

Edward Moore
Ballyvaughan

The Journal of Theological Studies

APRIL, 1901

THE FULHAM CONFERENCE ON COMMUNION WITH THE ATONEMENT.

'THE occasion, the action, and the full words, of the Institution, all define the sacred Body in our Lord's thought to be the Body as in Death, and the sacred Blood to be the Blood as in Death; that is, as in the act and process of the One Sacrifice which is our Redemption. By the Body and the Blood I thus humbly understand to be "signified" the Means of our Redemption—themselves belonging to the past, but in their redeeming Effect ever present¹.'

These are Dr. Moule's words, written very carefully beforehand for the Round Table Conference at Fulham. They represent a position very deliberately taken, and maintained as crucial, by the 'Evangelical' representatives generally on that occasion. The same position was affirmed with the same emphasis and agreement at a discussion upon Eucharistic doctrine held a year or two ago, at the annual Islington Conference. We may probably take it, at this moment, that the position stated is the fundamental basis of the theological teaching, upon this particular subject, of our Evangelical friends. In the words of Mr. Dimock, 'the *Res sacramenti* is not Christ as He now is, but Christ's Body and Blood as separated in Sacrificial Death for our sins².'

The words quoted from Dr. Moule so nearly express the very

¹ *Report of a Conference held at Fulham Palace, Oct., 1900, p. 29.*

² *Ibid. p. 12.*

truth, that if we heard them for the first time without context or comment we might be inclined to welcome them as true. But the more we examine his position in full, and take it in all its context at Fulham and Islington, the more shall we feel that it just misses, after all, the very truth at which it aims; while in that margin of exaggeration, between the truth at which it aims and the thing which it actually says, there has crept in the beginning of a somewhat far-reaching misconception. But before commenting upon it, I may express something of my own satisfaction and thankfulness in finding that the difference in Eucharistic doctrine between High Churchmen and Evangelicals—between (that is) two classes of minds which differ in some real respects but are apt to imagine their differences much greater than they really are—can be brought to a clear theological issue like this. Here is a question strictly theological; a question which can be argued dispassionately, and, if need be, at patient length; a question outside the turmoil of party cries, or the heat of party feeling. We shall learn to be grateful for the Fulham Conference, if for nothing else, yet for this, that it has brought clearly to light a quiet theological issue upon which, nevertheless, a very large part of the whole great controversy rests.

And I should like also to acknowledge from the beginning that the position which is thus cardinal to modern Evangelical theology is in its origin neither new nor partisan. A doctrine strenuously maintained as cardinal to Eucharistic truth by Archdeacon Freeman and by Canon Trevor, based by both upon emphatic words of Bishop Andrewes¹, and by Canon Trevor upon a long catena of passages from distinctive and distinguished Anglican divines, is no device of modern 'Low Churchmanship.' It has a long history, and many-sided support. It is no more partisan than it is new. Those who think that there is in it nevertheless a core of mistake, will not only have to show their own grounds of principle against it, but will also have to account for the large amount of apparent historical consensus which can be urged on its behalf.

With this prelude I pass at once to the consideration of certain objections to the doctrine.

¹ See Freeman's *Principles of Divine Service*, vol. ii p. 209, ed. 1873 (ch. i, end of § 12), and Trevor's *Catholic Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist*, p. 176.

I. First I would urge that this doctrine, if pressed, is open to one of the objections which we have been in the habit of making—and making, as I believe, truly and rightly—against transubstantiation: namely, that it introduces a new and unnecessary miracle. Christ was—but is not—dead. His Body as dead, His Blood as separated in death, are not, anyhow or anywhere, now. It is obvious to urge that the gift given in the Sacrament is what is, and not what is not. There is no *cadaver*. There is no blood of a corpse. In whatever sense the bread and wine either represent, or are, or so represent that they may be said to be, certain realities beyond themselves, they at all events are, or represent, realities—things existent, not non-existent. There is indeed a ‘Christ who died’: but there is no ‘dead Christ.’ Now the answer, if I understand it, on this particular point, appeals really to the Divine power of making a past moment present. I am not sure whether it would be right to apply to this point Mr. Dimock’s quotation from Ridley on a cognate point, that it ‘could only be effected by the “omnipotency of Christ’s Word”¹.’ But I have no doubt that this is the meaning of Bishop Andrewes, where he says, ‘By the incomprehensible power of His eternal Spirit, not He alone, but He as at the very act of His offering is made present to us².’ ‘He at the very act of His offering’ clearly means, to Andrewes, Christ dying on Calvary, not Christ, risen and ascended, presenting the blood of His sacrifice in the Holy of Holies: and he conceives this perpetual re-identification of the Church with the moment of Calvary—this reproduction of a point in the past as present—to be an act of the ‘incomprehensible power of Christ’s Eternal Spirit.’ I shall have by and by to point out that if, by whatever exercise of miraculous power, this precise point of the past were reproduced as present, it would *not* be the moment, after all, of the consummation of the sacrifice. It would be, on the contrary, a moment in the process, a moment indeed of transcendent importance, but still a moment at which, if you could indeed break off there, the sacrifice would be still not fully consummated. But my present point is that whether that moment is the moment of consum-

¹ *Fulham Conference*, pp. 48, 49.

² *Sermons of the Resurrection*, preached on Easter-day, vii (*Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology: Andrewes’ Sermons*, vol. ii [1841], p. 302).

mated sacrifice or no, in asking to have it reproduced by 'incomprehensible power' as present, you are asking in fact for a miraculous inversion of realities.

I do not say that Mr. Dimock would allow this. On the contrary, I rather think his language is intended to avoid it. He says, of the *res significatae*—that is, the dead body, and the separated blood—that they are 'thus verily and indeed taken and received by the faithful, being really present for the manducation of faith, "Cui praesentia sunt omnia praeterita"'; and again he claims that 'there was no novelty in maintaining that things of the *past* may be things *present to faith*¹.' I think, perhaps, this 'presence to faith' is meant to be conceived of as a mode of presence expressly not miraculous, but normal.

Now, I pass by the point which Canon Gore made as to the whole sentence of Rupert of Deutz² from which Mr. Dimock quoted a phrase; for I am more concerned with Mr. Dimock's meaning than with Rupert's. Mr. Dimock, then, at all events, puts it as a general principle, that things past may be present to faith. In what sense may they? I quite understand their being present to memory, or to imagination; both of which, it is to be observed, imply that whatever kind of reality may be asserted of the presence, the absence is incomparably *more* real than the presence; the presence is only a sort of quasi-presence, or substitute for presence, of the really absent; but it is plain, I suppose, that Mr. Dimock's 'presence to faith' means something more than the imagination of memory. He puts it as a normal principle, of universal application. To faith 'omnia praeterita' are present. Are they? I must venture to challenge the principle in this form. If in any sense 'all things' are present to faith, assuredly they are not all present in the same sense; and directly you begin to discriminate, the principle as principle is gone. It is no longer a property of faith to make all things present. But you have to ask what that property is, in some things which causes them to be, and in other things which causes them not to be, present eternally to the faculty which can discern them as present.

For it is important to observe that faith is not a cause of existence. It does not make things to be when they are not. It is rather a power of corresponding with what is. It sees what

¹ *Fulham Conference*, pp. 48, 49.

² *Ibid.* p. 49.

