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THE EXPOSITORY TIMES.

Motes of Recent Exposition.

MUCH has been written about the Beatitudes, but we do not understand them yet. Mr. CLUTTON-BROCK says so. We do not understand any one of them, he says. In his book entitled What is the Kingdom of Heaven? (Methuen; 5s. net) he selects one of the Beatitudes as an example of our misunderstanding. The Beatitude is 'Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.'

The words, all the words, in that Beatitude, says Mr. CLUTTON-BROCK, have been misunderstood all through the centuries. We misunderstand them still. 'We think of blessed as meaning blest by some one, rewarded by some one, in this case God. We think of pure in heart as meaning only sexually, or at least morally, pure. We think of seeing as meaning actual ocular vision; and we think of God as the Hebrew God, as a royal person sitting on a throne, to whose presence the pure in heart will be admitted after death as a special privilege.'

Mr. Clutton-Brock expects that his readers will protest here. They do not understand these words thus grossly. But, he retorts, can they say clearly how they understand them? Do they believe that Christ means something quite precise by them? At any rate, he repeats, the grosser misunderstanding has been common all through the centuries and is common to this day. Well, what do the words mean?

'What, for instance, does Christ mean by the pure in heart? He means more than sexually or even morally pure. He means rather what we call single-minded. He is always telling us that we profit by things only when we cease to seek our own profit in them. The single-minded are those who are, as we say, interested in people or things for their own sake, and not with an eye to any profit that can be got out of them. They are interested in them, as an artist is interested in beauty or a philosopher in truth, not as a financier is interested in stocks and shares; interested because they are aware of some virtue in the things themselves, a virtue independent of themselves and of any profit they can get from them. This kind of interest is what makes men single-minded; and it is a condition of all the highest excellence, as we know by experience.'

Now, Christ says that the single-minded (that is to say, if they are single-minded altogether and not only in some one interest) are blessed. That is to say, they are happy. Why? Because they shall see God.

The words seem very simple. But that is because we are so familiar with them. They are really very daring words. We would see that they are daring if we understood precisely what they mean, and if we believed that Christ meant what He said in them.

'He did not, of course, mean that the single-minded would see God as we see a cow in a field, actually with their eyes. As St. John says, "No man hath seen God at any time." But He did mean that they would see a reality we do not see, in such a way that it would become more real to them than the world of sense is to us; and, further, that they would know this reality to be supremely good. And He meant more even than that, namely, that they would know this reality to be God, to be living and personal, more living, more personal, than human beings are.'

Mr. CLUTTON-BROCK wants us to hold our hand a moment and think about that. He wants us to ask ourselves if we believe that Christ really meant that. He tells us that we may believe what Christ said or we may not, but we must believe that He meant what He said. And what He said is that the pure in heart will see God with the most extreme certainty that the human mind is capable of. He used the word see to express that certainty.

'Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy' (Mt 5⁴³).

Who said so? Not Moses, nor the prophets. There is no such command in the Old Testament. On the contrary, when we turn to the Book of Proverbs we read (25²¹), 'If thine enemy (RVm, he that hateth thee) be hungry give him bread to eat; and if he be thirsty, give him water to drink'—the very precept which St. Paul quoted in Ro 12²⁰ as embodying the highest duty of the Christian towards those who wrong him. And in the Law itself it is written, 'If thou meet thine enemy's ox or his ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again.'

No doubt there are precepts in the Old Testament which seem to encourage hatred of an enemy, but there is no express precept to that effect, and the example of God, which is held up for imitation, is all the other way: 'The Lord is

full of compassion and of great kindness.' Who then said, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy'?

The Rev. W. L. Paige Cox, B.D., Archdeacon of Chester and Canon-Residentiary of Chester Cathedral, answers the question. In a little book, entitled *Christian Ethics and Peace Problems* (S.P.C.K.; 2s. net), Canon Paige Cox discusses the whole question of hatred and revenge in relation to Christianity. He is especially concerned to understand what our Lord means by the words, 'Love your enemies,' and how that precept is to be obeyed by a British citizen who has seen the sinking of the *Sussex* and the murder of Nurse Cavell and Captain Fryatt. *Love* your enemy? How am I to help *hating* him? he asks.

