

Theological Review

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A PIT DIGGED FOR OTHER: PERILS IN MORAL AND SOCIAL THEOLOGY

G. R. DUNSTAN

I

On Tuesday, 14 November 1967 I had the honour to deliver in this College an Inaugural Lecture in the newly-established Chair of Moral and Social Theology, entitled *A Digger Still*.⁽¹⁾ Our then colleague, and still dear friend, Professor E.L. Mascall, put it about (though with no claim to infallibility in the matter) that my theme might be the production of spiritous liquor in Australia. He might well have been right, for nowhere had I seen, or have I yet seen, a definitive description of the scope of my subject. The *Daily Mail*, in reporting my appointment, located my professional interest in what has since brought fame to page three of *The Sun*. All I had was a verbal invitation from the then Dean, S.H. Evans – ratified, of course, by the formal procedures of the College and University – to come and pursue at King's what I was attempting already in Church House, Westminster: that is, developing (I suppose) a method in moral reasoning which set a theologian or two and a philosopher or two to work within a small company of specialists in medical science, or law, or professional or public life, to search out together the points of moral claim, of ethical interest, in various areas of practice, and then to postulate how those claims should be met. In that work I had had as colleagues Professor Ian Ramsey, later Bishop of Durham, Dr John Habgood who was to succeed Ramsey at Durham, Professor R.M. Hare and Professor Basil Mitchell. By the time I wrote my Inaugural Lecture I ventured to define for myself the intention of the College in these words: "To establish in a modern University, where a distinguished Faculty of Theology is already integrated with the life of other Faculties, and in the capital city where every activity of modern life is represented, a point of serious academic encounter between theology and other disciplines." I knew that my base, my only academic offering to this encounter, had to be theology. Yet, standing here as I did in a company of such distinguished theologians, I followed F.D. Maurice, who said he could not give himself "the grand title of a theologian", but was "only a digger": I was a digger still.

Now, fifteen years later, I emerge from my hole, my pit. It is "a pit digged for other". It is not indeed, as the Psalmist's was, a snare or mantrap into which, by the just judgment of Providence, I have fallen myself – though if a man digs deeply enough he must expect a tumble or two as he climbs in or out. The pit is digged for my successor, whom I am happy to welcome as a former colleague here in King's College, The Reverend Mr Keith Ward, of Trinity Hall, Cambridge. And the purpose of the pit becomes clear when we add Maurice's own gloss upon his being a digger, quoted in the newly-published Autobiography of J.M. Ludlow: "I am not a builder" (he said, more than once), "but one who uncovers foundations for building on."⁽²⁾ It was the intention, I suppose, of those who so kindly conspired against me to promote this lecture, that I should examine those foundations to see what they will now bear – muddled though they may be, sometimes, when the water-table is high.

II

My sub-title speaks of Perils in Moral and Social Theology. Some, of course, are peculiar to any of us who is marked out for martyrdom. Not all sitters in this Chair will be lucky enough, as I was, to be invited to Rome regularly over several years, to attend the Pontifical Commission which drafted the *Lex Ecclesiae Fundamentalis* for the Revised Code of Canon Law; or unlucky enough, in consequence, to have his Anglican blood shed on the flagstones once trodden by the Holy Inquisition, now by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. But any may experience what is even more painful – exposure to television programmes or journalistic interrogation for which, through cast or habit of mind or lack of experience, he may be totally unsuited. The risk is high because his business is with contemporary moral issues of practical importance; and he cannot escape the fact of popular interest in them. Even if, recognizing his limitations, he keeps his distance from the TV studio and the portable tape-recorder, scarcely a week will pass without a young woman, "researching" (as she calls it) a TV programme, invading his peace by telephone to pick his brains upon some medical or other matter which she might be expected to read up for herself. And from the give-away newspapers for medical readers come callers for instant comment on events inadequately narrated or on reports not yet read. The practices raise serious questions about the right use, or exploitation, of academic time, and the proper responsibility of an academic to help in the forming of public opinion. His obligation he may recognize; but he cannot be indifferent to the fact that the programme is already biased by the pre-selected questions put to him, and to the possibility that his replies may be distorted in an editorial process over which he has no control. Without confidence in the interrogator, he maintains his reserve. Happily we have colleagues in King's who can use the wireless and TV well.

