawson discusses *Problems of the Peace* with knowledge and courage (Allen & Unwin; 7s. 6d. net). Take the problem of Alsace-

Lorraine. He does not see how the whole double province can be restored to France, both because Germany would suffer economically so seriously, and also because the Alsace of to-day is so different from the Alsace of 1871. His conclusion is: 'Given her adversary's defeat, it will be for France to say the decisive word. Whether, in the event of that word implying the rejection of compromise on any terms, France will expect the armed guarantee of her present Allies in supporting it, how far such a guarantee could be given, and what would be the extent of the liabilities thereby involved—these are questions which it may well be premature to discuss, though it is not even now too soon to think about them.'

Again, on the question of the German colonies, he says: 'To withhold colonies from Germany, great as our resentment against her may be, would be a petty act of retaliation which might be pregnant with large and disastrous results. It would be to tell her that henceforth she cannot be allowed to colonize except by permission of Great Britain. That would be a declaration of war against the German nation and its national aspirations. Are we prepared to face the consequences, and is the gain to be derived from such an attitude worth the risk? On the other hand, a policy of moderation and conciliation upon this question would justify itself abundantly: the history of the relationships of the British race to other nations has proved this a hundred times in the past, and will prove it a hundred times in the future.'

There is much more in the book which will be quite unacceptable to the average Englishman and quite offensive to the militarist in our midst. But nothing is set down hastily or of partiality. And it is assuredly our bounden duty to look all round every one of the Problems of the Peace.

THE WORLD AS IMAGINATION.

The question is (not *Who*, because we must not postulate a God yet, but), What is it that has made the world? We may use the word 'made,' but we must not use it in the sense of created. What is at the back of it? as the American would say. Perhaps we had better speak as yet of the 'Ground' of the world.

'Now the Ground cannot, of course, be regarded as Will. Will is altogether too thin an abstraction, even were there not other and insuperable objections to this line of thinking. And there are those who may urge that it is idle to liken the Ground to any aspect of the processes of our psychical life. But if we are inclined to trace a resemblance between the Ground and human mentality, we shall do well, perhaps, to conceive the former as Imagination. For note that from Imagination it seems practicable to derive all appearances, while if you try to "deduce" anything (*e.g.* Krug's famous pen) effectively from Reason or Will, or from a unity of a Logical Idea and Will, and the like, you fail utterly. Thus when Schelling discussed Nature as unconscious "immature intelligence"—there being supposed a giant cosmic reason which lies petrified in objective being—he was on a wrong tack. For the processes, which are named, and too often hypostasised as "intelligence," imply a highly selective attention and are far removed from that concreteness which Nature presents. But if Nature be viewed as a phase of the ever-changing cosmic imagination—why, then, you have all its living detail, storm, and stir fully provided for! Real Nature is not the ridiculous phantom of "extensions," "resistances," and "energies" so dear to scientific fiction. It is not simple but indefinitely complex, and it is aglow with the so-called "secondary" qualities. We need to seek patiently for the secrets of the inmost shrine, but we are sure that Cosmic Imagination can house all possible detail however complex.'

So the existence of the world—its first start and all its steps of evolutionary progress until now—is due to the (or should we say *a*?) Cosmic Imagination. Mr. Edward Douglas Fawcett says so. His book is *The World as Imagination* (Macmillan; 15s. net), and an extremely clear, clever, and convincing book it is. Yes, convincing. For there is nothing to hinder you from calling the God you believe in 'Cosmic Imagination.' The title is as good as 'Omnipresent Will,' 'Omniscient Intellect,' or any similar phraseology. Mr. Fawcett himself is half inclined to call it God. 'Many men,' he says, 'would not regard the Cosmic Imagination as satisfying the heart's desire. And their point of view cannot be ignored by us. The C.I. is indispensable for *metaphysics*—agreed. It is the all-sufficient infinite ground of appearance and of all that therein is. But what these men want, for the purposes of religion, is not the all-inclusive infinite ground, *but a limited Power supreme in their particular World-System*; a Power very wise, very

beneficent, and very active that can be looked upon as their "Father in heaven."' He is quite willing to give them that. And they may be content. As for himself, Mr. Fawcett wants a greater God, a God not of this world only but of the Universe. Let Him go find such a God. We are content with the God and Father and our Lord Jesus Christ, a God who has attributes we can appeal to. Perhaps when we pass out of 'this world-system' we shall discover that He is the God of the whole Universe. We believe that we shall.

