

JOURNAL OF
THE TRANSACTIONS
OF
The Victoria Institute,
OR,
Philosophical Society of Great Britain.

EDITED BY THE HONORARY SECRETARY,
CAPTAIN FRANCIS W. H. PETRIE, F.G.S., &c.

VOL. XXV.



LONDON:

(Published by the Institute.)

INDIA: W. THACKER & Co. UNITED STATES: G. T. PUTNAM'S SONS, N. Y.

AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND: G. ROBERTSON & Co., LIM.

CANADA: DAWSON BROS., *Montreal*.

S. AFRICA: JUTA & Co., *Cape Town*.

PARIS: GALIGNANI.

1892.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

JOURNAL OF THE TRANSACTIONS

OF THE

VICTORIA INSTITUTE,

OR

PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN.



ORDINARY MEETING.

THE PRESIDENT, SIR GEORGE G. STOKES, BART., M.P., V.P.R.S.,
IN THE CHAIR.

The Minutes of the last Meeting were read and confirmed, and the following Paper was then read (March 19th) by the Author:—

REMARKS ON THE MONISM, PANTHEISM, AND DUALISM OF BRAHMANICAL AND ZOROASTRIAN PHILOSOPHERS. By Sir M. MONIER WILLIAMS, K.C.I.E., D.C.L., Boden Professor of Sanskrit, Oxford.

IN the present paper I propose to draw the attention of this Society to the principal monistic, pantheistic, and dualistic theories of Indian philosophers—whether Brāhmans or Indo-Zoroastrians—with the object of pointing out that these theories, although apparently contradictory, are in reality closely connected with each other, as well as with the polytheistic doctrines and practices of modern Hindūism.

Perhaps other members of this Society may be induced by my remarks to draw attention to some of the parallel lines of thought in European systems of philosophy.

I ought at the outset to explain that my observations will be founded quite as much on the conversations which I had with living learned men during my travels in India, as on the ancient philosophical writings of Hindūs and Zoroastrians.

Clearly the first difficulty is to settle exactly what is meant by the terms Monism, Pantheism, and Dualism.

Without pretending to any special knowledge of the philo-

sophical terms current in Europe, I believe I am right in stating that Monism is a term which may be fairly used to express the doctrine that only one Being really exists—or, in other words, that everything is resolvable into one eternal Essence, and into one only.

Pantheism, again, so far as I understand this vague expression, generally means that, whatever the one infinite Essence or Substance, whom we call God, may be, the Universe is identical with that one God, or again that God is identical with the Universe (not merely immanent or present in it).

Dualism, on the other hand, is a term which is generally employed to express the existence of two co-eternal principles, neither of which is the product of the other.

But there may be different kinds of Monism, Pantheism, and Dualism.

For example, there may be a kind of Monism which consists in believing that matter is the one only really existing thing, and that Spirit is merely a form or modification of Matter.

Again, there may be another kind of Monism which, like the Monism of the Indian Vedānta, teaches that Spirit is the one really existing (Sanskrit *pāramārthika*) thing, and that material (*jaḍa*) forms are merely modifications or illusory (*prātibhāsika*) manifestations of this one all-pervading Spirit.

Or, again, there may be another kind of Monism which substitutes the term "Mind" for "Spirit," maintaining that Mind (including, of course, volition) is the only eternally existing Essence, and that Mind creates or evolves out of itself all material organisms, and the whole external world.

It should be noted, however, that this idea of Mind is opposed to the doctrine of Indian philosophers, who make Mind (*manas*) an internal organ (*antaḥ-karaṇa*) developed by and belonging to the perishable body, and occupying an intermediate position between the organs of perception (such as the eye, ear, &c.) and the organs of action (such as the hand, foot, &c.), its sole function being to serve as an instrument or inlet of thought to the Spirit.

Again, some writers substitute the term "Soul" for "Spirit," or employ these two expressions as if they were identical.

Perhaps the chief objection to the indiscriminate use of the terms "Spirit" and "Soul," at least in Indian philosophy, appears to be that our word "Soul" conveys the idea of liability to affections, passions, and feelings, whereas pure Spirit, according to the Vedānta, is not liable to emotions of any kind, and does not even possess *self-consciousness*, or a sense of individuality. It is *Nir-guṇa*, quality-less.

For this reason the term "Self" (implying personality), sometimes preferred to both "Spirit" and "Soul" by translators of the word *Ātman*, seems open to exception.

Finally, I may note here a form of Monism said to be in favour with some European Scientists, who maintain that what is termed "Vital Force" (Sanskrit *Prāṇa*?) is the only existing Essence, and that this all-pervading Energy evolves infinite forms of matter which are periodically dissolved, and by their dissolution furnish a constant succession of raw material for the reproduction and perpetuation of life.

Clearly every one of these monistic theories may be regarded as also pantheistic, so that there will be as many different kinds of Pantheism as of Monism.

As to the term Dualism, it is evident that there may be one kind of Dualism which simply asserts that Spirit and Matter exist as separate co-eternal substances.

Another kind of Dualism—and this I may remark is the true *Dvaita* of Sanskrit philosophers—simply asserts the duality of Spirit, meaning by the term Duality that God's Spirit and man's Spirit have had a real separate existence from all eternity, and will continue to have such an existence.

Note, however, that this Duality theory might more suitably be called Plurality, inasmuch as it holds that human spirits are not only distinct from the Supreme Spirit, but from each other, and are infinitely numerous.

Again, the term Dualism may be used to express the eternal separate existence of two opposing principles—the respective originators of good and evil, knowledge and ignorance—as exemplified in the teaching of Zoroaster, and in the later philosophy of the Manicheans. The idea may have arisen from the supposed impossibility of believing that the Creator of good is also the Creator of evil; or else from a simple belief in the existence of some eternal law of antagonism as a necessary factor in the equilibrium of the Universe.

Turning now more particularly to the monistic, pantheistic, and dualistic theories current in India, I may remark that there are two well-known Sanskrit philosophical terms, *Dvaita* and *Advaita*; of which the two equivalent cognate English expressions are, Duality and Non-duality.

But in an introduction to the *Advaita* philosophy, just published by Pandit *Dvivedī*, Professor of Sanskrit at *Bhaunagar*, the word Monism, as well as Non-duality (equivalent, he says, to "inseparability"), is used for *Advaita*.

And I may state that almost every learned *Brāhman* in India is a believer in the spiritual Monism of the *Vedānta*

philosophy, while materialistic Monism is thought to be the doctrine of heretics.

The Vedāntist, in fact, professes to be more orthodox than any other teacher, because his belief is founded on the inner doctrine of the Veda, which, according to him, is absolutely monistic, and inculcates spiritual Pantheism.

Here is a portion of a well-known R̥g-veda hymn (x, 129), which I translate in metrical form :—

In the beginning there was neither nought nor aught,
Then there was neither sky nor atmosphere above.
What then enshrouded all this teeming universe ?
In the receptacle of what was it contained ?
Was it enveloped in the gulf profound of water ?
Then was there neither death nor immortality,
Then was there neither day, nor night, nor light, nor darkness,
Only the existent One (*Ekam*) breathed (*anū**) calmly, self-contained.†
Nought else than that there was—nought else above, beyond.