If Moses or the prophets had said, 'Thou shalt hate thine enemy,' it would have been easy for some of us to obey the precept and let Christ and the New Testament go, as we do in so many other things. But Canon Paige Cox does not find it in the Old Testament. He believes that it was a gloss on the Old Testament teaching made by the Pharisees. And the last of all his desires is to be reckoned a Pharisee. He knows very well that 'many professed Christians have not got beyond the old popular Jewish rule of the hatred of enemies, and make no pretence of acting contrarily to it.' But even professed Christians such as these were some of them shocked and some of them horrified when the German 'Hymn of Hate' was heard of. And for himself Canon Paige Cox knows very well that, however he is to accomplish it, his bounden duty as a true follower of Christ is not only not to hate his enemies but actually to love them.

How is it to be done? It is to be done not by ceasing to hate but by beginning to love. The more difficult thing is the easier thing. It is the only possible thing. Here as everywhere else Christ set the ideal high because the high ideal is the only possible real. You say you cannot help hating the Germans when you think of what they

have done and what they are. No, you cannot. But you can love them.

You can love them. Canon Paige Cox knows that such words are to the Jews a stumbling block and to the Greeks foolishness. And the reason is that neither Jews nor Greeks know what love is.

There are two words in the New Testament for love. The one word is filia ($\phi\iota\lambda\dot{\alpha}$). It is akin in sound and derivation to our word 'filial.' 'It indicates,' says Canon Paige Cox, 'natural affection, the love we feel to our relations and to persons with whom we have much in common, whether we are related to them or not. The other word is $agap\hat{e}$ ($d\gamma\dot{\alpha}\pi\eta$), a word which Christianity has made specially its own, and to which it has given a special meaning. It suggests less of instinct than passion and more of reasoned and considered regard than filia, and is used to denote the love that has its origin in a renovated spiritual nature which changes the personal outlook and feeling towards all mankind.'

Now when our Lord bids us love our enemies He does not bid us love them as we love our relatives and intimate friends. He does not expect that as human beings merely, partakers of ordinary human nature, actuated by natural impulses and inclinations we should be able to love our enemies. But he does expect us to love our enemies if we are regenerate men and women, if we have turned and as little children have entered into the Kingdom. This is the whole point of the precept. To the unregenerate it is pure foolishness. To the least in the Kingdom of God it is the most natural expression of daily duty.

But Canon Paige Cox does not say that for the true follower of Christ the love of enemies is the same thing as the love of friends. He says that while the unregenerate man knows only one kind of love, the man that is born again knows two kinds. He knows the natural love of relationship and

intimate friendship expressed by the Greek word filia. He also knows the love which is expressed by the Greek word agapê, the love of all mankind—a love which has no respect to character or conduct—a love which loves even the brutal German and the not less brutal Turk.

But Canon Paige Cox does not mean to say that the German or the Turk is to be treated as if he had never done wrong. God Himself does not treat the German or the Turk so-'The wrath of God is revealed from Heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men.' And He does not expect us to be more complacent towards evildoers than He is Himself. 'On the contrary. He expects us, as having their best interests at heart, to be severe towards their wrong-doings, both for their sakes and for the sake of the reverence due to eternal law. We must notice, however, that there is this difference between what should be our attitude towards evil-doers and God's attitude, that we can never properly take part in correcting a brother except in "a spirit of meekness," inasmuch as we are so prone to err ourselves. We emulate the Divine love, then, when we exercise an untiring patience in dealing with an erring brother, whether with the view of correcting him or winning him over to a better mind, and when we are ready to incur any personal trouble or loss in the loving task, after the example of that tremendous sacrifice which the infinitely loving God made in giving His onlybegotten Son for the redemption of mankind from sin.'

What is the reason that the Golden Rule has fallen so utterly out of favour? There may have been a day when it lay under the suspicion of being an expression of 'mere morality.' For in that day the gospel sailed high above all considerations of conduct, and even the words of our Lord, if they could not be interpreted evangelically, had to be omitted from the selection of appropriate texts.