Meantime it is satisfactory to see that Mr. Fawcett's ground is not indifferent to good and evil. There is a struggle and we must keep it up. 'The story of creation is not that of a magical production of perfection out of the void. *It is one of the slow overcoming of the "fundamental evil" of the Metaphysical Fall;* an evil which is to be altered, and altered as far on the way to perfection as conditions allow. On these lines we can understand why Nature may be at once unsatisfactory and yet the best possible Nature of its sort. Given the "fundamental evil," nothing better, perhaps, could have been accomplished than what actually has been done. Do you ask why the "fundamental *evil*" itself occurred? Our reply has been given in advance; but may be put in a new way. The very "evil," implied by the genesis of a plurality of sentients, will become a "good" in the Divine Event consummating the world-process. There is no way, save through initial conflicts, to perfection. If this be so, it remains for the creative process to turn *the conflicts themselves* to the best possible account. And this, so far as my poor judgment avails, is what comes to pass.'

CROCE.

The Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce is clearly a force to be reckoned with. He is a personality. His activity is tremendous. Philosophy is only a part of it. 'Literary criticism and general historical research seem to have drawn him to this field. The amount of editorial work he finds time to do is extraordinary, and bears witness to a mind overflowing with activity. He is editor of *La Critica*, a "Review of Literature, History, and Philosophy," published every two months, every number of which contains considerable contributions from his own pen. He has edited a series of translations into Italian of the classical authors of modern philosophy, and he has himself translated Hegel's *Encyclopaedia* for the series. He has also searched out and published and reanimated valuable works of authors and philosophers which had become buried in museums and public libraries. Notably he has revived the study of two great but neglected Italian philosophers, Giovanni Battista Vico (1668–1744) and the Neapolitan patriot and literary critic, Francesco de Sanctis (1817–83).'

He is a force to be reckoned with in this country. His works are being steadily translated into English, chiefly by Mr. Douglas Ainslie, and must be finding readers not a few. And now we have a competent account of *The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce*, by Dr. H. Wildon Carr (Macmillan; 7s. 6d. net). Croce's appeal is to a wider circle than the philosopher can generally reach, for it is his theory of art that has brought him most of his fame. 'More than any other of his doctrines it marks out an original direction. The theory has now taken a permanent place among rival theories of art, and is named in the text-books "The Expressionist Theory." Its characteristic doctrine is that beauty is expression.'

And he is especially a force to be reckoned with by the Church. For he does not believe in the Church. More than that he does not believe in theology. More than that he does not believe in religion. Why does he not believe in religion? Because religion as he understands it is a philosophy of history, and that is a 'false idea, involving a false concept of history and a false concept of philosophy. The fundamental idea which underlies it is that the course of secular events is not an intrinsic and objective development, but a development overruled by final causes, which are not immanent in the history but the manifestation of a mind transcending history. Philosophy of history is found in ancient as well as in modern philosophy, but in Christianity it became a perfected body of doctrine. Its purest philosophical form we find in St. Augustine, in the concept of the *Civitas Dei* struggling against *Civitas terrena* or *Civitas Diaboli*. The whole content of Christianity is a philosophy of history. The birth of Jesus Christ is for Christianity the central historical fact towards which all previous events from the creation of man are seen to converge, and from which all subsequent

events derive their only true meaning. And this Christian conception has dominated philosophy and identified itself with philosophy throughout the long period which divides the modern from the ancient thought.'

Dr. Carr thinks that the only answer is to be found in Christian mysticism—but he doubts if even that answer will stand.

So Croce has to be reckoned with.

KNOWLEDGE.

Mr. James Gibson, Professor of Logic and Philosophy in the University College of North Wales, and late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, has published a study of *Locke's Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations* (Cambridge: At the University Press; 10s. 6d. net). He is engaged, he tells us, on a new edition of the Essay, and this was meant to be its introduction. But its length and importance have induced him to issue the study of the Theory of Knowledge separately. Thus we may have the introduction without the edition. But this study will assure the acceptance of the edition.

It is a study of Locke's Theory of Knowledge; it is also a study of historical relations. That is to say, we study with the author the theory itself, and then we study the sources of the theory and its circumstances. The first part (the theory) is the more useful for the man who has to 'get up' Locke's Essay for examination. The second part (the historical connexion) is the most original and interesting. Very clearly does Professor Gibson summarize the theory, as a whole and in its parts; a single paragraph will prove it. But for the lover of Locke and of philosophy there is fine pasturing in the chapters which discover the relation of Locke to scholasticism, to Descartes, to contemporary English Philosophy, to Leibnitz, and to Kant.

