

The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Nationalist, Xenophobic and Antiwestern Tendencies in Russia Today: Not Nationalism, but Fundamentalism

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Introduction

A lot has been written about nationalism in the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and I shall therefore touch on this theme only briefly here.

Aggressive Russian nationalism is quite widespread in Russia and it would be strange if it were not present in the ROC, as in any broadly-based public association which does not explicitly require its members to renounce nationalism. Many bishops and clergy maintain links with organisations reminiscent of the prerevolutionary Black Hundreds (*Chernaya sotnya*). The church has made no open condemnation of such links, and indeed a number of Black Hundred members have been canonised in the last decade, some on the occasion of mass canonisation of new martyrs at the Jubilee Bishops' Council in August 2000.¹ The largest nationalist organisation, Russian National Unity (*Russkoye natsional'noye yedinstvo*) is not officially Orthodox, but actively cooperates in many regions with ROC clergy.² Since 1991, when several monasteries ceased praying for Patriarch Aleksii II after his conciliatory speech before American rabbis, ROC leaders have not dared to speak directly against the antisemitism which serves as a major component of Russian ideological nationalism. There is no mention of antisemitism in the document *Foundations for a Social Concept for the ROC (Osnovy sotsial'noi kontsepsii RPTs)* adopted at the Jubilee Council. Meanwhile openly antisemitic literature, including *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, is frequently to be found on sale in Orthodox churches.

All this certainly does not mean that ROC is itself a nationalist and antisemitic body. The very same document directly condemns nationalism.³ There is no proof of direct approval of Russian National Unity by ROC bishops. Nevertheless the inconsistency of the position of bishops of the ROC (the reasons for which I shall not discuss here) allows members of the church to collaborate with aggressive nationalist and extremely antiwestern groups.

Within the church, a large number of Orthodox brotherhoods and other groups espouse extreme nationalist ideological positions. Just as the bishops do not support groups of this kind outside the church, so they do not support the extremist brotherhoods within the church either; but it is impossible for the church to expel anyone for his or her political views, and the nationalist brotherhoods continue working actively.⁴

For these brotherhoods nationalism and antiwesternism are derivative from their general world outlook, for which the most accurate name would be 'Russian Orthodox fundamentalism'. This is a world outlook based on extremely mythologised notions about the prerevolutionary Orthodox monarchy, and it is very widespread in the church. In essence it is a simplified and aggressive form of nostalgia for a Golden Age which came to a violent end at the 1917 revolution and which has been rejected both by communism and by postsoviet modernisation. It is fundamentalism, not nationalism as such, which is the basic antiliberal and antimodernist phenomenon generated by the church.

Without offering a detailed analysis of this phenomenon, I shall simply note at this point that 'Russian Orthodox fundamentalists' (henceforth 'fundamentalists') stand for the restoration of autocracy, a state structure on the imperial model, restrictions on the Jews and confessions other than Orthodoxy, the status of state church for the ROC, rejection of the concepts of democracy and human rights (in particular, as far as freedom of conscience is concerned), opposition to any forms of western influence within the country and struggle against such influence beyond Russia's borders, rigid paternalism by the state in all areas and the compulsory imposition of 'Orthodox values' in everyday life, culture and even the economy.

These aspirations are so widespread that the Patriarchate can act only against their most extreme manifestations. Fundamentalist circles which could be described as moderate in at least some respects already coexist more or less peacefully with the Patriarchate. Moreover, fundamentalism in the ROC has been on the rise since the early 1990s; the unstable balance within the Patriarchate has been gradually shifting in favour of fundamentalism.⁵ There are no grounds for believing that this tendency will stop in the near future.

Religious Xenophobia: the Church as a Source of More Widespread Xenophobia

One of the aspirations for which the ROC is best known is that of curbing the proliferation of other religions in Russia. It is natural that the ROC should wish to convert as many people as possible to the Orthodox faith and save their souls; but in fact it is evident that this wish is not the only motivation for this aspiration.

As early as 1993 the ROC was actively supporting a campaign for radical restrictions on the activities of foreign missionaries, seen by the ROC as 'soul-hunters' trespassing on its canonical territory. It turned out to be possible for the ROC to proliferate this view more widely in society, even though a secular society should have no views on the division of canonical territories between churches. A secular state has no constitutional grounds for preventing anyone from seeking to convert others or breaching the boundaries of religious jurisdictions.

The Yel'tsin administration at that time did indeed take this secular line, and the ROC, overcoming its natural hostility toward communists, was compelled to make use of the support rendered by the communist-patriotic opposition. It has been using it ever since, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) nurturing its traditionalist great-power ideology more attentively than its communist one. It cannot be said that the ROC approves of the programme of the CPRF; but in the second half of the 1990s the ROC and the CPRF and other 'communist-patriotic' organisations even had joint semipolitical structures.⁶ When Putin came to power the Patriarchate put a substantial distance between itself and the opposition, but it has not been ready to dispense with its support altogether. Meanwhile, the very fact of their

collaboration works in favour of xenophobic and antiwestern tendencies personified by the CPRF and organisations similar to it.

