

The «Presuppositional» Apologetic of Francis Schaeffer

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. In this article I analyze and criticize the apologetic of Francis A. Schaeffer, D. D., president of L'Abri Fellowship Foundation (Switzerland) and a minister in both the Reformed Presbyterian Church, Evangelical Synod (USA) and the International Presbyterian Church. Dr. Schaeffer, who attended Westminster Theological Seminary and was graduated from Faith Theological Seminary (1938), is the author of numerous books and articles which relate evangelical Christianity and modern culture. His most important work to date on Christian apologetics is *The God Who Is There*.¹

1.2. I am concerned in this essay with the logical structure and conceptual content of Schaeffer's apologetic. In view of this, it will not be possible to discuss his many historical observations on philosophy, art, science and culture.² Even his theology will not come under scrutiny except in the broadest possible terms.

1.3. My plan is straightforward: (a) present Schaeffer's argument for Christianity, and (b) criticize that argument.

2. THE RUIN OF "RATIONALISM"; THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF CHRISTIANITY

2.1. The *aim* of a Christian apologetic is two-fold according to Schaeffer. First, an apologetic must demonstrate that there are but two, mutually exclusive, world views: "...on the one side nihilism (God is dead, man is dead, and meaning is dead); on the other side, the answer of the historic and Reformed Christian position which states that there is a personal God, that man is made in his image, that he has communicated to his creatures by a propositional, verbalized revelation . . . (which) is able to be considered by the whole man."³ Second, an apologetic must show the inadequacy of nihilism as a viable world-view.

2.2. The *method* of such an apologetic, Schaeffer maintains, must be "presuppositional." Schaeffer means by this that the absolute truth of Christianity can only be demonstrated *after* the presupposition which is common to all non-Christian thought has been disproved. Christian apologetics must, therefore, have a "downward" (destructive) direction prior to any "upward" (constructive) direction.⁴

The destructive aspect of a defense of the Christian Faith disproves this secular presupposition (which Schaeffer identifies as "rationalism") by showing that the only explanations of certain specific aspects of reality which are consistent with this assumption cannot meet the commonly accepted criteria of truth.⁵

The constructive aspect, the demonstration of the truth of the Christian system, proceeds upon the assumption of the *negation* of the secular presupposition. The explanations of the aspects of reality in question as found in the Christian system of truth, which is itself consistent with the negation of the non-Christian assumption, are then assessed in terms of the same criteria of truth. They are found to pass the criteria *summa cum laude*.⁶ Christianity, therefore, is true.

Only such a "presuppositional" method as this, Schaeffer claims, is adequate to the defense of Christianity. The older, classical forms of Christian apology failed because they did not see the necessity of the "downward" movement. To the extent that these older apologies did succeed, they did so only in so far as the non-Christian was inconsistent with his own presupposition.⁷

I turn now to a working out of Schaeffer's "presuppositional" method in detail.

2.3. Two pre-conditions of both the "downward" and the "upward" movements in Schaeffer's apologetic are (a) agreement concerning the criteria of proof and (b) agreement concerning what aspects of reality are to be explained.

2.4. *Proof*, says Schaeffer, whether in science, philosophy or religion, consists of the same "two steps: (A) The theory must be non-contradictory and must give an answer to the phenomena in question; (B). We must be able to live consistently with our theory."⁸

2.5. Schaeffer makes concrete his general apologetic challenge ("Do your presuppositions—your gods, your philosophy, your natural science—really explain what is?"⁹ by isolating the two basic *aspects of reality* which, he claims, the true world-view must be able to explain: ". . . the external world and its form, and man's 'manishness' . . ." ¹⁰ Apologetics must start here, according to Schaeffer, because every man ". . . knows something of the external world, and he knows something of himself,"¹¹ so that "no matter what a man may believe, he cannot change the reality of what is."¹² "The truth that we let in first is not a dogmatic statement of the truth of Scripture but the truth of the external world and the truth of what man himself is."¹³

2.6. These two aspects of reality are referred to in *four specific apologetic questions* which both the non-Christian and Christian must answer. The answers to the questions amount to explanations of the phenomena to which the questions refer. The four questions are:

- (a) Why is there *something* rather than nothing?
- (b) Why is that something orderly?
- (c) Why is man *personal*?
- (d) Why is man in a *moral dilemma*?