True Brāhmanism, the Vedāntist asserts, lays down as its fundamental dogma that there is only one really existing Essence, and that that Essence is pure Spirit.

This dogma is expressed by three Sanskrit words : *Ekam eva advītyam*, “there is only one Being, without a second.”

In this favourite phrase the one Being is designated by a neuter termination, yet a Brāhmaṇ will often apply to that Being the ancient name *Ātmā* (nom. case of *Ātman*), “the breathing Spirit,” or “Breath,”‡ which is a Sanskrit masculine noun.

In his daily worship, too, he will often repeat a well-known hymn of the R̥g-veda,§ which adopts another masculine title of the one Spirit, namely, *Puruṣa* (“the one representative male,” *pumān*, according to the commentator Sāyaṇa), a name which has no trustworthy etymology.

Then he often designates that Being by a very remarkable name, *Sac-cid-ānanda*, which is a compound word, or three words combined in one, ending in a masculine termination,

* Compare note on *Ātman* below.

† The Sanskrit is *Svadhayā* “in his own energy,” but Sāyaṇa, who is a Vedantist, interprets it to mean along with “illusion” (*Māyā* or *Prakṛiti*).

‡ I am aware that different etymologies of this word are given, but I prefer deriving it from the Sanskrit root *an*, to breathe ; cf. German *athem*.

§ That is, in the Pancāyatana ceremony. In this hymn (x, 90) it is stated that gods and holy men offered up *Puruṣa* as a victim in sacrifice, after cutting him up ; see my *Brāhmanism and Hindūism* (John Murray), p. 414. The final act of adoration in this ceremony is as follows :—Veneration to the infinite and eternal male (*Puruṣa*), who has thousands of names, thousands of forms, thousands of feet, thousands of eyes, thousands of heads &c. (see p. 415).

and denoting one Essence, composed of three inherent faculties, "Existence, Thought, Joy," which are inseparable.

Sometimes he prefers the simple name Cid (C = our Ch) or Cit, that is, pure "Thought," or Consciousness (but not *Self-consciousness*), which is a feminine noun; or the equivalent expression Caitanya, which is neuter.

In real truth, however, he most commonly designates the one Being by a name which is incompatible with all idea of sex.

He calls the one Being Brāhmā, a neuter word implying "growth," "expansion," "evolution," "universal pervasion."

It is only when that Being becomes the Evolver of the Universe that he is called by a masculine name, Brāhmā.*

This one eternal neuter Essence (in the Illusion by which it is overspread) is to the external world and to the human spirit what yarn is to cloth, what milk is to curds, what clay is to a jar.

From this is everything born, in this it breathes, in this it is dissolved (according to the Sanskrit formula *tajjalān*).

The Vedāntist's own personal identification with this one universal Spirit is expressed by the two monosyllables *Tat tvam*, "That art thou," two words which, when combined in one, stand for all philosophical truth (*tattvam*).

The number One, indeed, appears to have assumed the character of a kind of God in the minds of some Indian thinkers. *Aham Brāhmāsmi*, "I am God," says the Hindū pantheist.

Hence we read in the Bṛihad-āraṇyaka Upanishad (iv, 5) :—

"When there is anything like duality there one sees another, one smells another, one tastes another, one speaks to another, one hears another, one minds another, one regards another, one knows another."

Then this ancient philosophical work, which represents the views of Indian metaphysicians at least 500 years B.C., goes on to assert that the One Infinite Essence "neither sees, nor smells, nor tastes, nor speaks, nor hears, nor minds, nor regards, nor knows."†

The apparent sternness of ancient Indian Monism seems to be paralleled by almost identical phases of modern German philosophical thought. According to Dean Mansel :—

"With German philosophers the root of all mischief is the number two—Self and Not-self, Ego and Non-ego.

* The masculine deity Brāhmā is not eternal, but lapses back into the neuter Brāhmiṇā. The crude base Brāhmān (in grammar) stands for both.

† Compare *Amos* v, 21.

“The (German) pantheist tells me that I have not a real distinct existence and unity of my own, but that I am merely a phenomenal manifestation or an aggregate of many manifestations of the one infinite Being.”

Then again, we know that a favourite dogma with all pantheists is, *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, nothing is produced out of nothing; Sanskrit, *nāvastuno vastusiddhiḥ* or *a-sataḥ saḥ jāyeta kutas*, “how can something be produced out of nothing?” so that if there is a Supreme Creator, he cannot create the external world out of nothing.

Hence he evolves all visible nature out of Himself, and all nature is Himself.

And is it not the case that some of our own modern scientists are continually telling us that all Nature is one, and that mind and matter are inseparable? or that all the elements are mere modifications of one element? or again, that all the forces which act on the elements are mere modifications of one force; or that “everything is everything else”?*

The point to be noticed is that in India the Unity-theory was current many centuries before it was even heard of in Europe, and that there this idea is found to be compatible not only with dualistic, but with the grossest polytheistic doctrines and practices,

I found in fact that, although, in my conversations with learned Brāhmins, they laid the greatest stress on their dogma, *Ekam eva advītyam*, “there is only one Being, without a second,” they always, when questioned, admitted the truth of another Vedāntic dogma, *Māyā-cid-yogō'nādīḥ*, “the union of the one Essence with Illusion is from all eternity.” In other words, the one infinite Essence is associated from all eternity with *Māyā*, “Illusion” (also called *Avidyā*, *Ajnāna*, Ignorance), which is also eternal (so far, at least, as it is confessedly “without beginning,”) though merely an illusory essence.

In point of fact the modern Vedāntist holds that it is from this *Illusory Essence*, associated from eternity with the one *Real Essence*, that the whole external universe is evolved.

From this *Illusory Essence*, too, are evolved the separate individual spirits of men, whose sense of individuality ceases at the moment when they deliver themselves from all Illusion (or Ignorance) and attain a knowledge of the Truth, that is, of their own identity with the one spiritual Essence.

* The President of the Royal Society in a recent speech quoted this saying of the eminent chemist Galen.

“Get rid of ignorance,” says the Vedāntist; “all the evils and sufferings of life arise from your not knowing that you are God (Brāhmā).”

Confessedly, at any rate, the Advaita or Non-duality of the Vedāntist amounts *practically* (that is, in the *vyāvahārika* or practical world) to a kind of Dvaita or Duality.

It is commonly said that Śankara, the great Vedāntist Teacher of the 8th century of our era, was a stern upholder of the Non-duality creed against the Dvaita, or Duality creed.

On the other hand it is commonly alleged that the chief teacher of the Duality (Dvaita) doctrine was the great Vaiṣṇava teacher Madhva, who is believed to have lived in the 13th century.

Strictly speaking, however, the only difference between the teaching of these two eminent philosophers was that Śankara taught that the separate spirits of men were the product of an eternal Illusion united from all eternity with the one Spiritual Essence, while Madhva taught that the spirits of men had a *real* eternal existence of their own.

It is a question, indeed, whether one form of Dualism, which ultimately became formulated in the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy, was not a more ancient belief in India than Advaita or Non-duality.

The idea of a second principle, as necessary to the act of creation, is vaguely implied in a text of the well-known hymn of the Rig-veda (x, 129), thus translatable:—

“Then in the beginning in that one Being arose Desire, which was the primal germ of Mind, and the subtle bond of connection between Entity and Nullity.”