* cannot be seen, it realizes what cannot be realized, save by special capacity. But it does not invent, or create, what is not. It is true that there is a sense in which things may be said not to be, except to the capacity for discerning them. As there is no light save to the seeing eye, nor harmony save to the ear that is capable of music, nor spiritual discernment save to spirit: so divine things, save to faith, may be said not to be, in the same sense in which it is true that a poem is not a poem to the fire that burns it, or to the animal that tears it to pieces. But the man who rescues the poem and apprehends it, does not, by apprehending, make it. When these various things *are*, to faith, it is not faith which is the cause, or author, of their being. The musician hears, as the eye sees, what *is*. And faith receiving and discerning what, save to faith, is not, does not create but discerns what it receives, and both receives and discerns only what is.

| Only that, then, can be present to faith which is present really; that is, which is present to God. Is it true to say that to God 'praesentia sunt omnia praeterita'? I must submit that it is not true. Some things are eternal presents as others are not. It is true indeed that all accomplished facts tend to be, in their measure, an element in the abiding present. But some are so very faintly; some very mightily; and some can cease to be so altogether. And since they can cease to be so, the presentness is not an inherent, or universal, property of the past.

|| It is the haunting terror of conscious sin that it is contained within the present self. It is the inherent presentness of the past which is naturally its sting, or its power. But there is such a thing as consummated redemption, consummated forgiveness, consummated beatitude. There is such a thing as a real elimination and undoing of the past. The fact is that some past things are present in a sense in which others are not. *Cui praesentia sunt omnia praeterita* is misleading. Abraham's call, Abraham's faith, are they in the sight of the Eternal, eternal predicates, eternal truths of Abraham? I can well suppose that they are. Is the treachery of Judas an eternal reality? Our hearts may say *μὴ γένοιτο*, while we dare not, even for that, usurp the seat of the Judge. Is 'slainness' an eternal attribute of Christ? Emphatically it is. From the foundation of the world, and to eternity, He is the 'Lamb as it had been slain.' Not by

an act of miraculous reproduction of a single point in the unfinished record of the past; but inherently, because He is what He is, therefore His fact of death is an eternal attribute, an inherent and inalienable present. Not that He is always in the present dying, or in the present dead; not that sometimes, or often, His moment of dying is by God's power reproduced, or recalled; but that it always is an indivisible part of what He is, and He, apart from it, would be less than Himself. Here is an instance indeed, without special miracle, yet as a property of God, in which 'praesens est, usque ad aeternum, id quod est praeteritum.'

But is St. Peter for ever lying, or for ever a liar? Is the moment of his betrayal—is the moment of every Christian's fall and sin—alike part of God's eternal present? Emphatically it is not. Else were the Cross a failure after all, and real sanctification a delusion. I will not try to elaborate this further. To say that a certain past act is of such character as to constitute an eternal attribute, predicate, or property, is one thing. To say that a certain point in a past process is by God's power miraculously reproduced, to say that the perfect wholeness of a consummated work can be so (as it were) rolled back, that men can be set by God's power at a special moment when the work was prepared and waiting to be consummated eternally, is another. The one is to conceive of Christ's death, as I believe that Scripture conceives of it, as an eternal element or attribute, inseparable from what Christ is. The other is to bring back the actual moment of Christ's dying—itsself a point (albeit a transcendent point) in the work as yet unconsummated and uncrowned—to bring it back, unnaturally and unnecessarily, by a divine act of 'incomprehensible power,' into the midst of the perpetual present.

II. The second objection I would urge is one which was explicitly made at Fulham. It is that the doctrine makes an unreal distinction between the sacrificed and the glorified Body: as though there were two Bodies of Christ, when there is but one. The sacrificed is the glorified Body, and the glorified Body is the sacrificed. It is the distinctive glory of the glorified Body that it is the Body of sacrifice. The slainness is not a mere past fact, which is naturally ever more remote but supernaturally resuscitated into the present. The slainness is an eternal fact; an essential—for the purpose we may even say *the* essential—

element and character of the eternal present. To me it seems essential to theological truth to insist upon the indivisible oneness of the Body. It is as the characteristic attribute of the glorified Christ that His sacrificial Death is present eternally: not as an undoing of the glory; a going back into the desolateness of the past; a cutting of the redemptive work of Christ into halves; a stopping short (*per impossibile*) in the moment of the blackness. It was never a dead Christ, as dead, but a Christ who could not be holden of death; it was a Christ who died and lived through dying; a Christ who by dying conquered death; a Christ not νεκρός but ὁ ζῶν, καὶ ἐγενόμην νεκρός, καὶ ἰδοὺ ζῶν ἐπι εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων; it was such a Christ, and as such, who triumphed and who atoned, not in, but through, death. I would fully adopt on this point the words of Canon Gore, as given in the report: 'He could not separate the sacrificed from the glorified Body of our Saviour, and could not conceive of our partaking of the former except through the latter. The latter, he urged, is the only Body now existing, or that ever has existed; and it is the same Body which, once in a crucified, is now in a glorified state¹.' I would add only the reminder that even the two states must not be so contrasted as to seem to be mutually exclusive; that as the crucified state was itself a mode or condition of the glory, so the 'glorified state' does not by antithesis exclude, but rather includes, and is based on, and is characterized by, the inalienable fact of 'crucifiedness.'

A reply on this point was attempted by Chancellor Smith², which seems to me to involve a good deal of misconception. There must, he seems to argue, be some such dualism as is implied in the antithesis between the crucified and the glorified Body of our Lord, because, at the institution, Jesus in bodily form, and the bread and wine which He gave as His Body and Blood, were separately present, side by side with each other. In what sense does Chancellor Smith suppose that the bread and wine, at the last supper, *were* the Body and Blood of Christ? And were they the crucified or the glorified Body? If the crucified Body by antithesis against the glorified, then, in whatever sense of the word 'were,' they were the same Body as the Body which handled and delivered them. This may possibly raise some

¹ *Fulham Conference*, pp. 50, 51.

² *Ibid.* p. 52.

question about the word 'were'; but if both 'were' the same Body of crucifixion, what becomes of the necessary antithesis between the crucified and the glorified Body? The very fact that the bread and wine could really 'be' that which, in an obvious sense, at the very same moment they were not, is (to say the least) a strong suggestion in the direction rather of identification across apparent antithesis, than of antithesis breaking up identity. On the other hand, if they were the glorified Body, what would become of the whole argument for the sake of which the antithesis is desired? The only remaining alternative, that the palpable Body of Jesus which went that night through the agony, and through the crucifixion next day, was itself the glorified in contrast with the crucified Body, could of course not even be suggested.

On the face of it, then, this answer does not appear to be very formidable, or to shake our position when we maintain that there neither are, nor were, two Bodies of Christ; but that the crucified Body is glorified because crucified, and that the glorified Body is, both now and for ever, essentially characterized as crucified. Would you find the crucified Body? Do not go back and peep into the tomb. Behold it! alive and glorified for ever! 'Why seek ye the living among the dead? He is not here, He is risen!'. The crucified Body is on the throne of God.

I do not care, then, to adopt exactly the sentence with which Canon Gore first raised this question at the Conference². I do not suppose, in the light of his words which I quoted just now, that he would himself regard it as theologically felicitous, though it effectually served to raise his point. Neither 'the crucified Body directly and the glorified Body consequentially,' nor 'the glorified Body directly and the crucified Body consequentially,' seem to me quite happy or quite true phrases³. Our communion in the Eucharist is communion with, or of, the Body of Christ *which is*. And the Body of Christ is the crucified Body glorified. We are made partakers, in the Eucharist, of humanity sinless and glorified; but sinless through sacrifice, and glorified by that victory over death which could only have been won through dying. But Chancellor Smith's answer suggests, no doubt,

¹ Luc. xxiv 5, 6.