What brings the Patriarchate closer to those organisations is above all its attitude towards non-Orthodox (predominantly foreign) preachers. Metropolitan Kirill (Gundyayev), head of the Department of External Church Relations (*Otdel vneshnykh tserkovnykh svyazei*) and the second most influential figure in the ROC, personifying its liberal-conservative wing, spoke in 2001 as follows:

We believe that struggling against sectarianism by making religious legislation more strict is an unpromising course. ... Because in the case of sectarianism we are referring not simply to freedom of choice, we are referring to the attempts by known forces to divide our society spiritually and to add religious divisions to the national, property and political divisions which already exist today.⁷

If one takes into account the fact that most of those who now are being called 'sectarians' in Russia belong to religious associations which arrived in Russia from abroad decades or even hundreds of years ago, it is clear that the assumption is that these 'known forces' are also located abroad.

It is frequently said that the main reason why the bishops of the ROC fight against non-Orthodox organisations is that they are afraid of competition. This is said to be the reason why they subject the Muslims or the Baptists, who are not engaged in active proselytism, to incomparably less condemnation than the 'rapidly multiplying' Jehovah's Witnesses. There is a good deal of truth in this view, but it is not the whole reason. We simply need to recall, for example, the fact that in 1993, when the major competitive threat to the ROC was posed by the 'indigenous' White Brotherhood (*Beloye bratstvo*) and Mother of God Centre (*Bogorodichny tsestr*), the main demand from the ROC was still to introduce restrictions on foreigners.

Whatever the bishops' motives may be, their rhetoric, as in the quotation from Metropolitan Kirill, is of a clearly isolationist nature. Meanwhile the fact that 'sects' of western origin obviously prevail in Russia over 'sects' of eastern origin means that antisectarian rhetoric is essentially antiwestern in tone. The rhetoric of many fundamentalist activists in the ROC and their patrons among the bishops is, moreover, much more extreme than that of the relatively moderate Metropolitan Kirill.

Privileges for 'Traditional Religions'?

Since 1999 antiwestern sentiments have been growing stronger in Russian society in general, including Putin's administration. It not surprising, then, that anti-sectarianism motivated by the confrontation with the West has found now semi-official support.

On 5 June 2001 a draft Concept of state policy in the religious sphere was published and widely advertised.⁸ One of its authors was the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation for Moscow. Let us note some of its provisions.

The declared purpose of the Concept was to develop the distinction made in the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations between 'traditional' religions and the rest, a distinction made in the Preamble to the law but not in its main body. The Concept proposed to legalise and regulate the privileges of the 'traditional' religions and the practice of state cooperation with them. The question naturally arises: which religions were going to be defined as the 'traditional'

ones? The Concept gave an answer which had little to do with the legal context and was intrinsically discriminatory. Religions were to be sorted according to three criteria: the number of their adherents; their historical contribution to the development of the country; and their activities 'as a creative and unifying spiritual force in Russian society aiming to maintain peace and stability in the Russian Federation'.

The motivation for the proposed reform was clearly conservative and xenophobic. The draft Concept noted the following problems:

- manifestations of a spiritual crisis in contemporary Russian society in all spheres of its life; the devaluation of the traditional moral system; the disorientation of the world outlook of a part of society; the loss of moral guidelines in many areas of modern culture; the weakening of the spiritual and moral foundations of the institution of the family; and other negative social consequences;
- threats to the preservation and development of the cultural identity and the indigenous spiritual nature of the peoples of Russia;
- the aggravation of problems related to manifestations of religious enmity and of religious extremism in society;
- foreign religious expansion into Russia as an element of the foreign policy of a number of states.

These formulations recall the rhetoric of the communist–patriotic opposition of the 1990s. The draft was edited during the summer of 2001 and toned down in some respects: in particular, the passage about foreign religious expansion disappeared. During the editing process another important amendment was made, however: the phrase 'traditional religion' was almost everywhere replaced with 'traditional religious organisation'. The reason for the amendment is clear: the state intends to interfere in disputes over jurisdiction within confessions. This fact will be of much practical importance, for the Moscow Patriarchate in its struggle with other Orthodox groups and also for the so-called 'moderate' muftiates which are under great pressure from new Muslim associations which are religiously and politically more radical.

Here we find ourselves on the border between confessional and antiterrorist policies. It should be understood, however, that the opportunity for interference in the internal affairs of religious denominations is not going to be confined to the sole purpose of combating extremists. In 2000, for example, the Kremlin interfered with the election of the chief rabbi of Russia, favouring a man who was not only of a different religious persuasion from the incumbent but also loyal to the Putin government.