Regarding the first two questions (a, b) which have to do with the "external world and its form," Schaeffer observes: "Jean-Paul Sartre has said that the basic philosophical question of all questions is this: Why is it that *something* is there rather than *nothing*? He is correct . . . However, it is not only that something chaotic is there but that something orderly is there."¹⁴

Regarding the latter two questions (c, d) concerning "man and his 'manishness,'" Schaeffer understands question *c* as asking why man has ". . . hope of purpose and significance, love, notions of morality and rationality,

beauty and verbal communication;"¹⁵ and question *d* as asking why "man is able both to rise to great heights and to sink to great depths of cruelty and tragedy."¹⁶

2.7. With agreement in these two areas, the criteria of truth and the questions which every man must answer, Schaeffer's apologetic "stage" is set. He must now identify the presupposition which is common to all secular thought and check the answers to the apologetic questions which this presupposition necessitates against the agreed criteria of proof. In the following sections (2,8—14) I give a detailed statement of Schaeffer's analysis and criticism of secular thought.

2.8. Schaeffer identifies the *fundamental presupposition* of non-Christian thought as "rationalism": the view that man alone is the ultimate "integration point"¹⁷ and autonomous origin¹⁸ of "all knowledge meaning and value."¹⁹ This fundamental presupposition has been joined, in the history of secular thought, with two additional, and conflicting, sets of presuppositions regarding "the nature of truth and the method of attaining truth."²⁰ One school of rationalists he calls "optimists" and the other school "pessimists."

2.9. The *optimistic* rationalists, who, according to Schaeffer, flourished prior to the present century, believed in *absolute truth* (their presupposition regarding the "nature of truth") and in *man's ability* to produce that absolute truth on his own (their presupposition regarding the "method of attaining truth"). The optimists believed, comments Schaeffer, that man was able, of himself, to "... draw a circle which would encompass all thoughts of life, and life itself... They thought that on their own, rationalistically, finite men could find a unity in the total diversity."²¹

2.10. The *pessimistic* rationalists, who dominate philosophy throughout the world today,²² were born "out of desperation" when the optimists' enterprise failed.²³ Seeing that man is not a sufficient point of reference to produce a unifying world-view, they gave up "... all hope of achieving a rational unified answer to knowledge and life."²⁴

Surrendering the notion of *absolute truth*, they introduced a new understanding of the "nature of truth." "True" now means "having pragmatic value." Truth, therefore, for the pessimist is *relative* to particular cultures and historical periods.²⁵

With this alteration of their concept of truth,²⁶ they altered their "method of attaining truth" also. "Truth" is no longer found, as it was by the optimist, in terms of empirical and rational proof, but solely in terms of heuristic considerations. These new pragmatic "truths" are found by empirical investigation in the natural sciences, but they are found by a "non-logical leap of faith" in religion and morality.²⁷

When optimism failed, says Schaeffer, rationalism was clearly in danger. It could only be saved by a rejection of the optimists' understanding of it. Whereas the optimists sought a *rational* unity to "all knowledge, meaning and value," the pessimists sought only a *pragmatic* unity determined by the relative needs of man. When, therefore, the pessimists saved rationalism, they surrendered their rationality.²⁸