In theory the moralist should welcome the public discussion of moral and social issues on which he works hard to form his own mind; in fact he may, in the evening retreat, either (having scanned the *Radio Times*) switch over in escape to music, or, if he resists that, submit himself to the provocation of tongues. He has to work hard, I say; for his first duty, when working at the ethics of a practice, is to master the relevant facts. ("If we ignore facts", F.D. Maurice wrote, "we change substances for supposition"; and R.M. Hare has written, more recently, of their place in moral thinking⁽³⁾). And facts change with demanding rapidity, especially in medical practice. It is never safe to use a lecture or paper again a few months later. In the issues of ethics and social policy attending the remedies for renal failure, for instance, techniques change in dialysis and transplant surgery, and with them the inter-relation of the two processes and the norms of selection for them; new immuno-suppressive drugs are synthesized, altering the balance of risk and benefit, as well as the requirements for matching and hysto-compatibility. The ethics of conception, gestation, fetal diagnosis, abortion, and the remedying of congenital disorders, are constantly called into question by rapid advances in the genetic sciences, in embryology and in the techniques of exploration and intervention. Judicial decisions and judgments in the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords determine the legal aspects of matters under discussion. In short, every encounter with a medical audience or with medical participants requires the revision

of old interim positions, and each revision based on a search of the journals or the literature of the subject. There is no comfortable reliance on past work from year to year.

It is hard for him, therefore, unless he is a saint (and the University does not appoint us for our sanctity) to endure the generalities of popular debate when so many of the refinements on which ethical analysis turns are obscured. The jargon corrupts our language with gratuitous suffixes and verbal jerry-building; transplantation and transportation; proportionality and confidentiality; hospitalization, institutionalization – and now communitization; decision-making, parameter and cohabitee; and, of course, the word which is dropped in anywhere as a substitute for any other, no matter what – situation.

Worse than this – even worse – is to hear the discussion imprisoned from the start in dubious, inappropriate or misleading categories. It is now common for any aspiration, legitimate or extravagant, and any disputable claim, to be advanced in the language of *rights*. I have come to suspect this language. I observe that the common law of England was concerned with liberties centuries before we imported the political notion of rights. Today, in popular debate, it appears to be enough to prefix the words “the right to” to any notion, verb or substantive, to imprint on it an indefeasible, indisputable claim, subjectively interpreted. So the euthanasia lobby propagates a “right to die” as a euphemism for a liberty to commit suicide (also miscalled a right) or for a claim upon someone else to commit murder. Abortion is popularly assuming the status of a right. Pressure groups for the humane treatment of animals think it necessary to invest animals with “rights”, when they could articulate all their moral assertions more clearly, and more convincingly, in the language of duty: as a man I have a duty to protect animals from unnecessary suffering, whether or not they have rights. The inflation of the so-called rights of parents has complicated increasingly the ethics of paediatric care, especially of the handicapped new-born; though happily the judgment in the Court of Appeal in August 1981, in the wardship proceedings *re B*, the Hammersmith child Alexandra,⁽⁴⁾ restated the interest of the child in such cases, against which parental wishes may not prevail. Parents have no property in a child, and, I suspect, few or no rights either. They have *duties* towards their children, including a duty to secure such medical care – and formal education – as will protect and enhance the child’s interests. It seems to me – though subject heavily to correction, – that it is the proper function of the law, when the law is invoked, to protect parents in the exercise of that duty when willing, to encourage and assist them in it when not very willing or not very competent, and to relieve them of it, in the interest of the child, when they are clearly recusant, negligent or incapable. It seems to me that in language of this sort we can make sufficient moral assertions about the responsibilities of parents for their children without resort to the language of rights.

Meanwhile pressure grows to invest the unborn child with rights, including a right to be born without defect. So “wrongful life” suits are brought by children born handicapped, actions for damages against their parents for letting them be born. Fortunately the first attempt in this country was rebuffed by the Court of Appeal on 20 February 1982⁽⁵⁾; but in the U.S.A. the “right” is vigorously asserted.