But we have passed from that. With some

churches, and with some individuals in all the churches, there has been even a violent reaction from that. No sermon is considered a sermon if it has not to do directly with character and conduct. Yet the men who most openly and unreservedly occupy themselves with ethical preaching are the very men who most scrupulously disregard the Golden Rule.

Is this because the discovery has been made that the Golden Rule is not original? One would have imagined that the value of such a discovery would have been estimated easily. But even Viscount Morley, with his commanding intellect, tells us in his *Reminiscences* that there were three things which induced him in early life to become a Secularist, and one of the three was the discovery that certain sayings of Jesus were not original.

In an ethical study of much interest, published by Messrs. Macmillan under the title of Self and Neighbour, Mr. Edward W. Hirst discusses fully the reasons why the Golden Rule is so discredited to-day. And he gives this as the first reason. It is not original to Jesus. He admits that it is not original. 'Not only is such an ideal expressed in Jewish writings, both pre-Christian and post-Christian, but it finds a certain form of expression also among Greek, Roman, and Oriental peoples.'

Nor is this objection removed by pointing out that the form of the Rule in the Gospels is positive, while elsewhere it is for the most part negative. It is true that in Jewish literature it is negative, as in Tob. 4¹⁵, 'That which thou hatest, do to no one'; and in the saying attributed to Hillel, 'What thou hatest thyself, that do not thou to another; this is the whole of the law, all the rest is only comment upon it.' It is also negative where it occurs in Greek literature, as in the Stoic maxim that 'you should not do to another what you do not wish to be done to yourself.' But 'in the sixth century before Christ there was an enunciation of the Golden Rule in China by Confucius, who, according

to Professor Legge, understood the principle in its positive and most comprehensive sense. "The peculiar nature of the Chinese language enabled him to express the Rule by one character, which for want of a better term we may translate in English by 'reciprocity,' or by the phrase 'my heart as yours,' or 'my heart in sympathy with yours.'"

No, the Golden Rule is not original to Jesus. But what is originality? The very men, like Morley himself, whose loyalty to Christ is arrested by this discovery, abate not one jot of their loyalty to Shakespeare when they discover the wholesale way in which he appropriated the thoughts and even the words of earlier writers.

For originality is not in the word or even in the thought. Let us recall the language of a learned Jew, Mr. Claude G. Montefiore. 'It seems to be held,' he says, 'by many Jewish writers that if a certain saying in the New Testament can be paralleled by a saying of the same sort in the Old Testament or the Rabbinical Literature, the saying may forthwith be neglected. It is no longer original. We have, however, already seen that the greatness and inspiration of a New Testament passage do not depend upon its being wholly un-They depend upon its position of importance, upon its stress, upon its form and passion, upon its relation to, and its place in, the teaching as a whole, upon its ultimate effect upon the world.' Let us recall Montaigne. 'The bees do heere and there suck this and cull that flower, but afterwards they produce the honey, which is peculiarly their own, then it is no more Thyme or Marjoram.'

But there are other reasons for the neglect of the Golden Rule. It is the subject of misconception. It is the subject of more misconceptions than one. Mr. HIRST has taken some pains to search them out and remove them.

The first misconception he mentions is due to

Professor Sidgwick. 'Professor Sidgwick criticised the Golden Rule on the ground that "one might wish for another's co-operation in sin, and be willing to reciprocate it." Much the same kind of objection was raised by Dr. Edward Caird, who maintained that "our wishes for another might be as unreasonable as our wishes for ourselves."'

'The usual illustration of such complicity in evil is that of a band of thieves. Each member of the party shows the same fidelity to the other which he desires to have shown to himself. The party in this way stick together and maintain their coherence as a band. But their co-operation is in the interest only of a scheme of evil, and such reciprocity is merely a furtherance of sin and crime. Though each does unto the other what each would have the other do unto him, yet this principle of action seems only to aid complicity in wrongdoing.'