After the Concept was published, receiving support from progovernment media and the leaders of the main 'traditional' religious associations,⁹ a discussion on amendments to the law of 1997 promptly began. Hearings in the State Duma began on 6 July 2001 under the impressive title 'The Question of Legislative Support for State–Church Relations in the Light of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church'.

The recommendations¹⁰ approved at the hearings are permeated with the very same xenophobic spirit which characterised the Concept. No vote was taken at the hearings, but it is reasonable to assume that Metropolitan Kirill, who was one of the key speakers, was generally in support of the recommendations.

We should note that the draft of the Concept quoted above was not the only one. Some days after it appeared an alternative draft prepared under the guidance of Professor Nikolai Trofimchuk¹¹ by the Russian Academy of State Service (*Rossiiskaya akademiya gosudarstvennoi sluzhby* (RAGS)) was published. The language

of this draft was a little less xenophobic and it did not lobby for the interests of the ROC. The leadership of the ROC and other 'traditional' religious organisations preferred the draft Concept published on 5 June. On 24 September Mufti Talgat Tadjuddin handed it to Putin on behalf of the leaders of the main religious confessions.

The 5 June draft Concept proposed that amendments should be made to the 1997 law; but this idea met with fierce resistance from liberally-minded government functionaries. In November 2001 the Patriarchate and the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate changed their tactics. The proposal now was not to amend the law but to add clauses to it privileging the 'traditional religious organisations'. ROC leaders and their allies are always referring in their speeches to the list of 'traditional religions' in the Preamble to the 1997 law, and always substitute the word 'Orthodoxy' for the word 'Christianity'.

Concrete proposals were shortly to come from Duma deputy Aleksandr Chuyev. He suggested defining 'traditional' religious organisations as those over 85 years old. This status was to be conferred by another law and would entail the right to free television time and allow local authorities to arrange for those faiths to teach religion in schools. There was no mention of any tax privileges. Chuyev's proposal was badly worked out and went through several versions.¹² It has still not been tabled, but in autumn 2002 Georgi Poltavchenko, the presidential representative in the Central Federal District, who carries weight in the Kremlin, took on the job of preparing a final draft.

We should note that while they approved in principle of Chuyev's initiative, ROC spokesmen were critical of his proposal. Metropolitan Kirill's view was that it did not lay down clearly enough the mechanism for showing whether religions were 'traditional' or spell out adequately what their privileges were to be.¹³ The Historical and Legal Commission (*Istoriko-pravovaya komissiya*) of the ROC, under Metropolitan Mefodi, held that a century was not long enough for a religion to become 'traditional', and that anyway it was not up to bureaucrats to decide whether a religion was 'traditional' or not: the ROC had certain natural privileges which this proposal would sideline.¹⁴ Meanwhile top government officials have expressed grave reservations about the Chuyev proposal, as they have about other efforts by the ROC to gain privileges for itself.

In 2001 it seemed that some people in the presidential administration were making serious attempts at an ideological rapprochement with the ROC, including its fundamentalist wing.

Official propaganda began producing material openly favouring the fundamentalists. The religious section of the website *Strana.Ru*, which was in fact a vehicle for official propaganda, was openly promoting the views of the fundamentalist Archimandrite Tikhon (Shevkunov). Part of the purpose was probably state manipulation of intrachurch conflicts; but clearly there was some rapprochement of principle too.¹⁵ For example, *Strana.Ru* published a manifesto drafted by Archpriest Vladislav (Sveshnikov), confessor of the Union of Orthodox Citizens (*Soyuz pravoslavnykh grazhdan*), a broad Orthodox-nationalist coalition.¹⁶ Part of the text reads:

Never before have the European West and America been feeling so openly hostile to Russia as at present.

One of the most necessary and difficult tasks for contemporary Russia is what may be called the search for true friends and true services to them

for a joint opposition to the International of the so-called 'new world order', which for people who understand the issue spiritually is the basis for the beginning of the Apocalyptic times.

This is a statement which in some respects resembled themes in Russian foreign policy, as it was before 11 September 2001. But the state, of course, usually prefers to cut off the extremes. At the end of August 2001 the openly fundamentalist religious department of *Strana.Ru* was closed; and after 11 September the state's propaganda priorities changed.

The 'INN Jihad'

The Orthodox fundamentalists are first of all basically opposed to liberals and westernisers, in fact perceiving the two as almost identical. Second, practically all Russian nationalists including Orthodox ones believe that there is a 'worldwide Jewish–Masonic conspiracy' with its spearhead aimed at Russia. Third, as the concept of 'globalisation' has started to become the subject of widespread discussion in the West and then in Russia too, the response has been a specific Orthodox anti-globalism.