2.11. Pessimism, observes Schaeffer, is certainly correct in seeing that rationalism is an inadequate base for a rational unification of "all knowledge, meaning and value." It has seen that "... if rationalistic man wants to deal with the real things of human life (such as purpose, significance, the validity of love) he must discard rational thought

about them and make a gigantic, non-rational leap of faith."²⁹ Pessimism has seen where rationalism *does not go*. But rather than ask where it *does* lead, the pessimist simply chooses, irrationally, an answer which could not have been rationally supplied by the optimist before him. The apologist cannot permit the rationalist the use of this way out. No meaningful discussion is possible if one of the parties refuses to be consistent with his presupposition.³⁰ The Christian must insist on rational discussion because it is only in terms of the *consistent outcome* of the rationalistic presupposition that the Christian can show the non-Christian the antithesis between his presupposition and the real world.³¹

2.12. What answers to the four apologetic questions are, therefore, necessitated by rationalism? Schaeffer maintains that there are but two which are used again and again to answer each of the four questions: "chance" and "nihilism." Schaeffer develops and criticizes these two answers most fully in terms of apologetic question *c*: *Why is man personal?*

2.13. The first, and most often proposed, answer to "Why is man *personal*?" is *chance*, i. e. "... we are the natural products of the impersonal, plus time and chance..."³²

Schaeffer maintains that this is, contrary to appearances, just another "leap-of-faith"³³ answer, because the proposal is clearly "against all experience."³⁴ "No one has presented an idea, let alone demonstrated it to be feasible, to explain how the impersonal beginning, plus time, plus chance, can give personality."³⁵

The second proposal, hardly ever advanced, is that of *nihilism*, i. e. that there are no phenomena to be explained because personality is an "illusion," a "kind of sick joke."³⁶

Against this Schaeffer objects that "although man may say he is no more than a machine, his whole life denies it, "he... simply cannot live as though he were a machine."³⁷

2.14. When faced with the apologetic questions, therefore, the rationalist is on the horns of a dilemma. Either he admits that the phenomena in question are ones for which he cannot provide an explanation (they are the products of "chance") and thus fails to meet criterion of proof *A* (cf. 2,4); or, he is consistent with his rationalism and adopts nihilism, thus failing to meet criterion *B*.

Schaeffer concludes from these considerations that *nihilism* is the only *rationally consistent* expression of rationalism and that nihilism is false. If it were true, he says, a man could not "... consistently communicate even with himself."³⁸ If nihilism is false, then rationalism is also false; for rationalism succeeds only in separating man "... not only from the real world, but from the real self that he is."³⁹

From these conclusions it follows, says Schaeffer, that all of man's knowledge is *in spite of* and not *because of* his basic presupposition. Non-Christian man has no foundation for the knowledge which he has.⁴⁰

2.15. This then is the end of the "downward" (destructive) movement in Schaeffer's apologetic. Its basic thrust was a disproof of rationalism. Nevertheless, I think it is apparent throughout Schaeffer's "downward" writings that he considers this effort to have a *constructive* aspect which is foundational to the "upward" movement which is to follow. I want to make clear that constructive aspect before I outline Schaeffer's apologetic *in favor of* Christianity.

2.16. Non-Christians, in Schaeffer's scheme, are rationalistic. They insist on thinking up unifying world views for themselves.⁴¹ They think that they can

build a "bridge toward ultimate truth"⁴² and that, if they cannot, there is no absolute truth. On the other hand "the Christian is not rationalistic, he does not try to begin from himself autonomously and work out a system from there on."⁴³

These two views can be set over against each other as the affirmation and denial, respectively, of this proposition: A rationally adequate (cf. 2.4) explanation of reality is possible if and only if man *can* construct it by himself.

Schaeffer realizes that if the proposition is *demonstrably* false, then its negation is *demonstrably* true. Its negation reads: A rationally adequate explanation of reality is possible if and only if man *cannot* construct it by himself. Therefore, a disproof of rationalism is a proof of this second proposition. It, therefore, supplies a very formidable foundation upon which to construct an argument for Christianity. It demonstrates the explanatory necessity of an infinite, personal and self-revealing God. This sort of argument is not, however, a *theistic proof*. The difference between a *theistic proof* and an argument such as Schaeffer's can be seen by an illustration.