What has Mr. HIRST to say to that? 'The criticism,' he says, 'looks rather formidable but is really not so.' 'For, in the first place, these thieves use the principle of the Golden Rule, not in any absolute sense, but merely relatively, as a means to their own convenience. They are not interested in reciprocity for its own sake; they are intent upon the internal honour of their party, only because that happens to be the best way to the success of their plans. What each one wants is spoil; and as each one realizes that he can get booty for himself, and the greatest share of booty, only as the "honour" of the band remains unimpaired, he is prepared to practise loyalty. They have no appreciation or reverence for the abstract principle of the Golden Rule; they are not interested in reciprocity for its own sake. They respect merely each other's share of booty. Their interest in one another lasts only as long as they are a band of thieves, and they are in alliance only for the sake of robbery. The members of the party refrain from robbing one another, not because they are men, but just because they are thieves. If they refrained from robbing one another on the ground that they were men, for the same reason

they would refrain from robbing anyone else. In other words, they deprive the Golden Rule of that absolute and universal character without which it is quite meaningless. We are to do, not simply to five or six particular men just the particular thing we want them to do to us, but we are to do unto man as man, anywhere, what we would have any and every man do to us.'

In these words Mr. HIRST has done something more than answer Professor Sidgwick. He has given us at least a glimpse of the right understanding of the Golden Rule, an understanding that in the end removes all the objections to it. But we shall come to that.

Another objection is that the Golden Rule may be used as an encouragement to indifference. 'Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you'—very well. I want to mind my own business and go my own way; what I want others to do to me is to leave me alone; if they leave me alone I will leave them alone. Thus interpreted, it is simply an encouragement to selfish isolation. It is a repudiation of every claim that the community has upon the individual. It is a repetition of the insolent demand of Cain, 'Am I my brother's keeper?' What answer has Mr. Hirst to that?

His answer is, that it is impossible for any member of a civilized society, or of any society whatever, to carry out such a policy of independence. And even if it were possible as a policy it would be an utter misinterpretation of the Golden Rule. For the fundamental meaning of the Golden Rule is that every man has obligations of conduct towards every other man. On that fundamental fact is it established. Its own object is not to establish that fact but to furnish the measure, the immeasurable measure, of its application.

There is another objection. Mr. HIRST returns to Professor Sidgwick for it. 'Nor is it even true,' says Professor Sidgwick, 'to say that we ought to

do to others only what we think it right for them to do to us; for no one will deny that there may be differences in the circumstances—and even in the natures—of two individuals, A and B, which would make it wrong for A to treat B in the way in which it is right for B to treat A.'

To which Mr. HIRST replies that such a qualification is, 'of course, true and obvious. It would indeed be folly to say that the actions appropriate for a parent to perform to a child should be precisely the actions which the child ought to do to a parent. Teacher and pupil must act in some ways differently by one another; so must master and servant. What is proper in one relation would be quite improper in another relation.'

But 'that this qualification should be thought incompatible with the Golden Rule could only be so conceived by those who give a too mechanical interpretation of the latter. The circumstances of persons are so different that an alteration of behaviour is necessary, according as you find yourself a child, a pupil, a parent, teacher, master, or servant. The equality taught by the Golden Rule cannot, therefore, mean a similarity in the details of behaviour—a procedure which could only end in absurdity—but rather a similarity of regard, due account being taken of difference of circumstances.'

A far more serious objection follows. Mr. HIRST finds it stated most effectively in an article by Sir Francis Younghusband in the *Hibbert Journal* for January 1914. The objection is that the Golden Rule is not good enough, it does not carry us far enough—a serious objection indeed, if it can be substantiated. How does Sir Francis Younghusband express it?

We are called upon to be perfect. But, he says, the Golden Rule does not imply perfection. 'For men have gone further still, and not in theory only, but in actual practice. There have been many men, and probably still more women, who

have loved their neighbours, not merely as themselves, but far more than themselves; who have given up their lives, not only in death but better still in life, for their neighbours, for loved individuals, for their country, for humanity. And they have not merely done unto others as they would that others should do unto them, but have done unto others a great deal more than they would ever expect others to do for them.'