This is the promised paragraph: 'We must turn, then, to the consideration of infinity in the only sense in which it can be exhibited as the content of a definite idea. Starting with the idea of a numerical unit, or with the idea of any finite distance in space, or period of duration, we can, as we have seen, "repeat" the idea, and produce the idea of a larger whole of the kind in question by "adding" these repetitions together. Now, not only is this process never brought to an end by the intrinsic nature of that with which it deals, but however far it has been carried, one finds, "he has no more reason to stop, nor is one jot nearer the end of such addition than he was at first setting out." Further, we are not only unable to find, but we are unable to conceive such an end. We are thus led to form ideas of the number series, of space, and of duration, as endless or infinite. In the same way, if, instead of "repeating" and "adding" our units, we regard our initial quantities as divisible into parts, we are led to recognise that the process of mentally dividing a given extension or duration is also one to which there can be no limit. We thus form an idea of the infinite divisibility of space and duration.'

THE MIDDLE AGES.

How many gifts and graces must the man possess who writes a book on *Religious Thought and Heresy in the Middle Ages* (Scott; 21s. net)? The Rev. F. W. Bussell, D.D., Fellow and sometime Vice-Principal of Brasenose College, Oxford, has them all. And the book which he has written—an octavo of 880 pages—is a product of learning, discernment, perseverance, and faith, of which he may justly be proud. It would have been easy enough to write even as large a work as this, if it had been reckoned enough to collect books and copy them. Dr. Bussell has read widely, of course—for his survey takes in Hindustan and the Religions of Further Asia, Islam, Greek Thought and Chaldeism, the Nearer East and Christianity—but he seems to have incorporated nothing into his book of all his reading without making it his own, giving it the stamp of his own mind and his own felicity of expression.

The book is much occupied with heresy. Let those who have studied the sects and heresies of even one of the great religions answer: Did you ever find any study more trying to the temper? Dr. Bussell works his way unruffled through the sects of every one of the great religions, and that, too, in the Middle Ages, when they were so many.

Moreover, there are perpetually recurring problems of philosophy to deal with. There also Dr. Bussell is at home. Let us see what he says, for example, about the great nominalism *versus* realism controversy. 'This subject,' he says, 'demands the closest attention not because of its verbal dialectic but for its underlying meaning.

The *realist* is the extreme authoritarian who can only conceive the *whole* as prior to the *part*, *State* to *citizen*, and *Church* to *believer*. The *nominalist* is anxious to justify and account for the severally existing instances of a type. Pushed by the needs of controversy and inexorable logic he will insist that the *part* is of course prior to the *whole*, which comes only gradually into being (like the "heap" in *sorites*), built up slowly by the aggregation of atoms one by one: at what exact point it becomes a mystical unity rather than a mere "group-name" it is not easy to decide. It is again the assent of the concourse of citizens that gives State and officials their corporate capacity. There is no "divine right" to start with, in an *individual* or a *collective* centre; but the members of a community "pool" their fragments of natural right or actual power and so create an artificial and resoluble State by "social contract." Once again (say the nominalists) it is the holiness of believers that makes a church holy; it is holy only by the actual sum of their collective holiness: it is not the church that makes the members holy.[1] What is the aim of the Christian message? to establish a church or a visible kingdom of God because of the intrinsic value and beauty of such a type or species? or to meet the needs of individuals and bring redemption and salvation within their reach? In the end we shall see that the "Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath." It was the *nominalist* principle that at last won the day; and it is not without suggestiveness that Alliacus and Gerson, the mystics, hold this doctrine and prefer the *part* to the *whole*.'

There is a footnote: [1] 'On this distinction perhaps the whole of Church History will be found to turn: St. Paul (Eph. iv. 16) has a very peculiar sentence which might well form the *nominalist* text: "The whole body, fitly joined together and compacted by that which *every joint* supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase." But even this passage, and many others in St. Paul, bears no less witness to the *realist* argument.'

It is a remarkable book. The days of the great treatises are not over. It will live.

WESSEL GANSFORT.

Ullmann gives the first place in his history of the Reformers who went before the Reformation to Wessel Gansfort. And Ullmann's *Reformers before the Reformation* was translated into English. There are also articles in English in the Schaff-Herzog and Catholic Encyclopædias. After that you must come to two handsome volumes, just published, which contain a well-written biography and a translation of the three most important of Wessel's extant writings. The title is *Wessel Gansfort:* Life and Writings by Edward Waite Miller, D.D. Principal Works translated by Jared Waterbury Scudder, M.A. (Putnams; 16s. net).

Wessel Gansfort came from Groningen, in the Netherlands. He was educated at Zwolle, Cologne, Louvain, and Paris. He taught at Paris and Heidelberg. He returned to Groningen to write the books which have survived and to die.