Imagine a man standing before a huge pile of lumber; he desires to build a house. He sets out to the task. After several weeks he realizes that he has neither the knowledge nor ability to build a house. In seeing his own disability, he has also seen what sort of person *could* do the job. Seeing disabilities and requisite abilities are two sides of the same coin. This would-be house builder, however, cannot conclude from his disability that there *is* an adequate housebuilder somewhere. He only knows what an adequate builder must be like and that *unless* such a builder does exist his house will never be built.

Schaeffer's disproof of rationalism brings the non-Christian to an analogous

point. The non-Christian (a) knows a great deal about himself and the world; (b) he has criteria of proof which any proposed explanation of what he knows must meet; and (c) he knows that the only adequate explanation must come from a person, other than man, who is "in a position" to supply such a worldview.

2,17. In terms of the house-builder illustration, the "upward" task of the Christian apologist is to show that there is, somewhere, a *house*. If there is a house, there is a builder. The apologist must demonstrate that there is a non-contradictory, factually accurate, worldview from the only person in a position to know such things. Immediately, therefore, says Schaeffer, the apologist must turn to a consideration of Christianity *as a whole*.⁴⁴

2,18. The non-Christian is challenged, in Schaeffer's "upward" apologetic, to consider Christianity on two factual levels. First, in terms of the apologetic questions (cf. 2.6). Does the Bible complete and explain what is the case, especially "... what was obvious before, though without an explanation—that is, that the universe and the 'mannishness' of man are not just a chance configuration of the printer's scrambled type."⁴⁵ Schaeffer is confident that the secular man will see that it does. Clearly "... the Bible answers the problem of the universe and man and nothing else does."⁴⁶ "With the propositional communication from the personal God before us, not only the things of the cosmos and history match up but everything on the upper and lower storeys matches too: grace and nature; a moral absolute and morals; the universal point of reference and the particulars, and the emotional and aesthetic realities of man as well."⁴⁷

Second, since this revelation has come to man in history, it is confirmable at the

historical level. "Having set the revelation in history," Schaeffer observes, "what sense then would it make for God to give us a revelation in which the *history* was wrong?"⁴⁸ Of special importance in this connection is *miracle*. Not only is the Bible verifiable in terms of the world *now*,⁴⁹ but it is verifiable in terms of "space-time proofs."

Schaeffer makes three points about miracles. "Firstly, these are space-time proofs in written form, and consequently capable of careful consideration. Then, secondly, these proofs are of such a nature as to give good and sufficient evidence that Christ is the Messiah as prophesied in the Old Testament, and also that he is the Son of God. So that, thirdly, we are not asked to believe until we have faced the question as to whether this is true on the basis of the space-time evidence."⁵⁰

2,19. Schaeffer is confident that if anyone will check the Bible out after seeing the ruin of rationalism, he will conclude that, "in contrast to non-Christian answers . . . , if the scope of the phenomena under consideration is large enough (that is if it includes the existence of the universe and its form, and the 'mannishness' of man as he now is) Christianity, beginning with the existence of an infinite, personal God, man's creation in his image and a space-time Fall, constitutes a non-contradictory answer that does explain the phenomena and which can be lived with, both in life and in scholarly pursuits."⁵¹

2,20. *Summary*. Schaeffer's apologetic method is "presuppositional." He asks, "Whose presupposition, that of the non-Christian or the Christian, provides an adequate base for explanations of 'the external world and its form and the "mannishness" of man' which meet the commonly accepted criteria of proof?" He then attempts to show that no ex-

planation of the phenomena in question (as expressly formulated in the apologetic questions) which is *consistent* with "rationalism" (the presupposition of non-Christian thought) *can* meet the criteria. Therefore "rationalism" is false.