² *Fulham Conference*, p. 44.

³ Compare the clear statements made by Canon Gore in *The Body of Christ*, pp. 61, 62, 66, 94, &c.

a deeper point than this comparatively superficial argument. And this leads us naturally on to, and will arise naturally under, the third of the principles which I had desired to advance. It is this.

III. It seems to me clear, as I have tried to set forth with greater fullness elsewhere, that every reality in the Church of Christ, is in Spirit, spiritual. Pentecost is the extension and the perpetuation of the real meaning and power of the Incarnation. And the Spirit of Pentecost constitutes the Church what it is. The Church may fall short, in all directions, of her own ideal meaning. But in her own ideal meaning, the Church *is* the Spirit; and the ordinances of the Church are what they are of, and by, Spirit. 'Ecclesia proprie et principaliter Ipse est Spiritus.' This is true, broadly, of the ideal meaning of the Church as a whole. It is true distinctively of the Church's distinctive principle and experience—the feeding upon the Body and Blood of Christ. It is the Ascension—and that which the Ascension implies—which is the key to the truly spiritual understanding of spiritual things. 'Doth this offend you? What and if ye should see the Son of Man ascend up where He was before? It is the Spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing: the words that I speak unto you, they are Spirit, and they are life¹.'

Nothing, then, in the Church of Christ has its own real meaning or being, save in and through Pentecost. It is within the sphere of Spirit, and by the power of Spirit,—and it is not except by, and within, Spirit—that the Communion really is what the Communion really is. What is pre-Pentecostal is preparatory merely. It had the form, the organs, the discipline; but not yet the full living spiritual essence. It was necessary that one mode of Christ's presence should be withdrawn, before the second—which was the real object and climax of the first—could be made a living reality. 'Nevertheless I tell you the truth; it is expedient for you that I go away; for if I go not away the Comforter will not come unto you, but if I depart, I will send Him unto you².'

As the Church, as Church, was called and shaped and welded and instructed and disciplined by the Incarnate Christ, yet was not, as Church, alive till the Breath of Christ—till Christ as Breath—was breathed into it, and it lived by His life, now

¹ Jo. vi 61-63.

² Jo. xvi 7.

become its own ; as the Apostles of Christ were personally called and trained and fitted to be apostles before the Ascension, and yet were not really what the word 'Apostles of Christ' properly connotes till the Spirit of Christ possessed them (the Simon Bar-Jonah who denied the Lord, though by a more than possible use of language he can be said to be, yet was not, for all purposes, to quite strict thought, the Apostle St. Peter) : so the last Supper, as instituted on the night before the Crucifixion, was not yet actually all that the Christian Eucharist—which nevertheless it was, and which was it—was to be in the Church of Christ.

This is a principle as to the necessary truth of which I feel very strongly ; and yet it is one against which I should anticipate very earnest protest. Do you venture, it will be asked, even to suggest that the Supper as instituted—as celebrated—by Christ Himself, was in any respect other, or less, than that Christian Eucharist, whose highest conceivable perfection it would be, to be exactly what Christ's Supper was ? It is indeed the highest conceivable perfection of the Christian Eucharist to be what Christ's Supper both ordained and signified. But why must it have had, at that moment of its preliminary institution for the life of the Church, all that inner essence which belongs to it as within the sphere of the life of the Church, which is the enabling Spirit of Pentecost ? Does any principle of reverence for the word of Christ preclude us from believing that the Church first became what the Church means : that the Apostles first were really Apostles indeed : that the breathing of Christ upon them for the power of remitting or retaining sins sprang to its essential fullness of living power : and that the institution of the last Supper became alive with all its inherent spiritual reality ; at the moment when the consummation of God's work as Incarnate, through the crowning of the Ascension and the entry in glory into the Holy of Holies, first made possible—as He Himself had taught before—His return, as Spirit, to be the Breath and Life, the vital essence and reality, of His Church, and of all that His Church meant and was ?

Christ, as Incarnate, condescended to a world of before and after. It was part of this condescension to the natural limitations and distinctions of before and after, that the Birth, the Life, the Death, the Resurrection, the Ascension, the Spiritual Indwelling,

became so many separate and contrasted moments. It was incidental to this condescension, that He prepared and ordained beforehand what was to have its full life afterwards: that He in bodily presence, before His death, instituted an ordinance whose whole vital significance depended not only upon the accomplishment of His death, which was not then, even as death, accomplished, but also upon the triumphant character of His death: upon the fact that His death was not death only, not death so much as the destruction of death; upon the fact that His death was but a stage, or mode, of eternally victorious life. Had the death ended in death, it would not have had the significance, or the power, which the institution (itself prior to the death) implied. In any case the institution precedes that which gives it its significance. Why should it not be recognized at once that that after-reality which gave it its significance was itself still incomplete, till the (yet future) Resurrection as well as the (yet future) Death—till the Ascension as well as the Resurrection—had been consummated? In the picture of Christ, handling with His Body the elements which He delivers as His Body, we are really to recognize not a distinctness of two Divine Bodies, but the simple truth that in a world of before and after, He ordains beforehand, and in palpable form, that whose full significance implies, and depends upon, and so far waits for, the things which are to follow, and are impalpable.

To take the ordinance which is most vitally distinctive of the life of the Pentecostal Church, outside the region of the Pentecostal Church: to say that it is, or that it ever was, what it essentially is, otherwise than precisely within the sphere, and by virtue of the efficiency, of the Pentecostal Spirit, seems to me to be, in fact, a form of materialism; a substitution of the dead for the living, of the mechanical for the vital; an abandonment (at the central point) of the distinctively spiritual character of the Church and her ministries and sacraments.

Any real union and communion of our real selves can only be, not with dead symbols as dead, but with the living Christ, the redemption and perfection of humanity. Any real union and communion with humanity as perfected in Christ can only be by Spirit, of Spirit, in Spirit. The material, the symbolic, are vehicles—are means—of this. But to make the material or the

symbolic in any way a substitute for this ; a truth more primary or more real than this ; a reality from which communion of Spirit ('that we may evermore dwell in Him and He in us') follows only as a secondary sequel, or inferential corollary : this, so far as it goes, seems to me to be an obscuring of the spiritual—which is the real—truth ; a materializing of the spiritual—which is the highest—reality.

All these three points which I have urged seem to me to be real and weighty, and to be suggestive of much beyond what I have been able to say. I do believe that the doctrine in question assumes a superfluous miracle ; that it distinguishes Christ's sacrificed and Christ's glorified Body as two bodies ; and that it takes the most characteristic experience of the Pentecostal Church—in the teeth of our Lord's direct words in St. John vi—outside the sphere of the Pentecostal Spirit, in and by which alone I believe it to be what it is. And I believe these objections to be really invincible. And yet after all it is not, I think, mainly upon these that the controversy as to the truth or falsehood of the doctrine will turn. It is really knit closely up with a certain form of the doctrine of the Atonement ; and with that, in the long run, I believe that it will stand or fall.

Now it is precisely here, as I conceive, that we really touch one or two questions which are, to the whole matter, cardinal. It is here that we touch the real animating motive of the whole Evangelical contention. It is here also that we find the key to the real meaning of the Anglican language quoted by Canon Trevor ; and learn at once, both what it really means, and wherein what it really means is, or may be, in part misrepresented by the form of language in which it is often conveyed.