It was in 1998 that Igumen (now Achimandrite) Tikhon (Shevkunov), father superior of Sretensky Monastery in Moscow, first uttered warnings about new trouble coming from the West and betokening nothing less than the advance of the Antichrist.¹⁷ He spoke out against the bar code being placed on goods for sale; prompted by like-minded men in Greece, our fundamentalists had discovered there the number 666.¹⁸ Passionate discussion began in the church press and in the parishes as to whether it was admissible for Orthodox believers to buy bar-coded goods. The Sretensky Monastery is one of the church's largest publishing houses, so widespread propaganda was easy to achieve.

The fundamentalists then started to discover the 'Seal of Antichrist' or 'Number of the Beast' in all kinds of codes and in particular in the taxpayer's individual number (*individual'ny nomer nalogoplatel'shchika* (INN), which the Ministry of Taxes planned to assign to every citizen. An energetic campaign was unleashed against the INN in autumn 1999. Hundreds of parishioners, monks and even fathers superior of monasteries were signing petitions demanding that it not be introduced. The motivation was in all cases Apocalyptic, so that the heat of passion at once ran very high. One observer aptly dubbed the campaign the 'INN Jihad'.¹⁹ Other campaigns were going on at the same time as the campaign against the INN: in favour of the canonisation of the family of Tsar Nicholas II and against the 'heresy of ecumenism', for example; but the 'INN Jihad' was aimed directly against the policies of the state authorities, and this fact gave it an additional impetus in the radical environment and created an additional problem for the leaders of the church.

The Holy Synod tried to stop the new campaign by making a compromise proposal. On 7 March 2000 it ruled²⁰ that the INN was not the 'Seal of Antichrist', but confirmed that bar codes contained the number 666. The Synod did not argue against the introduction of the INN in principle, but asked the authorities to show consideration for the more superstitious among believers and to introduce neither more nor less than a system of bar codes different from that in use in the whole of the rest of the world.

After the Synod's decision the campaign was actually suspended for a few months, but in the autumn, after the Bishops' Council fulfilled the fundamentalists' main

demand, to canonise Nicholas II and his family, the 'INN Jihad' was resumed on a much larger scale.

This time the protagonists invoked the authority of some elders, in the first place that of Archimandrite Kirill (Pavlov), confessor at the Trinity–St Sergius Monastery, the main monastery and the main theological academy in the country. Fathers superior of monasteries started taking more active stands and some politicians of various orientations who traditionally lobbied for the interests of the ROC, including, of course, radical nationalists, joined the chorus. Hearings on the theme 'Globalisation and personal codes as an issue in the world outlook choice of contemporary human beings' were held in the State Duma on 23 January 2001.

A summary of the allegations voiced since the autumn of 2000 produces a fairly homogeneous picture. The first is that the number 666 is 'implanted' in bar codes, including the one used in the taxation-related document. The second is that the act of giving a person a unique number for life substitutes that number for his or her Orthodox Christian name. The third is that uniform computer registration leads to total control over the population, and that the introduction of the INN is just one more step on the path towards such control. The fourth is that computer systems are all globally compatible and this makes it possible to include details of all Russian citizens in a worldwide registration system controlled by the mystical global forces of evil: the West; the 'new world order'; the 'leaders of world Jewry'; or indeed Antichrist himself.²¹

As the campaign developed the focus of attention shifted away from the bar codes themselves and onto the broader idea that globalisation leads unswervingly to the kingdom of Antichrist, and that in the face of this trend it is the mission of Russia and of the Russian Orthodox Church to defend the national and religious identity. The central issue was not now whether the INN was literally the 'Seal of Antichrist' or whether there were sixes in bar codes, but that Russia should not take not a step backward in the global confrontation.²²

Meanwhile some voices were heard calling on people to 'escape into the wilderness', and there were cases of priests refusing the sacrament to parishioners who accepted the INN; there was thus some justification for those who voiced warnings of a split in the church. Some went so far as to make barely disguised calls for the overthrow of the secular authorities.²³

Radical positions adopted by some of the opponents of the INN led to splits within the ranks of the Orthodox antiglobalists. Comparatively moderate opponents of globalisation believed that the INN was not the boundary at which it was necessary to take a final stand. They believed that it was both possible and necessary to bargain with the state authorities on the issue, but that it was not worthwhile bringing relations to a sharp conflict and subjecting themselves to the risk of real persecution for the sake of INN.

Archimandrite Ioann (Krest'yankin), a person of great authority among the conservatives, produced the most convincing arguments in favour of a moderate position. In late January 2001 he took the extremely unusual step of releasing a specially video-recorded appeal: '... And what can be said about control and total surveillance, with which they frighten simple-minded people so much? Was there ever a time or a state which didn't have a secret department? Everything has been, everything is, everything will be ... but nothing prevents a believer from seeking salvation.' In the same appeal the archimandrite spoke sharply against the divisive rhetoric used by opponents of the INN.²⁴