This refutation of "rationalism" bestows on the Christian system an immediate *prima facie* reasonability for it presupposes the falsehood of "rationalism." The whole of the Christian system, its explanations of the phenomena in questions, its historical claims and its conceptual content, is then carefully tested by the same criteria. It meets the agreed criteria of truth. Therefore, the Christian religion is true.⁵²

Is this argument sound?

3. CRITICISM

3,1. Dr. Schaeffer has not yet finished writing on the subject of apologetic method. He plans for a work to appear in early 1972, *He Is There and He Is Not Silent*, in which he further develops and clarifies his apologetic. In that work he also plans to answer some of his critics. A *final* assessment of his method of defending Christianity is, therefore, not possible.

3,2. Nevertheless, the value of this essay would be significantly diminished if I left the reader with no critical perspective with which to interact. I, therefore, propose to provide this perspective by putting to Dr. Schaeffer some questions which I have about what he *does* say and by expressing to him some disappointments which I feel about what he *does not* say.

3,3. What Dr. Schaeffer *does say* can be divided into five sections: (a) the criteria of proof, in 2,4; (b) the apologetic questions which refer to the aspects of reality: in 2,5—6; (c) the identification of the basic secular presupposition, in 2,8; (d) the "downward" (destructive)

argument, in 2,9—14; and (e) the “upward” (constructive) argument, in 2, 15—19. I have the following questions about these sections.

3,4. Dr. Schaeffer, if a non-Christian agreed with your argument as it develops in *a—d*, would it be *logically necessary* for him to agree with your assessment of Christianity as found in *e*, or might he conclude that some other revelation-dependent religion, and not Christianity, or that no now existing revelation-dependent religion, meets the criteria of proof? Might a non-Christian agree with *a—d* and yet agree with Michael Scriven’s assessment of the Christian doctrine of creation? He says,

A creation “explanation” of the Universe is hopeless since such a creation has to be more than a rearrangement of previously existing materials by a previously existing entity. We have to pay the excessive price for this explanation of introducing a Being whose own origin is exactly as unexplained as that of the first material object and whose nature and creative procedures are additional unfathomables. In short, the act or process of divine creation, rather than being an explanation, not only is itself unobservable and incomprehensible, with no observable effects that distinguish its product from a naturally but spontaneously originated Universe. It is also supposed to be performed by an entity whose own origin simply reintroduces the mystery which it was his function to eliminate.

... instead of seeing that the introduction of a God simply substitutes two mysteries for one (the mystery of his own origin and of the way he creates matter, for the mystery of the origin of matter), we think it actually explains where the Universe came from. It is about as explanatory as telling a child who asks where the rainbow comes from that the light elves weave it. We cannot avoid the questions: “How do they do this?” “Where do they come from?”⁵³

3,5. “Dr. Schaeffer, in section *d* you maintain that ‘rationalism’ is not an adequate *logical* base for ‘optimism’ and you point to the historical shift from ‘optimism’ to ‘pessimism’ to support this. However, in spite of your lengthy discussions of this shift, the precise *logical*

relationship between ‘rationalism’ and ‘pessimism’ remains unclear to me. Would you give me a purely logical argument which shows that the only consistent form of ‘rationalism’ is ‘pessimism’? Precisely *how* does the assumption that man must be the source of all ‘knowledge, meaning and value’ entail that he has never uncovered, nor will ever, of himself uncover the absolute truth about all things?”

3,6. “Dr. Schaeffer, in section *c* you maintain that the basic presupposition of secular thought is ‘rationalism’. How did you arrive at this identification? How would you defend it if a non-Christian should deny that he assumes this? Can you refer me to any non-Christian who has ever rejected Christianity for *this* reason?”

3,7. “Dr. Schaeffer, in section *b* I refer to the four basic apologetic questions which it seems to me you propose. Can you tell me why it is *these* phenomena, as opposed to others which might be suggested, e.g., the evolution of the horse, the age of the solar system which runs into billions of years, or the physiochemical base of all human thoughts and emotions, which are in such great need of explanation? Do you expect the non-Christian to accept each of your questions precisely as you put them? How would you answer, for example, an argument against your first question such as that expressed in this dialogue between Kai Nielsen and Paul Tillich?