His mind was moulded by the Brethren of the Common Life, and by Thomas à Kempis. 'Thomas had himself been brought up in a school of the Brethren at Deventer; he had deeply imbibed their principles of devotion, and had become skilled in the transcription of the Bible and other books of religion. Later he had entered the Augustinian monastery at Mount Saint Agnes, where he took priestly orders, and was made canon. He had come to distinction as a writer and as a man of unusual wisdom and piety, and his counsel was much sought by young men outside his order. It was not strange that a serious youth such as Wessel should have sought the acquaintance and instruction of Thomas, especially as his monastery was less than two miles from Zwolle, and that something like friendship should have grown up between this saint of sixty years and this eager student of twenty. And Wessel had some influence on Thomas.' As a consequence of Wessel's expressed dissent from certain statements in *The Imitation of Christ*, which to his more practical and critical mind seemed objectionable, Thomas so revised them that the book when published showed 'fewer traces of human superstition.'

When Wessel went to Paris—the greatest theological school in the world—the controversy was at its keenest between the Realists and the Nominalists. 'It was more than an academic contention, it had important practical bearing in the realm of dogmatics; just as the evolutionary hypothesis, which relates primarily to biology, has profoundly affected the theological thinking

of our generation. The doctrines most involved in the scholastic controversy were those relating to Anthropology and to the Nature of God. If the Realists were right, and the thing that we call "Man" has distinct existence apart from men, then we can reason about the effect of Man's Fall in Eden, and frame a doctrine of original sin, and the conditions of its remedy. But if the term refers only to a mental concept and not to an objective reality, then the doctrine of original sin hinted by Paul and elaborated by Augustine loses its philosophical support. And so with the doctrine of the Trinity. The Realists affirmed that the basal, the generic idea was that of Deity, in which the three persons participate as concrete expressions, individualizations of Deity. The Nominalists declared that this destroyed the distinct personality of Father and Son and Spirit, and was no better than Sabellianism. But the Realists replied that if there was no reality corresponding to the term, Deity, then the divine persons had no adequate ground of unity, and the result was practical Tritheism. A like antinomy arose in the doctrine of the Divine Attributes. When, for example, the Realist affirmed the objective existence of divine justice, the Nominalist replied that that was to separate God from His own attributes. But to the Nominalist contention that one should speak, not of the justice of God, but only of a just God, and a wise God, and so forth, the Realist objected that that was to imply as many Gods as there were divine qualities, which was nothing less than Polytheism.' Wessel went to Paris a Realist, he left it a convinced Nominalist.

He left Paris in the suite of Pope Sixtus IV. And when Sixtus asked what favour could be conferred upon him, 'I beg you,' said Wessel, 'to give me a Greek and a Hebrew Bible from the Vatican library.' 'These shall be given to you,' said Sixtus. 'But, you foolish man, why do you not ask for a bishopric or something similar!' Wessel answered: 'Because I do not need it.'

He died on October 4, 1489.

All the writings of Wessel that survive were apparently the product of his last years. One volume of 921 pages, published at Groningen in 1614, contains them all. It has seven divisions, as follows: 1. Concerning Prayer, with an Exposition of the Lord's Prayer. 2. Scala Meditationis, or the Training of Thought and Meditation. 3. Examples of the above dedicated to the monks of Mount Saint Agnes. 4. The Causes of the Incarnation, and the Magnitude of the Sufferings of our Lord. 5. The Sacrament of the Eucharist. 6. The Farrago, which has six sections or chapters. 7. The Letters. In this work we have an English translation of the Letters, the Treatise on the Eucharist, and the Farrago.

It is the Farrago that is likely to keep the name of Wessel Gansfort longest alive. It is a miscellany in which the author discusses Providence, the Incarnation and Passion, the Church, the Sacrament of Penance, the Communion of Saints, and Purgatory. As a specimen of his writing and the translation let us quote this passage from the section on the Providence of God. Its title is 'How Works of Art may be invested with Life.'

'In order that any artistic production may truly live, *i.e.* may properly represent vivifying art, it must be made the subject of reflection. For unless one discovers what the artist purposes to portray, the work of art is inert and dead. If an ape should happen to enter the workshop of a woodcarver, the axe, the pick, the plane, the saw, the hammer, the joint, the rule, the compasses would all be fruitless, barren, empty, and therefore dead things to him. And they would be equally so to a man of inert mind. In order to understand and enjoy what the workman purposed, one must give his work due reflection. Now the whole creation from its highest point to its lowest is the work of divine art. This is evident from the systematic and complete order that prevails in it, causing philosophers to observe that all things have been arranged in related forms (*species*) just as is the case with numbers. And a man is dull in so far as he does not perceive the purpose of the Supreme Artist in the world about him. Hence to a wise man the whole creation is an expression of the Divine Artist, demanding reflection, just as to an intelligent observer works of art are the expression of artists, requiring reflection. If, therefore, the inspection of a work of art does not reveal its purpose, it will not present a complete and inner image of itself, or reveal itself perfectly; hence it will not fully express its meaning.'