Many Orthodox fundamentalist leaders, including Archimandrite Tikhon

(Shevkunov), the hard-line opposition activist and editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Rus' Pravoslavnaya* Konstantin Dushenov and the editor-in-chief of the website *Russkaya liniya* Sergei Grigor'yev came out in solidarity with Archimandrite Ioann, but added the argument that refusing to obey the state authorities was unpatriotic as it implied that Putin's regime was fighting against God; they themselves pinned their hopes on Putin as 'their' president. Nevertheless they continued to emphasise the need in general to continue to oppose liberal and antichristian globalisation. As far as one can judge, Archimandrite Kirill (Pavlov) took a similar position.²⁵

Other staunch opponents of the INN include the St Petersburg priest Aleksei Masyuk and the editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Serb'sky krest* (*Svyataya Rus'*), Konstantin Gordeyev, who have become the leaders of the movement For the Right to Live without INN (*Za pravo zhit' bez INN*), as well as Fr Rafail (Berestov), an elder on Mount Athos. The ranks of the staunch opponents have gradually been depleted, however, and with such a non-equilibrium of forces the outcome of the struggle was inevitable.

A Broadened Plenum (*Rasshirenny Plenum*) of the Theological Commission of the ROC held on 19–20 February 2001 in the Trinity–St Sergius Monastery adopted a Final Document (Itogovy dokument)²⁶ which definitively denied that bar codes or the INN had an apocalyptic meaning and condemned the schismatic spirit of the opponents of the INN; on the subject of the threat posed by globalisation it said only that 'processes of globalisation ... may be used by a malicious will to enslave people and human communities'.

The radicals were defeated. The more moderate Orthodox antiglobalists are still active, however. In addition to the above-mentioned figures, they include a large number of elders and fathers superior of monasteries, as is evident when one reads the officially-published statements made at the Broadened Plenum of the Theological Commission,²⁷ even though not all judgments at odds with the opinion of the Patriarchate were published.²⁸ Archimandrite Kirill (Pavlov), who was absent from the session, did not sign the Final Document either.²⁹

The main outcome of the Plenum of the Theological Commission was that it clearly distanced itself from the radicals; whereupon they in their turn came out in opposition both to the Patriarchate and to the more moderate fundamentalists. The movement For the Right to Live without INN held a meeting in Moscow on 4 October,³⁰ and the agenda included the following points:

12. The leadership of the ROC as a conduit for the ideology of globalisation, which is incompatible with the Christian world-view: for example, lobbying for the introduction of identity numbers and for a 'theological' justification for so-called vengeance strikes.
13. The role of para-church media holdings (*Radonezh*, *Russky dom* and others) in manipulating public opinion and disseminating material in support of the globalising scenario in Russia.³¹

When the Ministry of Taxation and the Sberbank issued a directive requiring citizens to give their INN number when making payments the radicals took the completely unprecedented step of organising a demonstration at the Patriarchate building in Moscow (5 December 2001). Then on 15 December the radicals picketed the entrance to the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour where the Moscow Diocesan Assembly was meeting. After talks with the Patriarchate the Ministry withdrew its directive on 24 December.

The Theological Commission found it necessary to hold another session on the

INN on 24 December 2001, involving government officials and also moderate and radical opponents of the INN,³² and on 26-27 December the Synod had to discuss the subject again. No new decisions were made: all the arguments had been rehearsed and discussed time and again; but the line-up of forces remained unchanged.

On 13 March 2002 a meeting of the movement For the Right to Live without INN in St Petersburg approved the text of a letter to the patriarch, with an important polemical conclusion:

We thus have grounds for doubting the accuracy of the conclusion of the Synodal Theological Commission that 'technological activity cannot of itself produce alterations in the innermost depth of the human soul, leading it to forget Christ'. On the contrary, it seems that it can! This is precisely the aim of all the developments in high technology in the twenty-first century.³³

Nevertheless, 2002 saw far fewer critical attacks on the Patriarchate by the radicals. There was a general renewal of passports and a census, but these events produced only anonymous protests from monasteries. We may conclude that the Patriarchate has won the confrontation with the hard-line radicals. This is not surprising: the church is essentially a hierarchical structure, and agitation by groups of laypeople or priests within in practically never achieves anything except schism.

Respectable Orthodox Antiglobalism: a New Type of Antiwesternism

There are a good many principled antiglobalists among the bishops, however, who have nevertheless been implementing the instructions of the Patriarchate to prevent the proliferation of 'INN Jihad'. By the same token, Patriarch Aleksii and Metropolitan Kirill, who are considered to stand towards the liberal wing of the spectrum within the church, have regularly spoken since early 1999 on the topic of the confrontation between liberal western values and the traditional national-Orthodox values of Russia.³⁴

Metropolitan Kirill writes that '... civil rights and freedoms ... remain in our view an unconditional value', but goes on to observe that 'liberal values in politics, economics and social life should be considered by us as admissible only under the condition of resolute renunciation of establishment of the principles of liberal axiology as applied to the human personality', and, more specifically, that the church insists on 'the establishment of the system of values traditional to Russia in the sphere of upbringing, education and formation of interpersonal relations'.³⁵ The balance between liberal values and traditional values must accordingly be shifted in favour of the latter.³⁶

Formulations contained in *Foundations for a Social Concept for the ROC* written under the supervision of Metropolitan Kirill (and adopted without discussion by the Bishops' Council in August 2000) are moderate enough, but unambiguous:

The spiritual and cultural expansion fraught with total unification should be opposed through the joint efforts of the Church, state structures, civil society and international organizations for the sake of asserting in the world a truly equitable and mutually enriching cultural and informational exchange combined with efforts to protect the identity of nations and other human communities.