The language of rights, I suggested, is political language, not the normal or most natural language of morality or of the English concept of law. Political language is invading the discussion of medicine, conspicuously the discussion of mental illness and psychiatry. On the surface it appears to be a squabble about labelling, about authority to place patients into categories – a squabble in which the fact that mentally ill people actually suffer seems often to be overlooked. Beneath is a real conflict, as the debates on our own new Mental Health Bill demonstrate. The final question is whether, for fear of infringing the “rights” (or, as I would say, the liberty) of subjects, and for fear of increasing the power of institutions, political or professional, over individuals, good medical practice may be inhibited in ways from which both the patient and, in consequence, society itself, may suffer. The debate has been polarized harmfully in the U.S.A. where, on the one hand, individuals uncertain of their own innate capacities for living a reasonably contented life have invested their chosen psychiatrists with almost godlike authority over their thoughts, feelings and decisions; and, on the other hand, Szasz and his fellow-libertarians have driven to its extreme the right of anyone not to be treated or detained for psychiatric treatment without consent. My own hope is that those who are pressing the libertarian view in the process of enacting a new Mental Health Bill for this country will consider very carefully some weighty medical, legal and philosophical reflections on that controversy in recent American literature. I refer particularly to papers edited by Spicker, Healy and Tristram Engelhardt in *The Law-Medicine Relation: A Philosophical Exploration* (1981)⁽⁶⁾, and to another collection edited by Bloch and Chodoff entitled *Psychiatric Ethics* (1981)⁽⁷⁾.

My own generalizations, influenced particularly by the first of these books, hardly reflect the gravity of my concern lest medical ethics in this country also should become dominated by political labelling and threats of litigation. It is not, I believe, unfair to say that in present-day American medical circles, the word “ethical” means that which would give a doctor a good defence to an action for malpractice in a court of law; “unethical” means that which would cost him or his insurers heavy damages. The fever is inflamed, to the advantage of lawyers who engage in it, by the “contingency fee” system. The cost to doctors in insurance premiums, and therefore to the provision or purchase of health care, is enormous. Here we have not in this College, or at King’s College Hospital, an “Associate Professor of Pharmacology (Law)”, or an “Assistant Professor of Paediatrics (Law)” or a “Professor of Obstetrics (Law)”, as an equivalent American institution would now have. Instead we have a Centre of Law, Medicine and Ethics, in which three or four benign gentlemen (I hope), teachers, combine together to mount courses of lectures and other teaching and – when we can get a bit of money – to promote research. We have, in the University of London, that remarkable institution, now twenty years old, the London Medical Group – copied now in almost all the Medical Schools of Britain – where the discussion of medical ethics is promoted by and among the doctors, medical students and nurses themselves, with the invited participation of others with a contributory view – lawyers, philosophers, theologians and patients. It publishes an established *Journal of Medical Ethics*: it sponsors ethical research. The aim throughout is good medical practice, not the avoidance of litigation. The ethics must be practice-based; and the moralist who would take part in the exercise

must be continually sensitive to it. For myself, if I may speak personally on this occasion, I am indebted to those medical people who have kept me immersed in the tides of practice over these years – in the Medical Schools, the Royal Colleges, the Royal Society of Medicine, the Ciba Foundation, the Councils of St Christopher's Hospice and Trinity Hospice, and, more recently, in Research Ethics Committees. Without these, I might have read more books, and even written one or two; but I could not have fulfilled the duties of this particular Chair of Moral and Social Theology.

The work is not, indeed, entirely without literary monument. *A Dictionary of Medical Ethics*⁽⁸⁾, now in its second edition, was partly edited here, though the two distinguished medical editors were from outside, one from the Royal Post-Graduate Medical School, the other from the University of Edinburgh. And for five years, once a term, three members of this College have been pursuing the similarities and differences in the Hippocratic, Jewish and Christian traditions of medicine, in a group containing the Chief Rabbi, a Catholic moralist, and doctors and medical scientists standing in those three traditions. The result, a book entitled *Consent in Medical Practice*, will be published by King Edward's Hospital Fund for London, in 1983.

III

I have rambled, rather, over medical issues because the College Centre of Law, Medicine and Ethics is joint host with the Faculty of Theology for this Lecture. Yet there are other things to do, other perils to undergo. The moralist is liable to be drawn into the affairs of Church and State: of the Church, to help to form the Christian conscience on this problem or that; of the State, to help administer or improve a service provided under Statute, or to work out the basis for a new Statute, or to discuss with Ministers and Civil Servants such national issues as Arms Control and Deterrence. In both sorts of company he is at risk: in the Church from the representative amateur, and from the Church House bureaucrat who fears lest the Church "say the wrong thing", or "not be heard to speak", even though it is uncertain what it should say; in the State from the formidable expertise which civil servants bring to their tasks, before which the moralist, with his few working principles and jumbled impressions, sits astounded. The ecclesiastical dread of academic theologians or of experts in anything was voiced by the late Cardinal Heenan in the Second Vatican Council, during the preparation of the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World: *Timeo expertos* (he said, or, according to another recension, for oral tradition is variable) *Timeo peritos et annexa ferentes*. ("I dread the experts, even with appendices in hand")⁽⁹⁾.