How does Mr. HIRST meet that objection? He does not seem quite able to meet it. There are two things which he says in answer to it, but they do not seem to be quite a complete answer. The first is that such circumstances as Sir Francis Younghusband suggests, in which a man has to neglect himself entirely for the sake of others and even to surrender life itself, must be quite abnormal. They must be quite abnormal because 'if every person died for his neighbour, there would be no neighbour remaining for whom to die. Or if every person merely weakened himself in health, or neglected his business or his culture, soon there would be no one left in the position of a helper, for all alike would in such a case be needy and helpless. It is therefore obvious that such conduct, if other than exceptional, would defeat itself.'

The other answer is that 'not only would such an unequal love of neighbour prove impracticable and absurd, it would make the good of "alter" superior and sole, and would become liable to all the objections urged against Egoism as an ethical theory. The "ego" is a self, and therefore has value—value not as a means, but intrinsic value, value as an end, or as a joint end. Self-sacrifice there must always be; but it is not self-immolation; it is rather self-socialisation.'

These answers, we say, are not quite satisfactory. After all that they urge they leave the Golden Rule, as a rule of conduct, one step behind the actual conduct of many men and women. We have but to think of the war to realize how many.

Nevertheless there is a complete answer. And Mr. Hirst himself gives it, though in a different part of his book.

The answer is, that the Golden Rule is not a rule for 'the man in the street,' nor even for 'the average Christian'; it is a rule for the true followers of Christ. Now the true followers of Christ are called upon to be 'perfect' or complete in all things. They know that nothing short of that is expected of them, and they expect nothing short of that from others. For the Golden Rule is given to the individual Christian, not in an indifferent or selfish society, but in a community of fellow-Christians. It is beside the mark to say that no such community has ever been seen on earth. Christ meant it to be seen on earth, and no doubt He will yet see of the travail of His soul and be satisfied. The point is that He came to establish

just such a perfect community and gave the Golden Rule for its guidance.

Now in such a community there will be great diversity of gift and of need. What the one needs the other will supply. And no sacrifice will be counted too great; no thought will be given to the greatness of it. For every act will be within the range of Christ's own gifts and sacrifices. Is it money? 'Ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich, yet for our sakes he became poor.' Is it life for life? 'Who loved me, and gave himself for me.' The Golden Rule is as limitless in its operation as is the work of Christ Himself. 'If I then, your Lord and Master, have washed your feet, ye also ought to wash one another's feet.' 'A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another.'

Suggestions toward a New Liturgical 'Credo.'

By A. G. Hogg, M.A., PROFESSOR OF MENTAL AND MORAL SCIENCE IN MADRAS CHRISTIAN COLLEGE.

I.

The Credo.

MIGHT not a very real, even if seemingly minute, step forward toward ultimate unity be achieved if it could come to pass that, into what church building soever one might step at the hour of worship, one found there one and the same *Credo* being recited? To press this question, and to suggest the lines along which it seems not impossible to construct a *Credo* that might meet with very general acceptance, is the purpose of this article.

It is necessary first to clear away possible misunderstandings of the object aimed at, as otherwise the suggestion is sure to be condemned unheard. If by a *Credo* be understood a profession of assent to any doctrinal formulation as such, then the suggestion must fall under the ban of those who, like myself, hold that the inclusion in a liturgy of any profession of assent to doctrines

as doctrines tends to encourage that confusion between true faith and correct beliefs which resulted from the Hellenizing of Christianity, and from which the Church at large still too grievously suffers. It is with the idea of making this misunderstanding a little less inevitable that, instead of the English word 'Creed,' I am here employing its Latin original. If the term 'Confession of Faith' could be rescued from the perverted associations which cling to it in consequence of the existing Confessions being still more elaborate doctrinal formularies than the Creeds, it would be an ideal phrase for the present purpose. For the object in view is nothing more ambitious than this, that in spite of variety in doctrinal beliefs all Christians should be free to enjoy the inspiration of confessing in the same words their common faith or trust in the competence and redeeming