Again, in an ancient Brāhmaṇa (Śatapathabrāhmaṇa xiv, 4, 24), as well as in an ancient Upanishad (Bṛihad-āraṇyaka i, 3), it is affirmed that the “One Being was not happy being alone.

“He wished for a Second.

“He caused his own self to fall in twain, and thus became husband and wife.”

A still older idea was the supposed marriage of a Heavenly Father (Dyo or Dyans) with Mother Earth (Pṛithivi) for the creation of gods, men, and all creatures.

When the Sāṅkhya philosophy was formulated its distinctive characteristic was the assertion of the eternal existence of two principles:

1. A Producer or creative germ, named Prakṛiti (but also called Māyā or “Illusion”), and
2. A Spirit (Purusha).

This Spirit, however, is not one, as in the Vedānta; but is multitudinous, each human spirit existing of itself as an independent eternal entity.

Neither the Producer nor a Spirit, however, can create by itself.

The external world (including the human frame, consciousness, feeling, individuality, and mind) is evolved out of the eternal creative germ, Prakriti, and yet only so evolved when an individual eternal spirit is associated with it.

It is abundantly clear, therefore, that the only distinction between the so-called Unity-theory of the Vedānta and the Duality of the Sāṅkhya system seems to be that the germ of the material world has an *illusory* existence from all eternity in the one system, and a *real* eternal existence in the other.

And if this be so, I think I am justified in asserting that a kind of dualistic woof everywhere underlies the monistic and pantheistic warp of Indian philosophy.

I may add that such an assertion is borne out by ocular observation, for it is certain that the idolatrous worship of the Linga and Yoni*—united in one image and symbolizing the mysterious union of the two creative principles—meets the eye of observant travellers in every part of India.

And this is not all—the student of Indian philosophical thought, who has been brought into actual contact with the religious life and usages of the inhabitants of India in their own country, will observe in every village, and almost in every nook and corner of the land, illustrations of the remarkable fact that the Monism and Pantheism of the Vedānta are compatible with all varieties of religious belief—now with Theism—now with Deism—now with Dualism—now with Triadism—that is, with the worship of the Indian Triad (wrongly called the Indian Trinity), Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva, the three gods who, with their wives, preside over creation, preservation, and dissolution respectively—and now with all the polytheism, polydemonism, animism, and fetishism associated with these three chief deities of the Hindū Pantheon.

Time will not admit of my going into this important subject at any greater length; it will be sufficient for me to state that a Hindū finds no difficulty in attributing either

* Only students of Indian religions are likely to know that these symbols represent the phallic emblem (linga) and the emblem of the opposite sex (yoni) united. Similarly, Śiva has an Ardhā-nārī form.

duality or triplicity or plurality in unity to the one Being who delights in manifesting his Essence in various forms.

It is, of course, understood that this same Being may ignore himself for a time, so that any one of his forms may do homage to another, as to a superior Being, or deal practically with another as with a distinct Being.

This alone will account for the multiplicity of divine manifestations (popularly thought to be 330 millions), worshipped or honoured as gods, although the number represented by images is not large; all the gods being finite and subject to re-absorption into the one essence. Indeed few idols are to be seen, except forms of Vishnu and Śiva and of their wives. Brāhmā's image is only worshipped in two temples in all India, while the one eternal Brāhmā has neither temple nor image.

And here, too, lies the secret of the great difficulty of Christianizing India according to the true meaning of Christianity.

For, according to the Brāhmanical theory, Christianity is to be accepted as an example of the one Being's many manifestations suited to Europeans.

Its excellence is even sometimes admitted; at any rate, I found that whenever I succeeded in pointing out to thoughtful men the fundamental differences between the religion of Christians and that of Hindūs, the reply generally was that both might be true, according to the doctrine taught by one of the oldest texts of the R̥g-veda (1-164, 46), *Ekam sad Viprā bahudhā vadanti*, "Sages declare that the one Essence manifests himself in manifold ways;" just as (according to a later illustration) the metal gold, though really preserving the unity of its nature everywhere, assumes different forms, names, and uses in different places.

I must not conclude my remarks without adverting more particularly to the theory of the existence of good and evil spirits—the respective sources of good and evil.

It is well known that the eternal existence of a good and evil principle is a kind of Dualism, which is generally regarded as a distinguishing feature of the Zoroastrian philosophy.

The idea, however, is by no means exclusively Zoroastrian. The continual conflict between good and evil spirits is a dominant idea in many other religious systems.

In Śankara's commentary on the Chāndogya Upanishad (p. 26, ll. 2-8) there is a remarkable passage, describing the constant struggle between good and evil, knowledge and ignorance.

All Sanskrit literature, too, teems with descriptions of the battle continually going on between gods and evil demons;

and images of the chief gods of the Hindū Pantheon frequently represent them in the act of crushing their demon-antagonists.

Krishna (a form of Vishṇu) is often seen bruising the head of the malignant serpent Kāliya, and Śiva tramples, during a kind of wild dance, on the prostrate body of the arch-fiend Tripura.

As regards Zoroaster's Dualism, I now submit briefly to this Society the explanation of it given to me by some learned Indian Pārsīs of Bombay (especially by Mr. K. R. Cama).

Let me first remark that we read in the Gāthās, that Zoroaster began his mission by declaring that: "In the beginning there were two spirits—each active. These are the good and the base in thought, word, and deed." "I will declare the two primeval spirits of the world, of whom the better One thus spoke to the evil One—'Neither our minds, nor our doctrines, nor our understandings, nor our belief, nor our words, nor our actions, nor our laws, nor our souls agree.'"

The explanation given to me was that Zoroaster, although a believer in one Supreme Being, and a teacher of Monotheism, set himself to account for the existence of evil, which could not have its source in an all-wise Creator,

He, therefore, taught that two opposite—but not opposing—principles or forces, which he calls "Twins," were inherent in the nature of the Supreme Being, called by him Ahura Mazda (or in Persian Ormazd), and emanated from that Being, just as in Hindūism, Vishṇu and Śiva emanate from the Supreme Being Brāhmā.

These two forces were set in motion by Ahura Mazda, as his appointed mode of maintaining the continuity of the Universe.

The one was constructive, the other destructive.

One created and composed.

The other disintegrated and decomposed, but only to co-operate with the creative principle by providing fresh raw material for the work of re-composition.

Hence there could be no new life without death, no existence without non-existence.

Hence, also, according to Zoroaster, there was originally no really antagonistic force of evil opposed to good.

The creative energy was called Ahura Mazda's beneficent spirit (Spento-Mainyus), and the destructive force was called his maleficent spirit (Angro-Mainyus, afterwards corrupted into Ahriman), but only because the idea of evil is connected with dissolution.

The two spirits were merely antagonistic in name.

They were in reality co-operative and mutually helpful.

They were essential to the alternating processes of construction and dissolution, through which cosmical being was perpetuated.

The only real antagonism was that alternately brought about by the free agent, man, who could hasten the work of destruction or retard the work of construction by his own acts.

It is therefore held that the so-called dualistic doctrines of Zoroaster were compatible with the absolute unity of the one God (symbolized especially by Fire).