This work is published as the first and second Special Volumes in the Papers of the American Society of Church History. We congratulate the Society of Church History.

THE SUPERNATURAL IN FICTION.

Miss Dorothy Scarborough, Ph.D., Instructor in English in Extension, Columbia University, has made an extensive study of *The Supernatural in Modern English Fiction*; and under that title she has issued a large volume containing her conclusions (Putnams; $2.00). The number of novels which Dr. Scarborough has read is astounding. Has she read them for the fun of the thing or solely for this serious study? We do hope she found pleasure in her pursuit, for the profit of it is small. No doubt it had to be done; everything has to be done in the search for truth; and when a thing is ripe for the doing, it ought to be done thoroughly. But the writers of modern fiction have no sufficient sense of what the supernatural is to make a study of their work on it really profitable. For the most part they have only the humorous tolerance for it of the average ante-war, well-fed English citizen. The ghost story is its representative. At the best they use its crudities (and then the more crude the better) for the purpose of a sensation when the ordinary story-telling has become stale on their hands. A few have the horror-provoking gift, but even they, and the cleverest of them, seem to be harmless practitioners beside their great example, Edgar Allan Poe.

So it has not been a profitable pursuit. We are no wiser at the end. We have no more belief in the supernatural and we have no less. We simply learn the titles of a great multitude of modern novels, and marvel exceedingly that out of so many not one novel has risen above the commonplace, not one novelist has had a vision of the eternal and the true.

What is it that hinders the novelist from handling religion — supernatural religion — with power? The poet can do it. The greatest poetry of all is supernatural poetry—Dante, Milton, Shakespeare. And even so very modern a poet as Browning makes his most vivid and lasting impression by those poems or passages in which he has the vision of the unseen. Nay, we can say with some confidence that the best poetry of our day is supernatural—Francis Thompson, Katharine Tynan, John Masefield. But the fiction? Well, this service at least Dr. Dorothy Scarborough has done us: she has warned us that if we give much time to the reading of Modern English Fiction, we are labouring in vain and spending our intellectual strength for nought.

The Dawn of Mind is the title of a book by Margaret Drummond, M.A., Lecturer on Psychology in the Edinburgh Provincial Training College (Arnold; 3s. 6d. net). Who could write a dull book on the subject? Not Margaret Drummond. She has written a delightful book. Its examples are fresh and as funny as ever. And her ideas are as fresh, though not so funny, as her examples. She handles wisely that difficult and absurdly neglected subject the child's imagination. She concludes, also wisely, that its value in education depends on the food it is fed on. 'Of a little new-comer to one of the Edinburgh Free Kindergartens, the Kindergartner writes, "She is underfed and underclothed. Her favourite occupation is to play being 'junt' (drunk); which she does with horrible realism."'

Mr. Henry Maudsley, M.D., who was born in 1835, is still writing books. And his latest deals with Religion! Who is left now untouched by the war to this fine issue? There are many things in the book about morality. There are essays on Truth, Vanity, Virtue, and even English Style. But there is religion also. The title is no misnomer: *Religion and Realities* (Bale; 3s. 6d. net). It is true that Dr. Maudsley is not sure of much in religion yet. He is not sure if the prophets, for example, prophesied what they knew or only what they surmised, as they prophesied of the time when the lion should lie down with the lamb. But in some measure even Dr. Maudsley has at last 'got religion.'

To the 'Peeps at Many Lands' Series, the Rev. James Baikie, F.R.A.S., has added a volume on *Ancient Rome* (A. & C. Black; 2s. 6d. net). Its first attraction is the numerous illustrations it possesses, coloured and uncoloured, all well chosen and authentic. The reading follows at once, for Mr. Baikie can write for young people.

The Oxford Edition of *The Table Talk and Omniana of Samuel Taylor Coleridge* (Milford; 2s. 6d. net) is distinguished from other editions by the combination of correctness, convenience,

and cheapness, as well as by a prefatory note on Coleridge as a talker, by Coventry Patmore.

The Rev. H. T. Knight, M.A., has resolved that he at least will do what in him lies to make ready for demobilization. He edits a series of books with the title of 'The Church's Message for the Coming Time.' One of the series, written by the Rev. N. E. Egerton Swann, B.A., deals with *The Hebrew Prophets and the Church* (Milford; 2s. net; paper covers, 1s. 3d. net). Our chief aim must be adaptation; this book shows us the way. The new time is not going to cast away the Old Testament; but it is going to read the Old Testament with new eyes. And when 'adapted,' as Mr. Swann adapts it, how pertinent is the message of the prophets to the social problems of our day, how searching even for the heart and conscience of employers and employed.