... Invariably open to co-operation with people of non-religious

convictions, the Church seeks to assert Christian values in the process of decision-making on the most important public issues both on national and international levels. She strives for the recognition of the legality of religious worldview as a basis for socially significant action (including those taken by state) and as an essential factor which should influence the development (amendment) of international law and the work of international organizations.³⁷

Certainly, there is nothing reprehensible in the fact that the ROC as a religious association wants society to take its faith into account as much as possible. What is important, however, is the tone to which the church is being tuned by its leaders. The fact of the matter is that the ROC has always been a very disciplined structure, particularly at the level of the episcopacy, and, as a rule, neither the bishops nor even the majority of politically active laypeople allow themselves to deviate significantly from the line designated by the Synod. The antiglobalist position of the Synod's leading members which has gradually taken shape in the last two years gives more freedom to fundamentalists and their sympathisers.

The St Petersburg Theological Academy headed by Bishop Konstantin (Goryanov) held a conference on 3–4 May 2001, together with two secular institutes, on the subject 'the spiritual and social problems of globalisation'. The conference adopted a final document,³⁸ which all Orthodox antiglobalists could well sign. The document was thoroughly drafted and has already become a theoretical basis for further development of the antiglobalist movement. It is therefore worth quoting quite extensively.

1. The ideology of globalization is in opposition to the Christian world outlook and incompatible to it; it takes root and is propagandized in the secular society and the Church through the efforts of the world elite and it expresses its interests. Globalization becomes an embodiment of the utopian idea of mondialism about creation of a unitary, supranational and rigidly controlled community on Earth. ...
2. ... The conference ascertains a principal conceptual distinction between the processes of economic integration and technological progress and the global concentration of power. The latter is the essence of the ideology of mondialism using the planet-wide introduction of information–financial technologies as a tool to achieve the world leadership.
3. The historical calling of Russia as a country preserving the Orthodox faith, culture and traditions is not recognized and is rejected by the mondialists. Yet the values mentioned are important for the whole world. The Russian Orthodox Church and the state have become the main obstacle in the path of aspirations for the world domination. ...
4. Changes in the traditional system of values, destruction of national culture, Christian moral and senses, primitivization of the people's thinking and universal work to make them accustomed to 'voluntary–compulsorily' acceptance of digital identifiers (personal codes) replacing a human name in all state–public relationships are presently the main manifestations of the globalization process in the Russian Federation. ... As Confessor of Svyato-Troitskaya Sergiyeva Laura Archimandrite Kirill (Pavlov) noted with justice and precision, 'By accepting INN a person is incorporated into the system of evil'. ...

This document differs in a number of respects from the Final Document of the February Plenum of the Theological Commission, but on the whole it consists of more resolutely reformulated provisions to be found in *Foundations for a Social Concept for the ROC*. It is not surprising that no reprimands, or at least no public ones, have come from the Synod. Metropolitan Vladimir (Kotlyarov) of St Petersburg and Ladoga has not objected either, although he is considered to be one of the most liberal bishops of the ROC.

Fundamentalist antiglobalism, albeit not in its most radical form, has thus in fact been legitimised in the ROC. It naturally includes a large element of xenophobia. In its radical forms Orthodox antiglobalism is tied up with antisemitism, while in its respectable forms it is characterised first and foremost by antiwestern sentiment. Leaving aside the utterances of bishops of a fundamentalist or nationalist persuasion, I can quote the patriarch and Metropolitan Kirill, whose statements are often aggressive enough.

Metropolitan Kirill sees the situation after 11 September as follows: 'It is claimed that the current worldwide process of asserting the values of liberalism is somehow the triumphant culmination of centuries of the historical development of human civilisation. In fact it presents an even greater danger than communist atheism once did.'³⁹ The patriarch uses even stronger terms: 'Both before and after 11 September evil has been on two tracks to conquer the world: liberalism and fundamentalism.'⁴⁰

It is not hard to imagine how statements like these are reflected in the church. Fundamentalist rhetoric and antiglobalist rhetoric are closely intertwined and they are giving new legitimisation to xenophobic attitudes in the ROC. At the moment it is difficult to predict how far this process will go.