Between Church and State lie a wide range of citizen activities, pressure groups, councils and committees for the promotion of good causes or the suppression of bad ones. Perils for the moralist abound, for the avoidance of which he may insulate himself in a lofty indifference to them all.

Some measure the objective morality of their cause with the intensity of their moral feelings about it, and cannot tolerate indifference or dissent. Some, moved by Christian conviction, insist that there must be a specifically *Christian* solution to every human problem, and cannot understand when a Christian moralist cannot instantly agree. There is of course a specifically Christian solution to the problem of the Falkland Islands. But the possibility of its adoption rests

upon the hypothesis of prior acceptance by all parties of the total content of the Gospel, and a total and successful commitment to the Resurrection life. How difficult it was even for the earliest Christians, for whom Jesus, Calvary, the Resurrection and Pentecost were a recent and compelling experience, we may learn from the New Testament. The hypothesis is unrealizable in the world which it is a political responsibility to govern. To assume that there is a specific Christian prescription for ills created by a wholly different organization of the world and of life is to mistake the nature of Christianity and of politics, to the detriment of both. Once we have moved from a Resurrection *koinonia*, of which the animation is fellowship, to political organization, in which control is ultimately exercised by power, we move also from the language of Christian morality into that of political morality – a move back, if you will, from the spontaneous mutuality of a close-knit body to the moral reasoning of the natural man; from mutual self-giving in love to mutual and self protection in terms, at best, of an enforced distributive justice. If the two moralities *are* brought together, that conjunction is in and through the character of Christian men who find their vocation in politics, or law, or the profession of arms, or in those other civil occupations by which the fabric of an ordered world is sustained. There is no Christian reason for going to war, nor a Christian way of waging war; yet it may be right to go to war. (On determining whether we are right or not in being now at war, I spoke in the College on the first day of Term. The subject would make a lecture in itself.)

The peril, then, is of being trapped by a Christian vocabulary in uses for which it is not appropriate. It may be the word of Jesus in the Gospel; it may be the slogans of theology – "the two kingdoms", "justification by faith"; "eschatology" in various forms; a "theology of hope" or of "despair"; "liberation theology". The words, the imperatives, *may* have their place at some stage in the argument; but seldom can we *begin* from them.

If one is sometimes embarrassed by the Christian embrace in matters moral, so one is also by those who, at the first offence to moral susceptibility, seek to invoke the law: "there ought to be a law against it." In 1960 the then Archbishop of Canterbury wanted Artificial Insemination by Donor made into a statutory crime. I subscribed to a less prohibitive but still not encouraging position.⁽¹⁰⁾ I would not sign the same memorandum of evidence today.

In the intervening decades I have analysed the problems more freely than I could then. But now the same demand, to legislate, is raised about the new and consequent developments in assisted fertility: *in vitro* fertilization, embryo transfer, sperm banks, surrogate motherhood, do-it-yourself kits for lesbians and spinsters – and experiments on fertilized ova to advance such studies and practices as immunology and gene therapy. It is easy to imagine abuse – rows of little Hitlers (or – why not? – of little Dunstons) cloned; it is easy to predict, more realistically, commercial exploitation: the business is well advanced in the U.S.A. Should we not guard against these abuses by legislating in advance, now? That is the proposal.

There was a short period in our history when we resorted to penal statutes to uphold our moral repudiation of what were self-evident wrongs. It was at its height, I suppose, between Lord Ellenborough's Abortion Act of