IV. The animating motive in the whole Evangelical contention is, I believe, the instinct, strong and clear, that the Eucharist immediately connects us *with the atoning Sacrifice of Christ*—with the Blood of the Atonement, with the Body that died. This causes an instinctive protest against any Eucharistic theory which would connect us, in communion, with something other than atoning sacrifice—with something that may seem (as it were) to shirk atoning sacrifice—with glory merely as glory, with bliss as bliss. Now with this instinct, and this protest, I desire to associate myself without reserve. I would say, as strongly as Dr. Moule,

or Mr. Dimock, or Dr. Wace could say it, that it is with nothing so much as the sacrifice as sacrifice, the atonement as atonement, that the Eucharist was ordained to associate us.

If I were asked whether I believed the union of the communicant to be primarily with Christ in glory as victorious or primarily with the Blood of the Atonement, I should utterly protest against the antithesis, as in itself misleading and untrue. But if you *press* any one to choose between two things as alternatives which are not alternatives and cannot be separated, it is a matter largely of temperament, or of mood, which of the two will at a given moment appear to be the more primary or vital. It is to me quite certain that I could not choose or mean, by the *res significata*, anything which was not itself, in its most essential being, the Body and Blood of *the atoning sacrifice*. We do *not* mean any substitution of fruition *instead of* sacrifice, of blissful presence *instead of* atoning blood. But then it is no less clear to me that I cannot be made one with the Body and Blood of the atoning sacrifice in any way that is at all distinguishable from that living identification of the spirit of the self, through Spirit, and in Spirit, with the Spirit of the Christ, who was sacrificed and triumphant through sacrifice; which, however inconceivable to my natural self, is, none the less, my only possibility or hope—the presence of me in Christ, and of Christ in me.

For such reasons I cannot but think that Dr. Robertson's summary of the first discussion at Fulham, if correctly reported, was unfortunate¹, though both Dr. Moule and Canon Newbolt are said to have concurred. 'The question is,' so the summary runs, 'whether the virtue of the Sacrament depends upon our receiving the benefits of Christ's passion (*a*) by commemoration of His death, or (*b*) by union with His living Body.' To this I object, first, that the alternative is not an alternative; and secondly, that whilst each of the two phrases is true, and each, for its truth, requires the truth of the other, neither of them hits the true point quite fully. For 'union with His living Body' does not make explicit reference to His Death. It would characterize the truth more precisely to say 'union with His Body that died.' But then 'His Body that died' would

¹ *Fulham Conference*, p. 47.

emphatically mean 'that died and is alive.' We are made partakers of His Body *ὡς ἐσφαγμένον*. So far I agree with my whole heart. It is the very core of the truth. But *ὡς νεκρόν*? Most emphatically not.

With much, then, of the Evangelical meaning I can heartily concur. When Dr. Wace¹ says that 'the Holy Communion is a commemoration, as well on the part of God, by whom it was instituted, as on the part of man, of the one sufficient sacrifice offered by our Lord on the Cross, and a visible means for assuring and conveying to us the benefits of that sacrifice,' I could accept his saying, not indeed without some added explanation, but without the alteration of a word. When Mr. Dimock² urges the extreme importance of 'bearing witness to the truth, that for outcast lost sinners, there was no access to life in communion with God, save by the reconciliation which we have by the death of His Son—no way of entering into fellowship with the resurrection life of Christ except by being made partakers of His Body and Blood, as sacrificed for the remission of sins,' I am, so far as these words go, with him altogether. Even when Dr. Moule³ urges that it is 'involved in the terms of institution that our Lord put forward His Body and Blood as sacrificed—the Body as dead, and the Blood as shed—to be participated in as a sacrifice,' I could still adopt the words, if only I may put my own interpretation on 'dead'; making it clear that I mean the Body which died and is not dead, not the Body in a state of death; and again, that by the 'Blood as shed' I mean really the 'shed Blood,' not the Blood as now in a state of separation from the Body.

I know of course that against this there will be urged, first, the fact, so often supposed to be symbolic, that the bread and the cup are separately consecrated and received; and secondly, the present tenses in the words of institution (if, or so far as, they are genuine)—the *διδόμενον*, *κλόμενον*, and *ἐκχυνόμενον*.

As to the first of these, I would answer, with all reverence, that if bread and wine are to be consecrated to represent Christ's Body and Blood, the symbol cannot, save in very general outline (as it were), represent the thing symbolized. Bread and wine do not naturally combine into a single entity: and the soaking of the

¹ *Fulham Conference*, p. 38.

² *Ibid.* p. 45.

³ *Ibid.* p. 44.

bread in the wine, which is the one method of combination, would produce a form of unity singularly unlike the unity which (it is implied) would have symbolized Christ as alive. Blood contained in body, not body steeped in blood, is the natural condition of material life. If bread and wine are to represent body and blood, it seems to me so far the more natural thing that they should represent them severally, rather than in a forced combination, which would fail symbolically, that I cannot admit that the fact that they represent them severally, rather than by an artificial commixture, carries us exegetically any way at all towards determining that they represent them in a state of death. Moreover, it is, after all, not so much in a state of material life *before* death, as in a state of spiritual life *through* death, a state of which 'having died' is an eternal predicate, that I conceive the bread and wine as representing them. So far as the symbolism of the separateness of the elements is conceived of merely as reminding us that the Body and Blood are not as in the ordinary condition of material life, but are those which died and, through death, are alive, I of course should have no ground for demurring to it. But it seems to me in any case clear that a precise detail of symbolism of this kind must be ruled by what we believe to be the true, revealed, and experienced doctrine of the Eucharist: not that our conception of the doctrine of the Eucharist can be shaped or ruled by it. So far as the bread and wine represent the Body and Blood in some reference to death, just so far there will be, in the suggested symbolism, an element of truth. But the suggested symbolism is far too uncertain to determine for us the precise truth of the doctrine.

In reply to any argument from the present participles, I would ask on what conceivable hypothesis they could have been otherwise than in the present tense, while Christ was still on the way to Calvary? From the point of view of the eve of the awful sacrifice they were inevitably—as inevitably upon my hypothesis as upon Mr. Dimock's—the Body that *was being* broken, the Blood that *was being* poured out. But from the point of view of the Pentecostal Church the sacrifice is already fully consummated: and the Body and Blood are, therefore, whatever they are in, and in view of, the consummation of the sacrifice. The tense is the one thing which cannot be simply carried over to the Pentecostal

Church. If, as tense, it is strictly true in the Pentecostal Church, this must be shown on weightier grounds of its own. It certainly does not follow as an inference from the fact that on the night before His death Christ spoke of His sacrifice as being still in process, and incomplete.

I return, then, from arguments like these, to the more central question of doctrine. This question I have already raised as a question between *ἔσφαγμένον* and *νεκρόν*. *Need* the truth, or *can* the truth, which is expressed in the words *ὡς ἔσφαγμένον*, be translated into the form *ὡς νεκρόν*, as though *ὡς νεκρόν* were an equivalent phrase? My contention is that it neither *need* nor *can*.

But the transition is one which can be made very easily, very imperceptibly. And it is precisely this transition which seems to me to have been made—without any consciousness that there was a transition—by certain Anglican divines, whose language is now insisted upon as cardinal to the Evangelical exposition of the Eucharist. Let me try first to exhibit the fact, and then to explain the meaning and moral of the fact.