Ultimately, however, Zoroastrianism crystallized into a hard and uncompromising dualism.

That is to say, in process of time, Spento-Mainyus became merely another name for Ahura Mazda, as the eternal principle of good, while Angro-Mainyus or Ahriman became altogether dissociated from Ahura Mazda, and converted into an eternal principle of evil.

These two principles are believed to be the sources of two opposite creations which were incessantly at war.

On the one side is a celestial hierarchy, at the head of which is Ormazd; on the other side, a demoniacal, at the head of which is Ahriman.

They are as opposed to each other as light to darkness—as falsehood to truth.

The whole energy of a religious Indian Pārsī is concentrated on the endeavour to make himself—so to speak—demon-proof, and this can only be accomplished by absolute purity (in thought, word, and deed), symbolized by whiteness.

He is ever on his guard against bodily defilement, and never goes out to his daily occupations without first putting on a sacred white shirt and a sacred white girdle. Even the most highly educated, enlightened, and Anglicized Pārsīs are rigorous observers of this custom, though it seems probable that their real creed has little in common with the old and superstitious belief in demons and evil spirits, but rather consists in a kind of cold monotheistic pantheism.

How far Zoroastrian dualism had affected the religious opinions of the Babylonians at the time of the Jewish captivity is doubtful, but that the Hebrew prophets of those days had to reckon with dualistic ideas seems probable from Isaiah xlv, 6: "I am the Lord, and there is none else. I form the light and create darkness, I make peace and create evil. I, the Lord, do all these things." The New Testament, on the other hand, might be thought by a superficial reader

to lend some support to dualistic doctrines, inasmuch as it asserts the personality of Satan, and takes for granted the existence of evil spirits hostile to the spirits of men.

I need scarcely, however, point out that the Bible account of the origin, nature, and destiny of Satan and his angels differs, *toto cælo*, from the Zoroastrian description of Ahriman and his host.

Nor need I add that the various monistic, pantheistic, and dualistic theories, briefly indicated by me in this paper, are utterly at variance with the Christian doctrine of a Personal, Eternal, and Infinite Being existing and working outside man and outside the material universe which He has Himself created, and controlling both, and in the case of human beings working not only outside man but in and through him.

Our Church of England Prayer Book tells us in one place that God "made all things of nothing,"* and this, no doubt, is the meaning we give to the word "create" in the first chapter of Genesis. But we are nowhere told, either in the Bible or Prayer Book, that, having created material germs on the one hand and the spirits of men on the other, He willed to endow these two distinct creations with an eternal independent separate existence and an independent capacity for self-evolution.

We know, indeed, that God is Spirit (*Πνεῦμα ὁ Θεός*),† and that, having created man's spirit *with a separate personality of its own*, He has endowed it with moral free agency; that is, with the power to choose or reject the good or the evil.

We know, too, that this freedom of choice is held by acute thinkers to furnish a fairly satisfactory explanation of the origin of evil without having recourse to the Indian method of solving the difficulty through the doctrine of metempsychosis.‡ But the exact relationship of man's spirit to material organization is not revealed to us. Nor can we tell whether the dissolution of man's body at death releases his spirit from all connection with even the subtlest forms of matter, so that an intermediate conscious existence of entire separation from matter is possible to it.

* See the third prayer at the end of the Marriage Service; and compare Psalm xc, 2.

† So also, *ὁ Θεὸς φῶς ἐστίν*, "God is Light," 1 John i, 5.

‡ I am reminded by the Rev. C. G. Chittenden, of Hoddesdon (who has sent me some able remarks on my paper), that Butler (*Anal.* i, 5; iv, 2) considers that the gift of moral free agency only furnishes a partial explanation of the origin of evil, and that the same writer thinks it possible

What we may surely believe is that God is always creating, and that out of His eternal Workshop (if I may so speak reverently) are for ever issuing new spirits and new material forms.

Surely, too, we must believe that God is for ever superintending and supporting His creations; and that not a single spirit and not a single material atom can exist for a single instant without His upholding and vivifying power.

We Christians, at any rate, who feel that we depend on our Creator for life and breath and all things, may surely so interpret the words of Christ, "My Father worketh hitherto and I work."

It has occurred to me that, with the permission of the President, I might add a few remarks to my paper; and in the first place I should like to remind you that the Brāhmanical expression for the One Infinite Being—*God is Existence, Thought, Joy*—has been compared with the Christian statement of God's tri-une Nature.

God is Life. God is Light. God is Love.

In regard to this point, however, I may observe that the Sanskrit translators of the Bible have translated the words *I am the Life* by a phrase meaning *I am the Life-causer*, because we believe that God is not simply Pure Life but the Giver of Life to His creatures.

The difference, too, between *God is Joy* and *God is Love* is to be noted (though we may also note that the Apostle St. Paul's three primary fruits of the Spirit are Love, Joy, Peace).

I may also be permitted to point out as noteworthy that the idea of a peculiar sacredness attaching to the number "three" runs through all Indian systems of thought.

And, in explanation of the prevalence of this idea, I may remind you of a well-known fact—that there are not a few cases in which *three* seems to exhaust all that can be conceived of any subject.

For example, Past, Present, and Future exhaust the whole conception of time; Length, Breadth, and Height, of space; Solid, Liquid, and Gaseous, of matter; and not less than three lines (or a triangle) enclose a space.

Let me also add that one object of my remarks this evening has been to draw attention to the fact that Brāhmanism

that the living agent may exist and even be active apart from matter (*Anal.* i., 1). (See page 28.)

is a most subtle system of pantheistic philosophy, which, while it is tolerant of Christianity and claims to have much common ground with Christianity, admits of the development of every form of corrupt religious doctrine and idolatrous superstition.

It is on this account a very formidable antagonist—more formidable than either Zoroastrianism or Muhammadanism—an opponent indeed of such hydra-like vitality that no Christian missionary can hope to cope with it effectively, unless he be armed with the truest and most divinely tempered weapons in the whole Christian Armoury.

And let me further say that the grossest polytheistic superstitions of modern India, absurd and deplorable as they may appear to us, are not to be scornfully brushed aside, as if they were mere heaps of rubbish obstructing the onward march of the victorious army of Evangelists, and quite unworthy of serious examination.

On the contrary, these, to us tangled and unintelligible, masses of time-honoured traditional doctrines and practices, which I have elsewhere treated of under the general name of Hindūism, are really like rugged jungle-clad mountain ranges, rising one behind the other in the path of the progress of Christianity. Or rather perhaps may they be compared to a series of outposts grouped in circle after circle around the ever-receding fortress of Pantheistic Brāhmanism. Hence it is that the proud and self-confident Hindū, when apparently driven in defeat from the defence of any one point, retires, without the slightest sense of humiliation, to other coigns of resistance, and has always the last resource of retreating behind what he conceives to be the impregnable Brāhmanical dogma that:—

There is only one God—only one Infinite Essence—which, although inseparably one, is to be identified with every really existing thing, and may manifest itself in manifold ways and in different forms in different places.

The PRESIDENT (Sir G. G. Stokes, Bart., V.P.R.S.).—I am sure I need not ask you to return your thanks to Sir Monier Williams, for the very learned and deep discourse with which he has favoured us. (Applause.) I now invite those present who have attended to these religious views of other nations, to make some remarks.