1803 and the Contagious Diseases Acts of the late 1860s, or perhaps later. It was a response to a new wave of evangelical and humanist moralism which had awakened to the fact that with the decay of the ecclesiastical courts, moral offences, formerly punishable under the canon law, now went unpunished. The 1803 Act implied as much in the Preamble. Since then a partial reading of Mill on Liberty – partial because we have accepted all his restrictive judgments on the ambit of the criminal law while forgetting his reliance on a vigorously moral public opinion – we have rubbed quite a number of those offences out of the statute book. The purpose of a statute which creates an offence and assigns to it a penalty is to remedy an evident ill: we have, alas, no preambles of the old sort to our statutes now to tell us so; but that, I believe, is what their purpose is. The ill must be serious and general enough – particularly heinous if a very minority interest is affected – to warrant the mischief which such a statute must entail: the problems of enforcement, and a further, if necessary, restriction of liberty. The necessity of such a law must be demonstrated on consequential grounds: what evil is the action, if not forbidden, likely to entail? Clearly the interest most at risk in these experimental modes of conception is that of the children to be born from them. The risks of deformity can be estimated from teratology studies of comparable techniques with animals. Probably the law of tort is strong enough, with the threat of civil action, to restrain the impetuous practitioner. The risks of emotional damage from bartered or unsuitable motherhood are less predictable or preventable. But the difficulty would be to demonstrate that they are sufficiently worse than those of normal parenthood, within or without wedlock, to justify the creation of an offence. It may be that cognisance of these matters were better left to professional regulation, under codes of practice drawn and upheld by the respective Royal Colleges.

There remains the question of commercial exploitation. To this my approach must be even more speculative. There is no property in a corpse; and no property either, I believe, in a live human body. Can we extend this to a presumption of no property in human tissue, including semen and ova, fertilized or unfertilized? We do not sell human blood for transfusion in this country. We have the Peel Report on the use of human fetal tissue.⁽¹¹⁾ Could we work on from there, to prevent the spread in this country of the ludicrous and degrading adventurism already so profitable in America? To doubt whether there is a place for a new criminal law enactment in this field is not to deny the need for *law reform*. The law relating to the registration of birth, to personal identity, to bastardy, and to other areas of social consequence arising from new medical practice, is obsolete and, in some instances, mischievous. It should be the task of an Inter-Departmental Committee, following on the work which the Law Commission has already done, to make proposals on this to Parliament.

IV

The perceptive will have noticed how easily I slip back into the ethics of personal or professional relation, try as I will to escape. I forsook work on *The Family* early in my time here, in order to free myself for other tasks; only to be drawn back into it for four years with the Home Office and the DHSS – fruitless years, it now seems, while the Government is too preoccupied with economic recovery to make better use of the rich marital support services already

at its disposal. I refer to the Consultative Document, *Marriage Matters* now somewhere on a shelf.⁽¹²⁾ Ties of long personal friendship have kept me close also to the Institute of Marital Studies, and the world of psychotherapy behind it, from which I have learned far more than I have been able to give or teach. But what of the other life of this capital city in which the Maurice Professor was supposed to immerse himself? What of the City itself, the world of commerce?

As in other areas of work, effective action on business ethics requires the right context, the right company, in which the exchange, the moral analysis, can be made. I have, in fact, found myself working in such company on and off throughout my years here. Modest publications have followed. A group of friends did early work together at Worth Abbey, in Sussex. The Foundation for Business Responsibilities set me up among the sons of Belial from time to time; and the Christian Association of Business Executives, and its international counterpart, UNIAPAC, sometimes call on me to think. My students have, I hope, benefited from what I have fed back to them. Six did, certainly, in one vintage year, when they earned a champagne supper and ten pounds apiece for exposing themselves to clips of advertisements for an evening and recording their “reactions”. This was called, by their hosts, *research*. Preliminary thinking for Lord Watkinson’s Company Affairs Committee of the C.B.I. was done at St George’s House, Windsor Castle, involving closely a former student of this College and Treasurer of its Council. The two Reports of that Committee had no chance to make the impact they deserved, because of a change of Government at a General Election. But the thinking continues; and it may yet shew itself in a *Dictionary of Business Ethics*, to stand alongside of the volume on medical ethics already published.

The perils for the moralist – for that is my theme – are obvious. Ethics and system are inseparable; he may well be trapped mentally within the system, even as he seeks to understand it. He is torn continually between the evident faults in the system and the evident integrity of men working within it, trying to raise the standards of the worst to those of the best. And he is not impressed by the alternative systems on offer. At all events, the Maurice Professor stands in a good tradition in encountering those risks; for the Christian Socialists, led here not so much by Maurice as by his lieutenant, J.M. Ludlow, a barrister of Lincoln’s Inn, strove in the mid nineteenth century, not only to make it lawful for working men to associate in co-operative societies and trade unions, but also for the enacting of the statute which gave us the limited liability company; that was legislation worth campaigning for.