No one does it more completely, not to say brusquely, than Bishop Andrewes. The passage quoted is from the seventh of the sermons preached on Easter Day upon the resurrection¹. Now, in this sermon, it seems to me plain that the really underlying object is (as I said of the modern evangelicals) to insist upon the direct connexion of the Eucharist with the atoning sacrifice of Christ. When he writes: 'It is not mental thinking, or verbal speaking, there must be actually somewhat done to celebrate this memory. That done to the holy symbols that was done to Him, to His Body and His Blood in the Passover; break the one, pour out the other, to represent *κλώμενον*, how His sacred Body was "broken," and *ἐκχυνόμενον*, how His precious Blood was "shed." And in *corpus fractum* and *sanguis fusus* there is *immolatus*': I do not really need to criticize a word; though I would remark, in parenthesis, that the process of 'outpouring' has never been, in fact, so prominent a ceremony in the consecration of the Eucharist as some of the language often used on this subject would appear to imply. But Bishop Andrewes does not draw the distinction

¹ *Sermons of the Resurrection*, vii (*Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology: Andrewes' Sermons*, vol. ii pp. 300-302).

which I have asked for between, on the one hand, the Blood in its character as having been shed, and so as directly representing the Life which died, and in its aspect as having both died, and atoned by living through death; and on the other the Blood conceived of as stopping short and remaining in a state of death. Nor is Bishop Andrewes the man to refrain from expressing his thought in the most pungently epigrammatic form: while even in a Bishop Andrewes it remains that pungent epigram is apt to be theologically perilous. It is tempting, no doubt, to culminate in a biting phrase. But biting phrases, as such, are apt to lack somewhat of the delicacy of truth. I submit, then, that it is exactly the exaggeration of his true insistence when he reaches the climax of his paragraph in the word *cadaver*. 'If an host could be turned into Him now glorified as He is, it would not serve; Christ offered is it—thither we must look. To the Serpent lift up, thither we must repair, even *ad cadaver*; we must *hoc facere*, do that is then done. So, and no otherwise, is this *epulare* to be conceived.'

In the paragraph which leads up to this climax the sentence which seems to me to be most argumentative asserts that Christ 'as now He is, glorified, is not, cannot be, *immolatus*, for He is immortal and impassible.' It is true, of course, that Christ cannot now a second time go through mortal sufferings. It is true, of course, that He is not, and cannot be, *immolandus*. But I should have supposed that if there was one proposition more certainly true than another, it is that Christ as He now is, glorified, both is, and shall be for ever, *immolatus*—τὸ ἀρνίον τὸ ἐσφαγμένον ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου¹—ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ θρόνου καὶ τῶν τεσσάρων ζώων, καὶ ἐν μέσῳ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, ἀρνίον ἐστηκὸς ὡς ἐσφαγμένον, ἔχων κέρατα ἑπτὰ καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς ἑπτὰ, οἱ εἰσι τὰ ἑπτὰ πνεύματα τοῦ Θεοῦ².

Besides Andrewes, Canon Trevor quotes some five and twenty other Anglican writers, of more or less imposing authority, upon the same side. They include Laud and Lake, Bramhall and Jeremy Taylor, Patrick and Dale and Waterland, and many others. As was to be expected (if I have been even approximately right in my statement of the case, and of the slurred distinction), many of the passages quoted by Canon Trevor would fall in as well with my view of the truth as with his own. I will

¹ Apoc. xiii 8.

² Apoc. v 6.

quote just three. Thus when Jeremy Taylor says, 'It is but an imperfect conception of the mystery to say, it is the Sacrament of Christ's Body only, or His Blood; but it is, *ex parte rei*, a sacrament of the death of His Body, and, to us, a participation or an exhibition of it, as it became beneficial to us, that is, as it was crucified, as it was our sacrifice. And this is so wholly agreeable to the nature of the thing, and the order of the words, and the body of the circumstances, that it is next to that which is evident in itself, and needs no further light but the considering the words and the design of the institution¹:' it seems to me that what Jeremy Taylor claims as 'next to self-evident' is *not* (as Canon Trevor seems to say) the proposition that the Body and Blood are received 'as in a state of death,' but (as I have said) that they are the shed Blood, and the Body sacrificed—which is not the same thing. So, again, either side of the controversy might equally receive the words of Bishop Bull, when he says: 'In the holy Eucharist, therefore, we set before God the bread and wine as "figures or images of the precious Blood of Christ shed for us, and of His precious Body" (they are the very words of the Clementine Liturgy), and plead to God the merit of His Son's sacrifice once offered on the Cross for us sinners, and in this sacrament represented; beseeching Him, for the sake thereof, to bestow His heavenly blessings on us².' Or of Waterland, when he says: 'The Apostle's account of it is briefly expressed, in its being a communion of Christ's Body and Blood; that is to say, of the Body considered as broken, and of the Blood considered as shed; as is very plain from the terms of the Institution³.'

In saying this, however, I do not mean to deny that, as a whole, the writers quoted do certainly tend, with more or with less distinctness, to shape their thought and language on the subject in the same direction as that of Bishop Andrewes; or to assert that any of them draws the precise distinction which seems to me so important⁴.

¹ *Real Presence*, vii 7 (*Works*, ed. Heber, ix 494).

² Bishop Bull's *Works* (ed. Dr. Burton), vol. ii p. 252.

³ Waterland, *Review of the Doctrine of the Eucharist*, ch. viii, *ad init.* (*Works*, ed. 1823, vii 199; ed. 1843, iv 613). Waterland's statements on the next page, however, are quite unequivocally on Canon Trevor's side.

⁴ There is, no doubt, a tendency in some of these writers to regard their special doctrine of the Eucharist as a bulwark against Rome. Unfortunately, its contro-

So far as they tend to insist upon the *res significata* as dead, I should certainly suggest that their tendency is not that of the language of patristic or liturgical devotion. It would be well if some one who has knowledge would furnish adequate evidence

versial aspect, as against Rome, seems to be connected with just its own most doubtful elements. Thus, there is first a natural and legitimate prominence given to the word 'commemoratio' as used of the Sacrament. Then 'memory' is contrasted with 'presence,' and emphasized as *the contradictory* of presence. Men's minds are influenced, more or less definitely, by the idea which Bishop Ridley had expressed in the form of a quasi-scientific maxim, 'Commemoratio non est rei praesentis sed praeteritae et absentis' (*Works of Bishop Ridley*, Parker Society, Cambridge, 1843: see the *Disputation at Oxford*, pp. 199, 442).

As a result of this (more than questionable) corollary from the word ἀνάμνησις, it becomes not only permissible, but a positive principle, of value for its own sake, to maintain that nothing is, or can be, the 'res significata' except what is plainly 'absens et praeterita.' What is signified in the Eucharist *must* be something which, having no existence, cannot possibly be, in any real sense, present.

It is on the basis of such a process of thought as this that an argument like that of Bishop Lake becomes clearly intelligible (as quoted by Canon Trevor, p. 183), when he complains that 'the Church of Rome, not distinguishing between Christ crucified and glorified, or rather not building their conclusion answerable to this undeniable principle—the sacraments represent Christ crucified, not glorified—are driven to coin so many new articles: 1. of real presence corporal; 2. of a metaphysical transubstantiation; 3. of an ill-applied concomitancy. All which easily vanish, if we consider Christ's purpose to represent Himself in the Sacrament, not as He is now, at the right hand of God, but as He was, upon the Cross. Not but it is the same Body and Blood which is in glory, but it must not be so considered as it is in glory. Which will necessarily enforce us to acknowledge that the union between the thing earthly and the thing heavenly can be no more than sacramental, and that respective also to what was done on earth, not what is in heaven; was, I say, done *formaliter* on the Cross, but is effective, working in heaven.'