Kai Nielsen: . . . When we ask Tillich’s question “Why is there something rather than nothing at all?” we are asking what is the *reason* for there being something rather than nothing. But it seems to me that there is no possible answer to this question that does not itself generate the same type of question . . . If nothing could *conceivably* answer Tillich’s basic philosophical question or problem, in what sense is it literally a question or problem? A question or problem without a *conceivable* answer seems to me no question or no problem at all.

Tillich: There is no doubt that the question, “Why is there something, why not nothing?” is not a question in the proper logical sense of the word. There is no answer to it, as I myself have indicated by referring to Kant’s mythical God who asks this question with respect to himself and cannot answer it.⁵⁴

3,8. “Dr. Schaeffer, in section *a* you adopt certain criteria of proof or truth. Do you understand these criteria to be infallible guides to what is, with absolute certainty, the case? It seems to me that your view of truth needs criteria which fill this bill.⁵⁵ It seems to me, however, that your criteria are not adequate to this task. I say this because it seems *conceivable* to me that a non-Christian might agree with your entire argument *a—e* and yet say that *not only Christianity* but many other revelation-dependent religions (Mormonism?) are thoroughly consistent and adequate to all the facts *as their adherents see them!* If this is possible, what additional criteria arguments would you introduce to help a non-Christian to decide between Christianity and the competing truth claims of other revelation-dependent religions?”

3,9. My disappointments about what Dr. Schaeffer *does not say* fall into two categories: (a) the conceptual problems within the Christian scheme itself, and (b) the relationship of many Reformed doctrines to apologetic method.

3,10. “Dr. Schaeffer, you use biblical doctrines to answer your apologetic questions,⁵⁶ yet you nowhere mention that these doctrines (creation, the sovereignty of God, the Fall and responsibility of man, the Trinity, the deity and humanity of Christ, the ‘personality’ and ‘rationality’ of God) are conceptually elusive, having long histories as recalcitrant puzzles within Christian theology. I hope this situation will be remedied in the future.

You would do Christian apologetics a

genuine service by acknowledging these difficulties, offering your own solutions to them and, most importantly, justifying your use of these theological concepts (which include in a fundamental fashion the biblical notion of “mystery”) as rationally and scientifically sound “explanations.”

As things now stand, I cannot help but feel that your use of theology borders on the cavalier and that you are insensitive to the theoretical struggles which many Christians, both past and present, go through in an effort to understand and hold on to their personal faith.

3,11. “Dr. Schaeffer, after reading all your works I am still very much in the dark about your own personal synthesis of theology and apologetics. I do not understand how you view the relationship between the two. Where does the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit fit into your apologetic method? In what sense is this divine work *necessary*?⁵⁷ Of what import to apologetics is the doctrine of the Fall? How is *fallen* man different from *finite* man, noetically speaking?⁵⁸ How does the doctrine of election fit into a *thoroughly rational apologetic* for the Christian faith? I look forward to reading some stimulating discussion of these crucial matters in your future work on epistemology.”

3,12. These are not all, nor even, perhaps, the most significant questions which I or readers of this essay might have. Nevertheless, I hope that raising them has set the reader’s mind to jog along certain apologetic tracks and created in him some concrete expectations regarding the content of Dr. Schaeffer’s forthcoming book, *He Is There and He Is Not Silent*. I personally look forward to reading it. Then, perhaps at some future time, I can return to provide a yet clearer picture of Francis Schaeffer’s “presuppositional” apologetic.

NOTES

¹ Dr. Schaeffer's five books to date are: *Escape from Reason* (London: Inter-Varsity, 1968); *The God Who Is There* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968); *Death in the City* (London: Inter-Varsity Press, 1969); *Pollution and the Death of Man: The Christian View of Ecology* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1970); and *The Church at the End of the Twentieth Century* (London: Norfolk, 1970). These works are referred to in the footnotes by their significant initials; thus *Escape from Reason* is ER.