The Herbert Spencer Lecturer for last year was Dr. Emile Boutroux. He delivered his lecture at Oxford in October. It is now published with the title *The Relation between Thought and Action from the German and from the Classical Point of View* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press; 2s. net). It will be quoted by the future commentator on Hamlet—perhaps some day even by the laborious German commentator—and this paragraph will not be missed: 'Neither Thought, nor Action, nor Feeling can be held self-sufficient or absolutely pre-eminent within the human soul. As the development of Thought and Action implies the intervention of Feeling, so Feeling itself develops, grows higher, nobler, more definite, rich and spiritual, under the influence of Action and Thought. In an ideal life, Thought, Action, and Feeling would be at the same time first principles all three, yet each of them yielding to the penetration of the others. So that their relation would be one of reciprocity and harmony, not of lineal derivation one from the other.'

The critical attitude to the Book of Daniel is taken and admirably defended by the Rev. Edwyn B. Hooper, M.A., in a book entitled *Daniel and the Maccabees* (C. W. Daniel; 2s. net). There is no better brief introduction in English.

A pretty little book of *Prayers* is issued by Messrs. Gowans & Gray. The initials on the title page are J. R. C. Will Dr. J. Robertson Cameron pardon us for writing the name in full? For the Prayers are worthy—war prayers with the sorrow very near, but always a sorrow that is already turned into joy. This is the doing of true faith in God, and it is wondrous in our eyes.

A selection has been made from John Wilhelm Rowntree's 'Essays and Addresses,' and has been published under the title of *Man's Relation to God* (Headley; 1s. 6d. net). Dr. Rufus M. Jones has written an Introduction to the book, and S. Elizabeth Robson has added a biography by recasting and combining the two short biographies already issued. It is more than another book. It is the offering of the hand of a most helpful, original, and loyal friend.

How it strikes a stranger may be seen by reading Enrique Gomez Carrillo's book *In the Heart of the Tragedy* (Hodder & Stoughton; 2s. 6d. net). He awakes every morning to some new surprise at the British soldier. And not only does he tell good stories about him, he also draws an amusing character sketch of him.

He says: 'As with individuals, so with peoples—virtues are ineradicable. The English of to-day, as far as fair play is concerned, are the equals of the English of yesterday. It matters little that the enemy shows himself unworthy of such courtly treatment. An officer to whom I was speaking about the German atrocities a little while ago, answered me: "What would you have us do? If the niggers in Central Africa were to eat a soldier whom they had captured, we should not therefore eat niggers who fall into our power!"'

Again he says: 'A French peasant who offered us a drink of cyder in a village of Picardy gave us perhaps the most graphic illustration of the change worked in Franco-British relations by the war: "Those men who seemed far-off to us once," he said, "seem now to be our sons." And he added that the stern enthusiasm with which those same men defended French villages and rivalled French "poilus" in ardour brought tears to his eyes. . . .'

Mr. Matthew Page Andrews, M.A., has written a *Brief History of the United States* (Lippincott; 4s. 6d. net) for the use of schools. And a fine example it is of the school book now written to

make everything interesting for the pupil, with its picturesque style, its telling incidents, its magnificence of map and illustration. Give them the chance and the children will read it in the play-hour. Is it not come at a good time? We must see to it now that our schools teach the history of the United States before that of some European countries that we know.

Here is a book on *Church Advertising, its Why and How* (Lippincott; 4s. 6d. net). It is edited by Mr. W. B. Ashley, who is described as 'Executive Secretary, Church Advertising and Publicity Departmental.' It is contributed to by twenty men, most if not all of them ministers. Its sole purpose is to encourage you to advertise your church and to tell you how to do it. If you do not understand the writing or are not sufficiently impressed by it, there are drawings—arresting enough, and unmistakable. The time seems to be coming when churches will have their advertising agent as the periodicals have, and the best agent will produce the best-filled church and receive the best salary.

A committee appointed by the Diocesan Council of the National Mission of Repentance and Hope invited men who knew to write down what were the chief issues, national and social, of this time. Their replies have been edited by the Rev. E. A. Wesley and the Rev. J. R. Darbyshire—thoroughly, even drastically edited, no overlapping or looseness being left—and the result is a sane, searching, yet hopeful book, easily read, and well worth reading, entitled *Social Problems and Christian Ideals* (Longmans; 3s. net).