It seems to be assumed that, if the elements signified anything which existed anywhere at all, questions on the subject of 'presence' might arise, which are happily excluded so long as the 'res' is, by abstract necessity, absent save only in the way of memory or effect. The worship of the Church on earth is not, even ideally, *identified* with the worship of heaven. It is a symbol, from which 'reality' is absent *ex hypothesi*.

All this, though it can hardly stand as patristic or permanent theology, is at least more consistent than Canon Trevor's own position appears to be. Somewhat strangely, in criticizing Johnson's 'unbloody sacrifice,' he complains (*Catholic Doctrine*, p. 208) that 'like the Romanists he confounded presence with *existence*. Because the Body and Blood no longer *exist* in the condition represented in the Eucharist, he argues that they cannot be so *present*. Just so the Romanist argues conversely, that because Christ is present in the use, the elements are His Body in the condition now existing.' Whatever may be said for or against Bp. Lake's position, it is certainly hard to follow Canon Trevor's. A man must feel himself very cogently bound, by other considerations, to maintain the reality of 'presence,' before he would call it a confusion of thought to assume that that which is 'present' must 'exist'!

on this point. I have but glanced at Dr. Pusey's volume¹, and gleaned, almost at random, a few phrases. Yet even these seem to me to bear clear witness to a quite different strain of language and thought. It is not, of course, that people who hold with Mr. Dimock could not explain them, or would be at once refuted by them². Yet I cannot imagine that any one who ever dreamed of making a point of that of which our Evangelical theologians make a point, could have expressed his devotional feeling in such language as some of the following.

Thus the Eucharistic bread is entitled by *Ignatius*³, the *φάρμακον ἀθανασίας*, ἀντίδοτος τοῦ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν, ἀλλὰ ζῆν ἐν Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ διὰ παντός. 'I am thy nourisher,' says *Clement of Alexandria*, 'who give thee myself as bread, of which whoso tasteth no more tasteth death, and who daily give thee the drink of immortality⁴.' From *Eusebius* he quotes: 'To eat the living bread, and His life-giving flesh, and to drink His saving Blood⁵.' From *Julius Firmicus*: 'Seek ye the grace of the immortal cup; in the heavenly food renew ye the lost man:' and again, 'We drink the immortal Blood of Christ; to our blood is the Blood of Christ united⁶.' From *Cyril of Jerusalem*: 'That thou by partaking of the Body and Blood of Christ, mightest be made of the same Body and the same Blood with Him. For thus we come to bear Christ in us, because His Body and Blood are diffused through our members; thus it is that, according to the blessed Peter, "we become partakers of the Divine nature."⁷'

From *Ephrem Syrus*: 'Thou hast given me Thy Body to eat, and Thy living Blood to drink:' and again, 'From hateful desires free me, through Thy living Body which I have eaten:' again, 'Thy living Body and Thine atoning Blood which I have received from the hands of the priests:' again, 'Spare us who

¹ *The Doctrine of the Real Presence, as contained in the Fathers, &c.*

² Any more than, e.g. Bishop Ridley; see *The Oxford Disputation* (as above), pp. 201, 202, and appendix I p. 444.

³ *Ad Eph.* xx.

⁴ Πόμα ἀθανασίας—'Quis Diues,' § 23, p. 948, ed. Potter; p. 18, ed. P. M. Barnard.

⁵ *In Ps.* xxxvi 4, p. 149, ed. Montfaucon. The passage proceeds, τούτους τροφόμενος καὶ πιαρόμενος, τῆς ἐνθίου μέθους ἀπολαύων 'κατατρόφησον τοῦ Κυρίου, καὶ δώσει σοι τὰ αἰτήματα τῆς καρδίας σου.'

⁶ 'Salutaris cibi gratiam quaerite et immortale poculum bibite . . . caelesti cibo renouate hominem perditum,' *De Err. Prof. Relig.* xviii fin.

⁷ *Lect.* xxii (*Myst.* iv) ad init.

have eaten of Thy Body and drunk Thy living Blood:’ again, ‘Thy Body and Blood, as a pledge of life, are hidden in their members¹.’ From *Ambrose*: ‘This is the bread of life: whoso then eateth life cannot die. For how should *he* die whose food is life? how should *he* fail who hath a vital substance²? approach to Him and be satisfied, because He is Bread; approach to Him and drink, because He is a fountain; approach to Him and be enlightened, because He is light; approach to Him and be set free, because “where the spirit of the Lord is there is liberty”; approach to Him and be absolved, because He is the remission of sins. Ask ye who He is, hear Himself saying “I am the bread of life; whoso cometh to me shall not hunger, and whoso believeth in Me shall never thirst”³.’ Again, ‘In that sacrament Christ is, because it is the Body of Christ; it is not therefore bodily food, but spiritual. Wherefore also the apostle says of its type, Our fathers did eat spiritual food and drank spiritual drink; for the Body of God is a spiritual Body; the Body of Christ is the Body of the Divine Spirit; since Christ is Spirit, as we read, the Spirit before our face is Christ the Lord⁴.’

From *Augustine*: ‘Let them then who eat, eat on; and them that drink, drink; let them hunger and thirst; eat Life, drink Life. That eating is to be refreshed; but thou art in such wise refreshed, that That whereby thou art refreshed faileth not. That drinking, what is it but to live? eat Life, drink Life; thou shalt have Life, and yet the Life is entire. But then this shall be, that is, the Body and Blood of Christ shall be, each man’s Life, if what is taken in the sacrament visibly is, in the truth itself, eaten spiritually, drunk spiritually⁵.’

Finally, from *Cyril of Alexandria*: ‘The Word, therefore, by having united unto Himself that flesh which was subject unto death, as being God and Life, drove away from it corruption, and made it also to be the source of life, for such must the Body of (Him who is) the Life be.’ After quoting, like others, the passage from John vi about the living bread—ending with, ‘As the living

¹ Dr. Pusey’s references are *Paran.* 11, p. 429; *ib.* 30, p. 480; *ib.* 31, p. 482; *ib.* 34, p. 487; *ib.* 73, p. 545. [I have not been able to pursue them.]

² ‘Quomodo deficiet qui habuerit uitalem substantiam!’ Query, ‘Who hath life in his substantial being?’

³ *In Ps. cxviii expositio, Serm. xviii § 28.*

⁴ *De Mysteriis, ix § 58.*

⁵ *Serm. cxxxi § 1.*

Father sent Me, and I live because of the Father; so he that eateth Me shall also live because of Me'—Cyril goes on, 'When, therefore, we eat the holy flesh of Christ, the Saviour of us all, and drink His precious Blood, we have Life in us, being made, as it were, one with Him, and possessing Him also in us.' Again, 'God, humbling Himself to our infirmities, infuses into the things set before us the power of life, and transforms them into the efficacy of His flesh, that we may have them for a life-giving participation, and that the Body of (Him who is the) Life may be found in us as a life-producing seed¹.'

But to return to Canon Trevor's Anglican authorities.

What is the explanation of the phenomenon? Or how can any one be acquitted of presumption—or worse—in suggesting that there can be anything, in such theologians as these, which can be in any way capable of correction?