² I refer interested readers to Colin Brown's *Philosophy and the Christian Faith* for a perspective of the history of philosophy (London: Tyndale, 1969) which differs at important points from Dr. Schaeffer's.

³ GT/79—80. In this manner I shall indicate page references. I must add at this early point in the essay that I am aware that a paper such as this, is, in some important ways, a "distortion." It forces a structure upon a work that is not so structured. It uses words with a precision not found in the author's work. Sometimes this means quoting certain passages which, while being truly representative of his thought, are, in context, only applications of that thought. At other times it means not using Schaeffer's exact words to get through to his ideas (cf. note 20). I have attempted, in the footnotes, to supply the interested reader with cross references so that he might be able to have a broader base upon which to judge Schaeffer's work.

⁴ GT/14, cf. 142.

⁵ GT/110—112.

⁶ GT/112.

⁷ GT/14.

⁸ GT/110.

⁹ DC/90.

¹⁰ GT/121.

¹¹ GT/122.

¹² GT/121.

¹³ GT/128.

¹⁴ DC/89; cf. CETC/16, 55.

¹⁵ GT/88.

¹⁶ GT/99.

¹⁷ GT/16.

¹⁸ ER/34—35, 88; GT/16, 21, 46, 92.

¹⁹ GT/16.

²⁰ GT/125. I might here mention some of the verbal difficulties that one encounters in Schaeffer's style. When Schaeffer refers to someone's "presuppositions", it is usually not clear whether he is talking about the presupposition of rationalism, rationalistic optimism or rationalistic pessimism. At times he even implies

that there are others beside these (GT/120). Sometimes he uses "truth" to refer to *absolute truth*, i. e. the true world-view, while at other times he means simply true as opposed to false. Often it is not clear which. "Pessimism" is sometimes used for the opposites of "optimism" (the way I use it in this paper), while at other times it means the same as "nihilism" or the logically consistent form of pessimistic rationalism.

²¹ GT/16.

²² GT/27.

²³ ER/41, cf. GT/16—17, 21.

²⁴ GT/27; cf. GT/14—15, 21, 92.

²⁵ GT/18.

²⁶ GT/142.

²⁷ GT/21; cf. GT/51—54; ER/46 ff.

²⁸ ER/41, 42, 45.

²⁹ GT/21; cf. GT/46, 92; ER/89; CETC/22—23.

³⁰ GT/79—80; cf. GT/13, 47—48.

³¹ GT/118—130.

³² ER/87.

³³ GT/111.

³⁴ GT/111.

³⁵ GT/87.

³⁶ GT/87; cf. GT/100, 111.

³⁷ GT/111.

³⁸ GT/121.

³⁹ GT/121.

⁴⁰ GT/125.

⁴¹ GT/110.

⁴² ER/88.

⁴³ GT/114.

⁴⁴ GT/86.

⁴⁵ GT/110.

⁴⁶ GT/112; cf. CETC/55.

⁴⁷ GT/110.

⁴⁸ GT/91.

⁴⁹ DC/79—96.

⁵⁰ GT/140.

⁵¹ GT/112.

⁵² Readers familiar with other American apologists will recognize the similarity between Schaeffer's structure and that first put forward by Edward J. Carnell in his *An Introduction to Apologetics* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1st ed., 1948).

⁵³ M. Scriven, *Primary Philosophy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 119—120.

⁵⁴ Sydney and Beatrice Rome, eds., *Philosophical Interrogations* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964), p. 403.

⁵⁵ GT/142; cf. CETC/102: "Truth, in the classic sense of that which accurately represents what is real for all time and all places . . ."

⁵⁶ GT/86—108.

⁵⁷ Cf. GT/142 with ER/93.

⁵⁸ Cf. ER/89 with ER/11.