Notes and References

- ¹ A short list of canonised members of 'Black Hundreds' organisations can be found in 'Torzhestvo istiny', *Rus' pravoslavnaya*, no. 9, 2000.
- ² See Vyacheslav Likhachev and Vladimir Pribylovsky, *Russkoye natsional'noye yedinstvo: politika, istoriya i ideologiya* (Center 'Panorama', Moscow, 2000); Aleksandr Verkhovsky, 'Tserkov' v politike i politika v tserkvi', in Aleksander Verkhovsky *et al.*, *Politicheskaya ksenofobiya v Rossii* (Center 'Panorama', Moscow, 1999); Al'bert Shatrov, 'Karayushchiye namestniki Boga', *NG-Religii*, no. 4, 1998; *Fashizm i religiya* (information and analysis bulletin of the Anti-Fascist Public Fund (*Obshchestvennyy fond 'Antifashist'*), Moscow), no. 6, 1998.
- ³ An English translation of *Foundations for a Social Concept for the ROC* (*Osnovy sotsial'noi kontsepsii RPTs*) is accessible at: <http://www.orthodox.org.ru/sd00e.htm>.
- ⁴ For more details about politicised Orthodox brotherhoods see: Verkhovsky, *op. cit.*; Stella Rock, *Fraternal Strife: Nationalist Fundamentalists in the Russian Orthodox Brotherhood Movement* (not yet published).
- ⁵ This process from the early 1990s to the spring of 1999 is described in Verkhovsky, *op. cit.*
- ⁶ The reference is to the All-World Russian National Congress (*Vsemirny russky narodny sobor*) and the Russian Zemstvo Movement (*Rossiiskoye zemskoye dvizheniye*). For more details about these organisations see Verkhovsky, *op. cit.*
- ⁷ Aleksandr Korolev, 'Opasno putat' religiyu s politikoi', *Trud*, 14 March 2001.
- ⁸ *The Concept of State Policy in the Sphere of Relations with Religious Associations in the Russian Federation* (*Kontseptsiya gosudarstvennoi politiki v sfere otnoshenii s religioznymi ob'yedineniyami v Rossiiskoi Federatsii*). The complete text, many relevant publications and almost all the discussion on the issue are accessible at the site of the second author of the draft, the Institute of State-Confessional Relations (*Institut gosudarstvenno-konfessional'nykh otnoshenii*) created in 2000. See: <http://www.state-religion.ru>.

- See the Concept text itself at: <http://www.state-religion.ru/cgi/run.cgi?action=show&obj=1270.htm>.
- ⁹ See <http://www.state-religion.ru>.
- ¹⁰ The complete text is accessible at: <http://strana.ru/society/religion/2001/07/09/994682962.html>.
- ¹¹ See the complete text at: <http://www.state-religion.ru/cgi/run.cgi?action=show&obj=1269>. The most important passages were also published in 'Kak vystraivat' vzaimootnosheniya vlasti i konfessii v novom veke', *NG-Religii*, 27 June 2001.
- ¹² For the full text of the bill *O sotsial'nom partnerstve gosudarstva i traditsionnykh religioznykh organizatsii v Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, in its version of May 2002, see <http://www.state-religion.ru/cgi/run.cgi?action=show&obj=1443>.
- ¹³ *Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov' ne speshit s podderzhkoi zakonodatel'noi initsiativy deputata A.V. Chuyeva*, website *Gosudarstvenno-konfessional'nyye otnosheniya*, 1 March 2002: <http://www.state-religion.ru/cgi/run.cgi?action=show&obj=1376>.
- ¹⁴ For details see the website *Russkaya liniya*: http://www.rusk.ru/News/02/4/new11_04a.htm
- ¹⁵ For more details see Aleksandr Verkhovsky, 'Dilemma Kirilla i Mefodiya', *Russkaya mysl'*, 29 March 2001.
- ¹⁶ *Protoierei Vladislav Sveshnikov predlozhit kontseptsiiyu vozrozhdeniya Rossii*, 25 March 2001, <http://strana.ru/society/religion/2001/03/25/985524595.html> and <http://www.strana.ru/special/dossier/2001/03/25/985533435.html>.
- ¹⁷ See for example Igumen Tikhon (Shevkunov), 'Amerikantsy ob Antikhriste: s nim nam bol'she vezet', *Pravoslavnoye knizhnoye obozreniye*, June 1998.
- ¹⁸ It is not appropriate to go into details of the alleged problems with the bar code here. Suffice it to say that the presence of three sixes in it is a kind of an optical illusion.
- ¹⁹ Sergei Grigor'yev, editor-in-chief of the website *Russkaya liniya*, who although a fundamentalist himself did not support the campaign, in his 'Chego khotyat protivniki INN?', *Russkaya liniya*, 2 December 2000: http://www.rusk.ru/News/00/12/new02_12a.htm.
- ²⁰ *Uvazhat' chuvstva veruyushchikh. Khranit' khristianskoye trezvomyслиye*, statement of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, 7 March 2000, http://www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru/nr00_3083.htm.
- ²¹ A fifth allegation was very seldom heard, but was in fact the most realistic one: that the creation of a unified taxpayer database makes taxpayers vulnerable not only to the state but to the criminal sector as well, since all such databases very soon find their way onto the black market.
- ²² See for example: an open appeal to president of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin, minister of taxes G.I. Bukayev and the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation from Orthodox clergy and laypeople of the Vladimir-Suzdal' Diocese of the ROC, 20 December 2000, published on the website of the movement For the Right to Live without INN (<http://infolab.spb.ru/anti-inn/text002.htm>); 'Yarko vyrazhenny demonichesky kharakter ...' (an appeal from the brothers of Svyato-Vvedensky Monastery of Optina Pustyn' to Orthodox Christians), *Rus' Pravoslavnaya*, no. 1, 2001; *Globalizatsiya i lichnyye kody kak problema mirovozzrencheskogo vybora sovremennogo cheloveka*, website *Russkaya liniya*, 27 January 2001, http://www.rusk.ru/News/01/1/new27_01a1.htm; V. Petrov, *INN i plany 'knyazey tmy'*, website *Russky vestnik*, <http://www.rv.ru/super/2001/2/diablos.htm>.
- ²³ Schema-Priest Nikolai [Uskov], 'Pravoslavnykh zagonyayut v ugol', *Rus' Pravoslavnaya*, no. 12, 2000.
- ²⁴ Archimandrite Ioann (Krestyankin), 1 February 2001, <http://www.pravoslavie.ru/jumal/society/ioannkrestyankin.htm>.
- ²⁵ See for example: Archimandrite Tikhon (Shevkunov), a talk on Radio *Radonezh*, 29 January 2001, http://www.pravoslavie.ru/jumal/society/arhim_tihon_radonezh.htm; Archimandrite Amvrosii (Yurasov), 'Antikhrista boimsya, a Boga – net?'; Sergei Grigor'yev, 'Chego khotyat protivniki INN?'; Konstantin Dushenov, 'Tsarsky put': all three articles in *Rus' Pravoslavnaya*, no. 1, 2001.