The answer is that their mode of thought and phrase about the Eucharist, however (so to say) eucharistically correct, was coloured by their mode of conceiving the rationale of Atonement. Now however audacious it may seem to criticize their precise phraseology about the Eucharist, I do not think it will be generally felt to be any such monstrous audacity to wish to modify some of the current phraseology of two centuries ago on the principle of Atonement. I do not believe that the truth about the Eucharist, as I am trying to represent it, differs in any single particular whatever from what these Anglican writers really meant. But I believe that they somewhat overstated what they really meant. They really meant to insist on the *ὡς ἐσφαγμένον*, and they allowed themselves, more or less explicitly, to put this as if it were correctly expressed by *ὡς νεκρόν*: not because their conception of the Eucharist, or its relation to Christ's sacrifice, was really different, but because they were accustomed to a mode of speech about the Sacrifice, as though it consisted simply of the fact of death as death, and therefore were for all purposes, and in all senses, fully consummated when Christ's Body was laid in the tomb on Good Friday evening.

Is this correct? Is the Sacrifice to be conceived as a single point only in the remote, and ever remoter, past? and not, as

¹ *Serm.* cxlii (on Luc. xxii 17-22). The translation from the Syriac in this case is Dr. Payne-Smith's, not Dr. Pusey's.

I think we should say, an eternal present? not indeed, as it were, generically, as though all pasts were present alike; but uniquely, in a sense in which no other past event is, quite as this is, inherent to eternal being? Was the dead Christ, as dead, the consummated atonement of man with God? Which is the truer way of putting it: that Christ *is* our propitiation; or that something which Christ once did *was* our propitiation? Had He remained unrisen, unascended, unglorified, unpartaken of as living Spirit, would the fact that He was dead and done with have been our holiness? Was God pleased by His death, regarded, merely and finally, as death? I have no doubt that very much mediaeval phraseology, from the time, *at least*, of Anselm and onwards down to Dr. Dale, would fall in most naturally with such a mode of stating the theory as this. And if this language be accepted, then the distinction between *εσφαγμένον* and *νεκρόν* is merged: and the *ad cadaver* of Andrewes is fully justified.

Our first instincts do indeed not unnaturally tend to think of the sacrifice as identical with the suffering; to identify, in phrase and thought, sacrifice, as such, with that portion of the sacrifice which was painful and costly. But to think seriously that death, simply as death, ended the sacrifice, or struck the central note of what sacrifice meant, is to go against the emphatic teaching alike of the Old Testament and the New. This is to ignore the significance of the ritual of the Day of Atonement, and to represent, in very deed, that God was propitiated by penal suffering, as suffering; and that death, the death of His Son, was the thing which His Spirit desired. It is to reject the conception that the death which atoned was not a death which was dead, but a death which by dying conquered and annihilated death. It was the *aliveness* through death; that is, not merely the fact of so holding on to life that death did not extinguish it, but more than this, the fact of achieving, through dying, the perfect fullness of life, which could only be achieved in the form of a life that had died and was *therefore* eternally alive; it was the presentation before God for ever of humanity through death victorious, through death alive, through death, in the consummation of penitence, sinless and glorified, with the glory of the Life of God; it was this, not the deadness of a corpse, which made the consummation of the sacrifice, and which constituted

the life and holiness of man. And it is this death, not as stopping short in the state of death, but as the death of the eternally victorious, as the death of the eternally alive, with which the Church is for ever identified in, and by, living Spirit, in the Christian Eucharist.

It was the holiness of man—which involved penitential suffering—but it was the holiness not the suffering; it was the life of man—which could only be through death—but it was the life not the death; which the Spirit of God desired: not that it might *purchase* from Him, but because it *was*, the life and the holiness of man. The essence of the Divine Atonement consisted, not in the slaying of humanity, but in the presenting of humanity—through death quite triumphantly holy and eternally alive—in the face of the all holy God. Here is indeed an atonement. But death, as mere death, could be no 'atonement' at all. And this 'presenting' is not more vitally a past than it is a perpetual, an ever present, reality.

It may be that this point has been brought, in modern thought, into a prominence which it had not possessed for at least many centuries, though not greater than it had—shall I say in the Pentateuch, or in the Epistle to the Hebrews? I do not believe that it would have seemed in any respect strange to St. Athanasius or to the pre-Athanasian Church, while I believe it to be, on examination, absolutely required alike by the Old Testament and the New. Yet it is a point which I would venture to say was not in this form before Andrewes and his fellows; and which, though their words ignored it, they certainly never intended to deny. But I am at a loss to understand how any one could now read the eighth and ninth chapters of the Epistle to the Hebrews—after, say, the commentary of Bishop Westcott—without accepting at once, as true and as cardinal, this most scriptural, though not mediaeval, conception of the true rationale of sacrifice.

It would be too long to go into the whole matter thoroughly. But it may be well to refer to a few sentences of Bishop Westcott's, which have reference to the two thoughts (*a*) that 'blood' does not signify 'death' but 'life,' and (*b*) that the ritual of sacrifice culminated, not in the act of slaying, but in the presentation of the 'life' which had been slain. We may express the thought by saying that the climax of sacrifice was the *ἀπαρεχθωία*—not

in the English sense of blood-shedding, i. e. killing, but in the Levitical sense of pouring out, or sprinkling, the blood (i. e. the death-consecrated *life*) in the Holy Presence. A very remarkable emphasis upon this doctrine is found in the words of Levit. xvii 11, 'For the life of the flesh is in the blood: and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls; for it is the blood that maketh atonement by reason of the life.' It is as certain as anything of that kind can be, that the mediaeval theology of the atonement (from which we are by no means quite free as yet) would have expressed this last clause in exactly the opposite manner, viz. 'for it is the blood that maketh atonement by reason of the death.' And here we have, as in a nutshell, the antithesis between the scriptural and the mediaeval conceptions.

Bishop Westcott says 'Death, *which makes the blood available*¹, is the seal of the validity of a covenant².' 'It will be observed that it is not the death of the victim as suffering, but the use of the Blood (that is, the Life) which is presented here as the source of purification³.' 'It is important to observe, that it is not said of the first covenant that it was inaugurated "not without death" but "not without blood." By the use of the words "not without blood" the writer of the Epistle suggests the two ideas of atonement and quickening by the impartment of a new life which have been already connected with Christ's work (vv. 14, 15)⁴.' 'The position of *ἐν αἵματι* is significant. Blood was the characteristic means for cleansing, though fire and water were also used. *It is the power of a pure life which purifies*¹. Under this aspect the Blood becomes, as it were, the enveloping medium *in* which (*ἐν*), and not simply the means or instrument *through* or *by* which, the complete purification is effected⁵.'

'The Scriptural idea of Blood is essentially an idea of life out

¹ These italics are mine.

² On Hebrews ix 14.

³ Ibid.

⁴ On Hebrews ix 18.

⁵ On Hebrews ix 22. May I say that this thought, if worked out, would seem to me to lead to the true answer to Bp. Westcott himself, when he sometimes (as on viii 3, and ix 15-22) seems to limit the idea of the blood as if it were only the *means of entering into* the Divine Presence, and hesitates to use the word 'offered' of the blood. The blood was solemnly sprinkled by the High Priest, when he was already within the Holy Presence. And, as representing life, it is surely the condition, or 'enveloping medium,' of the perpetual presence of the true High Priest within the veil. Cf. Westcott on Hebrews viii 1, 2 (p. 230), and on vii 25.

of death¹. 'In the Blood of Jesus—not simply "through" it—we have boldness to enter into the Holy place². 'The direct references to Christ's Death are naturally less frequent than the references to His Blood. Death, with its unnatural agony, was the condition, under the actual circumstances of fallen man, whereby alone the Life of the Son of Man could be made available for the race (ii 9, 14; cf. 1 Cor. xi 26; Rom. v 10, vi 3 f.; Phil. ii 8, iii 10; Col. i 22). The Blood was the energy of Christ's true human life, under the circumstances of earth, whereby alone man's life receives the pledge and the power of a divine glory³.