C. COLLINGWOOD, Esq., M.D.—I venture to call attention to the interesting fact that in these very ancient books we find a nearer

approach to what we may suppose to be the truth, than we find in later times, and I attribute this to the fact that all ancient religions began with a high standard of intelligence and excellence, and gradually became more and more materialized, so that in later times that excellence is, in a great measure, lost; and those truths which they seemed once to possess have become more or less corrupted. There is a statement on the second page of the paper, that "there may be a kind of Monism, which, like the Monism of the Indian Vedānta, teaches us that Spirit is the one really existing thing, and that material forms are merely modifications, or illusory manifestations of this one all-pervading Spirit." Of course there are various ways of taking such a statement as this; but in one aspect it may be regarded as strictly true: I think, that the original knowledge of truth of these ancient religious writers may be shown to have been derived from the foundation of all truth; though, on the other hand, some might argue that the view in question possesses a Pantheistic tendency, which I really do not think it does. The question in our minds is, I think, whether there is more than one world. All Monists admit that there is something more than the merely natural—something which they call, not supernatural, but *hypernatural*; but they all admit that there is more than one world. There was a statement by Professor Huxley some time ago, in the *Nineteenth Century*, to the effect that it is admitted that there are two worlds, the natural and the spiritual, but what the connection between those two worlds is no one can say. Now, I think it possible to point out what connection *does* exist between the two worlds, and this statement, which has much to do with the facts of Creation, can be shown to have a great deal of truth in it. Let us suppose, then, that there are two worlds, a natural and a spiritual: we all know that we have an external nature, which is in immediate connection with the world around us. All our senses are in communication with that external nature. We have also an internal nature—that part of it which thinks. No one imagines, surely, that that part of us which thinks, or that part which many of us believe to be of a spiritual nature, is *identical* with that external nature, which has merely to do with our bodily functions. How are we to know what that external nature is? For instance, I look at a man, and I see a body which is purely material—an organized body, and I know, for many reasons, that he also possesses a mind; but how am I to know whether a person possesses a mind or not? By merely looking at

him I cannot determine that fact. I might live for a month with such a person, and never know what passes in his mind, if he has one. How am I to know? The only possible way for him to give some evidence of it is by speaking or writing, *i.e.*, he must appeal to our external sense of hearing, or our external sense of seeing; but how can the man so appeal? In this manner. Let us take, for example, the eye. If you wish me to know what is passing in your mind, you *write* something that I can *read*, *i.e.*, you *reduce* the ideas in your mind to certain symbols of a purely conventional character, which have *no resemblance* to the ideas which they convey, but which symbols you place on paper before me. As soon as the eye of the mind recognizes those symbols, it is able to deduce from them the mental conceptions you have placed therein, and thus a *communication* is effected between mind and mind; and so also in speaking, the same thing is done in appealing to the ear. Certain sounds are produced bearing no identity whatever with the mental conception which they convey to the mind; but those sounds are capable of being reconstructed and returned again by the same process, so that we are then said to be able to *correspond* with each other, because the two symbols of writing and speaking and the mental processes which they convey are in exact *correspondence* with one another. Hence, when we write to a distant friend we place our ideas on paper and communicate with him, because when he gets our paper he can see and read what we say, and he is thus able to reproduce the ideas that we wish to convey, and we so correspond with him. Let us now adapt this principle to the idea of the creation. It was said, and very properly, not only by the ancient Greeks, but by the more ancient Hindüs, *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. I believe that is a perfectly sound principle, that "out of nothing nothing can be made." Now we are asked to believe, and the Bible tells us, and we believe it as Christians (without desiring to introduce theological matters into the discussion), that God is Spirit. If God is Spirit, and we are dwellers in the world, there can be no question which of those two is anterior. Evidently the Creator must be anterior to the created, and Spirit must be anterior to Matter. Therefore God, who is Spirit, created that material world which we see around us, of Matter. But how? Thus then, God being a Spirit, being anterior to Matter, it may explain by analogy what was the process by which it is possible to believe such a creation was effected. We possess, it is true, a Spirit, but it is hidden away in a material body. In

the body we cannot see the Spirit, but we can, under certain conditions, feel that a Spirit exists in it, and we feel that we can communicate with that Spirit; but it is so shut up in a material body that we have a closer connection with the world around us than with the Spirit within. Therefore it is very difficult to convey spiritual ideas to a mind so shut up in a material body. But if this Creator of the Universe did exactly what He has allowed us to do, as I have just shown, in order to communicate with our fellows by reducing our ideas to certain material substances and ultimate forms, and educing from those signs the ideas which they enable us to communicate with each other, so God could be imagined to project or reduce his spiritual qualities or attributes, which are infinite, into the material substances and ultimate forms which we see around, and which constitute the countless objects of the created world of matter. His two great primary attributes of Love and Wisdom, the outcome of which are Goodness and Truth, are, indeed, the source or spring of an infinite number of sub-qualities or attributes, every one of which, therefore, could be thus projected, as it were, and fixed in the material substances and ultimate forms of Creation. Each created thing would thus be the absolute counterpart, as it were, of something in the Divine to which it bore a strict and definite correspondence, and the universe would be a storehouse of signs and symbols of the infinite qualities of the Divine Mind; so that anyone who held the clue to the relation between the two could read in nature the absolute ideas of God Himself. Such a clue I believe it is intended we should find, and space alone prevents me from indicating it at this time. I think you have an explanation of how He may have created the universe, and how, by projecting His own attributes from the spiritual centre into circumferential (or ultimate) material forms and images—not out of nothing, but from the potencies of that spiritual cause, the natural materials (*i.e.*, created things) being not the realities they seem, but rather mere shadows of that real causative spirit, from which they were derived. Thus, indeed, by such knowledge we are enabled truly to *communicate* with Him. Let me give you an illustration of what I mean. We say that God is *Love* and *Wisdom*. That Love and Wisdom have nothing to do with our natural life as far as we live in this world. We cannot live on Love and Wisdom; we require natural food and drink. Love and Wisdom are only adapted to that spiritual part of us which we do not see. But other things are necessary in our external life, food

and drink, and heat and light. When we speak of Love, do not we always refer to its terms of warmth, such as an ardent attachment and warm regard? But if you speak of Wisdom or Truth, you always clothe the conception with terms relating to light, such as bright ideas, a brilliant imagination, luminous views, &c. Therefore, I say, inasmuch as we have two natures, one belonging to this earth, and one that does not, He has set over this external nature of ours something which exactly corresponds with Himself, viz., the sun. Hence we possess warmth and light from this material source which corresponds with His Love and Wisdom, and which ministers to all *external* creation in the same way as His spiritual attributes nourish our *internal* nature. (Applause.) I might say more, but the subject is inexhaustible.

MR. DESAI here spoke. (See note to the Author's reply.)