- ²⁶ The text is accessible at: <http://www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru/nr102206.htm>.
- ²⁷ Website *Vestnik 'Russkoi linii'*, no. 6, 2001 (http://www.rusk.ru/News/01/2/new24_02a.htm).
- ²⁸ Interview with Konstantin Gordeyev in the Samara newspaper *Blagovest*, on the website *Stoyaniye za pravdu* (<http://www.voskres.ru/truth/econtrol/INN/gord3.shtml>).
- ²⁹ 'Arkhimandrit Kirill ne podpisal itogovoye zayavleniye RPTs ob INN', *NG-Religii*, 28 February 2001.
- ³⁰ There was a similar meeting in St Petersburg on 30 October.
- ³¹ *Obshchestvennoye dvizheniye 'Za zhizn' bez INN'*, *informatsionnoye soobshcheniye* no. 11, website *Stoyaniye za istinu*: <http://www.voskres.ru/truth/econtrol/INN/inn11.shtml>
- ³² Report of the meeting of the Theological Committee of 24 December 2001: <http://www.voskres.ru/truth/econtrol/INN/kom241201.shtml>
- ³³ *Otkrytoye obrashcheniye k Svyateishemu Patriarkhu Moskovskomu i vseya Rusi Aleksiyu II*, 19 April 2002, website *Russky vestnik*: <http://www.rv.ru/content.php?id=229>
- ³⁴ The first important contribution was Patriarch Aleksi's article 'Mir na pereput'ye', *NG-Religii*, 23 June 1999. For more thorough coverage of this topic, see Alexander Verkhovskiy, 'The religious factor in the presidential campaign and in the formation of ideology of the new rule', in Alexander Verkhovskiy *et al.*, *National-Patriots, Church and Putin. Parliamentary and Presidential Campaigns 1999–2000* (Center 'Panorama', Moscow, 2001).
- ³⁵ Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, 'Norma very kak norma zhizni', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 16–17 February 2000.
- ³⁶ Metropolitan Kirill speaking on 21 March 2001 at a seminar at the Center for Strategic Developments (*Tsentr strategicheskikh razrabotok*), Moscow. See news service *Blagovest-Info*, no. 12, 2000.
- ³⁷ See note 3 above.
- ³⁸ This document has been published on the website of the movement For the Right to Live without INN at: <http://infolab.spb.ru/anti-inn/mfo09.htm>.
- ³⁹ Mitropolit Kirill, *Filermskaya ikona Bozhiyei Materi i sovremennyye vyzovy khristianstvu* (ROC Department of External Church Relations, Moscow), 17 December 2001.
- ⁴⁰ Nadezhda Kevorkova, 'Ya gotov vstretit'sya s Papoi Rimskim', *Gazeta*, 17 April 2002.