Compare also these statements in the Bishop's additional note on 1 John i 7. 'It will be evident that while the thought of Christ's Blood (as shed) includes all that is involved in Christ's Death, the Death of Christ, on the other hand, expresses only a part, the initial part, of the whole conception of Christ's Blood. The Blood always includes the thought of the life preserved and active beyond death. This conception of the Blood of Christ is fully brought out in the fundamental passage, John vi 53-56. Participation in Christ's Blood is participation in His life (v. 56). But at the same time it is implied throughout that it is only through His Death—His violent Death—that His Blood can be made available for men. . . The simple idea of the Death of Christ, as separated from His Life, falls wholly into the background in the writings of St. John (Jo. xi 50 f.; xviii 14; xii 24 f., 33; xviii 33)⁴. . . By "sprinkling" of Christ's Blood the believer is first brought into fellowship with God in Christ; and in the imperfect conduct of his personal life, the life of Christ is continually communicated to him for growth and cleansing. He himself enters into the Divine Presence "in the Blood of Jesus" (Heb. x 19) surrounded, as it were, and supported by the Life which flows from Him. Compare [he adds in a footnote] a remarkable passage of Clement of Alexandria: *διπτόν δὲ τὸ αἷμα τοῦ Κυρίου, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ σαρκικόν, ᾧ τῆς φθορᾶς λελυτρώμεθα,*

¹ Additional note on Hebrews ix 12.

² Ibid.

³ Additional note on Hebrews ix 14.

⁴ It is true that Bishop Westcott speaks of St. John's usage herein as differing 'from that of St. Paul and St. Peter.' But is the difference more than apparent? In any case they both supply many illustrations of St. John's conception. See e.g. the passages quoted by Bishop Westcott at the end of this same note.

τὸ δὲ πνευματικόν, τούτεστιν ᾧ κεχρίσμεθα. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι πιεῖν τὸ αἷμα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ τῆς κυριακῆς μεταλαβεῖν ἀφθαρσίας· ἰσχύς δὲ τοῦ λόγου τὸ πνεῦμα, ὡς αἷμα σαρκός (*Paed.* ii 2 line 19).'

To these may be added a passage from the essay on 'the Relation of Christianity to Art' at the end of the commentary on the Epistles of St. John¹. It is a suggestive passage, and has a wider application than to pictorial representations only. 'It may well be doubted whether the Crucifixion is in any immediate shape a proper subject for Art. The image of the Dead Christ is foreign to Scripture. Even in the record of the Passion, Death is swallowed up in Victory. And the material representation of the superficial appearance of that which St. John shows to have been life through death defines and perpetuates thoughts foreign to the Gospel. The Crucifixion by Velasquez, with its overwhelming pathos and darkness of desolation, will show what I mean. In every trait it presents the thought of hopeless defeat. No early Christian would have dared to look upon it. Very different is one of the earliest examples of the treatment of the Crucifixion on the Sigmaringen Crucifix. In that, life, vigour, beauty, grace, the open eye, and the freely outstretched arm, suggest the idea of loving and victorious sacrifice crowned with its reward. This is an embodiment of the idea: the picture of Velasquez is a realization of the appearance of the Passion.'

Under the second head mentioned above, namely the culminating point of the ritual of sacrifice, it may be enough to quote such expressions as these: 'Maimonides, in speaking of the Passover, lays down that "the sprinkling of the blood is the main point in sacrifice"²'; and 'This [i.e. the application of the blood] was the most significant part of the sacrifice³.' But I should like also to call emphatic attention to the comments upon *φέρεσθαι* ix 16 ('for where there is a covenant the death of him that made it must needs be presented'): and upon *ἐμφανισθῆναι* ix 24, 'In Christ humanity becomes the object of the regard of God'; Christ is 'described as the object of the vision of God,' and not God 'spoken of as seen perfectly by Him'; 'The "appearance" of Christ alone is, to our conception, the adequate presentment of the whole work of the Son to the Father (cf. c. vii 25 note).' So

¹ p. 358.

² Westcott on Hebrews ix 22.

³ Additional note on Hebrews ix 9 (p. 291).

completely is this a piece with the whole principle, that I should only demur to regarding it as appearing 'strange at first,' or needing 'explanation.'

Now in all this I need hardly say that the principles which I have desired to advocate seem to me to be taught, with ringing clearness, by Bishop Westcott. But clear as the essential principles are throughout his teaching, I should perhaps admit that he does not, in every particular, appear to go quite the full length of his own principles. With his commentary, therefore, I should like also to make reference to the seventh chapter of the Rev. Geo. Milligan's volume on the *Theology of the Epistle to the Hebrews*. Mr. Milligan is full, as is natural, of the thoughts on this subject which are familiar to us in the writings of his father, the late Dr. Milligan. And there are certainly some points, as, e.g. the exegesis of Hebrews viii 3 *ὅθεν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τι καὶ τοῦτον ὃ προσετέγκη*, and of the *ὅς διὰ πνεύματος αἰωνίου ἑαυτὸν προσήνεγκεν* of Hebrews ix 14, in which Mr. Milligan clearly seems to me to be nearer to the full truth than Bishop Westcott.

I must not go further in the theological exposition or defence of this position. Something I have had the opportunity of saying about it before now. But it is upon this question as to the interpretation of sacrifice, and the theology of the atonement, that (I feel convinced) the exact statement of the Eucharistic doctrine depends. If the whole significance of the atonement, as atonement, was completely consummated when the tomb closed over the dead Christ, so that all that followed after was but the sequel which ensued upon, but was no vital part of the significance of, atonement or sacrifice; then, and then only, can the Evangelical exposition of the Eucharist, as a reception of the dead Christ, seem to be really adequate; because then, and then only, could the partaking of Christ at that point, as a corpse, be conceived of as a real communion with His sacrifice, a living upon the Blood of the Atonement.

Let me end by quoting a few words which throb and glow with life, as words of Canon Scott Holland are wont to do:—

'Yet again,' he says, 'the main characteristic of the deep religious revival in this last half century, in all its varied forms, has been a return to the realisation of the transfigured humanity of Jesus Christ, and of His kingship over earth through the might

of His Resurrection. His Glory has been felt anew as it smites down from His living plenitude into our poor flesh and blood, and makes it His own. Once again men have apprehended the splendour of the primitive and creative ideal of the brotherhood bonded together, by the covenant of Blood, into the new manhood, into the One Body, which possessed the soul of St. Paul. All these convictions, now so potently stirring, meet and gather into the Eucharistic Action. There is their fulfilment; there is their arena of manifestation; there they must find their realised climax.' And presently, 'Every influence now active makes, then, for the disappearance of what now creates the cleavage [i. e. between High Churchmen and Evangelicals]. This is the hopeful outlook with which the Conference closes. It has failed to reach the desired conclusion. But it has detected what exactly it is which hinders it at the moment; and this detected hindrance is one which, under examination and explanation, ought to be found to be gradually yielding and breaking. And I cannot but believe that even those who now hold back would not continue their resistance, if once they were convinced of the utter whole-heartedness with which we who cling to union with the glorified humanity of the Lord still find all our hope and all our peace in the pardon won for ever by the outpoured Blood—in the absolute, unique, unqualified, and limitless Sacrifice done once for all at Calvary. Every Eucharist is but a reiterated declaration of the sole and unlimited and inexhaustible value of that undying Act of Death.'

R. C. MOBERLY.

M. C. Moberly