MR. W. H. ROBINSON.— I have paid attention for some years to the study of the Veda, and there is one point which, if I might, I would like to shape into the form of a question to the Author of the paper, at whose feet, metaphorically speaking, I have sat for many years. It occurs to me that while it is true that Christ identifies Himself with His Father, it is not true that all religious teachers do so; nor yet that many did, certainly neither Moses nor Zoroaster nor Mahomet identified themselves with God. The great stumbling-block of Brāhmanism at the present time is that its votaries identify themselves with God. The author of this paper says, at the ninth page, "all Sanskrit literature, too, teems with descriptions of the battle continually going on between gods and evil demons," and in another paragraph the authority he quotes for that is Śankara's *Commentary on the Chāndogya Upanishad*. Well, it strikes me that Śankara is no authority at all, any more than a man writing in the present day is an absolute authority on the doctrines of the New Testament—we take him for what he is worth. Śankara wrote 1500 to 1800 years after the time of the Upanishad he refers to, and at a period when the most corrupted notions of good and evil had taken possession of the Hindu mind; but I submit what I desire to say more as a question to the Author of the paper than as disputing with him. So far as my reading has gone, I have not met with any account of contests or battles between *good* and *evil* in the early literature of India. I am submitting this point to the Author; but according to my reading the contests are, for example, battles between Indra and Vritra, which are cosmic. They may be capable of such an application, but they

are not, to my mind, contests between *good* and *evil*. Now, in the literature of the Pārsis, you have it that this Indra himself became a demon, and that the followers of *Zerdušt* or *Zoroaster*, as we call him, styled Indra a demon; but I do not think, so far as I can tell, that the Vedic Indians retaliated and called any of his worshippers demons. I think, so far as I can see, the earliest Vedic conceptions were monotheistic. I have spent some years in the study of what I conceive to be a statement of the successive stages of the development of the Vedic religion, as described, not by modern students of the "Science of Religion," but by the very Vedic *Rishis* or "Seers" themselves. The Author well knows the passage of the Vedic story I am about to refer to, and the hymns of the Rig-Veda embodied therein. It occurs in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*—which is the ritual portion of the Rig-Veda—and is there called "The Story of Śunaḥśepha." The greatest importance was attached to it by its authors, it having been ordered to be related at the Coronation of Kings, occupying in such ceremonies a position and a ritual importance exactly corresponding to the formal presentation of the Holy Scriptures at our own Coronation ceremonies at Westminster. I do not think any of our learned scholars have yet commented upon the story in this, its very important original aspect. (I have spent some time on it, and hope shortly to present the result of my work to the public.)

Certainly no one has as yet construed the sequence of Vedic hymns attributed to the authorship of Śunaḥśepha and linked together, as in a chain, by the incidents of that wonderful and beautiful story. To make myself intelligible, I must, as briefly as possible, relate the main incidents leading up to these hymns, which consist of a hundred Rig-Veda verses. A certain king, *Haviśchandra*, had been required by *Varuṇa* to sacrifice his son. After many delays his son flies to the forest to avoid being sacrificed, and there, under Divine guidance, finds a youthful Brahman, Śunaḥśepha, who accompanies him back to his father, and who submits to be a vicarious sacrificial victim. I will not stop here to even touch upon the many thoughts arising out of this incident, but hasten to those which immediately touch the subject of the paper read. When Śunaḥśepha is bound to the sacrificial post, and the moment arrives for his immolation, he—whom I say the authors of the story intended to typify doomed humanity—exclaims, "I will seek refuge with the Devas." We know that this word—literally "the shinings," or "the shining ones"—involves

in later Sanskrit the idea of plurality in Divinity. But what does Śunahśepha do? He commences with a short mysterious verse, "Whom shall I seek of all the Divinities? Who will restore us to Aditi (*i.e.*, The Boundless One, The Infinite) that I may again see my father and my mother?" *Rig-Veda*, I, 24, i. This verse is said by the Vedic writers to have been addressed to Prajāpati—*i.e.*, "The Lord of all Creatures"—and to Him he cries for restoration to Aditi, the One Lord of All, in whom he should be restored to father and mother. This remarkable verse, when construed with the expression preceding its utterance, reminds us of the word Elohim in Genesis, a name of the One Lord in plural form, and of masculine and feminine conjoint significance. Then I see right through the succeeding chain of hymns an agreement in the successive manifestations of the various "Devas" or deities. Śunahśepha having addressed Prajāpati, the Lord of Creation, Prajāpati sends him to Agni, whom he addresses in substantially the same terms as Prajāpati. Agni sends him to Savitar, a name afterwards applied to the Sun, Savitar sends him to Varuṇa—the Lord of Encircling Heaven—to whom he addresses two sublime hymns, unsurpassed save in Holy Scripture, for pure spirituality, and reverential, pathetic human supplication. Varuṇa promises deliverance, but sends him to Agni, in the hymns to whom the sacrificial idea is more developed, Agni being addressed as being both the offering and the priest who officiates. Agni sends him to the Viśvedevas—or host of Devas—to whom he addresses a verse expressing veneration to all the Devas, "old and new," with a prayer for pardon if he neglect any of them. The Visvedevas refer him to Indra, whose worship, as the special divinity of the Aryans as against their enemies, comes next. In the verses to Indra, and his manifestation to the poet's imagination, appear the first traces of anthropomorphic, and therefore plural, conceptions of Deity in this chain of hymns. In Indra also we reach the first idea of anything like a contest, but that contest (and this is the point I started with) is not between good and evil, but between Indra and Vritra, both as representations of cosmic forces. Time would fail me to follow the legend and the chain of hymns further, or to do more than glance at Śunahśepha's subsequent deliverance at the morning dawn (for a close comparison of Vedic ritual has convinced me that the Vedic authors intended to represent him as crying out, while bound to the sacrificial post, from the waning hour of noontide—the ordinary sacrificial hour of the Mosaic ritual and of Vedic India also—all

through the dark night), when he was delivered at the first glint of the Sun, which, according to the later poets of the *Uttara Kanda* of the *Rāmāyan*, included all the Divinities of India in his One all-absorbing and predominating glory. I hope I have not intruded too long. The great point for present purposes is that the legend in the Aitareya Brāhmana shows that they called upon one God, represented in all these various manifestations co-operating together. I have epitomised the thoughts that arise on reading the story in a few brief lines of my as yet unpublished work on the legend. I trust I may be forgiven if I quote them.

'Twas thus the seers discerned The Infinite,
 In various aspects, various shades of light.
 Sometimes they neared Him, sometimes went astray,
 Sometimes enlightened, sometimes dark their way,
 But light or dark, as ages rolled along,
 By varied names, and ever changeful song,
 They worshipped *One* who lived for aye the same,
 Whate'er their song, whate'er they called His name.

(Applause.)

If we could only impress this on our Hindu brethren, we should go a long way towards the evangelization of India, by showing them that dualism came in far later—as the last speaker has said—than monotheism, and that there is one God to whom we hope all to be united at last. (Applause.)