There remain wide areas of the national life still untouched. Industrial and economic relations were pursued by my counter-part in the University of Manchester, Professor R.H. Preston, who studied economics under Tawney at the L.S.E. before he turned to Theology. In his F.D. Maurice Lectures given here in 1977 he brought some of those studies into the College.⁽¹³⁾ As for the ethics of war, it was indeed fortunate that in 1971 the then Principal, Sir John Hackett, was persuaded to establish a Lectureship in the Ethics of War in the Department of War Studies. The College has, in that Department, a strong team personally and professionally committed to the promotion of peace and of ethical restraints upon and in war. It is fortified now by the new Dean of the College, the Reverend Richard Harries,

who began post-graduate studies in the ethics of war here in 1970, and has brought his matured thinking on the subject back with him into our company; he is welcome. The College can boast expertise, not only in Law, Medicine and Ethics, but also in Theology, Ethics and War.

V

I began my work here, as I began this lecture, with a reference to Maurice in the first person singular: "I am only a digger." You must forgive me if that outcrop of grammatical vanity has been too prominent in this lecture. But, following Maurice again, it cannot intrude itself into the moralist's work without destroying it. Maurice proclaimed, with almost tedious fervour, that co-operation, not competition, was true to the nature of God's created universe. And the practical moral reasoning to which the holder of this chair is bound requires co-operation. He cannot work unless he has the confidence, and indeed, the friendship of practitioners in the arts which are his study. Maurice himself, though he could generate deep trust and friendship - even adoration - in some with whom he worked, seems yet to have been by temperament an isolate. He had a horror of "systems", "organizations", which led him to withdraw from his friends from time to time, so wrecking some of Ludlow's more promising schemes. And, of course, he was expelled for heterodoxy from this College: and, I am sometimes tempted to think, he may have enjoyed being expelled.

There was injustice in the process of his expulsion, leaving the College with a guilty conscience. The endowing of this Professorship was an act of reparation. I said in my Inaugural Lecture that the chair looked like an altar, and myself the first victim for sacrifice.

I hope the College has prospered, done rather better, since it purged its offence. Judging from the financial cuts imposed upon it now, we may need to search our consciences again, to see whether there is yet another

sacrifice required to be offered. Yet the enterprise of the endowment itself succeeded. For this, thanks must be returned to many donors - former Kingsmen who could probably ill afford what they gave, as well as to City companies and other institutional contributors. Thanks must be returned to Sydney Evans, the then Dean, who concerted the efforts of the Council to establish the Chair, and to Mr David Hunter Johnston, then Treasurer of the Council. To Mr Myles Tempany, the College Bursar, must go the final accolade, for he it was who husbanded the money, and put it out upon usury, to that it earned such increase that the College can afford to appoint my successor, even in these hard times, without any period of vacancy. And what sort of problem is *that* for Christian Ethics?

1. G.R. Dunstan. *A Digger Still* London: Epworth Press, 1968
2. *John Ludlow : The Autobiography of a Christian Socialist*. Ed. A.D. Murray. London: Frank Cass. 1981 p. 117.
3. R.M. Hare, *Moral Thinking* Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1981 p. 89.
4. *Re 'B' (Minor) : The Times Law Report*, 8 August 1981.
5. *Mackay v Essex Area Health Authority and Another*. *The Times Law Report*, 20 February 1982.
6. S.F. Spicker, J.M. Healey Jr. & H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr, ed. *The Law Medicine Relation: A Philosophical Exploration*. Dordrecht, Boston & London: D. Reidel, 1981.
7. S. Bloch & P. Chodoff, ed., *Psychiatric Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981.
8. Ed. A.S. Duncan, G.R. Dunstan & R.B. Welbourn. London: Darton, Longman & Todd; New York: Crossroad. 2nd edn. revised, 1981.
9. Both forms are quoted, the variant apparently unnoticed, in H. Vorgrimler, ed., *Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II*, (London: Burns & Oates) vol. 5 (1969), pp. 42, 226.
10. *Artificial Insemination by Donor: Two Contributions to a Christian Judgment*. London: Church Information Office, 1960.
11. *The Use of Fetuses and Fetal Material for Research*. London: H.M.S.O., 1972.
12. London: H.M.S.O., 1979
13. R.H. Preston, *Religion and the Persistence of Capitalism*. London: S.C.M. Press, 1979.

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