The Rev. R. Martin Pope, M.A., has written *An Introduction to Early Church History* (Macmillan; 4s. net). There is no man we know (now that Gwatkin has left us) better fitted for the duty. Mr. Pope has the scholarship, the personality, the style, the love of Christ and of the Body of Christ—all the necessary gifts for the historian of the Church. Gwatkin's two-volume book is unsurpassable. After Gwatkin this short history of the first three centuries for us.

Paul's Joy in Christ (Revell; $1.25 net) is the title which Professor A. T. Robertson of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary has given to an exposition of the Epistle to the Philippians. It is emphatically an exposition, not exegesis merely and not homiletic, and it is based on a minute (grammarian's) examination of the text. Notice, for example, the steady reference to the papyri in the footnotes. Thus on Ph 1^6 we are told that the word for fellowship or partnership is used in the papyri of the marriage contract as well as of commercial partnership—a life partnership. Notice also the unfailing reference to other expositors, the briefest possible reference, but always clear and to the point. Here are Kennedy, Vincent, Lightfoot, Lipsius, and Deissmann on one page. But Dr. Robertson has no difficulty in carrying all this learning.

In the Incarnation Jessie Douglas Montgomery finds the solution of the perplexities of life and the encouragement to its right living. Her title is *The Incarnation: Its Message for Daily Life* (Scott; 1s. net).

Simple in language, clear in thought, and steadfast to the theology of the New Testament are the Sermons for the Church's Year which have been published by the Rev. William Henry Ranken, M.A., under the title of *Faith and Duty* (Scott; 2s. 6d. net).

An account of the York Diocesan Itinerant Mission of the year 1916 is given by the Rev. C. C. Bell, M.A., under the title of *By Two and Two* (S.P.C.K.; 1s. 6d. net).

Somebody whose initials are A. H. heard 'Father Christopher' preach, and long after wrote down the addresses from memory. The result is a book with the title *The Sins of Religious People* (S.P.C.K.; 2s. 6d. net). What a list it is! And what a pertinent, even penetrating, word Father Christopher has upon every one of them. No doubt we know already that these things we ought not to do, but we forget. Let us be reminded by the reading of this book.

The Rev. Clement F. Rogers, M.A., is a Hyde Park speaker on behalf of the Christian Evidence Society. Having spoken, he invites questions, and answers them 'as shortly and as well as I can.'

He has now published a bookful of the questions

and his answers, and the range of the one is not less than the effectiveness of the other. Take this—

'Did you, before you became a theologian, study humanity, and come to the conclusion that Christianity was the only suitable explanation of it?

'A rather personal question, but I don't know that that matters. I began as a child, as we all do, by believing what I was taught. Then when I got older I began to think for myself, and everything went into the melting-pot. Not all at once, of course, but bit by bit, and it came out again not quite the same, but much more real. I felt sufficiently sure of my position to think I ought to work for ordination, and began to study theology for my degree, and at once realised how much stronger the Christian position was than I had in the least realised. And I think my experience was much the same as that of the majority of men who become parsons.'

The title is *Question Time in Hyde Park* (S.P.C.K.; 6d. net).

The readers of Mr. Harry Emerson Fosdick's little book on Prayer will all be readers, as soon as they hear of it, of his new book on *The Challenge of the Present Crisis* (Student Christian Movement; 1s. 6d.). And then they will look for another. For this book also is the close walk with God interpreted and addressed to a world at war.

Mr. Ernest A. Boyd has written a very entertaining volume of Irish essays on Irish men. Its title is *Appreciations and Depreciations* (Dublin: Talbot Press; 3s. 6d. net). It is a courageous title, for it is characteristic. The book is actually partly appreciative and partly depreciative; and the amusing thing is that the appreciations are of the authors who are Roman Catholic, the depreciations of the authors who are not. Mr. Boyd is sorry for the Episcopalian Edward Dowden; he is very nearly contemptuous of the Presbyterian Bernard Shaw; his ideal of author and Irishman is George W. Russell (Æ). But the good time is coming, when a Dowden, even a Shaw, will be recognized as a true Irishman. It is within sight. Mr. Boyd himself hails it. 'In fine, Dowden's was that false position to which so many Irishmen are condemned, owing to the peculiar constitution of Irish society. The process of denationalisation has failed, but there has long been a minority clinging tenaciously to the illusion of anglicisation. Nowadays nationalism has taken on an easier manner, and there is an increasing tendency to dissociate a sense of Irish nationality from those horrors with which Dowden, as a Protestant Unionist, identified it. This mellowing influence, which allows many to admire what older generations despised and misunderstood, is due, in some measure, to the work of the Literary Revival. Since the birth of an Anglo-Irish literature national in spirit, the conception of Irish nationality has widened. The aggressive, anti-English note disappeared when W. B. Yeats and his friends succeeded in overthrowing the supremacy of the *Spirit of the Nation* school of poetry, and in substituting artistic and cultural for political values. They raised the literary level to a plane upon which even the hypercritical could breathe, while the revelation of Celtic legend and the reaffirmation of tradition defied the accusation of provincialism.'