MR. U. S. MISRA.—In rising to speak upon this subject in the presence of such a select audience as I see before me, my heart sinks within itself, but when I think that I am a Brahman from the holy town of Benares, and son of a Brahman Pandit, a man well known in literary circles, I believe that, unless I gave expression to my feelings, a great burden would lie on my mind. Therefore I rise, but before making any observations on this great subject which is occupying your thoughts this evening, I must point out to you that of all living Englishmen, not only here but in Europe, Sir Monier Williams is the best of persons to deal with the religions of India, for he has not only revelled in the pages of Kālidās, but has actually made the great sacrifice of going out to India and making a practical study of the subjects treated of in his paper. When I talk of Sir Monier Williams I do not think of him as Sir Monier Williams, but as a Pandit of the holy town of Benares, who is fitted to take rank with other Pandits, and this

in itself is no mean distinction even for a knight. Now I see in the discussion that has followed the reading of the paper that a great deal of theoretic matter has been brought into the argument. Different systems of philosophy have different theories in regard to Mind and Matter, and it is difficult to decide which of them is correct. A recent writer in the *Nineteenth Century* takes a practical view of all religions and systems of philosophy, and in a conflict between religious science and philosophy the latter must fare the worse, as it begins in doubt and ends in doubt. Great stress has been laid on the Pantheism of the Hindus. It is nothing more than the cosmic theism of modern times. It simply illustrates the system of philosophy involved in Herbert Spencer's theory of the Unknown, and the Unknowable; or, in other words, that God is but the potent energy underlying the phenomena, and can only be known, as far as He is manifested, through phenomena. This being the case, the Hindu philosophy hit upon a theory, in times when Herbert Spencer was undreamt of, which is consistent with modern investigations, and is the keynote to all philosophical scientific discoveries. In talking of Hindu philosophy, all that we claim for it is that it laid the foundation for different modern philosophical systems. We find that Sāṅkhya philosophy is represented in the atheistic doctrines of David Hume, and the Vedānta in the ideal philosophy of Bishop Berkeley. However, my contention is that neither Christianity nor any other religion has anything to fear from other religions, but a great deal from science. I join most heartily in the vote of thanks to Sir Monier Williams for illustrating to us the different systems of philosophy of India.

Professor H. L. ORCHARD, M.A.—May I be permitted to point out that the two positions of the Brahmans are mutually destructive? One is exposed by our Brahmanical friend—that Brahma was an undifferentiated substance; and not only so, but could not be differentiated. Alongside with that position we have the other, that man is God; but if God is not differentiated, how came He to be identical with all the human denominations of sin? Then as to Spirit manifesting itself through material signs, this would be absolutely useless, unless understood by those to whom the manifestations were made, and this surely has some relation to the truth that man was made in the image of God (that there might be a certain correspondence between God and man), and the fact that the Messiah manifested Himself in ~~the~~ flesh. Between the mani-

festations and those to whom they were made there was a certain connecting link, a certain correspondence, without which those manifestations would have been absolutely useless. Brahmanism appears to me to be altogether inconsistent with Christianity, which teaches me that I am a fallen being; that I can only enter the Kingdom of Heaven by being born again, and becoming a partaker of the Divine nature. Brahmanism ignores this. It ministers to human pride and to human wickedness by declaring that without a radically new birth I can enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. Might I be allowed to add another to the very interesting list of triads with which Sir Monier Williams concluded? I do not think he mentioned self and not self and the consciousness which connects the two.

Sir M. MONIER WILLIAMS.—I have been greatly interested in the speeches which have followed my paper; but, to deal satisfactorily with all that has been said, I should require to make a very tedious reply, or to write a second long paper, which would be a bad return for the kind attention accorded to my exposition of a dry subject on the present occasion. With Dr. Collingwood's striking observations, in which he dwelt on the truth that Nature, or all natural phenomena, are, as it were, the written language through which we, who are created in God's image, may read, mark, and understand the ideas, designs, and qualities of Love, Wisdom, &c., existing in the mind of our Creator, and so communicate with Him; I need scarcely say that I entirely agree, and I may add that a well-known Christian hymn supports his view in the following words:—

Thou, who hast given me eyes to see,
And love this sight so fair,
Give me a heart to find out Thee
And read Thee everywhere.

And still more a well-known verse in the Bible:—"The invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." The speech which followed Dr. Collingwood's was dealt with by Mr. W. H. Robinson, and in some respects sufficiently answered.*

* The reporters' notes of this speech—that of Mr. Desai, a Brāhman—were sent to him for correction, but never received back, and Sir Monier Williams writes: "*Before the publication of my paper* (now published for

Mr. Robinson went on to question the authority of Śankara's interpretation. With regard to Śankara, I can only repeat what I have pointed out in my book on "Brāhmanism," (p. 55), that if it be possible to point to any one really historical concrete personality around which Brāhmanical dogmas and their orthodox interpretation may be gathered, it is certain that we must look to him rather than to any other native writer. Of course I could adduce many other passages from the sacred Sanskrit texts themselves, and, indeed, could point to the whole plot of the Rāmāyana and Mahābhārata in support of my statement as to the conflict between good and evil spirits; but the very superabundance of my proofs and illustrations leads me to forbear. Those interested in the subject will find it fully treated of in my chapter on Demon-worship (see "Brāhmanism and Hindūism," published by Murray, p. 230). As to Mr. Misra's speech, I will only say that I agree with much that he said, and thank him cordially for the kind expressions he used in speaking of me, and of the researches which I prosecuted during my travels through all parts of India on three different occasions. I will only, in conclusion, express my cordial agreement with what fell from Professor Orchard.

The Meeting was then Adjourned.

the first time in the *Journal of the Victoria Institute*), Mr. Desai most unwarrantably allowed to be printed and published (in a certain magazine) two articles written by himself containing an amplification of his speech and founded on an *unrevised* proof of my paper, sent to him merely for his convenience (that he might join more readily in the discussion) and marked 'PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL' in large type. This *uncorrected* proof was not adhered to verbatim by me in delivering my paper; but, even if I had not changed the wording here and there, it is clear that by all codes of literary honour (whether European or Asiatic) a rough, uncorrected, and private proof ought not to have been made use of for the purposes to which Mr. Desai applied it."

REMARKS ON THE FOREGOING PAPER.

The Rev. F. A. ORDE-WARD, M.A., writes :—

In reference to Sir M. Monier Williams's remark that "the number one, indeed, appears to have assumed the character of a kind of God," &c., and other allied remarks in his paper, I would briefly call attention to the Pythagorean doctrine, as rightly interpreted by Prof. Ferrier, in his "Institutes of Metaphysic" (the high water mark of English thought), p. 94. "Theory of Knowing," prop. I, section 18: "*Whatever is to be known must be known as one, or as many, or as both; but whatever is to be known can be made one only by being referred to one self; and whatever is to be known can be made many only when each of the plurals has been made one by being referred to one self; and whatever is to be known can be made both one and many only by the same process being gone through, i.e., its unity and its plurality can only be effected by its reduction to the unity of self.*" This necessary method of knowing, embedded in the very constitution of the mind, seems to me singularly fruitful in its suggestions. It evidently leads to Monism, as the inherent and fundamental principle of Nature. The popular notion, that Pythagoras taught things were already numbered by Nature as one or many, and we *re-number* them as they emerge within the horizon of knowledge, is too absurd to be entertained for a moment. Dualism and Pantheism, when really thought out to their logical limits, must land the enquirer in pure and simple Monism or Monotheism. Is it possible for minds constituted like ours to *think* Dualism or Pantheism? It is easy to *talk* of them, but that is little. The current counters of metaphysics are too often mere verbal signs, that correspond to nothing and mean nothing. To adapt Tertullian's saying, "O testimonium animæ naturaliter *monotheisticæ*."