A remarkable outcome of the war is the interest of everybody in religion. It is not in Christianity yet, but it will come to that. The surprise is that while the enemy cries out 'Where is now thy God?' the hitherto outsider and even easy unbeliever has discovered Him. 'Rita' (Mrs. Desmond Humphreys) has been moved to write a book about religion—a movement of price. She is no orthodox theologian; she is not even unmistakably a follower of Christ; she has scarcely gone further yet than 'God and Man'; with the 'problems.' She even calls her book *The Wrong End of Religion* (Westall; 2s. 6d. net). But the fact that she should set aside other fascinations for this, the deepest fascination now of all, is both surprising and promising. We could find fault with the book—how easily! We accept it thankfully.

Read this characteristic paragraph on the Gospels: 'They have existed from the first Christian era down to the present day. They are rooted and grounded in men's minds as the basis of Christian faith. They have served as the chief corner-stone of that great structure the Church, and the fact that they can be misunderstood and misapplied, juggled with or accepted literally, only makes them the greater wonder. For they depend upon words, the meaning and interpretation of

words, the right translation of words, and they have given to certain forms of words a peculiar importance which places the Christian believer in a more imposing position than the Christian doubter. They have proved and continue to prove that perfectly irreconcilable facts may become accepted tenets of Faith. They have at once provoked and defied criticism. They can mean anything that the Salvation Army or the Vatican chooses them to mean; and they are at once condemnation or consolation to the generality of mankind!'

Irenaeus and the Fourth Gospel.

By the Rev. H. A. A. Kennedy, D.D., D.Sc., Professor of Exegetical Theology, New College, Edinburgh.

IV.

Why, then, is the testimony of Irenæus so vehemently challenged by a large number of modern scholars? The question as to its relation to the *internal* evidence of the Fourth Gospel is one which I do not propose to deal with in the present discussion. In the region of external evidence, with which alone we are concerned, the crux of the difficulty is found by these scholars in certain statements of Papias.

I. There is, first, the famous passage examined above, in which he is supposed to distinguish between John, the member of the Twelve, and another John called 'the elder' and 'the disciple of the Lord.' We have already noted the extreme obscurity of the statement so far as the two mentions of 'John' are concerned. But upon its basis the assumption is made that Irenæus must have confused John the apostle with John the presbyter. This, of course, also involves a complete misunderstanding of what he had heard from Polycarp, to whom he specially refers his information regarding John. The argument is backed up by an attempt to show that Irenæus was a credulous, unreliable man, of singularly inaccurate memory. The proofs of this seem extraordinarily inadequate. Great stress is laid upon the position he takes against Ptolemæus, mainly based on Jn 8^{57} and some testimonies of elders, that Jesus was more than forty years old at the time of His crucifixion. It may be frankly admitted that here he has forced facts to fit a theory which helps his argument. But in a question so obscure as the chronology of Jesus' career, his own unwarranted inference or that of the elders to whom he refers is in no sense an error so grave as to cast suspicion on the historical statements he ordinarily makes. Nor is it fair to single out one or two eschatological fancies as evidence for the worthlessness of Irenæus' sources and his own uncritical temper. As we have seen, these seem to have been derived from Papias' *Expositions*, and the very scholars who emphasize their absurdity are found, in other connexions, to stake everything on Papias' authority. As a matter of fact, the impression left on the reader by a perusal of Irenæus' great work is anything but that of a facile or second-rate understanding. His arguments against the Valentinian Gnostics are alert and penetrating (*e.g.* his examination of the doctrine of Æons). Like his contemporaries, he often employs the allegorical method, but he is, on the whole, alive to the historical sense of Scripture, as contrasted with his Gnostic opponents. And his well-known conception of the 'recapitulation' of the race in Christ is one of the most impressive doctrinal formulations in early Patristic theology. Moreover, it is of great importance to observe that Irenæus, in speaking of his intimate relations with Polycarp, his chief authority for traditions regarding John, deliberately emphasizes the clearness with which the statements of Polycarp concerning the famous 'disciple of the Lord' stand out in his memory.

But, further, abundant evidence has been adduced to show that Papias was not the sole standard for early apostolic tradition. Polycarp and Polycrates we have dealt with at length. And many unnamed and unknown Christians must have linked the close of the first century to the middle of the second. It is easy to cast doubt on the accuracy of Irenæus' or any other man's