In connection with the Vedantic dogma, "the union of the one essence with illusion from all eternity," it is curious to find a popular doctrine now that God governs us (as children) by illusion, *βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι' ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι*. And in his "Institutes

of Metaphysic," Ferrier gives the only philosophical form of Agnosticism, which Huxley so unluckily coined.

Mr. W. MARTIN WOOD writes as follows:—

I would refer to the remark at page 11, where the author says:—

"The whole energy of a religious Indian Pārsī is concentrated on the endeavour to make himself—so to speak—demon proof, and this can only be accomplished by absolute purity (in thought, word, and deed), symbolized by whiteness. He is ever on his guard against bodily defilement, and never goes out to his daily occupations without first putting on a sacred white shirt and a sacred white girdle. Even the most highly educated, enlightened, and Anglicised Pārsis are rigorous observers of this custom, though it seems probable that their real creed has little in common with the old and superstitious belief in demons and evil spirits, but rather consists in a kind of cold monotheistic pantheism."

Now my query is in brief; can Sir M. Monier Williams (waiving the notion of so high importance being given to outward defilement), not put the ethical position of the Zoroastrian somewhat higher than this? I have known many of them intimately, in all ranks and conditions, and allowing for the earthiness which is one side of the dualism pervading all human nature, my impression is that many of them cherish a higher standard of moral action than he implies, and which as we know has always been maintained in the ethical—or even spiritual—side of their operative creed. Just to glance at authorities which are, of course, quite familiar to him, like the passage in the introduction to A. H. Bleek's "Avesta" (Stephen Austin, 1864), which was revised by Professor Spiegel; we read p. 18—"A religion which is probably as ancient as Judaism, and which certainly taught the immortality of the soul, and a future state of rewards and punishments for centuries before these doctrines were prevalent amongst the Jews—a religion which, for ages prior to Christianity, announced that men must be *pure in thought* as well as in *word and deed*, and that sins must be *repented* of before they could be atoned for—a religion whose followers were forbidden to kill even animals, at a time when the ancestors of the French and English nations were accustomed to sacrifice human victims to their sanguinary Deities—a pure and venerable religion, &c." Then see the quotation from Burnouf, in which he speaks of the high place that "human personality, and human morality occupy in Zoroas-

trianism." He goes on to compare this to the disadvantage of "Brahmanism as it appears in the gigantic conceptions of Vedic Naturalism." He points out that, "in detaching itself more decidedly from God and Nature, Zoroastrianism has certainly taken more account of man than Brahmanism," and has "gained in depth what it has lost in extent." And, what is more to the purpose of my query, he considers it "a system which tends to develop the noblest instincts of our nature, and which imposes on man as the most important of his duties that of striving constantly against the principle of evil."

Then the moral aspects of Zoroastrianism are opened up with much clearness in Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji's paper on the *European and Asiatic Races*, read before the Ethnological Society, March, 1866, at p. 7 (C. L. Parekh; collected essays, writings, and speeches of the Hon. Dadabhai Naoroji, Bombay. Caxton Printing Works, 1887)—he quoted from Zoroaster—"I understand truth-telling exalted; all the days of the holy man are with thoughts of truth, words of truth, and deeds of truth . . . What is the high religion? that which promotes my holiness and truth, with good thought, word, and deed." Then follow other citations to similar effect, and Sir. G. Rawlinson is quoted as saying that in "their (Zoroastrian) system, truth, purity, piety, and industry were the virtues chiefly valued and inculcated." But I need not further cite testimonies not only to the high ethical teaching of Zoroastrianism, but also to the moral quality of modern Parsiism, which must be familiar to Sir Monier as an eclectic philosopher. Hence I feel confident that he can, on due reconsideration, somewhat raise "the religious Indian Parsi" in the scale of comparative ethical quality.

THE AUTHOR'S REPLY.

August, 1891.

I have nothing to add to Mr. Orde-Ward's interesting remarks, and I agree with nearly everything in Mr. Martin Wood's remarks, but I think that he will find, on reading my paper attentively, that I have said nothing to derogate from the ethical position of the Zoroastrians. Can there be a higher standard of morality than aiming at absolute purity in thought, word, and deed?

NOTE.

The following are the remarks by the Rev. C. G. Chittenden, B.A., referred to in a note to page 12 of Sir Monier Williams's paper:—

Page 2, paragraph 1.—“I believe I am right,” &c. In the popular discussion of these questions in the present day, “Monism and Dualism” seem to be used, each in two different ways:—

(1) To denote opinions as to the cause of phenomena; whether they are the result of the existence of Mind alone; or of Matter alone (Monism): or whether they result from the mutual action of both, being distinct existences (Dualism). This use may be called “*Metaphysical*” Monism and Dualism.

(2) To denote opinions on the origin of the moral world as it is presented to us in this life; whether it is the work of one Being or of two, and this use may be called “*Ethical*” Monism and Dualism.

It may be observed with reference to “*Metaphysical*” Monism, that, to minds of a metaphysical cast, Bishop Berkeley's Idealistic Monism is more easily conceivable than what may be called Material Monism, viz.—that Mind is a product or function of Matter.

Berkeley's theory is consistent with itself, and the chief argument against it is a “dualistic instinct” in man.

Page 11, last paragraph.—Isaiah xlv, 6, 7.

Here “evil” being opposed to “peace” must mean “physical evil,” “adversity.”

Page 12, last paragraph.—“We know too that this freedom of choice,” &c.

“*Ethical Dualism*” seems to be the refuge of some minds from the difficulties of “*Ethical Monism*” in attempting to account for the existence of moral evil. (See S. Laing's “*Modern Zoroastrian*.”)

Bishop Butler (“*Analogy of Religion*,” Part I, Chapter 5), considers that a partial explanation of the entrance of moral evil among finite beings, is furnished by the fact of their having particular “*affections*” or “*propensions*.”

But the difficulty of many minds (*e.g.*, J. S. Mill) is in conceiving that a Being who is all-good, all-wise, and all-powerful, would permit a state of things in which moral evil should exist. (See “*Three Essays on Religion*,” Theism, Part II.)

J. S. Mill appears to be an "Ethical Dualist, or Pluralist," in assuming that the Creator must have been limited by one or more opposing forces. He seems to consider that we have faculties and materials sufficient to warrant this inference.

But is it not probable that the minute portion of the Universe within our cognisance should suggest ideas which a view of the whole would show to be erroneous?

It is surely conceivable that, as Good and Evil are to us correlative ideas, the highest good could not be produced in finite beings, except by actual acquaintance with evil; and that men are now passing through that zone of evil in the course of the evolution of their highest good.

It may be that to complain that this highest good is unattainable without the experience of evil is tantamount to complaining that Omnipotence cannot work contradictions.

The History of this World to this time may be a minute fraction, both in time and space, of the history of the Universe; and what is an enigma, if we assume the fragment to be the whole, might be seen to be a necessary portion of the scheme, could we comprehend the whole in our view.

If our existence, indeed, is supposed to terminate with this life there seems no room for the idea of a good and just Creator; and the difficulty of forming that idea is immensely increased if it must be harmonised with the perpetuity of evil.
